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Abstract 
Over the last thirty years, research on the immigration policy-making of liberal democratic 
states has been preoccupied with the puzzle of why migrant inflows have reached 
unprecedented levels in Western countries, despite popular calls for restrictionism. A 
common response of scholars to this puzzle is that whilst governments endeavour to reflect 
public preferences for restrictive immigration policy, they are prevented from doing so by 
norms and institutions that are characteristic of liberal democracies. These ‘liberal constraints’ 
include the national judiciary; international human rights norms; and supranational 
institutions, such as the European Union.  
But what of the national legislature? What is the role of this key liberal institution in 
shaping immigration law within Western democracies? On this question, the literature says 
remarkably little. 
 This thesis endeavours to redress this apparent neglect. Its case study is the United 
Kingdom, which is viewed, on the basis of existing research, as a ‘most-likely’ case for having 
a weak legislature; and in which the executive branch of government has been shown to be 
relatively unconstrained by the judiciary in comparison with other European states. Does 
anything, then, act to constrain the immigration restrictionism of the British government?  
Informed by a novel theoretical framework, ‘interpretive political opportunity structures’, 
the investigation focuses upon the Parliamentary passage of a single policy: the Immigration 
Bill 2013-14. Its analysis is based on a detailed examination of the Bill and its legislative 
process; and on thirty-three interviews that I conducted with key immigration policy 
stakeholders, including two Government ministers, one from each of the Coalition parties; 
Government and Opposition MPs; members of the House of Lords; civil servants; legal 
professionals; and lobbyists. 
The findings reveal that the UK Parliament had an important liberalising impact upon the 
Bill, acting to constrain the restrictionist bent of the executive. If the UK is accepted as a case 
in which we are most likely to find the opposite of this, i.e., a legislature impotent against a 
dominant executive, then the orthodox view that the legislature is in general a marginal actor 
in shaping immigration law may have to be revised.  
Notably, the unelected upper chamber, the House of Lords, appeared to constitute a 
stronger check on executive power than the elected lower chamber, the House of Commons. 
This is consonant with Peers’ understanding of their duty to legislate responsibly, rather than 
responsively (i.e., in line with popular opinion) like MPs in the Commons. Insulated from 
populist pressures, the Lords invites comparison with respect to its function and impact to 
the judiciaries of other Western nations, suggesting, perhaps, that in the British constitutional 
system, known for its pusillanimous judiciary, the Lords evidences an ‘adaptation’ to the 
marked power imbalance between the judicial and executive branches of the UK state.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
This doctoral thesis is about the role of the national legislature in shaping immigration 
policy, or more precisely, immigration law. Its case study is the United Kingdom.  
Set against a backdrop in which immigration had risen to the top of the UK’s political 
agenda – three years before that issue would come to decisive influence in the country’s 
referendum decision to leave the European Union – this research provides an explanatory, 
behind-the-scenes account of the impact of the Houses of Parliament upon one of the 
most controversial proposals for immigration reform in modern British history: those 
constituting the Immigration Bill 2013-14, which culminated in the Immigration Act 
2014.  
Representing the flagship policy of the Coalition Government’s third legislative 
programme, the Immigration Bill 2013-14 (hereafter, the ‘Immigration Bill’ or ‘the Bill’) 
sought to extend the power of the UK’s immigration regime in ways unprecedented 
among liberal democratic states, but familiar, said critics, to the world’s most despotic 
regimes
1
. When its principal architect, Theresa May, then Home Secretary, introduced the 
Bill to Parliament, her statement of its main aim was unequivocal (Travis, 2013b): 
  
To create a really hostile environment for illegal immigrants
2
.  
 
1
 This was the view of several Parliamentarians, most notably Lord Pannick, who stated in a 
speech to the House of Lords that, “There are, regrettably, all too many dictators around the 
world who are willing to use the creation of statelessness as a weapon against opponents” 
(Hansard, 7 April 2014, col 1169). 
2
 The use of the term ‘illegal immigrant’ can be considered contentious, for two reasons. First, 
‘illegal’ carries negative connotations of the violation of criminal laws. However, most 
immigration and asylum laws are civil, not criminal laws. Second, it has been argued that the 
term ‘illegal immigrant’ is degrading because it implies that people can be illegal.  
For example, guidance for journalists produced collectively by Oxfam, the National Union 
of Journalists, Amnesty International Scotland, and the Scottish Refugee Council, states that 
the term ‘illegal immigrant’, “although commonly used, is not defined anywhere within UK 
law” (Oxfam, 2007: 14). The document continues: “The phrase ‘illegal immigrant’ was found 
in January 2002 by the Advertising Standards Authority to be racist, offensive and misleading. 
Most international organisations including the UN and the International Organisation for 
Migration use the term ‘irregular migrant’ instead.” The adjectives ‘unauthorised’, and 
‘undocumented’, are also used to refer to the same phenomenon of illegal immigration, 
especially by academics.  
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The more divisive of the Bill’s proposals included: 
 
• the substantial reduction of rights of appeal against Home Office immigration 
decisions – at a time when over half of such appeals were upheld by the courts; 
• the incorporation of ordinary citizens into a national scheme of immigration 
control, by which private landlords would be required to check the immigration 
status of tenants; and 
• the granting of a new power to the Home Secretary to enable her to strip a person 
of their British citizenship even if it were to render them stateless – a condition 
labelled “evil” by the UK Supreme Court (R [Al-Jedda] v Secretary of State for 
Defence, [2007]). 
 
The Bill’s proposals bore the unmistakeable imprint of a government keen to enact 
restrictive immigration legislation. In fact, this was of a degree unprecedented in Britain’s 
more than three-hundred-year history of immigration law-making
3
. Of the Bill’s fifty-
seven main provisions, fifty-four were of a restrictive character. The remaining three were 
neutral, concerning the jurisdictions to which the Bill applied, and the timeline for its 
implementation.  
But was the scope of Coalition restrictionism in any way delimited by the national 
legislature, the UK’s Houses of Parliament? How far did the Parliamentary processes of 
legislative scrutiny, deliberation, and amendment constrain the restrictionist bent of the 
executive? Indeed, were the Bill’s proposals changed at all by Parliament, and if so, in 
what ways? In particular, did Parliament’s input make the final, enacted legislation, the 
Immigration Act 2014, either more liberal or more restrictive? And why? 
Explaining the nature of Parliament’s influence (or non-influence) in immigration 
law-making raises some key questions. What, for example, is the UK legislature’s 
institutional autonomy with respect to the executive arm of the state? More precisely, 
what authority, expertise, and capacity does the legislature possess? Critically, how might 
we best theorise and understand the role and function of the British Parliament? Is it to 
 
In this thesis, I use the term ‘irregular immigrant’, for the reasons stated above, as well 
as the term ‘illegal immigration’, which is not degrading, encompasses a number of criminal 
offences in the UK, and is the term most commonly used in UK public and political discourse.    
3
 This conclusion is supported by an historical analysis I conducted of major UK immigration 
legislation, from 1708 to 2007. The post-war part of that history is presented in Chapter 6 of 
this thesis. 
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be viewed as merely a neutral arena for the organisation and expression of societal 
interests and political parties, via debates and votes on prospective legislation? Or does 
its institutional structure serve to shape the perspectives and decisions of its constituent 
actors, and hence the proposals for reform that pass through it? In short, does it passively 
enact legislation, or actively generate it? 
More generally, at a time when analysts are reporting the decline of democracy and 
the concentration of executive power in nation-states the world over (e.g., Shane, 2009; 
Armingeon et al., 2013; Curtin, 2014), can elected legislators hold sway over the 
executive? Do they still matter – and specifically in relation to immigration law-making?  
All of these questions can be asked of Parliament as a whole. But in so doing we are 
liable to obscure any differences that exist between the two Houses of the UK’s bicameral 
legislature. This is why I have compared the legislative impact of the elected lower 
chamber of Parliament, the House of Commons, with the unelected upper chamber, the 
House of Lords. This distinction proved to be crucial in that my research findings 
demonstrated a marked division in the way the two Houses operated and in their 
respective levels of influence. 
 
 
Why the national legislature? 
 
My decision to focus on the role of the national legislature in immigration law-making 
has been justified by my revealing its neglect by researchers. This is rather surprising, 
since authors on immigration law-making have collectively contributed an extensive and 
diverse literature, working from within a variety of disciplines: law, demography, 
geography, economics, history, political science, anthropology, international relations, 
and sociology. Across these fields, several perspectives have been applied, ranging from 
Marxism and political economy, to ‘neo-institutionalism’ and ‘post-nationalism’. In total, 
these enquiries have identified at least twenty-four important determinants of 
immigration policy, including war, globalisation, unemployment, the European Union, 
international human rights norms, and the news media. But not one has been expressly 
concerned to examine the role of the national legislature, although the institution has 
been assigned explanatory primacy in studies of the United States (provided in Table A, 
under ‘national legislature’.  
In order to clarify and confirm this general pattern of omission, Table A organises the 
literature according to the main causal focus of each study, with authors that have 
presented a multi-causal perspective of immigration policy development listed under each 
THE LEGISLATURE IN IMMIGRATION POLICY-MAKING 
6 
of their main causal foci. At the same time, the authors of some of these studies have 
consciously left out the determinants they might regard as the most important, because 
their aim has been to highlight factors they believe have been unduly neglected, even 
though they are not considered of primary importance. Thus, we ought not to presume 
that the main causal focus in a listed study reflects the author’s view of the importance 
of that variable in shaping immigration policy. 
 
 
Table A  Explaining immigration policy: a survey of the research literature   
     
Causal category  Causal focus  Source  
     
International or 
supranational 
relations 
 The EU/Europe (including 
Schengen)  
 Hollifield, 1992b; Soysal, 1993, 1994; Bauböck, 1994; Convey and 
Kupiszewski, 1995; Skran, 1995; Baldwin-Edwards, 1997; 
Koslowski, 1998; Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; Guiraudon, 2000, 
2001a, 2001b, 2003; Fischer et al., 2002; Lavenex, 2002, 2006; 
Dell’Olio, 2005; Geddes, 2005; Menz, 2008; Boswell and Geddes, 
2011. 
     
  International treaties and 
norms (including human 
rights) 
 Salomon, 1991; Hartigan, 1992; Bauböck, 1994; Soysal, 1994; 
Skran, 1995; Jacobson, 1996; Sassen, 1996b, 1999; Gurowitz, 1999; 
Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; Guiraudon, 2001a; Jacobson and 
Ruffer, 2003; Thouez and Channac, 2006; Messina, 2007. 
     
  War  Zolberg, 1981; Meyers, 2004. 
     
  Foreign policy  Divine, 1957; Craig, 1971; Miller, 1979; Teitelbaum, 1984; Weiner, 
1985; Loescher and Scanlan, 1986; Mitchell, 1989; Suyama, 1995; 
Meyers, 2004; Messina, 2007. 
     
  Security concerns  Whitaker, 1987; Weiner, 1992, 1993; Huysmans, 2000; Bigo, 2001; 
Rudolph, 2003; Jackson and Parkes, 2006; Boswell and Geddes, 
2011.  
     
Domestic politics  ‘The state’  Hollifield, 1992b, 2004b; Simmons and Keohane, 1992; Guiraudon 
and Lahav, 2000; Boswell, 2007; Hinnfors et al., 2012.  
     
  Political leaders/elites  Dirks, 1977; Hawkins, 1989, 1998; Simmons and Keohane, 1992; 
Gimpel and Edwards, 1999; Veugelers, 2000; Rosenblum, 2004; 
Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005; Statham and Geddes, 2006; Hix 
and Noury, 2007; Somerville and Goodman, 2010; Wright, 2010; 
Bale and Partos, 2014; Consterdine and Hampshire, 2014; 
Consterdine, 2015a. 
     
  Political parties  Schain, 1987; 2002; 2006, 2008a, 2008b; Thranhardt, 1995; 
Perlmutter, 1996, 2002; Money, 1997, 1999; Minkenberg, 2001, 
2002; Schain et al., 2002; Janoski and Wang, 2006; Kriese, 2006; 
Messina and Lahav, 2006; Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove, 2006; 
Statham and Geddes, 2006; Bale, 2008a, 2008b; Boswell and 
Hough, 2008; Duncan and Van Hecke, 2008; Geddes, 2008; Green-
Pederson and Odmalm, 2008; Marthaler, 2008; Smith, 2008; Van 
Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008; Bale et al., 2010; van Spanje, 2010; 
Dahlström and Sundell, 2011; Consterdine and Hampshire, 2014; 
Hampshire and Bale, 2014; Consterdine, 2015a.  
     
  Electoral considerations  Money, 1997, 1999; Guiraudon, 1998; Bale and Partos, 2014. 
     
  Public attitudes  Benhabib, 1996; Money, 1997, 1999; Gonzalez and Kamdar, 2000; 
Tichenor, 2002; McGann, 2003; Lahav, 2004a, 2004b; Facchini and 
Mayda, 2008, 2009; Ellermann, 2009; Jennings, 2009; Bale and 
Partos, 2014; Levy et al., 2016. 
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Table A  Explaining immigration policy: a survey of the research literature   
     
Causal category  Causal focus  Source  
     
     
  Interest groups  Divine, 1957; Craig, 1971; Shughart et al., 1986; Freeman and 
Betts, 1992; Simmons and Keohane, 1992; Ireland, 1994; Goldin, 
1994; Freeman, 1995a, 1995b, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006a, 2006b; 
Joppke, 1998, 1999; Gonzalez and Kamdar, 2000; Freeman and 
Birrell, 2001; Hanson and Spilimbergo, 2001; Watts, 2001; Haus, 
2002; Amegashie, 2005; Messina and Lahav, 2006; Messina, 2007; 
Facchini and Mayda, 2008, 2009; Freeman and Kessler, 2008; Menz, 
2008; Facchini, Mayda and Mishra, 2011; Consterdine and 
Hampshire, 2014; Hampshire and Bale, 2014; Consterdine, 2015a. 
     
  Social movements  Bolzmann and Fibbi, 1991; Ireland, 1994; Blatt, 1995; Giugni and 
Passy, 2006. 
     
Economics  National economy (GDP, 
unemployment, individual-
level economic self-interest 
of public) 
 Beard and Beard, 1944; Divine, 1957; Gorz, 1970; Craig, 1971; 
Marshall, 1973; Marx, 1973, 1976; Castells, 1975; Nikolinakos, 
1975; Freeman, 1979; Petras, 1981; Zolberg, 1981; Castles and 
Kosack, 1985; Miles, 1986; 1987, 1989; Shughart et al., 1986; 
LeMay, 1989; Bovenkerk et al., 1990, 1991; Layton-Henry, 1990; 
Freeman and Betts, 1992; Hollifield, 1992a; Goldin, 1994; 
Straubhaur and Weber, 1994; Freeman, 1995a, 2001, 2002, 2004, 
2006a, 2006b; Money, 1997, 1999; Timmer and Williamson, 1998; 
Borjas, 1999; Gonzalez and Kamdar, 2000; Hanson and 
Spilimbergo, 2001; Watts, 2001; Meyers, 2004; Amegashie, 2005; 
Messina, 2007; Freeman and Kessler, 2008; Hollifield et al., 2008; 
Menz, 2008; Facchini and Steinhardt, 2011; Milner and Tingley, 
2011; Consterdine and Hampshire, 2014. 
     
  Global capitalism/ 
globalisation 
 Zolberg, 1978, 1999; Sassen, 1996a, 1996b, 1999; Watts, 2001; 
Jackson and Parkes, 2006; Consterdine and Hampshire, 2014. 
     
National culture  Citizenship; identity 
(national/ethnic/racial) 
 Higham, 1955; Divine, 1957; Jones, 1960; Foot, 1965; Dirks, 1977; 
Zolberg, 1978, 1981; Freeman, 1979; Herbert, 1990; Brubaker, 
1992; Bauböck, 1994; Pak, 1994; Schnapper, 1994; Stalker, 1994; 
Kurthen, 1995; Leitner, 1995; Fitzgerald, 1996; Rex, 1996; Paul, 
1997; Favell, 1998, 2001; Joppke, 1999; Koopmans and Statham, 
1999; Hansen, 2000, 2002; Rosenhek, 2000; Hollifield, 2004a; 
Meyers, 2004; Dell’Olio, 2005; Hampshire, 2005. 
     
  Ideas/ideology/discourse  Dirks, 1977; Bleich, 2002, 2003; Balch, 2010; Milner and Tingley, 
2011; Alexander, 2013; Consterdine, 2015a. 
     
Demography  Immigration 
(previous/current) 
 Hammar, 1985; Brubaker, 1992; Bauböck, 1994; Goldin, 1994; 
Convey and Kupiszewski, 1995; Freeman, 1995a, Money, 1997, 
1999; Zolberg, 1999; Hampshire, 2005; Messina and Lahav, 2006; 
Smith, 2008. 
     
  Ethnic diversity  Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Miller, 1981; Ireland, 1994; Money, 
1997, 1999; Richmond, 1998; Borjas, 1999; Meyers, 2004; 
Hampshire, 2005; Fetzer, 2006. 
     
Information  Information supply; 
experts/expertise; ‘policy 
narratives’ 
 Tichenor, 2002; Messina and Lahav, 2006; Timmermans and 
Scholten, 2006; Boswell, 2008, 2009b; Balch, 2010; Boswell et al., 
2011a; Boswell et al., 2011b. 
     
  Media discourse  Bauder, 2008; Gudbrandsen, 2012. 
     
National state 
institutions 
 National judiciary  Joppke, 1998a, 1999; 2001; Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; 
Guiraudon, 2002; Joppke and Marzal, 2004; Jacobson, 1996; 
Hollifield et al., 2008. 
     
  Bureaucracies (including 
institutional historical 
legacies/path dependence) 
 Birrell, 1981; Schultz, 1982; Abella and Troper, 1983; Hammar, 
1985; Whitaker, 1987; Hawkins, 1989, 1998; Calavita, 1992; 
Simmons and Keohane, 1992; Hardcastle et al., 1994; Ireland, 1994; 
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Table A  Explaining immigration policy: a survey of the research literature   
     
Causal category  Causal focus  Source  
     
Fitzgerald, 1996; Guiraudon, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003; Hansen, 
2000, 2002; Rosenhek, 2000; Veugelers, 2000; Lavenex, 2002; 
Tichenor, 2002; Togman, 2002; Wright, 2010, 2012a, 2012b; 
Consterdine and Hampshire, 2014; Consterdine, 2015b. 
     
  
National legislature 
(with case[s]) 
 
Goldin, 1994 (US Congress); Gimpel and Edwards, 1999 (US 
Congress); Tichenor, 2002 (US Congress); Togman, 2002 (US 
Congress, Parliament of France); Rosenblum, 2004; Banaian et al., 
2006 (US Congress); Fetzer, 2006 (US Congress); Jeong, 2013 (US 
Congress). 
 
 
As Table A reveals, to date few authors have considered the legislature to be important 
enough to feature centre-stage in their analysis, with the notable exception of eight 
studies of the United States. In that country, the national legislature, Congress, has long 
been taken for granted as the central institution within which immigration legislation is 
debated and shaped (Sassen, 1999: 187).  
However, as far as I am aware, beyond these studies of Congress, no other researchers 
have examined explicitly, let alone systematically, the role of the legislature in giving 
shape to the content of immigration law. There are no dedicated studies; and where this 
institution is mentioned at all, it features at the periphery. Although it is sometimes 
mentioned in the narration of events, statements that address expressly its function, 
capacity, or impact, are few and far between. In addition, and most importantly, the role 
of the national legislature has yet to be conceived theoretically.   
From a certain perspective, this neglect is somewhat perplexing. After all, a 
substantial body of research has attempted to resolve the puzzle of why, in most Western 
democracies, immigration has reached unprecedented levels and continues to rise, despite 
sizable majorities of the public wanting large reductions (European Monitoring Centre 
on Racism and Xenophobia, 2001; Fetzer, 2000; Facchini and Mayda, 2008; Ceobanu and 
Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). A recurrent response of researchers to 
this puzzle has been to aver that national governments endeavour to reflect their publics’ 
preferences for restrictive policy, but are constrained by institutions and norms that are 
characteristic of the liberal democratic states of which these governments are a part, as 
well as the relations between such states. Authors have referred to this as the “liberal 
constraint” (Hollifield, 1992a: 94; Boswell, 2007), which they see presented by: the 
constitutions of nation-states; the rule of law (see, for example, Hollifield on “equality 
before the law”: 1992a: 27, 1992b: 575); the national judiciary (e.g., Joppke, 1998a); state 
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bureaucracies (e.g., Hammar, 1985: 279-81; Guiraudon, 1998); international relations 
(Hollifield, 1992a); human rights norms and associated legal agreements and institutions 
(e.g., Soysal, 1994; Jacobson, 1996); economic globalisation (e.g., Sassen, 1999); and 
supranational organisations, such as the European Union (e.g., Soysal, 1994; Sassen 
1999).  
But what of the legislature, that other core component of liberal democratic states? 
The national legislature is the “central representative institution of national politics” 
(Fish and Kroenig, 2009: 1), forming as it does a principal part of the organisational 
solution to that most basic of liberal fears: the concentration within government of too 
much power in too few hands.  
This concern has a long history in political thought and can be traced back to antiquity 
and the writings of Aristotle
4
. This was over two millennia before the elaboration by 
Montesquieu (1748) of what has long been accepted as its best, or perhaps only, response: 
the separation of powers, by which the three functions of government – executive, 
legislative, and judicial – are vested in different, largely independent and autonomous 
bodies. When viewed from this angle, the very raison d’être of the legislature – the core 
of its constitutional remit – would appear prima facie to be to check the power of the 
executive. Hence, the conspicuous absence of research on the role of the legislature in 
immigration law-making may be thought reasonably to justify its critical investigation.  
 However, from another perspective, the marginal scholarly attention afforded the 
national legislature is not at all perplexing; it is, quite simply, a reflection of its minimal 
importance. Despite the legislature’s apparent centrality to democratic states, “the 
prevailing view among political scientists over the last few decades has been that 
parliaments play a marginal role in the policymaking process” (Martin and Vanberg, 2011: 
4; cited in Russell et al., 2016).  
Among immigration specialists, too, the consensus is that in the immigration law-
making of liberal democratic states, the role of the national legislature is peripheral, even 
negligible, and hence of too little significance to warrant an extensive enquiry.  As we 
have seen, the US Congress has been regarded as the one exception.   
 
4
 In Politics, Aristotle wrote with striking prescience that (Reeve, 1998: 125): “All 
constitutions have three parts … One of the three parts [1] deliberates about public affairs; 
the second [2] concerns the offices, that is to say, which offices there should be, with authority 
over what things, and in what way officials should be chosen; and the third [3] is what decides 
lawsuits.” Here, Aristotle describes institutions with functions similar to our modern 
conceptions of the legislature, executive, and judiciary, respectively. 
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This predominant view on the minimal role of national legislatures in immigration 
law-making carries some weight, and is one that can be evidenced from the literature. On 
Western Europe in general, Guiraudon agrees with Hammar (1985: 277-287) that in the 
post-war period up until the 1970s, “immigration policy was made in administrative 
contexts, without public participation and with little parliamentary supervision” (1998a: 
288). Geddes strikes a similar tone, pointing out that: “Policy co-operation has 
strengthened national executive authority and weakened courts and legislatures at 
national and EU level because of the limited scope for scrutiny and accountability” (2000: 
207). 
With regard to specific legislatures, Wihtol de Wenden characterises immigration 
decision making in France as, “Employers and the government are deciding; Parliament 
obeys the government majority” (2011: 91). Even Germany’s parliament – known for its 
strength, being ranked first out of 158 national legislatures in the Parliamentary Powers 
Index
5
 (Fish and Kroenig, 2009: 756) – has in immigration law-making been depicted as 
unusually ineffectual. As Ellermann writes, “Although members of the Bundestag 
opposition are highly proactive in employing oversight, the impact on executive decision-
making is negligible” (2009: 95). Similarly for Poland, where the legislature is said to 
represent the central institution of its state power, Kicinger and Koryśn (2011) consider 
parliament to be uncharacteristically feeble in the area of immigration law-making. As 
they conclude (2011: 361), “the lack of interest in migration shown by any political parties 
has led to Parliament’s role being reduced to a purely legislative one. Consequently, the 
involvement of Parliament in migration policy-making has not corresponded to its role in 
the state political system.” 
Thus supported in the literature, this contrasting vantage point, which inverts our 
expectations for the legislature, ought to give us pause before concluding that the limited 
scholarly attention afforded this state organ amounts to its neglect. That word suggests a 
failure on the part of researchers to give this institution its due. Yet, as this perspective 
reveals, there may have been no such failing. The minimal space in the literature that is 
dedicated to the legislature could be entirely commensurate with its relatively 
unimportant place within the immigration politics of Western democracies.  
However, there is, I wish to suggest, a possibility, which ought not to be ruled out, 
namely, that this apparently uncontentious and accurate picture may in fact provide us 
 
5
 The Parliamentary Powers Index, or PPI for short, compiled by M. Steven Fish and Matthew 
Kroenig, of Berkeley and Georgetown universities, respectively, represents the only 
systematic, comprehensive evaluation of the power of the world’s national legislatures. 
However, the last year for which there are data is 2009. 
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with a distorted portrait of the legislature’s (lack of) importance and influence. This 
possibility arises from the comparably sure and plausible claim from the same specialist 
immigration literature that, as a representative institution, the legislature can be expected 
to reflect the opinion of the national public. This is due, perhaps, to a perceived obligation 
on the part of legislators to represent the opinion of their constituents, or alternatively 
and perhaps more pragmatically, from a fear of incurring the ire of the electorate by failing 
to do so. As Joppke puts it (1999: 103): “Parliamentary openness in the formulation of 
immigration policy keeps law-makers within the confines of a pervasively restrictionist 
public opinion.” 
This dynamic, which has been encapsulated by the phrase “majority pressures” 
(Joppke and Marzal, 2004: 824), endows the legislature with “populist impulses” 
(Hollifield, 2002: 109-110). Given the ubiquitous anti-immigration sentiment among the 
populations of Western democracies, allied to the twenty-first century trend within many 
of these states toward draconian immigration policies (already detected in Massey and 
Taylor, 2004: 1-14, 261-388), it follows that we ought to expect from state legislatures 
broad and consistent support for executive strictures on immigration. If, then, both the 
executive and the legislature are restrictionist, as researchers suggest, it is plausible that 
there would be little in government proposals for immigration reform that the legislature 
would wish to amend. As such, there would indeed be reduced scope for the legislature 
to evidence its power to check the will of the executive. Hence, the observation that a 
legislature exerts only marginal impact upon executive proposals cannot be taken to imply 
that it possesses only marginal clout. This point has been recognised by McGann, who 
suggests, “if the legislature was to find an agent that perfectly implemented its wishes, 
then the legislative–executive model would tell us that the legislature was a rubberstamp, 
because there was no resistance to the executive” (2006: 454-455, cited in Russell et al., 
2016: 290). However, the reverse would not pertain. Substantial legislative impact does 
imply substantial legislative capacity. 
The question must now be raised as to whether scholars have convincingly 
considered and excluded the possibility that their data reveal only the appearance of the 
legislature’s incapacity – the result of sharing with the executive a bent for restrictionism.  
A systematic reading of the literature suggests they have not. Moreover, are 
pronouncements that the legislature has but limited influence on immigration policy-
making based on a strong foundation of empirical evidence? Almost all are presented 
without much supporting evidence or argument. As such, the answer to both of these 
questions must be in the negative.  
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Consequently, the impotence of the legislature in immigration law-making has yet to 
be demonstrated in the literature. This lacuna would appear, therefore, to make a 
dedicated empirical study most apposite. It is the nature of this investigation that is 
outlined in the next section.  
 
 
Case selection: why the United Kingdom  
 
This study analyses the role of the legislature in a single country. This, however, rightly 
invites questions that might cast doubt on the value of such a study. What, if anything, 
might we conclude more generally from examining just one nation-state? How might this 
case study bear upon wider debates within immigration policy research, especially those 
relating to the impact of the legislature upon the immigration law of liberal democratic 
states? Further, what contribution could a single-case investigation make to a research 
literature replete with such investigations, an increasing number of which populate 
comparative volumes, in which they are analysed systematically against other national 
cases, thereby allowing for the formulation of theories of immigration policy-making?  
These are important concerns, which may be said to apply with additional force to 
the choice of the UK, given that immigration policy analysts have published extensively 
on the country, both in academic journal articles (most recently: Bale and Partos, 2014; 
Consterdine and Hampshire, 2014; Hampshire and Bale, 2014; Consterdine, 2015a, 
2015b; Partos and Bale, 2015), and in several dedicated monographs (e.g., Joppke, 1999; 
Somerville, 2007; Hampshire, 2013).  
In response to these concerns, I argue that the UK, as a national case study, holds 
unique promise for research on the role of the legislature in shaping immigration law. 
This is for two main reasons. The first is theoretical in that it examines the UK as a ‘most-
likely’ case (Eckstein, 1975) for having a legislature that is both impotent and 
restrictionist. The second is related to the current state of research on British immigration 
politics, particularly attempts to explain the marked ‘gap’ between the restrictive goals of 
UK immigration policy and persistently high levels of immigration.  
 
 
The UK as a ‘most-likely’ case 
 
First, the theoretical reason is that a study of the UK enables particularly powerful 
inferences to be made regarding the role of the legislature – specifically, its importance 
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and bent (liberalist or restrictionist) – in the immigration law-making of Western 
democracies in general. This is because the UK represents what Eckstein has called a 
“crucial case” (1975), which describes a set of circumstances that may be used to test 
propositions derived from widely-acknowledged generalisations (see Lijphart, 1971, 
1975). According to Eckstein’s seminal account, a case may be thought to be crucial if it 
is either most likely or least likely to fulfil a theoretical prediction. A most-likely case is 
one that is predicted by established theoretical generalisations to produce a certain 
outcome – and yet does not. By contrast, a least-likely case is one that is not expected, on 
the basis of accepted theoretical generalisation, to produce a certain outcome – and yet 
does so. “The crucial case”, says Gerring, “is a most difficult test for an argument and 
hence provides what is, arguably, the strongest sort of evidence possible in a 
nonexperimental, single-case setting” (2007: 232). 
On the role of the legislature in shaping immigration law, existing research suggests 
that the UK can be thought of as a most-likely case with respect to two outcomes. First, 
the UK is predicted by established theory to be the case most likely to have a legislature 
that is weak. In the specialised literature, no national legislature is viewed as being less 
consequential in this area of law-making than is the UK Parliament (see Chapter 3). The 
second outcome is to do with the predisposition or bent of the legislature. Here too, the 
UK is held, on the basis of established theory, to be a most-likely case for having a 
legislature that is restrictive. 
In the political science literature concerning the power of legislatures to effect 
legislative change, the UK’s legislature is presented as particularly weak. As Russell et al. 
(2016: 287) put it:  
 
While legislatures in parliamentary systems are frequently dismissed as weak actors in 
the policymaking process, Westminster is often presented as an extreme case. For 
comparative scholars, it has classically been seen as at the opposite end of a spectrum 
when contrasted to the powerful US Congress. 
 
On examining these comparative studies, it is indeed true that the UK legislature ranks 
usually near the bottom for weight of influence (see, for example, Martin and Vanberg, 
2011). True also is the claim that it has long been contrasted unfavourably with the US 
Congress (e.g., Mezey, 1979; Kreppel, 2014). Moreover, systematic comparisons also 
reveal a UK Parliament that is considerably weaker than other European parliamentary 
systems (Flinders and Kelso, 2011; Lijphart, 2012).  In this regard, particularly scathing 
has been the verdict of Anthony King and Ivor Crewe (2013: 361, cited in Russell and 
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Cowley, 2016: 132), who state that, “As a legislative assembly, the parliament of the UK 
is, much of the time, either peripheral or totally irrelevant. It might as well not exist.” 
 A part of the reason for this view is that the UK’s system of government, the so-called 
‘Westminster model’, is understood to be characterised by executive dominance of 
parliament. Indeed, some view the term ‘Westminster model’ as shorthand for a political 
system exhibiting a strong and assertive executive, and a weak, hence compliant, 
legislature (e.g., Lijphart, 1999). As Somerville has observed, there is indeed a “general 
acceptance” among analysts that the UK does indeed embody “the ‘Westminster Model’ 
of government – a combination of strong parliamentary sovereignty, a first-past-the- post 
election system, a strong Cabinet, and executive dominance of the legislature” (2007: 4-
5).  
Somerville advises that this depiction of the UK Parliament also applies to its 
immigration policy-making (2007), with similar conclusions to be found elsewhere in the 
immigration literature. Thus, in comparison with the legislatures in the nation-states of 
continental Europe, the UK legislature is regarded as considerably less effective. Authors 
typically depict this by emphasising the power of the executive at the expense of the other 
branches of government. As Hansen has affirmed, “four factors…distinguish the 
Westminster model from Continental Europe: a powerful executive, a weak legislature, a 
timid judiciary and an absence of a bill of rights” (2000: 237). Likewise, Hampshire and 
Bale report that, “unlike most states, UK governments are – in normal times – 
constitutionally and politically empowered (by a tradition of strong executives facing 
relatively few legislative or judicial constraints) to act decisively if they so choose” (2015: 
5). Menz also corroborates this view. “[U]nlike elsewhere in Europe”, he states, “[in the 
UK] the role of the courts and, more remarkably, parliament is not as pronounced, 
affording the executive significant political power in shaping policy” (2008: 153).  
A further reason that we ought to expect a singularly weak British Parliament is that, 
unlike in the legislatures of continental Europe, the upper chamber of the UK’s bicameral 
legislature, the House of Lords, comprises unelected Peers who are typically viewed as 
wielding little influence. Of the eleven other EU nations with bicameral legislatures, not 
one appoints all of its members. 
As Russell and Sciara put it in a literature review of the UK’s upper chamber (2008: 
571):  
 
Today the chamber remains unelected, and current reform debates are littered with 
references to its inability adequately to challenge the government over policy. The Lords 
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is seen as lacking the legitimacy that it needs to be taken seriously. In all, it is not seen 
as an important policy actor. 
 
The second outcome, upon which we can expect the UK to comprise a most-likely case in 
immigration law-making, is with respect to the tendency or bent of its Parliament – 
towards either liberal or restrictionist policies. It ought to be highly restrictionist, scholars 
suggest, and more so than almost all other Western democracies. This has been credited 
in part to parliamentary systems, which, as opposed to republican systems like that of the 
United States, make governments, and their immigration legislation, more receptive to 
xenophobic public opinion. In addition, the UK in particular is viewed as exemplifying 
this trend (Layton-Henry, 1994; Joppke, 1999: 103); and this is a position that appears to 
remain today. As Consterdine has noted, compared with other European nations, the 
UK’s “constituency MPs are more receptive to the (usually) anti-immigration preferences 
of their voters” (2015a: 1449).  
Thus, it is because the UK has been adjudged to possess among the most ineffectual 
and restrictive of legislatures that it enables a critical test of two prevailing 
generalisations: that within liberal democratic states, the national legislature is of 
marginal importance and restrictionist bent. After all, if the weakest national legislature 
were to be found, contra-orthodoxy, to be rather substantial in its impact – what of 
stronger legislatures? Might not these be of greater consequence than is presently 
understood? Similarly, if a legislature that is expected to be particularly restrictionist in 
fact proves to be liberal in its orientation, might the legislature, as an institution, be a 
more liberal force in the immigration law-making of Western democracies than has been 
typically presumed?  
Therefore, if it is demonstrated that the UK – as a national case most likely to exhibit 
a weak and restrictionist legislature in immigration law-making – enacts law that bears 
Parliament’s strong liberalist influence, we would be faced with a powerful argument for 
the re-examination of the view, common among researchers, that the national legislature 
in general has a marginal and restrictionist role in the immigration law-making of liberal 
democratic states.  
That is what makes the UK a crucial case. More than any other Western state, it has 
the potential to compel immigration researchers to re-think the role of the national 
legislature, and inspire fresh research into its importance, bent, and function. In turn, this 
might lead to a revision of much conventional wisdom in immigration scholarship. 
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What explains the ‘gap’ in UK immigration politics? 
 
Previously I said there were two reasons that the UK is well-justified as a site for exploring 
the main question of this research. Having examined the theoretical reason, we can now 
turn our attention to the second reason, which is related to the current state of research 
on British immigration politics. In particular, an enquiry into the role of the UK 
Parliament throughout deliberations for the Immigration Bill 2013 ought to help answer 
an enduring puzzle: the cause of the marked gap between the executive’s proclaimed goals 
of its immigration policy, which are restrictive; and the reality of the UK as one of the 
world’s major immigrant-receiving countries6. As will be explored more fully, this is one 
derivation of the ‘gap hypothesis’. 
From May 2010, after the Coalition assumed power, the gap between a restrictive 
policy goal and a liberal immigration reality has found simple numerical expression. At 
that time, the Coalition announced their commitment to a Conservative election 
manifesto pledge: to “take net migration back to the levels of the 1990s – tens of 
thousands a year, not hundreds of thousands” (Conservative Party, 2010: 21). This target 
would become the central plank of the Coalition’s immigration policy (Hampshire and 
Bale, 2014) and provides a straightforward yardstick for the measurement of the 
discrepancy or gap between policy goals and immigration reality. This is given by the 
calculation N – 99,999, where N = net migration and the calculation assumes that ‘tens 
of thousands a year’ = 99,999 or fewer.  
As Figure 1 shows, since the target was confirmed as official Coalition policy, net 
migration has never fallen to within fifty thousand of it. Indeed, in the year up to June 
2015, when the Coalition left office, net migration rose to a record-high of 336,000. On 
average, since the announcement of this net migration target, the gap between the central 
goal of the UK’s national immigration policy, and the end result, has been an excess in 
annual immigration of 148,000 – this being the average (mean) difference between the 
quarterly net migration count and 99,999, from April 2010 to September 2016. 
 
 
6
 In 2013, the UK’s total foreign-born population was 7,824,131, equal to 12.4 per cent of the 
total population. This placed the country sixth in the global ranking of nations by foreign-born 
population, behind the United States, Germany, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates (United Nations, 2013: 5). (Note that not all UK residents born outside the UK will 
be classified as immigrants according to standard definitions. For example, children born to 
British citizens abroad whilst on holiday would not ordinarily be described as immigrants. 
However, despite such flaws, a country’s foreign-born population is a reasonable proxy for a 
nation’s immigrant stock.) 
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Figure 1  The United Kingdom’s immigration, emigration, and net migration, 
June 2010 – June 2016 
(Source: Office for National Statistics) 
 
 
What might account for such a wide gap? For other Western states, the judiciary has been 
advanced as an important explanatory factor, constituting a major constraint upon the 
capacity of governments to enact the restrictive immigration laws they desire (e.g., 
Joppke, 1998a, 1998b). Yet, insist scholars, this does not apply to the UK, where the 
executive is thought to be relatively unconstrained by the judiciary. As Joppke has 
observed (1998c: 132): 
 
[T]he immigrant and asylum‐seeker's best friend—the courts—which played so 
prominent a role in German and US immigration and asylum battles, have been largely 
absent from the British scene, at least domestically. On the contrary, as the doyen of 
British immigration law, Ian Macdonald, put it sombrely, courts have helped ‘tighten 
immigration control and extend the power of the state almost to the point of 
arbitrariness’.  
 
If not the judiciary, what, if anything, might work to constrain the UK government’s 
restrictionist bent, and therefore contribute to explanations of the gap between its 
restrictionist policy goals and the UK’s large migration inflows? Could the UK Parliament 
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in its role as national legislature be the reason? Shedding light upon this vexing question 
is a central concern of this thesis. 
 
 
This study: theoretical perspective and methodology 
 
This thesis is, in the main, a political-scientific study of immigration law-making – 
undertaken by a sociologist. Its theoretical framework combines two well-developed 
existing approaches from political science: political opportunity structures, or POS, as 
outlined by Koopmans and Statham (2000: 13-56; Tarrow, 1998); and an interpretive 
approach, with a particular debt owed to the research of Bevir and Rhodes on the nature 
of British governance (2003).  
Where POS can be said to emphasise the structural constraints that guide and limit 
the behaviour of political actors, interpretivism focuses its attention on their agency: their 
freedom to construct meaning, and their improvisational and creative capacity. This 
approach, exemplified by Bevir and Rhodes, following careful revision, therefore 
complements POS by recognising that whilst actors cannot escape the constraining social 
context in which they reason and act, they still possess the capacity to decide what beliefs, 
preferences and goals to hold; to make sense of the various opportunities and constraints 
that affect their potential to realise their goals; and to act on those interpretations for 
reasons that make sense to them. 
 This theoretical perspective, combining aspects of POS and interpretivism, implies 
the need for a multi-faceted research design that has at its heart an extended and rich 
qualitative engagement with a wide range of its subjects: the multitude of political actors 
who have a hand in immigration law-making.  
I began this project in October 2012 when the government of the day, the ‘Con-Lib’ 
Coalition, had embarked upon a major piece of immigration legislation, a bill. This 
presented an enviable opportunity to research its Parliamentary passage in ‘real time’. It 
was an opportunity I seized, there being no comparable in-depth empirical analysis of the 
UK’s legislative process, let alone that of a single immigration policy. The practical and 
methodological merits of studying the Immigration Bill during its passage through 
Parliament have been considerable. For example, it allowed me to conduct first-hand 
analysis of Parliamentary debates through visits to the chambers of the Houses of 
Parliament, and has meant that events have been fresher in the memories of my 
interviewees. 
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The empirical detail and depth implied by this concentrated research proces is not 
typical of recent fieldwork-based research of UK immigration policy-making. In fact, it is 
strikingly rare. At least ten studies published since 2013 have a substantial empirical 
grounding, incorporating many in-depth qualitative interviews, including those with 
ruling government politicians
7
. However, all have covered much longer periods of policy-
making
8
. The strength of these investigations lies in their power to sustain conclusions 
of a more general character, but by the same token, what is absent in these enquiries is 
much sense of the detailed process by which the proposals of the executive become 
binding law. This is no fault of the authors, of course. It would be churlish to expect a 
study covering, for example, sixty years of policymaking, to contain this level of detail. 
Accordingly, it is a contention of this thesis that its more concentrated focus is not 
merely preferable, but necessary if we are to understand why political actors – ministers, 
backbenchers, Peers, civil servants, lobbyists – behave as they do. Only in this way can 
the analyst seek to comprehend the ideas, motives, and powers, which led those involved 
to behave as they did, in given social, historical, and institutional circumstances. It is only 
through a close and sustained engagement with such participants that the researcher can 
hope to understand these phenomena of human political behaviour. It follows that such 
engagement must include interviewing relevant actors (thirty-one in this research); 
listening carefully to their points of view, both public and private; attending closely to 
their political behaviour, both frontstage and backstage
9
; whilst taking account of their 
institutional and broader political environment.  
 
7
 These studies are: Bale and Partos, 2014; Consterdine and Hampshire, 2014; Hampshire and 
Bale, 2014; Consterdine, 2015a, 2015b; Partos and Bale, 2015. 
8
 See, for example, Wright, 2010, which covers the early 1990s to 2008; Gudbrandsen, 2012, 
which covers 1985 to 2010; Consterdine, 2014, which covers 1997 to 2010; and Partos 
(unpublished), which covers the Conservative party from 1945-2015. 
9
 The concepts of the “frontstage” and “backstage” form part of a theoretical position, 
developed by Erving Goffman (see, for example, Goffman, 1959), that takes the theatre as its 
main organising metaphor. As the metaphor is understood in the social sciences and also more 
widely, people – who may also be called, consistent with this dramaturgical metaphor, social 
actors – play roles directed towards other actors. A social actor’s role performance is played 
before others, i.e., an audience, and occupies the space known as the frontstage. When that 
actor takes their leave of the audience and steps out of that role, they move into the space 
known as the backstage. It is here, ‘behind the curtain’ where actors are largely hidden from 
public view, that existing research has done little to illuminate, but whose dynamic processes 
of struggle, strategising, persuasion, collaboration, and conspiracy, this research aims to shed 
fresh light upon.   
In my research, I use the term “frontstage” to refer to the things that are, in principle, 
viewable to the public, including political speeches, Parliamentary debates, published political 
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It follows that a satisfactory analysis of such micro-phenomena would be beyond the 
capacity of a single investigator were they to examine either longer-term trends in 
immigration policy-making or policy-making across multiple countries. Therefore, in 
order to truly ‘get to grips’ with the processes by which legislators attempt to influence 
immigration legislation, it made sense to refine the case study approach. Better to 
investigate one policy only, in minute, first-hand detail, rather than to acquire 
insufficiently granular second- or third-hand knowledge from a handful of such examples. 
As with most choices in social research design, in opting for one approach and its 
inherent advantages, one is invariably faced with shortcomings that cannot be readily 
resolved. However, if the drawbacks of in-depth research into a single, narrow case study 
are plain, it is anticipated that its inherent qualities – rich empirical detail, due attention 
to micro-level power relations, and a focus upon the content of stakeholders’ arguments 
– will of themselves prove instructive.  This is especially so, since the thesis examines the 
legislative and deliberative processes of immigration policy development, which hitherto 
have been almost entirely ignored, and not just with respect to the UK. As the Hansard 
Society noted in Law in the Making, “While there is enormous political, professional, 
media and public concentration on the operation and effect of individual laws, there is 
scant knowledge of the detailed process by which legislative proposals change from policy 
idea to binding law” (Brazier et al., 2008). As such, this thesis focuses resolutely upon 
the institutionalised Parliamentary processes that the government must negotiate to 
ensure its immigration policies become immigration law. 
 
 
The Immigration Act 2014: genesis and elaboration 
 
The Immigration Act’s official life began on 26 March 2013 – as a bill. In a speech made 
to the House of Commons, Theresa May, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
made two important announcements (Hansard, 26 March, col 1500). The first was that 
the UK Border Agency
10
, the government department responsible for regulating 
 
correspondence, and so on. By “backstage” I refer to the places beyond public view, where 
actors strategise, make decisions and formulate policies, often for reasons that analysts, or 
sometimes even the actors themselves, do not know. More usually, the policy-makers 
themselves do know, and may well try to keep the more unpalatable reasons for their decisions 
backstage, while presenting more acceptable explanations frontstage for public consumption. 
10
 The UK Border Agency (or UKBA) was the main administrative organisation responsible 
for the control of the UK’s immigration and borders, operating from 1 April 2008 until April 
2013. It was formed as the result of a three-way merger between the Border and Immigration 
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immigration to the UK, was being disbanded. May’s second announcement was that the 
Government – a coalition of the Conservative Party and Liberal Democrats – would soon 
introduce to Parliament its first major piece of primary immigration legislation: an 
immigration bill (which would come to be known as the “Immigration Bill”). 
In all but name, revealed my interviewees, the Coalition’s Immigration Bill was a 
Conservative Immigration Bill. The Conservative Party was the “senior partner”11 in the 
Coalition. It had secured 306 seats at the 2010 general election, twenty short of an 
absolute majority, but considerably more than its “junior partner”, the Liberal Democrats, 
with fifty-five seats. 
Their parties’ respective 2010 election manifestos suggest important divergences on 
immigration. While the Liberal Democrats campaigned on a platform that proposed the 
naturalisation of substantial numbers of irregular immigrants
12
, the Conservatives had 
crystallised in their manifesto a commitment made by David Cameron, in a television 
interview, to “take net migration back to the levels of the 1990s – tens of thousands a 
year, not hundreds of thousands” (Conservative Party, 2010: 21). Scholarly research 
confirms the impression garnered from the manifestos that the Coalition partners 
diverged substantially on immigration, with some authors observing that they “could 
hardly have been more different” (Hampshire and Bale, 2014: 7). Indeed, my interviewees 
revealed that in intra-Coalition negotiations on immigration policy, the Liberal 
Democrats vigorously opposed this “highly illiberal” Bill, but that the junior partner was 
under no illusions as to who “wore the trousers” in the relationship (these are the phrases 
used by my interviewees). Hence, the Bill’s announcement before the Commons by the 
Home Secretary clearly reflected the position taken by Conservative Party. 
It was on 14 May 2014, fourteen months later, that the Bill received Royal Assent 
and became law as the Immigration Act 2014. The Act’s story may therefore be described 
as one of success for the Conservative part of the Coalition. But the road from broad 
 
Agency (BIA), UKVisas, and the detection functions of HM Revenue and Customs.  UKBA 
operated in 135 countries, with approximately 20,000 staff, and managed an annual budget of 
approximately £2.17 billion (National Audit Office, 2012: 4). In April 2013, UKBA was split 
into two new organisations, UK Visas and Immigration, responsible for the UK visa system, 
and Immigration Enforcement, responsible for the enforcement of immigration law. 
11
 “Senior partner” and “junior partner” were the terms employed by my interviewees. 
12
 The relevant passage in their manifesto stated: “We will allow people who have been in 
Britain without the correct papers for ten years, but speak English, have a clean record and 
want to live here long-term to earn their citizenship” (Liberal Democrats, 2010: 76). This 
policy was derided widely in the tabloid press. 
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political intent, to confirmed law of the land, was for them hardly smooth. The life of the 
Bill has been at times a dramatic and controversial one. It entailed widespread alarm about 
the expiration of labour market restrictions on Romanian and Bulgarian migrants
13
, 
which, it was feared, would lead to ‘masses’ of them ‘flooding’14 into the country on 1 
January 2014. Although this was a concern that failed to materialise
15
, there was a belated 
(and unsuccessful) Tory rebellion to reintroduce labour market controls on Romanian 
and Bulgarian immigrants. The Bill’s passage also witnessed the resignation of the 
Immigration Minister, Mark Harper, after it was revealed that his domestic cleaner was 
an irregular immigrant
16
. This could be seen as somewhat ironic, as this was precisely the 
category of immigrant that Harper had undertaken to be “tough on” (Home Office, 2013a: 
1). Yet it was not long before Harper’s replacement, James Brokenshire MP, also reignited 
 
13
 Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU on 1 January 2007. The accession treaties allowed the 
other EU Member States to apply restrictions on the free movement rights of Bulgarian and 
Romanian workers, for up to seven years after accession, officially to protect Member States’ 
labour markets. The UK government applied restrictions for the maximum period of seven 
years. Throughout this period, the opportunities for Bulgarians and Romanians to come to 
work in the UK have been limited to four schemes: a special scheme for highly skilled workers; 
a second route for skilled workers; and two quota-based schemes for low-skilled work in the 
agricultural and food processing sectors, respectively. However, when the transitional 
restrictions expired on 1 January 2014, Bulgarian and Romanian workers were eligible to 
work, or to look for work, in the UK, on the same basis as all other EU citizens (House of 
Commons, 2013). 
14
 For one of many examples of this kind of language, see Sheldrick (2014). 
15
 Commenting on this in the Lords, Lord Avebury (Eric Lubbock) noted that UKIP and the 
Daily Mail had helped to “create fear in the minds of the public. We saw this in the totally 
unjustified hysteria over the floods of Bulgarians and Romanians who were allegedly ready to 
invade the country on 1 January, when the hordes of newsmen greeting a flight from Bucharest 
were disappointed to find that only two of the passengers were Romanian” (Hansard, 10 Feb 
2014, col. 452). 
16 
In tendering his resignation, Mark Harper joined a number of key figures in the immigration 
system also compelled in recent years to resign. The immigration minister Beverley Hughes 
resigned in April 2004 after she denied knowledge of a visa scandal, but was later shown to 
have been informed of it before the time of her denial. In a television interview on BBC’s 
Newsnight in April 2004, Hughes falsely claimed she was unaware of a visa scandal in which 
Romanian and Bulgarian nationals were given British visas even though their applications 
were supported by false documents. David Blunkett resigned as Home Secretary on 15 
December 2004 amidst allegations that he helped fast-track a work visa for his ex-
lover’s nanny. Brodie Clark resigned as head of the Border Force on 8 November 2011, after 
he was blamed publicly by the Home Secretary, Theresa May, for relaxing entry checks at 
airports without her authority. 
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controversy. In his very first speech as Minister for Immigration and Security
17
, he 
suggested that a “wealthy metropolitan elite” had helped foster mass immigration by 
relying on cheap overseas labour (Warrell and Rigby, 2014). In this, he perhaps forgot 
the circumstances of his predecessor’s resignation, and the tendency of his Conservative 
colleagues to hire immigrants as domestic assistants. This included Prime Minister David 
Cameron. It had been revealed that he had hired two nannies from outside the EU, and 
that his wife Samantha, it had been suggested, had helped one of them to secure British 
citizenship (Hope and Kirkup, 2014). 
Moreover, the Bill’s provisions were thoroughly criticised as “nasty and pernicious”, 
“nonsense”, “unworkable”, and “totally irrational”. Would Parliament then be able to 
shape its provisions, so that the actual Act would be more humane and practicable? To 
answer this question, we must first consider what those provisions were. At the time of 
the Bill’s official announcement by the Home Secretary its contents were largely a 
mystery. But they would not be for long.  
 
 
The Queen’s Speech 
 
On Friday 8 May 2013, the chamber of the United Kingdom’s House of Lords was home 
to the most elaborate ceremony in the British political calendar: the State Opening of 
Parliament. Marking the formal commencement of a session of Parliament, this annual 
event attracted large crowds and a substantial media presence. Its centre point, as ever, 
was the ‘Speech from the Throne’ (since 1952: the ‘Queen’s Speech’), in which the 
reigning monarch reads aloud a prepared address outlining the government’s agenda for 
the year to come.  
In just 846 words, the Queen outlined the Coalition’s legislative programme, their 
third since assuming power in 2010. It contained a wide range of policies, covering the 
economy, benefits, childcare, the national curriculum, school exams, teachers’ pay, and 
mortgages. It also outlined proposals for twenty bills, one of which was on immigration. 
Queen Elizabeth II provided the following brief remarks:   
 
 
17
 The words “and security” have been added to the title of the Immigration Minister: This is 
perhaps to frame immigration as a matter of national security, although it could also be 
because James Brokenshire’s previous position was Under Secretary of State for Crime and 
Security. 
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My government will bring forward a Bill that further reforms Britain’s immigration 
system. The Bill will ensure that this country attracts people who will contribute and 
deters those who will not. 
 
Many immigration policy stakeholders located outside Westminster first learned of the 
Immigration Bill from these very words
18
. By contrast, key stakeholders inside 
Westminster had been working on the Bill ‘behind the scenes’ for many months. 
However, further clarity was provided later that day through the publication of a ninety-
two-page document, which supplemented the contents of the Queen’s Speech. An 
executive-authored document, it summarised the “purpose”, “main benefits”, and “main 
elements” of each of the bills announced in the speech.  
With regard to the Immigration Bill, the following information was publicised (Home 
Office, 2013a: 64): 
The purpose of the Immigration Bill was to:  
 
reform immigration law, including provisions to strengthen our enforcement powers and 
protect public services.  
 
The anticipated main benefits of the Bill were: 
 
• Stopping immigrants accessing services they are not entitled to.  
• Making it easier to remove people from the UK and harder for people to prolong 
their stay with spurious appeals.  
• Specifying that foreign nationals who commit serious crimes shall, except in 
extraordinary circumstances, be deported. 
 
The Bill’s main elements came in three categories: access to services; enforcement and 
appeals; and Article 8
19
:  
 
18
 Interviewees were asked “When did you first learn of the Immigration Bill?”. A majority of 
those not working in government stated that they first remembered learning of it from the 
Queen’s Speech.  
19
 Article 8 refers to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights: “Right to respect 
for private and family life.” This article comes in two parts: “(1) Everyone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no 
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance 
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
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Access to services  
 
• The Bill would enable tough action against businesses that use illegal labour, 
including more substantial fines.  
• The Bill would regulate migrant access to the NHS, ensuring that temporary 
migrants make a contribution.  
• The Bill would require private landlords to check the immigration status of their 
tenants.  
• The Bill would prevent illegal immigrants from obtaining UK driving licences. 
 
Enforcement and appeals  
 
• The Bill would ensure that only those cases that raise the most important 
immigration issues would have a right of appeal.  
• The Bill would close a number of gaps in enforcement officer’s [sic] powers.  
 
Article 8  
 
• The Bill would contain provisions to give the full force of legislation to the policy 
we have already adopted in the Immigration Rules.  
• The courts would therefore be required to properly reflect the balance given to 
the public interest when ruling on immigration cases.  
 
These focal points of the Immigration Bill came as no surprise to commentators and other 
interested observers. Since the Coalition took up the reins of government, national 
newspaper discourse on immigration reflected concern over such issues, including 
migrants’ access to services, especially benefits and the NHS; the Government’s 
difficulties in deporting immigrant “criminals”; and the presence and abuses of so-called 
“illegal” immigrants.  
 
 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.” 
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*** 
 
Thus began the life of the bill that, fourteen months later, would become the Immigration 
Act, 2014. This too is where this study’s behind-the-scenes investigation begins, leading 
to a critical account of the impact of Parliament on the Bill’s restrictive proposals. This in 
turn enables conclusions to be advanced and hypotheses to be generated, regarding the 
role of the national legislature in shaping immigration law, drawing on the United 
Kingdom as a ‘most-likely’ case. 
 Needless to say, these processes and these outcomes entail considerable scholarly 
activity: a critical review of existing literature; identifying and utilising appropriate 
theories; establishing a social scientific methodology; undertaking painstaking but 
focused primary research; and analysing data, historical as well as contemporary, in order 
to determine their theoretical implications for the role of the legislature. Such 
considerations make for complication. It is therefore the responsibility of the author to 
deliver information in a way that is accessible, including the way it is structured. What 
follows, then, is an outline of this very structure, chapter by chapter. 
 
 
The thesis in outline 
 
This thesis contains fourteen chapters, including this Introduction, and is organised into 
two parts. Part One sets the scene for my case study. In Part Two, I first provide a brief 
history of the political context of immigration law-making in the UK, with a focus on 
illegal immigration law; and then present the detailed analysis, findings, and discussion 
of my case study.   
In the next chapter, Chapter 2, I situate this thesis within the relevant scholarly 
literature, specifically that relating to the post-war immigration policy-making of liberal 
democratic states, and especially in relation to the puzzle known as the ‘gap hypothesis’. 
In so doing, I reveal researchers’ inconsistent specification of what precisely is the ‘gap’ 
to be explained. As such, this chapter serves also as a ground-clearing exercise, aimed at 
situating with clarity and precision the contributions of this study of the Immigration Act 
2014.   
 Chapter 3 extends my literature review into the substantive territory of this 
investigation, by examining more widely what earlier researchers have said about the role 
of the national legislature within democratic political systems, and in the shaping of 
immigration law within liberal states. 
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The fourth chapter outlines a theory of political motivation and action, a combination 
of POS and interpretivism, which I have used to make sense of the behaviour of the actors 
at the centre of this study.   
 In the light of this theoretical framework, Chapter 5 recounts the methodology of my 
investigation; describes its multiple sources of data; and discusses issues related to 
sampling, accessing political elites, and the quality of the information upon which I base 
the findings of this thesis. 
 Part Two begins with Chapter 6, which provides the political background to the 
Immigration Bill, via a history of UK immigration law-making after the Second World 
War. Its particular focus is legislation aimed at regulating illegal immigration. 
 Chapter 7 summarises the UK’s multi-stage legislative process, stage by stage, which 
gives structure to Chapters 8, 9, 10, and 11, which comprise the detailed empirical 
analysis of the Immigration Bill’s passage through Parliament.  
 Chapter 12 analyses the impact of Parliament upon the legislative content of the 
Immigration Bill. On the basis of this chapter’s findings, I argue that Parliament 
constitutes an important liberalist constraint upon executive restrictionism.  
Chapter 13 brings together the main findings of the thesis, and their theoretical 
implications for the role of the legislature in the immigration law-making of Western 
states.  
 The fourteenth and final chapter seeks a contemporary slant. It applies the insights 
of this study to an understanding of the role played by Parliament in the UK’s first step 
towards its exit from the European Union: the triggering of ‘Article 50’.  
 
*** 
 
This is what lies ahead for the reader. In the next chapter, we examine the scholarly 
literature which frames that part of the thesis regarding the puzzle of the ‘gap hypothesis’.
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2 ‘Gaps’ in the literature 
 
 
There is a persistent ‘gap’ in the research literature on the causes and consequences of 
immigration policy in liberal democratic states. I am not here referring to the kind of gap 
that authors habitually identify and then try to fill: the gaps in our state of knowledge. I am 
instead referring to a term of art, which for the last thirty years has been a recurring, if not 
the recurring, focus of explanatory theories of immigration policy.  
This is the so-called “gap hypothesis”, which when coined in 1994 referred, in essence, 
to the argument that across all major industrialised democracies there was a wide and 
growing discrepancy between the restrictive goals of national immigration policy and liberal 
immigration outcomes (Cornelius et al., 1994: 3).  
However, a careful review of the literature reveals the presence of not one gap 
hypothesis, but several. Over the years, researchers have defined this idea in different ways, 
thereby pursuing different investigations. Significantly, it would seem that analysts, in 
presenting inconsistent definitions of the gap hypothesis, have sometimes done so 
unwittingly, thus leading to a lack of precision in arguments regarding its nature and causes.  
In the main, this appears to have resulted from a lack of care in authors’ specification 
of what constitutes the ‘gap’ in the ‘gap hypothesis’: what exactly are the phenomena that 
this ‘gap’ lies between. This shortcoming has, I think, been compounded by insufficient 
sensitivity to the multiplicity of meanings evoked by the apparently straightforward term 
‘immigration policy’, which has been used as an umbrella to encompass a range of 
empirically distinct aspects of the social world that ought to be analysed separately.  
To bring greater precision and clarity to this study, I develop an original conceptual 
framework of immigration policy, which disaggregates the concept into three analytically 
discrete constituents. These are (1) stances on immigration; (2) immigration law; and (3) 
the implementation of immigration law. Ultimately, this framework will enable us to unpick 
the many gap hypotheses that have animated earlier investigations, and to delineate the gap 
hypothesis that frames this one. 
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The ‘gap hypothesis’: a history of the central idea in immigration policy research 
 
The first recorded reference to the ‘gap’, which would come ultimately to be termed the 
“gap hypothesis”, can be traced to 1986 in an article by James F. Hollifield (1986). Here, the 
author sought to explain why immigration to France and Germany had continued after 
government efforts to restrict it in the mid-1970s. In other words, he wanted to explain the 
“gap that has developed between policies…and the results of the policies…in each country” 
(1986: 114). Could France and Germany, he asked, have lost control of their borders? Or 
was something else responsible? 
Hollifield provided two explanations for this gap. His first concerned the formulation 
of immigration policy: that the regulations designed to stop this new wave of immigration 
“had to be liberalized in the face of criticism on constitutional and humanitarian grounds” 
(1986: 128). Hollifield’s second explanation concerned the implementation of immigration 
policy:  that “the dynamics of the migratory process, from the recruitment of temporary 
workers to the settlement of these workers and their families posed serious problems for 
the implementation of new policies designed to stop the influx of foreigners” (1986: 127). 
Over time, the word ‘gap’ would come to be familiar to researchers of immigration 
politics, with its usage denoting a variety of discrepancies between phenomena that might 
be expected to have been in convergence. It was eight years after Hollifield first framed his 
investigation around the existence of a ‘gap’ that the word “hypothesis” was appended to it. 
In Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 
introduced as one of two central theses, the “gap hypothesis”, which they defined as the 
argument that (1994: 3; emphasis in original):  
 
the gap between the goals of national immigration policy (laws, regulations, executive 
actions, etc.) and the actual results of policies in this area (policy outcomes) is wide and 
growing wider in all major industrialized democracies, thus provoking greater public 
hostility towards immigrants in general (regardless of legal status) and putting intense 
pressure on political parties and government officials to adopt more restrictive policies. 
 
This definition is problematic for at least seven reasons. First, the label ‘hypothesis’ is 
something of a misnomer. This is not a hypothesis in the stricter sense in which that term 
is used in the natural sciences: a proposed explanation for something. Rather, it is a 
propositional statement about the condition of the world.  
Second, it must be said that this is a rather complicated proposition. It appears to make 
seven interrelated claims, that: (1) the gap between the goals and results of national 
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immigration policy is wide, and (2) is growing wider (3) in all major industrialised 
democracies, (4) leading to greater public hostility towards immigrants in general, which 
(5) is putting intense pressure for the adoption of more restrictive policies upon (6) political 
parties and (7) government officials. Refutation of just one of these claims would technically 
be enough to reject the hypothesis in its entirety. However, of course, one may be foolish to 
do so if, say, the only point of refutation were that one of the world’s major industrialised 
democracies had achieved its immigration policy goals. As such, it could be said that this 
hypothesis incorporates too many interdependent claims to make viable its testing as a 
whole.  
Third, compounding the tortuous nature of the definition is the vagueness of some of 
its claims. For example, the gap between the goals and results of national immigration policy 
is described as “wide”. But how wide is “wide”?  
Fourth, as Zolberg has observed, the goals of national immigration policy “are often 
ambiguous” (1999: 80). Given such ambiguity, how are we to discover and then measure 
them so that we can discern the direction of their fortunes? Also, even where the goals of 
national immigration policy are stated clearly, how are we to know that they reflect true 
intentions and aims?  
Fifth, central to the definition of Cornelius et al. is the gap between the goals of national 
immigration policy and the actual results of policies in this area.  But how are we to discern 
the results of such policies? This is not at all easy, if indeed it is even practically possible, 
and is a problem that has been described clearly by Czaika and de Haas (2013: 491), who 
state: 
 
how can we empirically attribute a change in the volume, timing, or composition of 
migration to a particular policy change? The mere existence of a certain correlation between 
policy and migration trends obviously does not prove there is a causal link. Nor does the 
absence of such a correlation or the existence of a negative correlation prove that policies 
are ineffective. After all, the counterfactual argument is that, without immigration 
restrictions, the level of immigration would have been even higher. 
 
It is perhaps due to the above five problem areas, or some combination thereof, that this 
unwieldy definition of the gap hypothesis is entirely absent in the literature – even in the 
case study chapters of Controlling Immigration, the book in which it originated. In its place, 
we find a modified version that eschews the last six of its interrelated claims, whilst 
modifying the first. This revised version of the definition is the proposed, or in some cases 
the observed, presence of a gap between the stated objectives of national immigration policy 
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and the country’s (or countries’) actual levels of immigration (for examples see Table C, gap 
[7]). Yet, to date no study has sought to address directly the “results of national immigration 
policy”, when defined properly as only those changes in immigration that resulted from 
specified policies.  
Sixth, although the word ‘hypothesis’ implies a supposition – a speculative, tentative, 
or provisional belief – in Controlling Immigration the gap hypothesis is treated as more of 
a gap fact, with its presence unanimously confirmed through the case studies of that volume. 
This concern was acknowledged in the second edition of Controlling Immigration, published 
ten years after the first, in which the authors concede that, “It is perhaps misleading to refer 
to the gap hypothesis as a true hypothesis since it is an empirical fact that few labor-
importing countries have immigration control policies that are perfectly implemented or do 
not result in unintended consequences” (Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004: 4-5). 
The seventh problem is more fundamental. It is not related to the precise formulation 
of the definition per se, but rather to its focus upon policy goals and hence the general puzzle 
it claims to identify. This issue was also identified by Zolberg, who cautions that the goals 
of national immigration policy are often “grossly unrealistic” (1999: 80). This has a critical 
implication. It suggests that any growing failure of governments to achieve policy objectives 
may speak to nothing more than the attempts of politicians to mollify voters who have 
concerns about immigration, through ever ‘tougher’, and hence ever more fanciful, anti-
immigration promises. As an explanation for a gap that is routinely described as a vexing 
“puzzle” (e.g., Freeman, 2002: 77-78), even a “paradox” (e.g., Hollifield, 1992b: 584), what 
could be more banal than politicians’ ever-more inflated rhetoric?  
In the second edition of their comparative volume, the authors do propose a simplified 
definition of the gap hypothesis as the thesis that “significant and persistent gaps exist 
between official immigration policies and actual policy outcomes” (Cornelius and Tsuda, 
2004: 4). It must be said that from the perspective of Western Europe, the gap hypothesis, 
in this simplified form, does ring substantially true. It identifies a real and curious 
observation in the immigration politics of several liberal democracies; and nowhere does 
this gap find clearer expression than in the UK. The magnitude of its gap is made clear in 
Figure 1, and this may explain why the UK’s record on immigration is regarded as a ‘policy 
failure’ (Castles, 2004b).  
This simplified version of the gap hypothesis raises the question of why nation-states 
like the UK have been unable to stem the flow of migrants to their lands, and the prospect 
that this may reflect a broader decline in the power of sovereign nations to control who may 
cross into their territories, and for how long. The possibility of this important reversal in 
the capacity of the nation-state is perhaps an important reason for the gap hypothesis 
‘Gaps’ in the literature 
 
33 
appearing to capture the imagination of immigration policy theorists and becoming a focal 
point within their research. However, successive authors have ascribed a plurality of 
definitions to the gap hypothesis, even when their apparent intention had been to work on 
the same problem.  
The first major permutation of the gap hypothesis is to be found in a seminal article of 
1995, in which Freeman explains why “official policies tend to be more liberal than public 
opinion” (1995a: 882-883). Freeman has switched attention from the results of policies to 
what in democratic states should be their precursor: “public opinion”. We are now dealing 
with a new and different gap, between what the public thinks about immigration and the 
substance of governmental immigration policies. Thus, different phenomena with different 
causal dynamics have to be explained. 
This changes the direction of study from that set by the original gap hypothesis, which 
was concerned with gaps between the proclaimed goals of a government’s national 
immigration policy and resultant immigration flows (Cornelius et al., 1994). In my view, 
however, this original version asks a question that invites a broader range of potential 
answers than that posed by Freeman’s gap. The goals of national immigration policy may 
fail to be met, and by growing margins, for any of the following four sets of reasons: (1) the 
goals themselves are increasingly unrealistic; (2) the forces that persuade or prevent policy-
makers from enacting restrictive immigration law are increasing in strength; (3) restrictive 
immigration laws are ever more inadequately implemented; and (4) immigration pressures 
are increasing. These last two sets of explanations, the implementation of immigration law 
and immigration pressures, are irrelevant to Freeman’s version of the gap, because of its 
refocusing of attention upon policy formulation.  
Importantly, Freeman makes explicit his shift in focus. Unlike those of other 
researchers, his move is an intentional one. Observing that “[p]olicy failure is too easy a 
means of explaining the gap [hypothesis]”, he adds that he “chose a more demanding 
course”: to account for the decisions of policy-makers in the first place (1995b: 911). In a 
later work, Freeman confirmed that his version of the gap highlights a puzzle that should 
be seen as complementary to the gap hypothesis of Cornelius et al., stating: “To their 
analysis I would add an observation involving yet another gap: The central puzzle of the 
politics of immigration in liberal democracies is the large and systematic gap between public 
opinion and public policy” (2002: 77-78). More specifically, this (observed) gap is between 
markedly restrictionist public opinion, and more open immigration law (as revealed, in the 
US, in Simon and Alexander, 1993; Cornelius et al., 1994; Lee, 1998; Fetzer, 2000; and in 
Europe in Fetzer, 2000; European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2001). 
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The issue raised by Freeman, which he views as the central puzzle, is no less significant 
or perplexing than the original “gap hypothesis”. After all, democratically-elected 
governments should, in principle, enact the preferences of publics. Given that hostility to 
immigration is so widespread (two particularly good literature reviews are: Ceobanu and 
Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014), it is, as Facchini and Mayda aptly note, 
“somewhat puzzling…that migration flows take place at all” (2008: Summary). For 
Freeman, then, the aim of any theory of immigration politics must be not only to explain 
the persistent incongruity “between the goals and effects of policies” – i.e., those of the ‘gap 
hypothesis’ – but also “the related but not identical gap between public sentiment and the 
content of public policy” (2002: 78; my emphasis). 
For about the next decade, Freeman’s gap would for some immigration policy 
researchers supplant the gap hypothesis as the principal focus of attention (e.g., Statham 
and Geddes, 2006). This was perhaps to be expected. As previously illustrated, the original 
gap hypothesis asks a broad question that is beyond the primary research area of most 
immigration policy theorists, who are concerned mainly to explain the formulation of 
immigration policy. Moreover, explanations for the original gap hypothesis are not thought 
to have much to do with immigration policy formulation per se. The original hypothesis 
identifies the significance of policy implementation and the drivers of immigration. These 
in turn are influenced by a wide array of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, including economic and 
social inequalities between the countries of origin and destination as well as the internal 
dynamics of migration networks (e.g., marriage, family migration). Neither of these 
domains is thought to have much to do with the formulation of immigration policy, which 
is precisely what Freeman’s new gap pointed to. There is then a clear analytic disjunction 
between these two approaches to the gap. 
In her 2007 review of explanatory theories of migration policy, Boswell distinguished 
between these two different gaps in the literature (2007: 75), as follows: 
 
The first deals with the gap between (proclaimed) policy objectives and outcomes. It seeks 
to explain why states fail to achieve the goals set out in their stated migration policies 
(Hollifield, 1986, 2000; Castles, 2004; Cornelius et al., 1992:3). The second theme is 
concerned with explaining the gap between the generally protectionist bent of public 
opinion in democratic states, and the more inclusionary policies that often emerge. 
 
The first of these gaps is equivalent to the original definition of the “gap hypothesis”, with 
the second a faithful translation of Freeman’s version. Yet, as Bonjour has observed, these 
separate questions have “not always been clearly distinguished in the scholarly debate” 
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(2011: 91). As such, in differentiating explicitly between these gaps – each of which had 
come to occupy its own space in the literature – and alerting us to the difference in their 
meaning and thereafter their explanatory foci, Boswell has brought welcome clarity to our 
object of study.  
However, not all authors appear to have heeded Boswell’s analytic contribution. Later 
analyses would continue to display an inadequate sensitivity to the subtle but important 
distinctions that she, and Freeman before her, drew. Consequently, too many researchers 
have deployed the two gaps interchangeably, or worse, have advanced new definitions; and 
not, it would seem, always knowingly. For example, in 2010 Somerville and Goodman 
provided a further new definition of the gap hypothesis, even though they cite the second 
edition of Controlling Immigration, whose gap hypothesis is equivalent to that of the first 
edition, though simpler, as we have seen. Somerville and Goodman (2010: 952) specify their 
gap as being between:  
 
public demands to limit immigration (together with the ‘control’ rhetoric of politicians) and 
the reality of an increasing volume of immigration. 
 
This definition presents us with at least two difficulties. First, it merges public demands to 
limit immigration with policy-makers’ ostensible policy goals: their “‘control’ rhetoric”, 
which, to further complicate matters, may not reflect their ‘real’ goals. Public demands and 
policy goals are two phenomena that can operate independently, have different 
determinants, and which it is helpful to keep separate. Second, the main gap it posits, 
between restrictive public opinion and “an increasing volume of immigration”, is also 
different to the two earlier gaps specified by Cornelius et al., and then by Freeman.   
 The same authors continue to confuse matters when, in their very next sentence, they 
mischaracterise Freeman’s thesis as providing an explanation for the “discrepancy between 
restrictive migration goals and liberalised migration outcomes” (Somerville and Goodman, 
2010: 952). Freeman discusses no such discrepancy. On the contrary, he argued that policy 
goals were in fact liberal, not restrictive, and as he emphasised, “I have carefully excluded 
from the model any consideration of the efficacy of particular immigration policies” (1995b: 
911).   
We next find, in 2012, the most telling definition of the gap hypothesis, by one of its 
original authors, Wayne Cornelius. In the Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International 
Migration (Rosenblum and Tichenor, 2012), he and Marc Rosenblum re-evaluate the gap 
hypothesis as defined in the first edition of Controlling Immigration. Their revised version 
states that it “predicts a divergence between popular demands for tight migration policies 
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and less restrictive immigration policy outputs and outcomes” (Rosenblum and Cornelius, 
2012: 245). The “goals” or “stated objectives” from the original definition (which the 
authors cite) are here absent. In effect, Rosenblum and Cornelius have now provided us 
with a combination of two gaps: “popular demands for tight migration policies and less 
restrictive immigration policy outputs”, which is that proposed by Freeman (cf. 2002: 77-
78; my emphasis); and “popular demands for tight migration policies and less restrictive 
immigration policy outcomes”, which is that specified in Somerville and Goodman (2010: 
952; my emphasis).  
It should perhaps come as no surprise, therefore, to learn that the gap hypothesis 
continues to be defined inconsistently, with each definition producing different questions, 
and hence different research. For example, Consterdine states in her article on Labour party 
immigration policy (2015a: 1434), that: 
 
Labour’s managed migration policy is a pertinent example of the ‘gap hypothesis’ 
(Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994)—the seeming mismatch between public demands 
to limit immigration on the one hand and expansive policies on the other hand…  
 
The two elements in the original definition, which is the one that Consterdine cites, namely 
(restrictive) policy goals and (expansionary) migration outcomes, appear here to be absent, 
having been replaced by restrictive public opinion and expansionary policies. Consterdine 
has seemingly confused the original gap hypothesis with Freeman’s, which, let us recall, is 
“related but not identical” (Freeman, 2002: 78).  
I say that the elements of the original definition of the gap hypothesis appear to be 
absent in Consterdine’s version. This is because there is an ambiguity in such phrases as 
“expansive policies”, which authors typically do little to resolve. Are these policies to be 
understood as expansionary in their content or expansionary with respect to their effects, 
as in the notion of policies being de facto expansionary? To some extent this lack of certainty 
is compounded not only by Consterdine but more generally in the broader literature by the 
use of key phrases as catch-all terms. Thus, for example, ‘policies’ (whether restrictive or 
expansionary) can refer to: policy-makers’ goals or proposals; draft legislation; enacted 
legislation (actual laws); policy implementation, such as visa processing and border control; 
and, less intuitively, immigration and related phenomena, such as inflows, outflows, and 
naturalisation. 
Elsewhere in her article, Consterdine provides yet another definition, writing of “the 
apparent ‘gap’ between expansionist immigration politics and restrictive public sentiment” 
(2015a: 1435). Note here the inclusion of another new and ambiguous variable, 
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“immigration politics”, which might ordinarily be thought to encompass public sentiment, 
had not Consterdine specified otherwise.  
It seems most unfortunate that the central idea of research on immigration policy has 
not been more reliably translated: not only between the works of different authors, but in 
works with the same authorship, and, as here, within a single work by the same author. An 
illustrative list of the varied definitions of the gap hypothesis presented thus far, and 
organised chronologically, is provided in Table B. 
 
 
Table B  Varying definitions of the ‘gap hypothesis’  
   
Definition and its source  Which ‘gap’? 
   
   
Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield (1994: 3) 
“Second, we argue that the gap between the goals of national immigration policy (laws, regulations, 
executive actions, etc.) and the actual results of policies in this area (policy outcomes) is wide and 
growing wider in all major industrialized democracies, thus provoking greater public hostility 
towards immigrants in general (regardless of legal status) and putting intense pressure on political 
parties and government officials to adopt more restrictive policies. We refer to this as the “gap 
hypothesis.” 
  
Between restrictive 
policies and liberal 
immigration outcomes  
(The original gap 
hypothesis) 
Freeman (1995a: 883) 
“Nevertheless, I want to argue that there is in general an expansionary bias in the politics of 
immigration in liberal democracies such that official policies tend to be more liberal than public 
opinion…” 
  
Between restrictive public 
opinion and liberal 
policies 
(Freeman’s gap) 
Freeman (1995b: 911) 
“…I have carefully excluded from the model any consideration of the efficacy of particular 
immigration policies – border controls, employer sanctions, visa policy, and the like. Policy failure is 
too easy a means of explaining the gap between public opinion and immigration policy.” (Note that 
by “immigration policy” Freeman means liberal immigration outcomes, which is made clear by the 
surrounding text) 
  
Between restrictive public 
opinion and liberal 
policies 
(Freeman’s gap) 
Freeman (2002: 77-78; 78) 
“The gap hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that the distance between the goals of policies and 
their effects is large and growing larger in all the industrialized countries. To their analysis I would 
add an observation involving yet another gap: The central puzzle of the politics of immigration in 
liberal democracies is the large and systematic gap between public opinion and public policy.” 
“The goal of a theory of immigration politics must be to “explain persistent gaps between the goals 
and effects of policies as well as the related but not identical gap between public sentiment and the 
content of public policy.” 
  
Between restrictive 
policies and liberal 
immigration outcomes  
(The original gap 
hypothesis); and between 
restrictive public opinion 
and liberal policies 
(Freeman’s gap) 
Cornelius and Tsuda (2004: 4) 
“We retain the two central theses used to organize the first edition. The first, which we call the “gap 
hypothesis,” is that significant and persistent gaps between official government policies and actual 
policy outcomes.” 
  
Between restrictive 
policies and liberal 
immigration outcomes  
(The original gap 
hypothesis) 
Statham and Geddes (2006: 248) 
“Freeman has arguably gone furthest in developing a theoretical model to explain the purported 
paradox or ‘gap’ between expansionist policies and restrictive publics.” 
  
Between restrictive public 
opinion and liberal 
policies 
(Freeman’s gap) 
Boswell (2007: 78) 
“Recent literature on the theory of migration policy has tended to be dominated by two overlapping 
themes: the question of why migration policies fail; and attempts to explain the inclusionary 
tendency of migration and integration policies. While the two issues are often treated together – and 
may indeed be similarly theorized – they are in principle separable. The first deals with the gap 
between (proclaimed) policy objectives and outcomes. It seeks to explain why states fail to achieve 
the goals set out in their stated migration policies (Hollifield, 1986, 2000; Castles, 2004; Cornelius 
  
Between restrictive 
policies and liberal 
immigration outcomes  
(The original gap 
hypothesis); and between 
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Table B  Varying definitions of the ‘gap hypothesis’  
   
Definition and its source  Which ‘gap’? 
   
   
et al., 1992:3). The second theme is concerned with explaining the gap between the generally 
protectionist bent of public opinion in democratic states, and the more inclusionary policies that 
often emerge.” 
restrictive public opinion 
and liberal policies 
(Freeman’s gap) 
Somerville and Goodman (2010: 951) 
“Recent migration literature has been dominated by the question of why migration policies fail 
(Boswell, 2007) and in particular one of the central puzzles of immigration scholarship – the seeming 
mismatch, or ‘gap’ (see Cornelius et al., 2004), between public demands to limit immigration 
(together with the ‘control’ rhetoric of politicians) and the reality of an increasing volume of 
immigration.” 
  
Between restrictive public 
opinion and liberal 
immigration outcomes 
(‘Somerville and 
Goodman’s gap’) 
Rosenblum and Cornelius (2012: 245) 
“[this chapter] concludes by reevaluating two hypotheses from previous research (Cornelius et al. 
1994; Cornelius et al. 2004; Hollifield et al. forthcoming): the “convergence” hypothesis, which 
predicts that diverse migrant-receiving countries are moving toward common policy modes, and the 
“gap” hypothesis, which predicts a divergence between popular demands for tight migration policies 
and less restrictive immigration policy outputs and outcomes.” 
  
Between restrictive public 
opinion and liberal 
policies 
(Freeman’s gap); and 
between restrictive public 
opinion and liberal 
immigration outcomes 
(‘Somerville and 
Goodman’s gap’) 
Consterdine (2015a: 1434; 1435) 
“Labour’s managed migration policy is a pertinent example of the ‘gap hypothesis’ (Cornelius, 
Martin, and Hollifield 1994)—the seeming mismatch between public demands to limit immigration 
on the one hand and expansive policies on the other hand—as there was no public demand for 
expansion, indeed quite the opposite.” 
“Gary Freeman has advanced what is perhaps the most developed theoretical model to explain the 
apparent ‘gap’ between expansionist immigration politics and restrictive public sentiment (Freeman 
1995, 2002, 2006).” 
  
Between restrictive public 
opinion and liberal 
policies 
(Freeman’s gap) 
 
Between restrictive public 
opinion and liberal 
immigration outcomes 
(‘Somerville and 
Goodman’s gap’) 
   
 
 
A failure to mind the gap 
 
In the preceding discussion, I identified three sets of authors who cite either the original 
definition of the gap hypothesis found in Controlling Immigration (Cornelius et al., 1994: 
3), or the simpler definition provided in the second edition of that volume (Cornelius and 
Tsuda, 2004: 3). Yet these authors do not depict those definitions faithfully. Somerville and 
Goodman (2010: 951) cite the 2004 definition, but supplant policy goals with public 
demands. Rosenblum and Cornelius (2012: 245) misdefine the 1994 gap that Cornelius 
himself helped originally to define, incorporating into a single definition both Somerville 
and Goodman’s gap and Freeman’s gap. Consterdine (2015a: 1434) also cites the 1994 
definition, yet goes on to describe Freeman’s gap.  
It is precisely because these three sets of authors provide no indication that they are 
intentionally redefining the original gap hypothesis – unlike Freeman, as we have seen – 
that we are justified in inferring that they may well have done so unwittingly.  
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The consequences of this have been most unfortunate. As mentioned previously, this is 
because each definition specifies a different puzzle to be solved and different questions to 
be answered. The original gap hypothesis asks: why are immigration policy goals not met? 
The answer here could concern four different sets of variables and their respective questions, 
as follows:  
 
(1) The nature of the policy goals – are these unrealistic? 
(2) The content of the immigration laws enacted – are these more liberal 
than desired? 
(3) The implementation of these laws – are they only partially or weakly 
implemented?  
(4) And, migration pressures – are these stronger than usual? 
 
By contrast, Freeman’s gap asks why the content of immigration policy is not as restrictive 
as the public would wish. Clearly, public opinion is a relevant variable to consider in 
explaining this gap, whilst policy implementation and migration pressures will have no 
direct relevance.  
In presenting their research on immigration policy, authors do reveal that they are aware 
of the logical connections between the definition of their problem, research questions to be 
asked, and variables to consider. They clearly demonstrate analytic consistency with respect 
to their own version of the gap hypothesis: asking appropriate questions, specifying 
pertinent dependent and independent variables, and reaching relevant conclusions. The 
difficulty arises where authors define the gap hypothesis in a way that is not consistent with 
other authors’ definitions: identifying a gap that is different from other gaps. It is in this 
way that we have ended up with a plurality of gaps, each with its own research questions 
and set of variables. Thus, while each gap may have been consistently handled and logically 
interpreted, when we examine these gaps in the round – across studies – we are faced with 
a confusing picture, and a subject that is difficult to grasp.  
How did this situation arise? The core of the problem seems to be authors’ lack of 
exactitude in their comprehension and communication of what, in the ‘gap hypothesis’, the 
‘gap’ falls between. In not having taken enough care to ‘mind the gap’, and thereby re-
defining the gap hypothesis, probably unwittingly, they share responsibility for the 
conceptual and analytic confusion which has resulted.  
 However, this problem, of the unintentional re-definition of the gap hypothesis has, I 
think, a root cause, that once identified and dealt with will empower the analyst to avoid 
repeating such missteps. This root cause is authors’ insufficient sensitivity to the ambiguity 
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of the concept ‘immigration policy’. It is therefore to a clarification of this apparently 
straightforward term that we must now turn.  
 
 
Immigration policy: a conceptual framework  
 
I say apparently straightforward. After all, most would agree that ‘immigration policy’ refers 
simply to a course or principle of action proposed by a government, party, or individual 
regarding the control of immigration. Yet further reflection reveals a complication. Any kind 
of public policy may be not only propositional. It may be taken one step further and enacted. 
That is, public policy can go beyond the stances of politicians or parties’ pledges and 
encompass the formal rules and regulations that derive from these and which govern a 
country’s immigration system. These rules and regulations are often referred to in the 
literature as “policy outputs” (e.g., Hollifield, 1986), though immigration law is perhaps a 
clearer label, with an established meaning in legal scholarship (Clayton, 2013). Hence, our 
definition of immigration policy can be broadened to encompass both political actors’ 
proposals and the written substance of immigration law. There is also a third possibility, 
which suggests itself when one considers that immigration law has no life of its own. For it 
to have an effect, it must influence people’s thinking and behaviour. That is, it must be 
administered and enforced. Here we find a third dimension of immigration policy: 
implementation.  
Immigration policy is thus an aggregate concept that encompasses a plurality of 
phenomena. When discussing ‘immigration policy’, to which of these three dimensions do 
scholars wish to refer? All three of them, it seems, in isolation or in some combination –  
though often ambiguously. That is partly why it has been possible for the gap hypothesis to 
have been so frequently misinterpreted, and why it is necessary to outline a conceptual 
framework of immigration policy that disaggregates it into these three aspects, which can 
be viewed as analytically, and empirically, discrete. Respectively, these are: (1) stances on 
immigration; (2) immigration law; and (3) the implementation of immigration law.  
To provide a comprehensive map of the analytic landscape that comprises immigration 
politics and policy, these must be distinguished from three further related concepts, which 
have also featured in definitions of the gap hypothesis. The first of these is public opinion, 
which, as we have seen, has supplanted policy goals in some definitions of the gap 
hypothesis (e.g., Somerville and Goodman, 2010: 951). The second is immigration, which 
refers to a country’s migration phenomena (inflows, outflows, etc.), and which in some 
definitions appears to have supplanted immigration law (e.g., Statham and Geddes, 2006: 
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248). Finally, we have immigration policy effects, which features in the original definition 
of the gap hypothesis, and ought to refer to only those immigration phenomena that resulted 
from policy changes, but is typically replaced in later definitions by immigration (e.g., 
Somerville and Goodman, 2010: 951). Together, these six elements make up my conceptual 
framework and are depicted in Figure 2 with the two most prominent ‘gaps’ in the literature 
(i.e., the gap of Cornelius et al., 1994 and of Freeman, 1995).   
In developing this conceptual framework, I owe a debt to the work of both Jennings
20
 
(2009: 853) and Czaika and de Haas (2013)
21
.  Although my framework was developed with 
the UK in mind, in its essentials it can be expected to find fruitful application in other 
national contexts. This view is supported by its consonance with the conceptual scheme 
formulated by Czaika and de Haas. 
 
 
 
20
 In an article examining the impact of public attitudes upon immigration policy, Jennings 
(2009) drew similar conceptual distinctions between various aspects of “policy”, observing that 
(2009: 853): “there is an understated – but important – conceptual distinction in estimations of 
the degree of democratic responsiveness between (1) policy, (2) bureaucratic outputs, (3) policy 
outputs and (4) policy outcomes. Simply, policy is equal to political commitment or intent, as 
measured in a particular form (such as legislation or expenditure). Bureaucratic outputs are 
equal to active transformation of policy intent into action either by individual bureaucrats or 
bureaucratic agencies…. Policy outputs are equal to the sum of activities related to policy 
objectives, inclusive of behaviour of non-bureaucratic actors and exogenous forces … Policy 
outcomes are equal to the verifiable consequences of policy interventions, relative to exogenous 
forces ... This distinction between units of analysis means that – in practice – policy might fail, 
despite successful implementation, due to shortcomings in the underlying causal theory or 
resistance from environmental factors.”  
21
 I developed my conceptual framework separately to that of Czaika and de Haas, though I 
subsequently refined my own in the light of theirs. I depart from Czaika and de Haas in many 
ways. Most notably, I prefer to speak of ‘immigration law’, which has a clear definition, rather 
than the vaguer “policies on paper” (2013), though in practice they do appear to be referring to 
immigration law. I also make a firmer distinction between ‘immigration policy’ and ‘migration 
phenomena’, viewing the two as separate entities. For Czaika and de Haas, migration phenomena 
(what they call “policy (migration) outcomes”) is one of four “levels at which migration policy 
can be conceptualized”, the others being: “public policy discourses”, “migration policies on 
paper”, and “policy implementation” (2013:  494).  
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Figure 2  Conceptual framework of immigration policy, with two gaps 
 
 
Examining Figure 2 and moving from the top down (though not wishing to imply a 
hierarchical relationship for the elements of my model), public opinion refers to the 
aggregated attitudes of a country’s resident individuals regarding immigration; immigrants; 
the measures that should be used to regulate the former; and the treatment of, including 
rights afforded to, the latter. The term often seems to imply that such attitudes are held by 
a substantial proportion of the national population, with the opinions of the voting public 
being especially relevant to the concerns of political analysts. 
My use of the term stances refers to the stated or inferable positions of individuals, 
groups, or institutions, including governments, vis-à-vis immigration and immigrants. It 
encompasses the discourse or ‘rhetoric’ of political actors, including their proclaimed goals, 
as well as governments’ legislative proposals (e.g., immigration bills), and government 
proposals regarding the administration of the visa system or the enforcement of immigration 
controls. In the UK context, immigration policy stances will therefore include Green Papers: 
consultation documents produced by the government to allow people inside and outside 
Parliament to debate the subject at issue, and give the government department feedback on 
Public opinion
Immigration
Immigration policy effects
Implementation
Law
Stances
Immigration policy
Cornelius et al.'s gap
(1994) 
Freeman's gap
(1995a)
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its proposals; White Papers: documents produced at a more advanced stage of the policy 
process, which set out details of future legislation, and form the basis for the production of 
a bill to be put before Parliament; speeches; and party manifestos. ‘Stances’ on immigration 
is hence a rather broad concept, including a range of diverse phenomena, from politicians’ 
vague promises to detailed draft legislation.
 
Yet, what these phenomena share is that they 
are all propositional. 
Research has shown that there is often a considerable discrepancy between politicians’ 
publicly-stated stances, as conveyed by their ‘rhetoric’, and their ‘real’ positions on 
immigration. Often, ‘tough’ discourses are deployed to mollify voters who are concerned 
about immigration, but without that tough talk being translated faithfully into legislative 
proposals, immigration law, or border enforcement measures (e.g., Castles and Miller, 2014; 
Massey et al., 1998). Because it is difficult to determine whether actors’ stated positions are 
in fact their genuine positions, the label ‘stances’, with its connotation of publicly stated 
opinions, refers to declared positions, either oral or written, and not ‘actual’ ones. 
Nevertheless, this does not preclude the possibility of an actor’s declarations reflecting their 
true position.  
Immigration law refers to the total of the UK’s primary legislation (i.e., Acts of 
Parliament, also known as statutes); secondary legislation, known as the ‘Immigration 
Rules’; case law; and ‘guidelines’ pertinent to immigration and immigrants (Clayton, 2012). 
Immigration law, therefore, can be said to result from the translation of the more 
propositional stances, identified above, into specific, written legal provisions: the system of 
rules that are recognised as regulating the action of citizens and non-citizens with respect 
to immigration.  
The third leg of my tripartite schema, implementation refers to the ways in which 
immigration law affects (or fails to affect) a country’s immigration and its dealings with 
immigrants. This includes the processing of applications to enter or remain in the country, 
whether as an economic or family migrant, or a refugee, as well as applications to acquire 
native citizenship. It also includes the activity of the courts and of the legal system in relation 
to the application of immigration law, and all forms of border control and within-country 
enforcement measures. In the United Kingdom, it encapsulates all the activities of UK Visas 
and Administration, the governmental agency responsible for processing immigration 
applications; and of Immigration Enforcement, the agency responsible for the enforcement 
of immigration law at the border and within the country. Implementation here excludes 
official departmental guidelines, which, following the conventions of legal scholarship, are 
classed as immigration law (e.g., Clayton, 2012). However, it does include administrative 
rules of thumb, also known as “professional idioms” (Rosenhek, 2000: 53). The total of a 
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country’s activity that comprises the implementation of immigration law, I refer to as an 
immigration regime. 
I am certainly not the first analyst to mark a clear distinction between immigration law 
and its implementation. In his chapter from the edited collection, Migration Theory: Talking 
Across the Disciplines (Brettell and Hollifield, 2000), the legal scholar Peter H. Schuck 
delineates the “elementary distinction in legal sociology…between the “law on the books” 
and the “law in action”” (2000: 187-204). The former refers to the law as formally enacted, 
the latter to law as actually implemented. Schuck adds that the importance of this distinction 
can be measured by the “immensity” of the gap between the law and its implementation, 
which, he observes, “while existing in all legal and social systems to some extent, is 
particularly large in the immigration system” (2000: 189-191).  
For others, too, this particular immigration gap is “colossal” (Ellermann, 2009: 9). It 
has even attracted its own labels. Cornelius and Rosenblum call it the “enforcement gap” 
(2000: 113), Czaika and de Haas the “implementation gap” (2013: 494). Furthermore, 
research by Czaika and de Haas (2013: 496) has shown that this gap varies widely and 
depends on many factors: practical, planning or budgetary constraints; corruption, ignorance 
or subversion; and the discretion of civil servants or private companies in the way they 
implement immigration law (Ribas-Mateos, 2004; Ellermann, 2006; Menz, 2008: 235; 
Wunderlich, 2010).  
The term immigration is used here to refer to a country’s immigration phenomena, or 
what has been called the “immigration reality” (Joppke, 1998a: 266). It includes migration 
inflows, naturalisation, denationalisation, asylum applications, the number of people 
granted asylum, and so forth. It also includes, perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, 
migration outflows, also known as emigration. In the UK, for example, migration is 
measured by the Office for National Statistics, which produces quarterly reports on 
immigration and emigration based on data from a sample survey. Also, there are two further 
main sources of data on international migration: the Home Office, which measures long-
term immigration of non-EU citizens; and the census, administered decennially, which 
provides a snapshot of the UK’s foreign-born population.  
In practice, there will always be some discrepancy between these statistics and the UK’s 
actual migration phenomena. However, to avoid unnecessary complication, the conceptual 
framework presented here deals only with the theoretical ‘real’ state of a country’s 
migration. I therefore put to one side questions regarding the reliability and validity of 
migration statistics, which for the purposes of this thesis must be considered of secondary 
importance.  
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Finally, in the study of immigration policy it is also helpful to distinguish a sixth 
concept: immigration policy effects. Other researchers appear to refer to this or a similar 
concept by the term “policy outcomes” (e.g., Hollifield, 1986; Cornelius et al., 1994). But 
‘effects’ is a preferable term because “policy outcomes” has been used to refer to both 
immigration law (e.g., Guiraudon, 1998; Jeong, 2013), and the effects of immigration law 
upon immigration. It is this second interpretation of the term that is most widely held, 
applying as it does to all of those in Table B who used the term ‘policy outcomes’. 
In my schema, policy effects would refer to only those patterns of immigration that 
resulted from identifiable stances
22
 or from immigration laws and their implementation. As 
noted earlier, however, I exclude policy effects from my model, because the causal 
relationship implicit in the term policy effects cannot be inferred. 
Directing our attention to the first five parts of this conceptual framework, it is clear 
from the literature that they are connected by some general causal assumptions that are 
often implicit but seldom acknowledged. In plain terms, their reasoning follows a common-
sense, linear path, namely: public opinion influences immigration stances; these stances 
determine immigration law; law shapes a country’s immigration regime; and finally, a 
country’s immigration regime will affect its immigration.  
Distinguishing between these five objects of analysis is of major benefit. In allowing the 
analyst to frame with greater precision and clarity a number of central puzzles in the 
literature, it should thereby prevent the kind of analytic ambiguity reflected by the variety 
of ‘gaps’ referred to previously. At the same time, it is important to appreciate the 
continuing value of the term ‘immigration policy’, which (as in Figure 2) informs and 
integrates the central phenomena of our subject: stances, law, and implementation. Indeed, 
there will be instances where an analyst may wish to take advantage of this broad meaning 
of the term, to refer to any two, or all three, of its component parts. For the purposes of this 
thesis, I use the term to capture all three facets of immigration policy.   
Referring to the conceptual framework, but excluding immigration policy effects, we 
can see that each of its five elements can be linked to the other four, thus forming ten ‘pair-
relations’ in total. As depicted in Figure 3, these represent ten distinct ‘gaps’, each of 
relevance to immigration policy, its determinants, and its effects. It is interesting to note 
that in the literature, at least nine of these gaps have been said by authors to constitute the 
“gap hypothesis” or some other ‘gap’ that is comparably puzzling, theoretically significant, 
or politically important.  
 
22
 I include stances because they can affect migration even if they do not lead to a change in the 
law, by, for example, dissuading would-be migrants from coming to the UK. 
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It is vitally important to recognise here that each of these ten gaps asks a different 
question. As such, each gap may be explained by different sets of variables. By way of 
example, consider a country that substantiates the original gap hypothesis. It has a highly 
restrictive net migration target that is missed by ever greater margins. To explain this 
discrepancy, we might suppose that the proclaimed target had not in fact led to the 
enactment of restrictive legislation, or that restrictive immigration laws had not been 
enforced effectively, thereby producing an immigration regime that was more liberal in 
practice.  
That line of reasoning makes good intuitive sense. By contrast, it would seem misguided 
to respond to the puzzle of this gap by proposing that public opinion on immigration had 
something to do with it, and hence that to solve the mystery we should endeavour to 
understand the causes of popular xenophobia. That strikes one as much less plausible. 
However, if we are to explain the puzzle of Freeman’s gap, the discrepancy between a 
restrictionist citizenry and expansionary laws, then public opinion would certainly be of 
interest. It might be the case, for example, that a factor, X, is solely responsible for the public 
backlash against immigration. Knowing that X is the cause, and removing it, would hence 
dissolve the gap.  
The conceptual discrepancies between our ten gaps may, of course, not always be this 
striking and may sometimes be quite small or share the same explanatory variables. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that every one of the gaps invokes different sets of 
phenomena as their likely determinants. Yet, few studies can be said to demonstrate an 
assured awareness of what are the most likely explanations for the ‘gap’ that they 
themselves specify.  
 
*** 
 
To clarify where our analysis stands, Table C lists these ten gaps, and illustrates each one 
with examples found in the literature. Some of the definitions cited, when read in isolation 
from their source text, can appear somewhat ambiguous. Where this is the case, I have used 
a close reading of the source text to reach a reasonable interpretation of the author’s 
intentions and so resolve any such ambiguity. I also provide in the table what I consider to 
be the source of each gap’s most likely explanatory variables: ‘explanatory foci’. 
Interestingly, though, individual studies seldom identify, still less analyse, all of what I 
consider to be the most intuitive and probable explanations for the particular ‘gap’ they have 
chosen to examine.  
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Figure 3  Conceptual framework of immigration policy with ten gaps 
 
Public opinion
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[8] Law-Implementation Gap
  [4] Public Opinion-Immigration Gap
Law
Immigration
Immigration policy effects
Implementation
  [1] Public Opinion-Stances Gap
[5] Stances-Law Gap
[10] Implementation-Immigration Gap
  [9] Law-Immigration Gap
[2] Public Opinion-Law Gap
[6] Stances-Implementation Gap
[7] Stances-Immigration Gap
[3] Public Opinion-Implementation Gap
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Table C  Immigration policy-making in liberal democratic states: ten gaps with links to the research literature 
     
Gap 
Also known as  Definition(s)  Likely explanatory foci 
     
[1] Public Opinion-Stances 
Public opinion gap 
(Facchini and Mayda, 2009) 
 ▪ Facchini and Mayda (2009: 2)  
“We document a “public opinion gap”, i.e. a gap between very restrictionist public opinion on one 
side, and more open stated policy goals on the other.” 
▪ Davis (2012: 3) 
“The thesis centres around three main themes: 
(1) The ‘gap’ hypothesis which poses that party positions on immigration do not correspond with 
voter preferences…”  
 ▪ Public anti-immigration preferences and their drivers 
▪ Policy-makers’ rhetoric on immigration 
▪ Policy-makers’ responsiveness to public opinion 
     
[2] Public Opinion-Law  
Freeman’s gap  
(Freeman, 1995a) 
 ▪ Freeman (1995a: 883)  
“Nevertheless, I want to argue that there is in general an expansionary bias in the politics of 
immigration in liberal democracies such that official policies tend to be more liberal than public 
opinion and annual intakes larger than is politically optimal.” 
▪ Freeman (2002: 88) 
“The central puzzle of the politics of immigration in liberal democracies is the large and systematic 
gap between public opinion and public policy.” 
▪ Statham and Geddes (2006: 248) 
“Freeman has arguably gone furthest in developing a theoretical model to explain the purported 
paradox or ‘gap’ between expansionist policies and restrictive publics.” 
▪ Boswell (2007: 78) 
“Recent literature on the theory of migration policy has tended to be dominated by two overlapping 
themes: the question of why migration policies fail; and attempts to explain the inclusionary 
tendency of migration and integration policies. While the two issues are often treated together – 
and may indeed be similarly theorized – they are in principle separable. … The second theme is 
concerned with explaining the gap between the generally protectionist bent of public opinion in 
democratic states, and the more inclusionary policies that often emerge.” 
▪ Rosenblum and Cornelius (2012: 245) 
“[this chapter] concludes by reevaluating two hypotheses from previous research (Cornelius et al. 
1994; Cornelius et al. 2004; Hollifield et al. forthcoming): the “convergence” hypothesis, which 
predicts that diverse migrant-receiving countries are moving toward common policy modes, and 
the “gap” hypothesis, which predicts a divergence between popular demands for tight migration 
policies and less restrictive immigration policy outputs and outcomes.”  
 ▪ Public anti-immigration preferences and their drivers 
▪ Policy-makers’ rhetoric on immigration 
▪ Policy-makers’ responsiveness to public opinion 
▪ Interest group influence 
▪ Liberalist constraints on policy-makers (e.g., from the 
judiciary, bureaucracies, international human rights 
norms) 
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Table C  Immigration policy-making in liberal democratic states: ten gaps with links to the research literature 
     
Gap 
Also known as  Definition(s)  Likely explanatory foci 
     
▪ Jeong (2013: 600)  
“…this article sheds light on a puzzling aspect of immigration policy – namely, the gap that exists 
between public opinion and legislative outcomes.”  
▪ Consterdine (2015a: 1434) 
“Labour’s managed migration policy is a pertinent example of the ‘gap hypothesis’ (Cornelius, 
Martin, and Hollifield 1994) – the seeming mismatch between public demands to limit immigration 
on the one hand and expansive policies on the other hand – as there was no public demand for 
expansion, indeed quite the opposite.”  
     
[3] Public Opinion-
Implementation 
 None found  ▪ Public anti-immigration preferences and their drivers 
▪ Policy-makers’ rhetoric on immigration 
▪ Policy-makers’ responsiveness to public opinion 
▪ Interest group influence 
▪ Liberalist constraints on policy-makers (e.g., from the 
judiciary, bureaucracies, international human rights 
norms) 
▪ Implementation of immigration law (e.g., management of 
administration and enforcement agencies; budgetary 
constraints; officials’ discretion) 
     
[4] Public Opinion-Immigration 
Populist gap 
(Boswell, 2003)  
 ▪ Boswell (2003: 4) 
“This has created what I term the ‘populist gap’: a gap between what can feasibly be done to restrict 
migration in liberal democracies and the often unrealistic and ethically unacceptable demands of 
populist politics.”  
▪ Somerville (2010: 951) 
“Recent migration literature has been dominated by the question of why migration policies fail 
(Boswell, 2007) and in particular one of the central puzzles of immigration scholarship – the 
seeming mismatch, or ‘gap’ (see Cornelius et al., 2004), between public demands to limit 
immigration (together with the ‘control’ rhetoric of politicians) and the reality of an increasing 
volume of immigration.” 
▪ Rosenblum and Cornelius (2012: 245) 
“[this chapter] concludes by reevaluating two hypotheses from previous research (Cornelius et al. 
1994; Cornelius et al. 2004; Hollifield et al. forthcoming): the “convergence” hypothesis, which 
predicts that diverse migrant-receiving countries are moving toward common policy modes, and 
 ▪ Public anti-immigration preferences and their drivers 
▪ Policy-makers’ rhetoric on immigration 
▪ Policy-makers’ responsiveness to public opinion 
▪ Interest group influence 
▪ Liberalist constraints on policy-makers (e.g., from the 
judiciary, bureaucracies, international human rights 
norms) 
▪ Implementation of immigration law (e.g., management of 
administration and enforcement agencies; budgetary 
constraints; officials’ discretion) 
▪ Drivers of immigration (‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors) 
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Gap 
Also known as  Definition(s)  Likely explanatory foci 
     
the “gap” hypothesis, which predicts a divergence between popular demands for tight migration 
policies and less restrictive immigration policy outputs and outcomes.”   
     
[5] Stances-Law  
Discursive gap  
(Czaika and de Haas, 2013) 
 ▪ Menz (2008: 4)  
“The “gap” between restrictionist rhetoric and slightly more permissive practice…” 
▪ Czaika and de Haas (2013: 494) 
“…the discursive gap, or the discrepancy between public discourses and policies on 
paper…” 
 ▪ Policy-makers’ rhetoric on immigration 
▪ Interest group influence 
▪ Liberalist constraints on policy-makers (e.g., from the 
judiciary, bureaucracies, international human rights 
norms) 
     
[6] Stances-Implementation   ▪ Bruquetas-Callejo, Garcés-Mascareñas, Penninx and Scholten (2011: 153)  
“Another similarity, related to this politicisation, concerns the growing gap between policy 
discourse and policy practice.”  
 ▪ Policy-makers’ rhetoric on immigration 
▪ Interest group influence 
▪ Liberalist constraints on policy-makers (e.g., from the 
judiciary, bureaucracies, international human rights 
norms) 
▪ Implementation of immigration law (e.g., management of 
administration and enforcement agencies; budgetary 
constraints; officials’ discretion) 
     
[7] Stances-Immigration 
Gap hypothesis  
(Cornelius et al., 1994; Cornelius 
and Tsuda, 2004) 
 ▪ Hollifield (1986: 114)  
“This article focuses on the changes in immigration policy in France and Germany in the 1970s. 
Particular attention is given to explaining the gap that has developed between policies – outputs – 
and the results of the policies – outcomes – in each country.”  
▪ Freeman (1992: 1155) 
“Public concern has been heightened because of the gap between the official closed door policy and 
the reality of expanding migrant communities in Europe.”  
▪ Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield (1994: 3)  
“…we argue that the gap between the goals of national immigration policy (laws, regulations, 
executive actions, etc.) and the actual results of policies in this area (policy outcomes) is wide and 
growing wider in all major industrialized democracies, thus provoking greater public hostility 
towards immigrants in general (regardless of legal status) and putting intense pressure on political 
parties and government officials to adopt more restrictive policies. We refer to this as the “gap 
hypothesis.” 
 ▪ Policy-makers’ rhetoric on immigration 
▪ Interest group influence 
▪ Liberalist constraints on policy-makers (e.g., from the 
judiciary, bureaucracies, international human rights 
norms) 
▪ Implementation of immigration law (e.g., management of 
administration and enforcement agencies; budgetary 
constraints; officials’ discretion) 
▪ Drivers of immigration (‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors)  
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Table C  Immigration policy-making in liberal democratic states: ten gaps with links to the research literature 
     
Gap 
Also known as  Definition(s)  Likely explanatory foci 
     
▪ Joppke (1998a: 266) 
“The phenomenon of unwanted immigration reflects the gap between restrictionist policy goals and 
expansionist outcomes.” 
▪ Freeman (2002: 77-78) 
“The gap hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that the distance between the goals of policies 
and their effects is large and growing larger in all the industrialized countries.” 
▪ Cornelius and Tsuda (2004: 4)  
“We retain the two central theses used to organize the first edition. The first, which we call the 
“gap hypothesis,” is that significant and persistent gaps between official government policies and 
actual policy outcomes.”  
▪ Boswell (2007: 78) 
“Recent literature on the theory of migration policy has tended to be dominated by two overlapping 
themes: the question of why migration policies fail; and attempts to explain the inclusionary 
tendency of migration and integration policies. While the two issues are often treated together – 
and may indeed be similarly theorized – they are in principle separable. The first deals with the gap 
between (proclaimed) policy objectives and outcomes.” 
     
[8] Law-Implementation 
Enforcement gap 
(Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005) 
Implementation gap 
(Czaika and de Haas, 2013) 
 ▪ Cornelius and Rosenblum (2005: 113)  
“Much of this recent work seeks to explain the unmet demands for migration control (i.e., the 
“enforcement gap”), primarily by focusing on interest group dynamics and/or political institutions.” 
▪ Czaika and de Haas (2013: 496) 
“The implementation gap is the discrepancy between policies on paper and their actual 
implementation.” 
 ▪ Implementation of immigration law (e.g., management of 
administration and enforcement agencies; budgetary 
constraints; officials’ discretion) 
     
[9] Law-Immigration   ▪ Cornelius and Rosenblum (2005: 100)  
“Although the recent gap between formally restrictive policies and de facto permissiveness in the 
immigration domain…” 
 ▪ Implementation of immigration law (e.g., management of 
administration and enforcement agencies; budgetary 
constraints; officials’ discretion) 
▪ Drivers of immigration (‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors) 
     
[10] Implementation-Immigration 
Efficacy gap  
(Czaika and de Haas, 2013) 
 ▪ Czaika and de Haas (2013: 497) 
“…the efficacy gap reflects the degree to which the implemented laws, regulations, and measures 
have the intended effect on the volume, timing, direction, and composition of migration flows.” 
 ▪ Drivers of immigration (‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors) 
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The two main gaps in the literature on immigration policy-making 
 
Now that we have clarified what it is we mean by immigration policy, having 
disaggregated the concept into three empirically separate aspects – stances, law, and 
implementation – we can return to the puzzles at the heart of immigration policy research, 
as expressed by the various definitions of the gap hypothesis. Now, however, we can give 
these puzzles a more precise, hence clearer, formulation, and hence frame more exactly 
the central concern of this thesis.  
There are two ‘gaps’ that have been most prominent in the literature, and which are 
also the most relevant to the present study. These are the pair of subtly different gaps 
identified by Freeman (2002: 78) and Boswell (2007: 75-76).  The first is the discrepancy 
between politicians’ restrictive immigration policy objectives and an increasing volume of 
immigration. According to the terms of my conceptual framework, this is the stances-
immigration gap. This is equivalent to the original conception of the gap hypothesis, 
excepting that definition’s inclusion of immigration law and at least one manifestation of 
its implementation (“executive actions”). 
When viewed through the lens of my conceptual framework, the puzzle of the 
stances-immigration gap can be seen to comprise several of the other gaps, included in 
Table C. These can be conceived as ‘sub-gaps’ of the stances-immigration gap, each of 
which poses a narrower puzzle. Three of these are especially pertinent: the stances-law 
gap, which is the gap between restrictive government stances and more liberal 
immigration laws; the law-implementation gap, which is the gap between restrictive 
immigration law and the more liberal immigration regime that results; and the 
implementation-immigration gap, which arises from the observation that a country with 
a restrictive immigration regime nevertheless exhibits large-scale immigration. Thus, 
explanations of the stances-immigration gap may contain explanations for each of the 
following puzzles: why politicians’ tough rhetoric is not matched by the laws they pass; 
why immigration laws are so poorly enforced; or why a country’s strict immigration 
regime cannot prevent mass immigration.    
The other most important gap in the literature is what may be termed the public 
opinion-law gap, that introduced by Freeman (1995a). In the UK for the period under 
study, this may be expressed as the gap between the aggregate of UK citizens’ attitudes 
towards immigration – specifically, the majority view that it should be reduced – and 
immigration law, which is hypothesised to be less restrictive than the Coalition 
government wants it to be.  
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This second gap, like the previous stances-immigration gap, encompasses the 
stances-law gap. Here, the two main gaps overlap, both being concerned with the 
subordinate puzzle of why there is a difference between a government’s proclaimed 
legislative goals and the law on the books. This second gap is also concerned with the 
correspondence between public opinion and policy-makers’ stances, the latter including 
their rhetoric and proclaimed goals.  
A merit of this second gap is its narrower focus. As Boswell observed, being more 
narrowly drawn it raises “questions which may be obscured if we treat it as a subset of 
the first [gap]”, adding that it “implies a more narrow focus on the configuration of 
interests, ideas, and institutions that shape policy” (2007: 75). Additionally, from the 
perspective of immigration policy theory, it is the second of these gaps that is by far the 
more relevant. It is also, therefore, the more relevant to this investigation.  
By contrast, if we reflect upon the puzzle of the first gap, the stances-immigration 
gap, we notice it has come frequently to be formulated as one of two questions: why do 
migration policies fail? (Castles, 2004); and why do states accept unwanted immigration? 
(Joppke, 1998a: 266). In turn, the answers to these questions have been manifold. As 
Boswell says, “there are any number of theories” that seek to answer these questions 
(2007: 75). This observation is certainly supported by the contents of Table C, which 
shows six plausible explanatory foci for the puzzle posed by this gap.   
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that in view of the discussion so far, the 
present study aims to contribute to explanations of Freeman’s narrower gap. First, 
though, what does the research literature tell us about the causes of this public opinion-
law gap in liberal democracies? That is the subject of our next chapter. 
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3 Explaining the public opinion-law gap 
– a review of the research literature   
 
 
Explanations of the public opinion-law gap – the disjuncture between highly restrictionist 
public opinion and more liberal immigration law – typically assert that national governments 
endeavour to reflect their publics’ preferences for restrictive immigration reforms, but are 
persuaded or prevented from doing so by sources of pressure to liberalise immigration law. 
More specifically, this pressure aims at liberalising existing immigration law, or loosening 
the proposed legislative restrictions of the executive.  
There are, say researchers, two main sources of this liberal pressure (Boswell, 2013). 
The first comprises organised interest groups that seek to persuade policy-makers to make 
immigration law less restrictive. These include the business lobby, trade unions, and 
advocacy groups like Liberty. The researchers that have done most to explore this influence 
have applied political economy approaches, and argue that lobbying success is underpinned 
by a powerful economic logic, whereby the concentrated organised interests of lobbyists to 
loosen immigration restrictions tend to outweigh the diffuse collective interests of the 
public to restrict immigration.  
The second source of pressure encompasses liberal institutions and norms, operating 
both nationally and extra-nationally (i.e., internationally or supranationally). These derive, 
respectively, from the internal structural features of liberal democratic states, and from the 
relationships between such states. At the national level, they include written constitutions 
and constitutional arrangements and conventions; national judiciaries; and bureaucracies 
with entrenched liberal cultures. At the extra-national level, they include international 
relations and “embedded liberalism” (Hollifield, 1992a: 26-37); international norms on 
human rights; global capitalism; and supranational institutions such as the European Union.  
Collectively, these influences are known by the term “liberal constraint” (Hollifield, 
1992a: 94). This is because they emanate from features of the liberal democratic state, and 
perhaps because they are liberal in their effect, constraining the restrictionist bent of the 
executive’s stances on immigration. The core of the ‘liberal constraint’ argument here is that 
national policy-makers have lost the capacity to enact their preferred immigration laws. 
Joppke (1999) uses the term “self-limited sovereignty” to describe a similar trend, though 
he identifies only domestic liberal constraints, not extra-national ones. 
THE LEGISLATURE IN IMMIGRATION POLICY-MAKING 
 
56 
 
To situate this study within its appropriate scholarly context, in this chapter I review 
the arguments relating to the role of both organised interest groups and the liberal 
constraint in shaping immigration law. I then explore what scholars have said about that 
other potential liberal constraint: the national legislature. 
 
 
Organised interest groups 
 
By far the most-cited explanatory theory of immigration law, aimed at explaining the 
opinion-law gap, has been that of Gary P. Freeman (1995, 2002), who is credited with being 
the first to offer a comprehensive explanation of this particular gap (Somerville and 
Goodman, 2010: 951). Freeman’s argument was startling. He disputed the orthodox view 
that immigration law-making in liberal democracies, especially those of Western Europe, 
was highly restrictive, driven by populist politicians seeking electoral advantage by appealing 
to voters’ anti-immigration proclivities. Instead, he argued that since World War Two the 
dynamics of immigration law-making in liberal democracies had been “broadly expansionist 
and inclusive” (1995: 881). 
 Freeman attributed these liberalising dynamics principally to the actions of organised 
interest groups, such as human rights organisations and employers. These groups lobby 
executive elites, seeking to persuade them to loosen immigration restrictions and 
implement more inclusive laws. Adopting a term from James Q. Wilson (1980), Freeman 
labels this mode of policy-making “client politics” (1995a), which he characterises as: 
 
a form of bilateral influence in which small and well-organized groups intensely interested 
in a policy develop close working relationships with those officials responsible for it. Their 
interactions take place largely out of public view and with little outside interference. Client 
politics is strongly oriented toward expansive immigration policies. 
 
Although Freeman was not the first to argue for the influence of interest groups in 
immigration law-making (see Divine, 1957; Craig, 1971; Shughart et al., 1986; Simmons 
and Keohane, 1992; Ireland, 1994), he did provide the first comprehensive theory from the 
perspective of political economy, which led him to the following insight (1995a: 885), 
explaining how policy-makers come to be influenced by the lobbying efforts of organised 
interests: 
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If one assumes that [the state actors that make policy] are vote-maximizers, then one 
predicts they will respond to the organized pressure of groups favorable to immigration, 
ignoring the widespread but poorly articulated opposition of the general public. 
 
While it is reasonable to assume that elected politicians are vote-maximisers, why should 
they respond to the pressures of interest groups, which constitute only a small proportion 
of the electorate? Surely, in following a vote-maximising logic, politicians would court the 
votes of the general public, which comprises almost the entire electorate. Freeman’s 
apparent answer to this theoretical pitfall lies in what he claims is the presence of a “strong 
antipopulist norm that dictates that politicians should not seek to exploit racial, ethnic or 
immigration-related fears in order to win votes” (1995a: 885). The extent to which this 
norm actually prevails has been questioned (Brubaker, 1995), but if Freeman were right on 
this point his policy-makers would be more normative agents than vote-maximisers. 
Strikingly, this apparent tension in Freeman’s argument has, to my knowledge, never been 
pointed out. Of course, this does not mean that interest groups are not influential in shaping 
immigration law, only that Freeman’s posited psychological mechanism is implausible.  
A number of works (Hanson and Spilimbergo, 2001; Watts, 2001; Haus, 2002; 
Amegashie, 2005; Facchini and Mayda, 2008, 2009; Menz, 2008; Facchini, Mayda and 
Mishra, 2011) would subsequently adopt and extend Freeman’s analysis, developing his 
essential thesis that interest groups are central to immigration policy-making in Western 
democracies. But is this supported by the evidence? In a more recent publication (Freeman 
and Tendler, 2012: 325), Freeman himself concludes that the evidence is anything but 
strong:  
 
...one might anticipate that immigration politics in liberal democracies would be 
quintessentially the politics of organized groups. Surprisingly, this claim has been only 
weakly substantiated with empirical data and has been challenged by some scholars. 
Students of European immigration politics in particular have criticized interest group 
models as inapplicable to most European cases… (Geddes 2003, 21; Joppke 1999; Statham 
and Geddes 2006). 
  
However, we should not reject the ‘client politics’ model just because it has not found 
extensive empirical support. After all, such influence is likely to be difficult to measure. As 
Freeman notes, interest groups work “quietly in tandem with policy makers to promote 
their favoured policies while most of society pays little or no attention” (2002: 80-81). In 
any case, Freeman is perhaps overmodest about the empirical support for his theory. In a 
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study of the United States, Facchini et al. (2011) adduce compelling evidence of interest 
group influence, a view supported by Messina with respect to post-war Europe (2007: 239-
241).  
However, to Freeman’s theory we may add an important qualification from Cornelius 
and Tsuda, namely that the “interest-group politics model tends to explain more of the 
variation in immigration policy-making in the ‘classic countries of immigration’ (the United 
States, Canada, and Australia) than in the ‘reluctant’ labor importers (Western Europe, 
Japan), where the pro-immigration lobby is much less entrenched” (2004: 12). As 
Somerville and Goodman also note (2010: 956), this position is certainly in keeping with 
the “vast majority of commentators on UK migration policy”, who “barely mention the 
possibility that interest groups, or policy networks inclusive of non-state actors, have 
influenced policy” (see, for example, Hammar, 1985; Spencer, 1997; Hansen, 2000). Joppke 
is equally unequivocal on this point: “In Great Britain, where immigration policy was from 
the start a restrictive policy to shut down unsolicited post‐colonial immigration, 
immigration policy never was client politics” (1998b: 18). 
By contrast, however, Somerville and Goodman present a more ambivalent picture, 
made possible by their disaggregation of immigration policy into three areas: economic 
migration, asylum, and integration. Their study of UK immigration policy between 1997 and 
2007 confirmed that an elite-led, powerful executive was responsible for asylum policy 
development; but that for economic migration policy the business lobby played an important 
role; while a diffuse network encompassing local and national government actors was 
involved in integration policy-making (2010). 
Although my own research into the role of the legislature did not set out expressly to 
test the centrality of interest groups to the UK’s immigration law-making, its close empirical 
examination of Parliament’s legislative process may well uncover evidence that speaks to 
this question. With that said, this thesis may be said to be most closely associated with a 
different literature: that which analyses the ‘liberal constraint’. 
 
 
Sources of the ‘liberal constraint’ 
 
The idea of the ‘liberal constraint’ may be traced to Hollifield’s path-breaking account of the 
political and economic factors that drove the rise of immigration in post-war Europe and 
the United States (1992a: 94). As previously mentioned, this concept relates to sources of 
pressure that aim to liberalise immigration law, whether existing or proposed. However, to 
those unfamiliar with the research literature on immigration policy-making, the term is 
Explaining the public opinion-law gap 
– a review of the research literature  
59 
liable to mislead, in two respects. First, it could be taken to mean that the constraint itself 
is liberal, and hence that it is loose, weak, or sets wide limits for compliance. That 
interpretation is sure to confuse. After all, how can a constraint be liberal when a constraint 
is by definition restrictive? Second, it could be thought to refer to a constraint on something 
liberal. This inverts the intended meaning of the concept, which refers to a constraint on 
restrictive immigration policy. 
To avoid such ambiguity and hence make these erroneous interpretations less likely, I 
propose a replacement term: liberalist constraint
23
. In so doing, I recognise that those who 
conduct research into immigration policy need not remind each other that the ‘liberal 
constraint’ is a constraint, specifically a constraint upon illiberal immigration stances, with 
a view to moderating their restrictiveness. Equally, immigration researchers will know that 
the liberal constraint does not act to restrict something liberal. Yet, although this revision 
will be unnecessary for the specialist reader – and worse, might cause confusion were they 
to mistakenly think that the change denotes a new concept – I would nevertheless suggest 
that this does not mean we should use ambiguous terminology if we can help it. It is in that 
spirit that I adopt the term ‘liberalist constraint’ for this thesis.   
 With our terminology clarified, we may now turn to the liberalist constraints that have 
been uncovered by researchers, which, they have argued, operate at both national and at 
extra-national levels. The former encapsulates two sources: national judiciaries and state 
bureaucracies; while the latter encompasses four: “embedded liberalism”; international 
human rights norms; global capitalism; and supranational institutions, such as the European 
Union. Each of these sources is dealt with in turn. 
 
 
The national judiciary 
 
Our first domestic liberalist constraint comes from national judiciaries. The researcher 
perhaps best known for this argument is Joppke (1998a; 1998b; 1999; 2001; Joppke and 
 
23
 In general, the suffix ‘-ist’ means “of, relating to, or characteristic of” (Merriam-Webster), and 
is used to form nouns and adjectives that describe a particular set of beliefs or way of behaving. 
Here it modifies the adjective ‘liberal’ to make clear that by ‘liberalist constraint’ we do not mean 
that the constraint itself is liberal (i.e., weak – our first misinterpretation); and nor are we 
referring to a constraint on something liberal (the second misinterpretation). Rather, we are 
labelling something that is of, related to, and characteristic of, liberalism and the liberal 
democratic state, namely, their norms and institutions. 
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Marzal, 2004). However, it was in 1994 that authors first recorded the emergence of a form 
of “liberal republicanism” within the democratic polity, especially in “judicial rulings” that 
had resulted in “expanded rights for marginal and ethnic groups, including foreigners” 
(Cornelius et al., 1994: 9).  
Joppke’s research was inspired by the observation that while liberal states seemed to 
have little success in curtailing immigration, the immigrant-receiving states of the oil-
producing Middle East had no such trouble (a pattern identified in Weiner, 1995: 80-83). 
This led him to the idea that it was perhaps some characteristic feature of liberal 
democracies that prevented them from curbing their immigration. Ultimately, Joppke 
identified that feature as the legal systems of these nation-states. These, he concluded, 
constituted an important “source of expansiveness toward immigrants” (1998a: 271), 
especially via an “activist judiciary invoking constitutional norms to curtail the restrictionist 
policy intentions of the executive” (1998b: 18). This is possible, he maintained, because 
judges, unlike politicians, are not chronically vulnerable to populist xenophobia. They are 
“generally shielded from such pressures”, beholden to only “the abstract commands of 
statutory and constitutional law” (1998: 271). As such, independent and liberalist courts 
regularly defy a restrictionist executive in upholding constitutional or statutory rights for 
immigrants, especially of residence and family unification, with their arguments bolstered 
by “domestic legitimatory discourses” (Joppke, 2001: 339). The judicial tail, suggested 
Joppke, wagged the legislative dog. 
Virginie Guiraudon has corroborated Joppke’s arguments, and in some places has 
refined and extended them (1997, 1998a, 2001a, 2002). Based on detailed empirical 
research, she has been able to provide a more comprehensive list of liberalist legal 
constraints, which, “have developed since the 1970s in such a way as to constrain the 
restrictive objectives of migration control policy” and comprise: domestic constitutional 
principles such as ‘equality before the law’ and ‘fundamental rights’; general legal principles, 
including ‘due process’ and ‘proportionality’; and national jurisprudence and enacted laws 
(2000: 258). 
However, although this liberalist constraint is to be found in Germany and the United 
States (Joppke, 1998a, 1999, 2001; cf. Neuman, 1990), as well as in France (Joppke and 
Marzal, 2004), it appears to have been largely absent in the UK. As Joppke explains, “In 
Britain, with no written constitution and deferential courts, there is very little self‐limitation 
of the state” (1998b: 19; see also Joppke, 1999: 100-137; cf. Legomsky, 1987). This view is 
supported by Jacobson and Ruffer, who observe that, “The British political system has been 
one where…the courts were secondary, possessing very limited powers of judicial review” 
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(2006: 89). Based on these views, one might ask: in the UK, are there any liberalist 
constraints upon the restrictionist bent of the executive? 
 
 
State bureaucracies 
 
The importance of bureaucracies in immigration law-making was first proposed by Hammar 
in his influential comparative volume of post-war European immigration policy (1985). 
Informed especially by his chapter on Sweden (1985: 17-49), a country in which policy-
making is markedly bureaucratised, Hammar proposed five explanations for the 
participation of state administrative agencies in immigration law-making (1985: 279-81). 
First, civil servants have more expertise than do elected policy-makers in the drafting of 
immigration law, a technically-complicated area. Second, political parties struggle to 
respond to the immigration question, the central issue of which is largely unfamiliar to 
them: how to divide the nation’s ‘economic pie’ between citizens and non-citizens, rather 
than, as before, between members of the electorate. Third, there is no significant difference 
of opinion on immigration policy between countries’ mainstream political parties. Fourth, 
it is politically risky for a party or politician to take a stand on an immigration issue. Fifth, 
a country’s political parties often agree to allow their immigration policies to be led by the 
national interest, which, as for points three and four, effectively de-politicises the issue, 
thereby handing over responsibility for the drafting of immigration legislation to 
administrative agencies.  
Hammar’s arguments were to be investigated by Guiraudon, based on her comparative 
research of France, Germany, and the Netherlands (1997, 1998a, 2002, 2002). Across these 
studies, she sought to answer the puzzle of the stances-law gap: why social rights should 
come to be enjoyed by foreigners in Western Europe, given the restrictionist policy goals of 
governments. Guiraudon found that the stances-law gap could be explained in relation to 
the influence of state bureaucracy. She discovered that social rights, such as access to social 
welfare benefits, were granted behind closed doors in bureaucratic venues “biased in favour 
of equality before the law” (2002: 72). This, in concert with bureaucrats’ proclivity to 
“standardise operations” and ease the administration of such benefits, produced a 
convergence of welfare rights for citizens and non-citizens alike (2002: 86). This discovery 
also helped Guiraudon explain why these rights were granted before political and civil rights, 
proposing that bureaucratic interventions were not possible for political rights, such as the 
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right to vote, because these typically require “constitutional reform or at least legislative 
debate” (2002: 72). 
Returning to Hammar’s initial study, Guiraudon also provides strong empirical support 
for his fourth proposition, that politicians are wary of taking a stand on the issue of 
immigration. On this she concludes that political leaders, in deploying strategies to win 
electoral advantage, also attempt to avoid blame for the passing of unpopular reforms by 
shifting debate to bureaucratic venues that are “sheltered from electoral fallout” (2002: 86).  
Based on these empirical studies one can appreciate that in European countries state 
bureaucracies have played a key role in shaping immigration laws. However, the extent to 
which they realise a comparable influence in the UK has yet to be established. Hitherto, the 
UK has not been the subject of similar research. 
 
 
“Embedded liberalism” 
 
As previously mentioned, four kinds of liberalist constraint are identified as having an extra-
national origin. Our first is what Hollifield has labelled “embedded liberalism”, a term that 
he adopted from the political scientist John Ruggie (Hollifield, 1992a: 26; Ruggie, 1982). 
This describes the emergence after the Second World War of an international system of 
norms guiding the relations between, and legal conduct within, the nations of Western 
Europe and the United States. These norms were introduced informally through tacit rules 
that govern international relations, and are codified in conventions, treaties, and 
declarations. However, these norms are hardly neutral. Hollifield suggests they were 
developed at the behest of the hegemonic states of the OECD, especially the United States, 
motivated by this superpower’s interest in exporting a particular worldview (1992a). 
Irrespective of this interpretation, the outcome has been that rights for foreigners became 
embedded in the jurisprudence and political cultures of these societies. 
For Hollifield, embedded liberalism can explain outcomes that other factors cannot. He 
suggests that the demonstrable failures of governments to meet their proclaimed goals to 
reduce immigration cannot be attributed solely to a lack of political will. Nor can they be 
fully explained by a focus upon the drivers of immigration, such as employers’ demand for 
foreign labour. Rather, he concludes, the stances-immigration gap is to be explained in 
substantial degree by refocusing attention upon explanatory factors invoked by the narrower 
focus of Freeman’s gap. These are to do with the formulation of immigration law, which, 
avers Hollifield, is influenced by political and economic factors that constrain policy-makers’ 
attempts to enact restrictive immigration legislation (e.g., 1986).  
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Critically, says Hollifield, these forces are bolstered by embedded liberalism. They stem 
from the international system, arising from the relations between, on the one hand, 
international markets, which are based on the liberal principles of free trade in goods, 
capital, services, and people; and on the other hand, rights, especially states’ respect for 
fundamental human rights and associated constitutional norms and principles. Yet, 
although all of these factors originated from inter-state relations, they are expressed mainly 
domestically through the rule of law and due process, especially in the emergence of 
adversarial legal cultures that afford greater protections to minority groups from the 
arbitrary powers of the state and employers.  
Accordingly, it would appear that the tenets of liberalism are securely embedded and 
that the rights that pertain to them are robust. As Hollifield comments, “If rights are ignored 
or trampled upon then the liberal state risks undermining its own legitimacy and raison 
d’être” (2004: 901-902). Moreover, rights that are located in a nation’s fabric may also be 
augmented by those with a more international remit, though perhaps at the expense of 
national clout. Most especially, these rights are those emanating from the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
 
 
International human rights norms 
 
The liberalist constraint provided by international norms concerning human rights was also 
prefigured in Hollifield (1992a; 1992b), but received its first detailed treatment by Yasemin 
Soysal in her influential book Limits of Citizenship (1994). Soysal’s thesis is that the 
authority of nation-states to enact their desired citizenship laws, a major subset of 
immigration law, has been diminished by transnational norms on human rights and their 
associated institutions. More than this, she argued that the foundation for human rights, 
including those of immigrants, is increasingly found at the transnational rather than the 
national level. As such, the traditional notion of national citizenship is gradually being 
replaced by an emerging post-national citizenship.  
Soysal labels this new form of citizenship “personhood”. It is universal in character, 
transcending individual nation-states and individuals’ national identities. Whilst 
personhood might seem like an abstract notion, says Soysal, it is anchored in concrete 
organisational forms and practices, especially those of collectivities, which in “advising 
national governments, enforcing legal categories, crafting models and standards, and 
producing reports and recommendations, promote and diffuse ideas and norms about 
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universal human rights that in turn engender a commanding discourse of membership” 
(1994: 152). 
Support for the importance of international human rights in shaping immigration law 
has also come from the legal scholar, David Jacobson (1996; see also Jacobson and Ruffer, 
2003, 2006); and Amy Gurowitz, who identified the importance of human rights norms in 
Japan, via their utilisation in political and legal discourse by domestic actors (1999). Of 
particular relevance to the present study is their observation, now corroborated by many 
researchers, that the principal institutional mechanisms by which international norms 
influence law are judicial and administrative – the two national sources of the liberalist 
constraint outlined above – and not those relating to the legislature (Jacobson and Ruffer, 
2006: 26).  
However, it would be fair to say that arguments regarding the role of international 
norms in shaping immigration law have been particularly controversial (see Joppe, 1998b; 
Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000). Three principal objections to the overlapping accounts of 
Soysal and Jacobson have been raised. First, they have failed to demonstrate empirically the 
impact of international human rights norms upon immigration policy-making (e.g., 
Freeman, 1998; Joppke, 1998b: 15). Second, there are good empirical grounds for believing 
that international human rights norms have little effect upon the content of enacted law 
(Martin, 1989; Koopmans and Statham, 1999). Joppke, for example, concludes that devoid 
of “hard legal powers”, the international human rights regime consists merely of the “soft 
moral power of discourse” (1998a: 296; see also Finnemore, 1996). Importantly, Joppke 
views the UK as the case that exemplifies this critique, evincing the “impotence” of 
international human rights norms “if not backed by a domestic bill of rights and 
independent courts” (1998: 141). Subsequently, Guiraudon and Lahav were to advance 
persuasive qualifications to this ‘post-national thesis’, based on their empirical examination 
of the power of human rights to influence immigration law across the EU (2000). They show 
how such norms are strictly limited in their scope, being “circumscribed to two specific 
areas: the right to lead a normal family life and the protection against inhuman treatment” 
(2000: 167).  
The third criticism concerns the validity of the designation international. Insofar as such 
human rights norms explain the substance of immigration legislation, they do so essentially 
via the operation of norms and institutions within nation-states (Joppke, 1998, 1999: 264; 
Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000: 189; Hansen, 2002: 264; Statham and Geddes, 2006: 267). It 
is perhaps this last point that most alerts us to the need to examine the influence of 
international human rights norms nation-by-nation. In the case of the United Kingdom, 
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might one expect, following Joppke, there be more governmental rhetoric than action in 
relation to such norms? 
 
 
Global capitalism 
 
The idea that international markets place normative and institutional constraints upon 
national immigration law-makers is to be found in Hollifield (1992a, 1992b, 2004), though 
the researcher who has presented it most vigorously is Saskia Sassen (1996a, 1996b, 1999). 
In her understanding, the nation-state has been nothing less than “transformed” by the 
growth of the global economic system (1999: 177). However, in Sassen’s account global 
capitalism is only one of several interwoven elements implicated in what she terms the “de-
facto transnationalism” of nation-states’ handling of immigration issues (1999). Most 
crucially, Sassen sees this process of de-facto transnationalism as encompassing a marked 
decline of state sovereignty in immigration law-making.  
In Sassen’s argument economic globalisation features as a medial force and has a precise 
definition, referring to the formation of a “privatized regime for the circulation of service 
workers” that has resulted from the “privatization of public sector activities and of economic 
deregulation” (1999: 177). The result, says Sassen, is that “corporations, markets and free 
trade agreements are now in charge of ‘governing’ an increasing share of cross-border flows, 
including cross-border flows of specialized professional workers as part of the international 
trade and investment in services” (1999: 177). Thus translated to a country’s efforts to 
control immigration, this particular factor would certainly figure as a potentially significant 
constraint upon national immigration law-makers. 
 
 
Supranational institutions 
 
Our final source of the liberalist constraint is found in supranational institutions, to which 
the locus of immigration law-making is argued to have shifted. One of the first authors to 
emphasise the importance of supranational institutions in the granting of migrants’ rights 
was Soysal (1994). She identified supranational organisations as a major source of 
immigrant lobbying, arguing that these “work explicitly to redefine the identity and status 
of migrants at the European level” (1994: 112). In particular, she identifies the following 
supranational organisations as of primary importance in influencing the shape of citizenship 
and integration law: the Council of Associations of Immigrants in Europe (CAIEUROPE); 
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the Council of Europe; the European Community; and the Court of Justice of the European 
Community. To these Sassen added several further supranational institutions, to which 
“various components of state authority” in immigration law-making had been relocated: the 
European Union; the European Court of Human Rights; and the World Trade Organisation 
(1999: 177). These institutions, especially the EU, have since received greater scholarly 
attention under the rubric of the ‘Europeanisation’ of immigration policy or ‘EU legal 
integration’ (Bigo, 1996; Brochmann, 1999a, 1999b; Guiraudon, 2000, 2003; Lahav, 2004a; 
Lahav and Guiraudon, 2006; Luedtke, 2006: 419-441; Martiniello, 2006: 298-326; Messina, 
2007: 150-151; Hampshire, 2013: 98-106). 
 The increased level of attention paid to this one supranational organisation would seem 
to confirm that, to no small extent, national decisions on immigration law are acquiescent 
to the ‘higher authority’ vested in the European Union. This theme chimes with the 
arguments exchanged during the UK’s Brexit debates – and logically with demands to return 
immigration control back to the country’s own legislature, unhampered by the liberalist 
edicts of the EU. It is to the role of the legislature in post-war immigration law-making that 
we now turn our attention. 
 
 
The role of the legislature in shaping immigration law: a literature review 
 
There is a large and varied research literature on the immigration law-making of the liberal 
democratic states of Western Europe and North America. Yet it has paid scant attention to 
the impact of the legislature and that of its constitutive actors, elected legislators. This 
dearth is reflected in the major literature reviews of immigration policy theories (Meyers, 
2000, 2004; Lahav and Guiraudon, 2006; Boswell, 2007; Money, 2009; Bonjour, 2011; 
Zogata-Kusz, 2012). Between these six reviews, which collectively provide a comprehensive 
overview of the field, just a single direct reference is made to the national legislature 
(Money, 2009: 9), and then only to note one study’s dismissal of it as an important 
institution (namely, Rosenblum, 2003).  
This seeming neglect in the literature of the legislature’s role in immigration law-
making, is redressed to some extent in Boswell’s review article, albeit indirectly. In a 
discussion of the various institutions in which the source of the liberalist constraint may be 
located, Boswell discusses those which “derive force from constitutional provisions that 
institutionalize their autonomy” (2007: 83). These constitutional provisions include, “the 
separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, and so on” (83); and it is reasonable to 
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presume that “separation of powers” includes the national legislature, irrespective of 
whether or not it is referenced explicitly. 
Nor does one find any reference in the six literature reviews to a specific national 
legislature. It is a telling illustration that in their identification of those social actors that 
they and other researchers have viewed as influential in immigration law-making, Lahav and 
Guiraudon include “organised interest groups, courts, ethnic groups, trade unions, law and 
order bureaucracies, police and security agencies, local actors and street-level bureaucrats 
and private actors” (2006: 207). Typically, their list does not include the national legislature; 
and in truth there is very little evidence in these literature reviews and elsewhere to suggest 
its warrant of greater scholarly prominence.  
Even so, I would contend that there are certain studies in which the legislature’s 
peripheral treatment or even total disregard ought to have received careful consideration 
and subsequent justification. For example, researchers of states with strong parliamentary 
traditions ought at least to have explained, however briefly, the legislature’s absence from 
their study.  However, this protocol has not been followed. By way of illustration, in an 
explanatory study of immigration policy-making in the Scandinavian countries, 
Gudbrandsen dismisses the legislature with a single remark: “The role of legislatures is not 
specified in the model” (2012: 20). This tends to exemplify the general lack of recognition 
of the potential role or importance of the legislature, notwithstanding its constitutional 
place within governments. Hence, in light of the widely-held view of this institution’s 
marginal role in immigration law-making, Gudbrandsen’s remark would be unsurprising, 
were it not for the very next sentence: “In cases of minority governments, which have been 
common in Scandinavia, legislatures may, however, change policies without going through 
the government” (2012: 20). An institution that possesses that kind of power – to change 
immigration law without the input or assent of the executive – ought not to be excluded 
from any explanatory model, let alone dismissed so lightly. 
There is, however, one legislature that is perceived as possessing the power to 
substantially shape immigration law, leading to one category of study that defies this pattern 
of neglect: those of the United States. 
 
 
The centrality of the United States legislature 
   
Every major study of the immigration law-making of the United States has the country’s 
legislature, Congress, at centre stage. My review identified ten studies, which we can 
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categorise into two broad types. The first, and earlier, type of study is historical-
institutionalist. These provide detailed narratives of the Congressional politics of US 
immigration reform, typically over many years or even decades. Four such enquiries are 
particularly noteworthy in advancing explanatory accounts in which Congress is a key causal 
variable (Goldin, 1994; Gimpel and Edwards, 1999; Tichenor, 2002; Togman, 2002). 
Significantly, the narrative in each of these four studies is a legislative one. The main players 
are legislators, senators, and presidents. Their main subjects are Congressional debates; 
coalitions struggling over legislation in the House of Representatives and the Senate; roll-
call votes; and presidents’ vetoes. Behind these legislative narratives are the shifting 
interests and coalitions of a variety of groups: organised and unorganised labour; owners of 
capital, including boards of trade and chambers of commerce; immigrants, both old and new; 
and rural America. The legislature provides the space for these coalitional struggles, with 
its institutional design shaping the political activities of government officials and lobbying 
groups.  
An insight shared by these studies is that political institutions, including the legislature, 
are not merely neutral arenas for their political actors. Rather, the organisational structure 
of the national state and party system ‘condition’ political actors by providing “structural 
advantages for particular groups and activists to pursue their policy initiatives” (Tichenor, 
2002: 45). A second theoretical insight is that macro-level forces, such as economic and 
cultural conditions, may influence immigration laws, but only indirectly. In other words, 
their impact comes via political institutions, which “act as intervening variables that 
determine which, if any, of these macro-level factors will influence immigration policies, 
and what that influence will be” (Togman, 2002: 12). These two insights have been 
especially fruitful in interpreting the findings of the present enquiry.  
Less relevant, however, is the second kind of US study, which can be categorised as 
quantitative. These studies tease out statistical correlations between the previously 
mentioned macro-level societal factors, such as labour market conditions and ideological 
orderings and beliefs, and the voting patterns of legislators on immigration legislation (see, 
for example, Gonzalez and Kamdar, 2000; Banaian et al., 2006; Fetzer, 2006; Milner and 
Tingley, 2009 [unpublished]; Facchini and Steinhardt, 2011). For most of these quantitative 
studies, however, it is the voting behaviour of legislators that is treated as the outcome or 
dependent variable, not actual immigration law (the only exception being Jeong, 2013). 
Moreover, the causal variables are not legislative, but social. In fact, in only three of these 
studies are variables related to the legislators themselves subject to analysis, and it is only 
these three studies included under the ‘national legislature’ in Table A. The subject of all 
these quantitative articles is not the influence of these legislators in shaping law, even 
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though the setting for this voting behaviour is the US legislature. Rather, these studies focus 
their attention on national-level sociological variables, especially those of an economic and 
ideological nature that are adjudged to operate within representatives’ constituencies and 
thereby determine legislators’ voting patterns, and hence the content of legislation. 
In such studies, the voting decisions of legislators appear to be viewed as providing 
tangible, measurable form to macro-level forces. For that reason, these legislators are in 
effect portrayed as a kind of neutral medium through which larger economic and ideological 
factors operate. The role of Congress as a legislative institution is seldom discussed. Its 
political structure and dynamics are, it seems, irrelevant to this kind of research. The nature 
of the legislative impact of legislators, and of the legislature as an institution, is only ever 
implicit. 
By contrast, the historical-institutionalist studies argue explicitly that the institutional 
structure of Congress significantly influences legislators: their goals; their perception of 
their interests; their sense of institutional responsibility; their power relations with other 
actors; and ultimately their behaviour, by making some courses of action more attractive or 
viable than others. These more qualitative studies demonstrate the legislators’ impact upon 
legislation; and it is with these detailed qualitative analyses that the present study shares a 
methodological and theoretical affinity. I therefore take serious note of Zolberg’s conclusion 
that, “However powerful, the effects of social forces, external or internal, are not 
automatically translated into policy outcomes but are mediated by established political 
structures…and political institutions – notably…the allocation of decision-making authority 
and power in the relevant sphere between the executive, the legislative, and the judicial 
branches of government” (1999: 86). 
 
 
The marginality of European legislatures 
 
A comparison of research on the United States with that on the nations of Western Europe 
reveals a marked difference with respect to the placement of the legislature within the 
constellation of immigration law-makers. Foremost among these differences is the attention 
that is afforded the institution. In studies of Western Europe, statements regarding the 
legislative branch of the state are sporadic. From a total of 253 pertinent sources, fewer than 
twenty-five referred to the legislature, and then only in passing. In addition, such studies 
are typically not substantiated through systematic empirical analysis, unlike those on the 
United States. That being said, within this literature there is sufficient comment from which 
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to tentatively propose the ‘consensus views’ with respect to the two main themes of this 
thesis: 
 
1 The role of the legislature in shaping immigration law – whether its influence is 
significant or marginal. 
2 The bent of the legislature with respect to immigration law – whether the direction 
of its influence, should it have any, is restrictive or liberal. 
 
In all there are eight European countries, excluding the United Kingdom, for which explicit 
or indicative statements can be found regarding either the importance of the national 
legislature, whether significant or marginal; or its bent, whether restrictive or liberal; or 
both. These are Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Sweden, and Switzerland. The statements made for each of these national case studies may 
be seen to coalesce, enabling a ‘consensus’ view to be discerned regarding the role or bent 
of its legislature, or both. These consensus views are presented in Table D, together with 
illustrative quotations. 
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Table D  The role of Western European legislatures in immigration law-making 
 
 ‘Consensus view’ of the legislature’s importance  ‘Consensus view’ of the legislature’s bent 
   
Western Europe Marginal 
▪ “[in post-war Europe] immigration policy was made in administrative contexts, 
without public participation and with little parliamentary supervision (Hammar, 
1985: 277–87).” (Guiraudon, 1998a: 288) 
▪ “Policy co-operation has strengthened national executive authority and weakened 
courts and legislatures at national and EU level because of the limited scope for 
scrutiny and accountability.” (Geddes, 2000: 207) 
▪ “As Stone-Sweet (2000: 130) describes the outcome: ‘[T]oday judges legislate, 
parliaments adjudicate, and the boundaries separating law and politics – the 
legislative and judicial functions – are little more than academic constructions.’” 
(Joppke and Marzal, 2004: 825) 
Restrictive 
▪ “…the judiciary, which may act as an institutional constraint on…the populist 
impulses of the legislature…” (Hollifield, 2000: 109-110) 
▪ With respect to voting rights: “Granting voting rights to foreigners entails 
constitutional revision and thus legislative passage by a large coalition. This means 
that public discussion on the issue is almost inevitable and bound to be long and 
divisive as all sorts of larger debates (e.g. on the definition of the nation) will 
resurface, thus hampering chances for reform.” (Guiraudon, 1998a:  294) 
▪ “In contrast to parties or parliaments, courts are shielded from democratic majority 
pressures.” (Joppke and Marzal, 2004: 824) 
   
Austria Significant 
▪ “The parliamentarisation of migration policy in the mid-1980s combined with the 
reconfiguration of migration policy-making in the late 1980s and early 1990s caused 
the disappearance of the informal, non-public decision-making mechanisms so 
characteristic of social partnership in post-war Austria.” (Kraler, 2011: 52) 
No relevant statement found 
   
Czech Republic Marginal 
▪ “The main debates over the creation of new acts among various governmental and 
non-governmental actors mostly took place before these acts entered the 
Parliament. This may be termed ‘closed-door’ policy-making done by civil servants 
and experts.” (Čaněk and Čižinský, 2011: 341) 
▪ “Migration matters have not been politicised in the sense that Parliament has not 
had a major role in detailed discussions on the Foreigners and Asylum Acts.” 
(Čaněk and Čižinský, 2011: 341) 
No relevant statement found 
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Table D  The role of Western European legislatures in immigration law-making 
 
France Marginal 
▪ “The decision-making process … was kept out of the potentially divisive 
parliamentary arena … the state has implemented its immigration policies via 
executive decrees and administrative circulars. In fact, between 1945 and 1980, not 
a single piece of legislation was passed in the National Assembly concerning 
immigrant entries (Wihtol de Wenden 1988:87).” (Togman, 2002:  16) 
▪ As in Britain, essentially all control over the legislative agenda has been placed in 
the hands of the executive (president and prime minister).” (Schain, 2008: 37) 
▪ “To sum up, the new configuration of the French decision-making process in the 
field of immigration is characterised as follows: employers and the government are 
deciding; Parliament obeys the government majority…” (Wihtol de Wenden, 2011: 
91) 
▪ Though see: “Throughout its immigration jurisprudence, the Conseil has insisted 
on this fundamental sovereignty principle that grants the legislature wider-than-
normal discretion on immigration matters; only lately has the court begun to 
indicate certain limits to legislative discretion in this area.” (Joppke and Marzal, 
2004: 830) 
Liberal 
▪ “With each new legislature, additional groups within the National Assembly 
submitted antiracism bills, each modeled to a large extent on the early MRAP and 
Communist Party proposals. In response, however, the government continually – 
and with little political cost given low levels of pressure – blocked Parliamentary 
initiatives from being passed into law.” (Bleich, 2003: 127) 
   
Germany Marginal 
▪ “…although members of the Bundestag opposition are highly proactive in 
employing oversight, the impact on executive decision-making is negligible.” 
(Ellermann, 2009: 95) 
No relevant statement found 
   
Netherlands Significant 
▪ “…the process of policy-making – in the context of strong politicisation – is 
predominantly led, as well as set forth, by the Minister and the political parties in 
Parliament.” (Bruquetas-Callejo, Garcés-Mascareñas, Penninx and Scholten, 2011: 
150) 
Liberal 
▪ “Dutch workers are entitled to two and a half years of benefits but nowhere in 
unemployment legislation was it stated that legally employed foreigners were a 
special category (Groenendjk 1980: 170). Intense lobbying by legal groups in 
Parliament succeeded in overturning this practice without going through the 
courts.” (Guiraudon, 1998a: 300) 
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Poland Marginal 
▪ “The government and central administration institutions formed the core of 
migration policy changes after 1989. The legislative authorities and courts were 
involved, but it was undeniably the government that took the lead in the policy-
making process. Thus, the policy-making process itself turned out to be gradual and 
bureaucratic, involving a limited number of players.” (Kicinger and Koryś, 2011: 
357) 
▪ “… the lack of interest in migration shown by any political parties has led to 
Parliament’s role being reduced to a purely legislative one. Consequently, the 
involvement of Parliament in migration policy-making has not corresponded to its 
role in the state political system. Parliament did not offer a forum for discussion on 
policy goals or, for that matter, a place where interests could clash.” (Kicinger and 
Koryś, 2011: 361) 
No relevant statement found 
   
Sweden Marginal 
▪ “When I argue that immigration policy received a more precise formulation through 
parliament's decisions of 1968 and 1975, this suggests that parliament and the 
political parties determine immigration policy, which is of course true in a formal 
and legal sense. However, the major determinants of policy are the bureaucracy and 
interest groups, and not the political parties.” (Hammar, 1985: 44-45) 
No relevant statement found 
   
Switzerland Marginal 
▪ “…the Federal Government formulated and proposed the policy and the 
administrative agencies executed the measures taken to prevent passage of the 
over-foreignization initiatives. The Federal Parliament and the political parties 
played only a minor role in this process.” (Hoffman-Nowotny, 1985: 231) 
▪ “…the other potential institutional veto points or veto players (both Chambers of 
Parliament and their respective committees, as well as the cantons) do not seem to 
have had much importance in the present case.” (Fischer, Nicolet and Sciarini, 
2002: 155) 
No relevant statement found 
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Table D  The role of Western European legislatures in immigration law-making 
 
▪ “In particular, in the area of migration policy, political processes and policy-making 
are dominated by pre-parliamentarian negotiations and direct democracy, while 
Parliament plays a secondary role (Mahnig 1996).” (D’Amato, 2011: 172) 
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This overview of the literature clearly indicates that national legislatures in Western Europe 
play a predominantly marginal role in shaping immigration law. It also suggests a simple 
explanation: they are believed to be weak.  Only two countries, the Netherlands and Austria, 
are said to have legislatures that, in general, have played a significant role in shaping 
immigration law since the Second World War.  
Statements on the bent followed by national legislatures, whether they make enacted 
legislation more liberal or more restrictive, are harder to come by, with statements on the 
Netherlands and France only. Furthermore, the three comments concerning Western 
Europe in general are only suggestive and inserted by their authors as asides, without 
theoretical or empirical grounding. Consequently, because statements on the bent of the 
legislature are so few and uncertain, such opinions ought not, perhaps, be described as 
embodying a ‘consensus’.   
With respect to France and the Netherlands, those countries for which the balance of 
opinion implies a liberal role for the legislature, that opinion too must be qualified. It is 
based on isolated statements, which suggest that these Parliaments have acted to further 
immigrants’ rights at certain times and under certain circumstances. However, this position 
runs counter to statements regarding the bent of national legislatures in Western Europe in 
general, which indicate that the legislature is, or can be expected to be, restrictionist. The 
logic here is that as a representative institution it will tend to reflect populist preferences 
for immigration strictures.  
 What else have researchers said about the national legislatures of Western Europe? 
Although explicit statements about the legislature are relatively rare, one can draw 
reasonable inferences from tangential studies, notably those examining the impact of far-
right political parties throughout Europe. These contain frequent references to national 
legislatures, even though they do not amount to clear analyses of their character. Particularly 
common are statements about the implications of far-right parties having won a small 
number of seats in Parliament. Whilst this does not empower them to exert direct legislative 
influence, it carries “symbolic” importance, enabling indirect influence (Schain, Zolberg and 
Hossay, 2002: 261). The very fact of their parliamentary presence endows them with a 
certain legitimacy and public prominence, from which they can exert influence over the 
immigration agenda and debate. From this, it may be inferred that national legislatures 
constitute an important public arena, which elevates legislators’ discourse to a higher plane 
of authority and prominence and thereby enhances their power to shape legislation through 
influence of the public debate. 
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However, it would be fair to conclude that this view of the legislature’s role in Western 
European nations has not been reflected in the extant literature, which has tended to place 
the legislature at the periphery of immigration law-making and, where it has addressed its 
contribution, has typically done so in a perfunctory way. It is now appropriate to explore the 
literature that relates to the United Kingdom and to establish whether it treats the role of 
the legislature any differently.  
 
 
The role of the UK Parliament in shaping immigration law 
 
Unfortunately, the legislature has not been a focus of immigration policy research on the 
UK. That is not to say, however, that the UK Parliament is ignored in the literature. One 
finds recurrent references to parliamentary debates; parliamentary campaigns; 
parliamentary committees; Parliament’s policy scrutiny; and Parliament passing Acts or 
rejecting proposals. What such references mean, though, for the role of Parliament in 
shaping immigration law, remains unclear, given an absence of accompanying analysis or 
argument regarding the significance of these phenomena for the legislation enacted.  
By way of illustration, consider Money’s study of UK immigration stance-formation and 
law-making (1997). Here one finds frequent references to Parliament, including 
“parliamentary debates”; a “parliamentary pact”; a “parliamentary campaign” against an 
immigration act; and an “all Party Parliamentary Select committee” that “called for stricter 
controls on entry as well as internal controls and a quota for the Indian subcontinent”. Such 
debates, pacts, campaigns and committees call upon the labour of numerous 
Parliamentarians, many of whom will be highly specialised, especially if they are Peers. 
Surely all this effort, experience and expertise cannot be in vain?   
Yet, except for the All-Party Parliamentary Select Committee, which Money tells us was 
“disowned by the Home Secretary” (1997: 709), which presumably precludes its having any 
legislative impact, little indication is given of whether these Parliamentary practices, 
processes, and procedures had any legislative effect. This is characteristic of studies that 
mention the UK Parliament (discuss is too strong a word because in most of these studies 
Parliament is not the author’s main concern; e.g., Boswell, 2009b), and contrasts with the 
historical-institutionalist studies of the United States, of which there are no British 
equivalents.  
Despite a lack of sustained analysis on the role and influence of the legislature, a 
consensus view prevails in the literature that Parliament exerts only marginal influence over 
the immigration laws it passes. Admittedly this consensus is deduced from very thin 
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material. The few statements researchers have provided on the role of the UK legislature are 
typically impressionistic or presented as asides without much supporting evidence or 
argument. Nevertheless, they do converge on the same picture. Parliament is presented as 
receiving legislation formulated by the executive, without having had any prior involvement 
in its determination (for example, Hammar, 1985: 20). Relative to the executive, it is “weak” 
(Hansen, 2000: 237, 244) and “largely subservient” (Geddes, 2000: 132). It is essentially a 
rubber-stamping institution. This depiction receives further support in a comparative 
volume on immigration policy-making in Europe (Zincone et al., 2011), where the UK 
Parliament is depicted as being able to achieve only “small changes” to British immigration 
legislation, although the meaning and evidential base for this judgement is not elaborated 
on (Cerna and Wietholtz, 2011: 204).  
Occasionally, one finds comments that run counter to the more explicit consensus view 
of the legislature having only marginal impact. However, these can be found only in 
statements that imply a position of influence for Parliament. For example, authors write of 
the passage of legislation through Parliament as “easy” (Favell, 2001: 165), or “stormy” 
(Hampshire, 2005: 26), or note that governments “faced a difficult time in the legislature” 
(Hampshire, 2005: 41). But explanations of how and why this is the case are not 
forthcoming. As such, one cannot escape the impression that the UK Parliament is looked 
upon as a largely passive body with respect to the formulation of proposed legislation, 
functioning as a neutral arena for the arguments and travails of political parties.  
With regard to the bent of the Houses of Parliament towards immigration, of the few 
statements expressed most suggest restrictionist tendencies. Layton-Henry, for example, 
argues that Britain’s parliamentary system makes its government more responsive to 
xenophobic public opinion (2004:  297-333), a point supported by both Consterdine (2015: 
1449) and Joppke, who notes that, “Parliamentary openness in the formulation of 
immigration policy keeps law-makers within the confines of a pervasively restrictionist 
public opinion” (1999: 103). However, Jennings suggests that the influence of public 
opinion is by no means absolute because “[t]he executive (Cabinet) controls the legislative 
process in Parliament, restricting the influence of public opinion” (2009: 849). Other 
statements seem more incidental and hence opaque. For example, Wright notes in passing 
that “the opposition parties did not use Parliament to obstruct the government’s major 
legislative initiatives” (2010: 128). From this, one might infer that Parliament can be 
manipulated into hampering or even blocking a government’s business. But one can only 
infer.  
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These patterns in the literature are shown in Table E, which provides a comprehensive 
sample of statements about the importance and bent of the UK Parliament in shaping 
immigration law. Overwhelmingly, it depicts a legislature that has very little clout over the 
executive and very little influence in the creation of immigration laws. This clearly poses a 
challenge for any study that might hope to shed any different light on the role of the UK 
legislature. However, before we can respond to this matter, we must first understand the 
basic nature of immigration politics and law-making in the British context. To do this, we 
must set it within an appropriate theoretical framework.  
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Table E  The UK Parliament in immigration law-making: a review of the research literature 
 
Importance Bent 
  
Significant 
 
Hampshire (2005: 41) 
“The Government faced a difficult time in the legislature, especially at the committee stage. In committee, an amendment was 
carried which effectively removed the grandparental concession and restricted the patriality clause to those with a UK-born 
parent.” 
Somerville (2010: 961) 
“The importance of this legal–business network in developing the content of UK migration policy cannot be underestimated. It 
had input at the parliamentary stage, the drafting of programme stage and in the implementation phase.” 
Wright (2010: 128) 
“While often expressing similar sentiments, the opposition parties did not use Parliament to obstruct the government’s major 
legislative initiatives.” 
 
 
Marginal 
 
Freeman (1979: 65) 
“In all of this, the 1971 Act seemed to push Britain closer to the French model of immigration control—an executive procedure 
based ostensibly on economic considerations, dominated by the strong political hand of the Home Secretary (the Minister of the 
Interior and the Minister of Labor, Employment, and Population in France) whose power of discretion, especially in the use of 
deportation, is quite wide.” 
Hammar (1985: 20) 
“Immigration policy in Britain is the product of a highly centralized and elitist political system. Policy is determined by the 
executive, legislated and legitimized by parliament, and administered by the bureaucracy or local authorities.” 
Joppke (1998a: 289) 
“In the orthodox view, Britain's “political constitution” is good for democracy because it lets elected officials make decisions that, 
in other systems, unelected judges make. But in practice it entails executive, rather than parliamentary sovereignty, and it leaves 
minorities, with or without citizenship, extremely vulnerable to the whims of the majority.” 
Joppke (1998b: 132) 
“In reality, the sovereignty of Parliament is the sovereignty of the executive, with the Home Office the uncontested authority in 
immigration and asylum policy.” 
Liberal 
  
Bleich (2003: 124) 
“As early as the late 1940s, Parliamentarians had submitted 
legislative proposals to ban racial discrimination in the colonies.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Restrictive 
 
Joppke (1999: 103) 
“Parliamentary openness in the formulation of immigration policy 
keeps law-makers within the confines of a pervasively restrictionist 
public opinion.” 
Consterdine (2015: 1449) 
“…Britain, where constituency MPs are more receptive to the 
(usually) anti-immigration preferences of their voters (Balch 2010, 
21), and where the executive leads on policy in a fairly autonomous 
manner.” 
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Table E  The UK Parliament in immigration law-making: a review of the research literature 
 
Importance Bent 
  
Geddes (2000: 132) 
“In the UK, a strong executive, relatively weak courts and a largely subservient legislature have been a recipe for stringent 
immigration control legislation.” 
Hansen (2000: 237, 244) 
▪ “…four factors … distinguish the Westminster model from Continental Europe: a powerful executive, a weak legislature, a 
timid judiciary and an absence of a bill of rights.” 
▪ “The door to the Commonwealth closed so quickly because policy-makers faced few constraints on pursuing the tight 
immigration policy demanded by the public. A strong executive, weak legislature, and tightly constrained judiciary allowed 
governments to respond to public demands with a single-minded success unknown in the rest or Europe or North America.” 
Hollifield (2000: 110) 
“Separation of powers acts as a constraint on the ability of states to roll back civil rights and take away negative freedoms. In this 
respect, Britain has both an institutional advantage (no separation of powers) and an ideological/ cultural advantage (no 
republican tradition) in pursuing internal control strategies.” 
Favell (2001: 115) 
“With no written constitution or higher legislature to force successive governments to be consistent with the rules of the game, 
it has been easy and costless for politicians to use and trade on invented conceptions of the nation, both of a traditional or radical 
nature.” 
Hossay (2002: 344) 
“The upper house, or House of Lords, traditionally consists of hereditary Peers and has very limited powers.” 
Bleich (2003: 107) 
“Between 1976 and the race laws of the past few years (discussed in Chapter 8), the source of British institutional developments 
[with respect to race relations] shifted away from Parliament to three other locations: the judiciary, local jurisdictions, and the 
bureaucracy.” 
Somerville (2007: 4-5) 
“There has also been a general acceptance in accounts of migration development that the ‘Westminster Model’ of government – 
a combination of strong parliamentary sovereignty, a first-past-the- post election system, a strong Cabinet, and executive 
dominance of the legislature – is prevalent.” 
Menz, 2008 
“…unlike elsewhere in Europe, the role of courts and, more remarkably, parliament is not as pronounced, affording the executive 
significant political power in shaping policy. Some observers have commented on the increasing presidential element in British 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No more statements 
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Table E  The UK Parliament in immigration law-making: a review of the research literature 
 
Importance Bent 
  
politics since Thatcher (Foley 1993; Thomas 2000), further contributing to this concentration of unchecked political power.” (p. 
153) 
Schain (2008: 37, 124) 
▪ “As in Britain, essentially all control over the legislative agenda has been placed in the hands of the executive (president and 
prime minister).” 
▪ “The governmental structure is defined by the strong control that any British government has over its legislative agenda. Unlike 
the United States or France, there are no clear constitutional constraints on government action.” 
Jennings (2009: 849, 866) 
▪ “The executive (Cabinet) controls the legislative process in Parliament, restricting the influence of public opinion…” 
▪ “In Britain, the executive sets the legislative timetable in Parliament and exercises direct control over bureaucratic departments 
and agencies. This constitutional design restricts the influence of public opinion over the elected legislature, but enhances the 
degree of political control over government outputs…” 
Cerna and Wietholtz (2011: 203-204) 
“In general, the executive power remains strong in the UK. The government can implement policy changes (e.g. increased financial 
allocations for immigration control), and does not need to go through Parliament. The legislature was able to achieve only small 
changes to British migration legislation. In other cases, the executive was able to push through its proposals.” 
Consterdine (2015: 1449) 
“This suggests that Freeman’s predictions have greater applicability in a political system perceived to be more open to the interests 
of big business than in a parliamentary system, such as Britain, where constituency MPs are more receptive to the (usually) anti-
immigration preferences of their voters (Balch 2010, 21), and where the executive leads on policy in a fairly autonomous manner.” 
Hampshire and Bale (2015: 5) 
“…unlike most states, UK governments are – in normal times – constitutionally and politically empowered (by a tradition of 
strong executives facing relatively few legislative or judicial constraints) to act decisively if they so choose.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No more statements 
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4 Theoretical framework 
 
 
In this chapter, I delineate the theory of political motivation that I have developed to guide 
my interpretation of the behaviour of the actors at the centre of the UK legislature. These 
include Government ministers; Government and Opposition MPs; civil servants; Peers; 
lobbyists; lawyers; and academics. I also outline a particular view of the political landscape 
for the UK Parliament: the British state with its distinctive ‘Westminster system’.   
 
 
A theory of political motivation: ‘interpretive political opportunity structures’ 
 
The organising perspective of this study, ‘interpretive political opportunity structures’, 
combines two well-developed existing approaches, though I adapt each for my own 
purposes. The first approach is ‘political opportunity structures’ (POS), as outlined by 
Koopmans and Statham in their theoretical study of migration and ethnic relations 
politics (2000). The second is the version of interpretivism developed by Bevir and 
Rhodes over several articles and book chapters (Bevir and O’Brien, 2001; Bevir and 
Rhodes, 1999, 2001, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2008; Rhodes, 2000; Bevir et al., 2003), and 
which received full elaboration in their books Interpreting British Governance (2003) and 
Governance Stories (2006). 
These are, first, political opportunity structures (POS), as outlined by Koopmans and 
Statham (2000); and, second, the version of interpretivism developed by Bevir and 
Rhodes over several articles and book chapters, and which received full elaboration in 
their books Interpreting British Governance (2003) and Governance Stories (2006). 
These theoretical frameworks are themselves integrative, each combining concepts and 
research methods from a plurality of approaches and disciplines.   
 The political opportunity structures approach emphasises the constraints faced by 
political actors in their attempts to maximise their interests and achieve their goals. 
Accordingly, it pays special attention to the institutional contexts in which actors are 
embedded, and which place limits upon their behaviour. The interpretive approach, by 
contrast, pays greater attention to individuals’ improvisational and creative capacity to act 
– their agency. In this second approach, the authors do not deny that actors’ behaviour is 
constrained by the institutional circumstances in which they find themselves, but the 
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focus is on actors’ interpretation of these circumstances. It is their interpretation, in 
combination with their beliefs, values, preferences, interests, and goals, that help to 
explain the strategies they devise to circumvent, exploit, or manipulate those 
circumstances to their advantage.   
In a nutshell, the combination of these approaches – what may be termed ‘interpretive 
political opportunity structures’ or ‘POS-interpretivism’ – proceeds through an 
examination of how actors’ behaviour is shaped by their multi-faceted beliefs, in 
interaction with their interpretation of the constraints and opportunities that they 
anticipate will affect their potential to realise their political goals. First, however, we need 
to examine critically each of these approaches, beginning with the work of Koopmans and 
Statham on POS (2000). 
 
 
Koopmans and Statham: their POS approach 
 
The POS approach was originally applied to the analysis of social movements and other 
forms of collective action in circumstances of “contentious politics”: what results when 
actors, working in concert, confront elites, authorities and opponents with their political 
demands, requests, or appeals, or those of whom they claim to represent (Tarrow, 2011: 
4). The typical players in episodes of contentious politics are ordinary people who, often 
in alliance with more influential citizens, attempt to exert power against national states 
and bring about some form of social change. Key to explaining these dynamics are political 
opportunity structures, defined by perhaps its most influential exponent, Sidney Tarrow 
(1994: 85), as:  
 
…consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political 
environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting 
their expectations for success or failure.  
 
The analytic context of contentious politics and the political activities of social 
movements naturally invokes two broad camps: political elites who hold power, most 
typically the reins of national government; and political ‘challengers’, who wish to change 
policy in ways that could not be expected without their action, and whose success depends 
upon teamwork and taking advantage of political opportunities.  
Although POS was originally applied to contentious collective action, expressed 
through, for example, social movements, protests, rebellions, riots, strikes, and 
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revolutions, the idea of political opportunity structures alone holds promise for an 
analysis of the UK’s Parliamentary process. The proposition is that POS can be applied to 
this form of non-contentious collective action, in which non-Government actors with 
relatively little power struggle against the will of a more powerful executive. Like the 
participants of social movements, these non-Government actors must also rely for their 
success upon collaboration and opportunity. (For a history of collective action, including 
its non-contentious variant, see Hardin, 1982, 1995).  
POS is based on an idea of collective action derived from the sociological theory of 
resource mobilisation, which was influenced by economics, and which was first 
elaborated by McCarthy and Zald (1977). From this perspective, collective action 
comprises the behaviour of two or more persons that is based on a rational appraisal of 
the perceived costs and benefits of different strategies, the success of which depends 
critically upon the acquisition and use of resources. Without such resources, political 
mobilisation is impossible (e.g., Zald and Ash, 1966; Oberschall,1973; McCarthy and 
Zald, 1977).  
In the POS framework of Koopmans and Statham, this notion of collective action is 
re-purposed, such that it may be used to describe the strategies of any group of political 
actors, and not just social movements, in drawing resources from the political 
environment in which they operate (Eisinger, 1973). What in this context are these 
resources? 
 
 
Resource mobilisation 
 
The article that introduced resource mobilisation to the study of social movements 
identifies the types of resources at issue, including money, labour, facilities, and time 
(McCarthy and Zald, 1977). However, its authors present no sustained treatment of what 
is the nature of the resources that are mobilised.  
However, this list is based on an impressionistic survey and its authors present no 
sustained treatment of what is the nature of the resources that are mobilised. The first 
systematic account was in fact provided by Edwards and McCarthy (2004), who advanced 
a five-fold typology that classified resources as “moral, cultural, social-organizational, 
human, and material” (117). The possession, pursuit and utilisation of some of these 
resources proved indispensable to understanding the behaviour of actors in the present 
study. Therefore, it is important first to introduce the detail within Edwards and 
McCarthy’s classification (2004).   
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Moral resources include legitimacy, solidary support, sympathetic support, and 
celebrity; cultural resources consist of conceptual tools and specialised knowledge that 
have become widely, though not necessarily universally, known; social organisational 
resources are of three broad kinds: infrastructures, social networks, and organizations; 
human resources include labour, experience, skills, and expertise; and material resources 
includes money, property, office space, equipment, and supplies.  
The relevance of this delineation of resources will become clear later in the thesis. 
However, it is worth pointing out that certain categories were to prove especially 
applicable to the Westminster scenario. First, ‘intellectual resources’, defined loosely as 
knowledge, applied experience, and expertise, and a sub-category of human resources, 
endows actors with a competitive advantage in their field of activity. For example, the 
Government has substantial reserves of intellectual resources in the form of expert and 
experienced lawyers, who draft its legislation, and help ministers to defend its legality. 
Second, moral resources recur in the form of pledged advocacy or support, such as when 
a Parliamentarian puts their name to a fellow Parliamentarians’ amendment, or votes in 
support of it. Finally, to these five sets of resources I have added one more. “Political 
capital” as a concept was devised to reflect the observations offered by my interview 
respondents when referring to the capacity of an actor to influence the behaviour of other 
actors. They also indicated how an individual might have a reserve of such influence, such 
as that built up through the accumulation of favours owed to him or her.  
This resource-based approach, which has been shown to be both fruitful and credible 
when applied to actors in contexts beyond social movements (e.g., Giugni et al., 1999), 
should resonate strongly with analysts of the UK Parliament. As the Parliamentarians I 
interviewed made clear, to influence legislation they must collaborate with lobbyists, who 
advise and draft amendments for them; with other Parliamentarians; and with the 
Government. It is partly in the process of this collaboration that resources are 
accumulated and consolidated. Protagonists hope, therefore, that these resources, which 
are usually of a moral, human and social organisational kind, will help them successfully 
influence immigration law.  
 
 
Which dimensions of POS? 
 
Now that we have reviewed the general intellectual foundation of POS, with its focus on 
collective action’s mobilisation of various social resources – we can define more precisely 
the perspective of political opportunity structures as developed by Koopmans and 
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Statham in their analysis of immigration politics. The authors identify two main 
approaches to POS, one being better suited to diachronic analysis and the other to cross-
sectional research (2000: 33-34). My framework combines elements from each, and is 
deployed to analyse three aspects of the political environment within which Parliament’s 
legislators acted to influence the Bill, as follows:  
 
(1) the formal institutional structures that constrain and enable political actors;  
(2) the informal procedures and prevailing strategies of these actors; and 
(3) ‘political alliance structures’. 
 
First, formal institutional structures are the constitutional, legal, and rule-bound relations 
between actors within a polity, which define their relative powers, responsibilities, and 
competencies. Koopmans and Statham advise that, “Specific dimensions of this 
opportunity variable may include the degree of centralization of political institutions, the 
type of electoral system, and the separation of powers between the executive, legislative, 
and judiciary” (2000: 34). Generally speaking, these institutional features define the 
boundaries within which political actors must operate. By way of illustration, in the UK 
Parliament the scrutiny of the executive’s legislative proposals takes place within its 
debating chambers and in accordance with their respective codes and conventions. This 
means, for example, that a Parliamentarian cannot deliver a speech out of turn, or use 
abusive language, or at least cannot do so without facing sanction. 
Second, the more informal dimensions of political opportunities encapsulate the 
unwritten rules, conventions and procedures that have emerged historically within a 
polity for the management of political activity, whether that be struggle, contestation, or 
debate, for instance. Foremost among these informal norms are those associated with 
polarising political traditions, through which conflicts have traditionally been approached 
by elite political actors, and that continue to shape the behaviour of, and reactions to, 
political challengers. In the UK, this is exemplified by conduct between the Conservatives 
and Labour (Koopmans and Statham, 2000: 34; see also: Bale, 2014). In this present study 
it applies to, among others, Parliamentarians and lobbyists, both of whom can be regarded 
as potential challengers to the political elites. 
These first two dimensions owe a special debt to the neo-institutionalist approach in 
political science exemplified by March and Olsen (1983), which they derived from the 
simple idea that the behaviour of political actors – individuals, groups, or institutions – 
is influenced in no small way by their institutional environment (see also, Hall and Taylor, 
1996). Thinking of the present study, because it is the behaviour of political actors that 
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ultimately determines the shape of immigration law, it follows, if we are to take seriously 
the institutionalist perspective that such law will also be influenced by the institutions 
within which these actors are embedded
24
. Moreover, almost all recent major empirical 
studies of UK immigration law-making adopt an institutionalist perspective, thereby 
endorsing Koopmans and Statham’s implicit view of the analytic value of this approach 
(e.g., Freeman, 1992, 1995a; Cornelius et al., 1994; Ireland, 1994; Joppke, 1996; 
Guiraudon, 1998a). This theoretical core has been supplemented by historical ideas and 
methods (Brubaker, 1992; Hansen, 2002) as well as those from sociology (Guiraudon, 
2002, 2003). What is significant here is that all these studies have generated congruent 
findings about the main actors and processes involved in the UK’s immigration policy-
making. 
 
24
 At a basic level, law-making, whether immigration or otherwise, occurs both within and 
through political institutions.  
Consider the political institution at the heart of this study, Parliament. Immigration law-
making certainly occurs within Parliament. It takes place within its debating chambers, which 
shape the thought and behaviour of its constituent actors, MPs and Peers. There are limits on 
what an actor can do within Parliament, where behaviour is constrained by Parliament’s 
associated codes and conventions. Other actions, if not circumscribed, may be either 
incentivised or disincentivised. Importantly, these codes and conventions function to not only 
constrain certain individuals, but also to empower them. For example, in the UK Parliament, 
loudness of voice is not a factor in determining who can speak. The system of rules that 
governs who may talk and at what time means even those who are soft of voice can be heard.  
Law is also made through Parliament because, without the majority support of both 
Houses, a bill cannot become law. Also, if enough Parliamentarians vote to amend a bill, that 
bill is amended, which can change the law that is ultimately enacted.  
Finally, institutions are important for a third reason. They influence the powers, interests, 
and choices of political actors via the influence of their perceptions of their role and power; 
and of what is achievable, acceptable, admirable, prudent, futile. Continuing with our example 
of the British Parliament, the design of that institution grants each individual legislator in 
attendance one vote on each piece of legislation, as well as on any proposed amendments put 
to a vote. That is an example of an institution influencing actors’ powers. With respect to 
interests and choice, the design of electoral and political institutions affects the way in which 
individual or aggregate preferences on an issue translate into actions by elected 
representatives. As Hix and Noury have observed (2007: 186):  
 
in a first-past-the-post electoral system and a separation of powers between the legislature and the 
executive (as in the United States), elected politicians are likely to respond issue by issue to the 
preferences of their constituents, rather than follow their personal ideological preferences or the 
voting instructions of their party leaders. In contrast, in parliamentary systems, with strong party 
organizations and where elections are fought on broad ideological issues, elected politicians are 
more likely to follow their general left-right preferences or the voting instructions of their party 
leaders. 
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Finally, the third part of my POS framework is that of political alliance structures. 
Compared with the previous two dimensions, which are associated with more enduring 
institutional arrangements., alliance structures are tied more closely to the specific 
contingencies of time and place. As Koopmans and Statham affirm, they “refer to the 
specific balance of power relationships between actors at a given time and place, including 
the composition of the party system, and the relative strengths of political parties and the 
government” (2000: 34). This includes political actors’ collaboration with influential 
allies as a means of resource mobilisation. Thus, a particularly conducive situation for 
mobilisation by political challengers is when political elites, which refers in the present 
study to the Coalition Government, are internally divided on an issue.  
The POS approach outlined above has come under criticism, chiefly for over-focusing 
on the institutional dimensions of opportunities, and so failing to take seriously their 
cultural and discursive basis (Koopmans and Statham, 2000: 35). To remedy this, 
Koopmans and Statham outline an approach they call “political discourse dynamics”, 
which has elsewhere been developed into the notion of “discursive opportunities” 
(Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). At the core of this methodology lie three strategic aims: 
visibility, resonance, and legitimacy. Success for political challengers, seeking to mobilise 
their claims in the public sphere, will be dependent on their ability to achieve these three 
aims. As Koopmans and Statham state (2000: 37): 
 
Firstly, a collective actor and her aims must be rendered publicly visible. … Secondly, to 
have an impact, a mobilized challenge must provoke public reactions from other actors: 
the claims must resonate and carry the contention to a wider public. … Thirdly, no matter 
how much visibility and resonance a challenge achieves, it will only achieve a level of 
success when it becomes a legitimate contention. This means that an actor needs to 
legitimate herself and her claims in public, by resonating positively in the reactions of a 
significant number of other actors, who are willing to declare at least partial support by 
acknowledging that something has to be done about the problem. 
 
Including this final discursive dimension, say Koopmans and Statham, is what allows the 
traditional concept of political opportunities to transcend its (neo-)institutionalist 
origins, restoring consideration of those dynamic cultural and discursive variables that 
shape political decisions (2000: 35-38). In this present study, as we shall see, lobbyists 
and Parliamentarians deploy a variety of methods during the Parliamentary process to 
project their claims into the public sphere, lobbyists through the publication of ‘briefing 
documents’ and media interviews, Parliamentarians through debates in Parliament. 
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As the repeated use of the term “structures” implies, the POS approach thus 
described has comparatively little to say about challengers’ agency. Its focus is resolutely 
upon those more enduring, inflexible features of an actors’ political environment. 
Responding to this apparent blind spot, one of the most influential advocates of POS, 
Sidney Tarrow, has himself conceded that the term ‘structure’ is perhaps misleading, as 
most opportunities need to be perceived (2011: 12). Perception is clearly a fundamental 
or even prior variable, and certainly more of an agential category than a structural one; 
but the challenge for the analyst is how to determine such perceptions.  Koopmans and 
Statham indeed acknowledge that “only perceived realities can affect collective action” 
(36), yet they have almost nothing to say on the matter and provide no guidance on 
research method or approach. 
 For this we must turn to interpretivism and specifically to the work of Bevir and 
Rhodes, who have directed this approach to their studies of British politics and 
governance, a subject that aligns with this present study’s research into the role of the 
legislature in immigration law-making.  
 
 
Bevir and Rhodes: their interpretive approach 
 
In several articles authored both separately and together, and then in two co-authored 
books, Bevir and Rhodes advance a fresh alternative to what they see as the ‘normal’ mode 
of political science, one based on “modernist empiricism” with roots in positivism (2003: 
3). This alternative perspective is interpretive, which like all such approaches, “begins 
from the insight that to understand actions, practices and institutions, we need to grasp 
the relevant meanings, the beliefs and preferences of the people involved” (2003:1). 
Interpretation, they argue, is not merely preferable in the analysis of politics, but 
necessary. They offer two reasons. The first is straightforward: that people act on their 
beliefs and preferences. The second is that beliefs and preferences cannot be apprehended 
solely from outward facts about a person, such as their social class, biography, ethnicity, 
gender, and institutional position. Though these may influence a person’s beliefs and 
preferences, they do not do so in a deterministic way.  
Hence, a political actor, like Theresa May, occupying a certain institutional position, 
here Home Secretary, is likely to be influenced in her behaviour by certain objective 
features of that position. However, that position alone will seldom be enough to explain 
the behaviour of the person who occupies it. Thus, while we might say that, as Home 
Secretary, May will have a clear interest in ensuring the Immigration Bill is changed as 
Theoretical framework 
91 
little as possible during its passage through Parliament, we could not infer from that fact 
alone why she initially chose to shape the Bill in the way that she did. For that, we must 
examine the content of her beliefs and her justification for the decisions she made.  
 However, Bevir and Rhodes go further than refocusing analytic attention upon actors’ 
beliefs and preferences. For them, “the old language for describing Westminster and 
Whitehall is at best a partial description of how British government works” (2003: 10). 
Such familiar concepts as “institution”, “government”, and “the Westminster model”, 
they view as unfruitful, even misleading. In their place, Bevir and Rhodes posit a new 
terminology, which, they argue, makes possible a more accurate analysis of British 
government. This terminology includes such concepts as “decentring”, “tradition”, 
“dilemma”, “governance”, “policy networks”, “hollowing out”, the “core executive”, and 
the “differentiated polity” (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 9). These are the leitmotifs of 
Interpreting British Governance.  
This version of interpretivism would indeed appear to offer fresh insights into the 
dynamics of Westminster politics. In that respect, it promises to be a useful addition to 
this researcher’s analytical armoury. However, whilst it may be helpful to incorporate 
aspects of the interpretivism of Bevir and Rhodes, applying it in its full form, would be 
incompatible with the version of POS employed in this present study. How could it be 
otherwise when they propose to dispense with the concept of the institution, which is 
integral to the first two elements of this study’s theoretical framework?  
As such, although I embrace the fundamentals of Bevir and Rhodes and accept their 
arguments about the universal importance of beliefs, meanings, and interpretation to 
political life, I do not adopt their approach wholesale. Whilst they provide a useful analytic 
lens for this study, it should not be at the expense of jettisoning what I have found to be 
particularly useful concepts within mainstream political science. That, I think, would 
entail throwing out the baby with the bath water. It remains important to converse with 
earlier research on British government, against which Bevir and Rhodes’s terminology 
lacks clarity and familiarity. Moreover, for this study of Parliament the notion of 
‘institution’ has powerful significance, and is informed by the neo-institutionalist 
foundation of POS.  
It follows that for this present study a combination of POS and a less fundamental 
form of interpretivism than that proposed by Bevir and Rhodes would be most productive. 
This tempered form of their interpretivism retains its focus upon individuals’ sense-
making and beliefs, without rejecting more conventional concepts of political science. 
One such concept, the ‘Westminster system’ or ‘model’, provides the institutional context 
for this present study. But what is it? And why do Bevir and Rhodes wish to abandon it? 
THE LEGISLATURE IN IMMIGRATION POLICY-MAKING 
92 
For Bevir and Rhodes, “[t]he phrase ‘Westminster model’ refers to the concepts, 
questions and historical story used to capture the allegedly essential features of British 
government” (2003: 25). What are these ‘alleged’ features? Bevir and Rhodes provide a 
useful definition (2003: 26), quoting Verney (1991: 637): 
 
The characteristics of the Westminster model…include: strong cabinet government based 
on majority rule; the importance attached to constitutional conventions; a two-party 
system based on single member constituencies; the assumption that minorities can find 
expression in one of the major parties; the concept of Her Majesty’s loyal opposition; and 
the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, which takes precedence over popular 
sovereignty except during elections.  
 
Of significance to this present study is that a clear corollary of such a strong executive is 
likely to be a relatively weak legislature, a view that has been confirmed by researchers 
(e.g., Lijphart, 1999). However, Bevir and Rhodes are reluctant to accept such a definition 
and identify some “cracks” in the model, most notably a Whiggish historiography which 
tends to present the Westminster system as arising out of a single and unilinear 
progressive idea or spirit that underlies the evolution of British government (2003: 27-
28).  
Nonetheless, a principal merit of this model is that it provides a clear baseline for any 
discussion of British government. Perhaps more importantly, as Bevir and Rhodes 
concede, “It could be argued that the Westminster model is the pervasive image shared 
by British politicians and civil servants” (2003: 26). My research supports that view, 
whereby the language and culture disclosed by the study’s informants reveals the veracity 
of this model. Established through this study’s interpretive lens as applied to its 
interviewees, the model is essentially a structural set of arrangements, given shape  and 
meaning through the perceptions of the study’s social actors. As such the model, which 
is a predominant frame of reference for those involved in the Westminster system, would 
seem to offer a sensible and realistic means for capturing the political terrain that is the 
setting for the legislature, which lies at the centre of this study. It is to this institution 
that we now turn our theoretical antennae. 
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The legislature within the Westminster system 
 
To understand the role of the national legislature of any country, we must first examine 
the broader constitutional system of which that legislature is a part. As the term implies, 
a constitutional system describes the way in which a political entity, typically a nation-
state, is constituted: its basic organisational structure and make-up, most especially the 
procedures by which laws are made, applied, interpreted, and by whom. The 
‘Westminster model’ is one kind of constitutional system: a democratic, parliamentary 
form of government modelled on that which developed in the United Kingdom, and which 
takes its name from the Palace of Westminster, the location of the UK Parliament. Today, 
some variation of the Westminster model is found in at least thirty countries, including 
Australia, Canada, Ireland, India, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, and New 
Zealand.  
The characteristic features of the Westminster system or model are, as we have seen, 
a strong executive and weak legislature. But what does it mean for an executive to be 
strong and a legislature weak?  To answer this question, it will be necessary to first 
describe more precisely what it is we mean by the terms executive and legislature. These 
are typically viewed as comprising two of the three central organising elements of the 
liberal democratic state, the third being the judiciary. To provide greater clarity to the 
analysis that will follow, we first turn to a consideration of these constitutional elements.  
 
 
The three branches of the liberal democratic state 
 
It was Montesquieu (1748) who provided the first detailed model of the governmental 
system of modern nation-states, dividing it into three distinct branches (based, it is said, 
on a misunderstanding of contemporary British politics). As already mentioned, these are 
the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. For Montesquieu, each performed a 
different function, and had different responsibilities and different powers. Believing 
political power to be open to abuse and that abuse to be dire in its consequences, 
Montesquieu argued that it was important for each of these branches of government to 
be kept separate from the others. No one person or small group should exercise powers 
under more than one of these branches of government. That, thought Montesquieu, 
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would be enough to guard against the tyranny that invariably results when too much 
power is concentrated in too few hands.  
In Montesquieu’s model, each branch would have prescribed powers that would also 
be circumscribed. Thus, the executive has the power to take decisions and enforce the 
state’s will, but not to make the law, that role being afforded to the legislature, nor to 
interpret and discharge the law, that role being reserved for the judiciary. However, in 
most modern political systems, the UK included, this neat demarcation does not hold. 
Members of the executive are the source of most new law, even if they do not formally 
pass it. Moreover, in many modern countries, especially those with parliamentary political 
systems, members of the executive will also be members of the legislature.  
Finally, regarding the executive, there is also a debate within political science about 
whether it should be taken to include only the political heads of the state apparatus: in 
the UK, the prime minister, cabinet ministers, and junior ministers; or whether the civil 
service should also be included. Strictly speaking, civil servants are assumed to have a 
staff function in relation to the executive, providing expertise, advice and support. Yet, 
the level of experience and knowledge held by civil servants may de facto place them in a 
relatively powerful position in relation to their departmental ministers. In this present 
study, this was evident in the actual drafting of the Immigration Bill. It is for this reason 
that the civil service might be said, at times, to function as a part of the executive, whilst 
recognising that the Government is essentially its cabinet ministers, drawn from the 
Coalition parties. 
The legislature in Montesquieu’s scheme is the official law-making body within the 
liberal political system. It need not be an elected assembly, although usually they are. 
Again, it is important to recognise that the reality of most government systems today does 
not accord with this model nearly as well as it did in Montesquieu’s time. This is for two 
main reasons. First, national legislatures like that of the UK Parliament are never purely 
law-making bodies, in that they always have some control over the executive. For 
example, the UK Parliament can remove the government through a vote of no confidence. 
Second, and perhaps more damaging to this conception of the legislature, is the existence 
of the following arrangement, described by Robertson (2002: 278): 
 
As a vast amount of the material that serves to lay down binding and legally enforceable 
rules in any modern society does not originate in, and may hardly have been seen by the 
parliament or legislative body, but is instead created by the executive under relatively 
light legislative powers of overview, the distinction [of the legislature as a law-making 
body] is rapidly losing an empirical referent. 
Theoretical framework 
95 
 
Finally, there is the judiciary, that branch of government which interprets and discharges 
those laws enacted in Parliament. More prosaically it comprises a country’s courts and 
judges with responsibility for deciding upon the guilt of alleged law-breakers and where 
guilty their punishment. More germane, however, is that the judiciary has the power to 
call governments to account through its interpretation of laws, which may result in 
decisions that find against government actions as well as endorse them. This is especially 
relevant in cases brought before the courts to protect the rights of asylum seekers and 
refugees. 
These three distinct branches of government are the bedrock of that classic doctrine 
of liberal politics, the separation of powers, although “[f]ew political systems operate, 
even in theory, by a strict separation of power” (Robertson, 2002: 443), the triple 
distinction on which the doctrine is based remains useful, and has become a part of 
ordinary discourse. What political analyst could deny, for instance, that a major problem 
of totalitarian or authoritarian political regimes, such as one-party states and military 
dictatorships, seems to be that the will of one person or group is exercised across all three 
branches of government? 
Having considered the tripartite sources of power within the modern democratic 
nation-state, including the legislature, we can now turn to a second important matter 
concerning the focus of our study, the role of the legislature today in the British system 
of government.  
 
 
The role of the UK Parliament 
 
The role of any legislature depends upon the constitutional system of which it is a part, 
and whether that system is considered to be parliamentary, semi-presidential, or 
presidential (Fish and Kroenig, 2009: 2). Scholars agree that a parliamentary system is 
one in which (1) persons from the legislature, typically a parliament, form the 
government; (2) the government, which exercises considerable executive power, is held 
to account by that parliament; and (3) there is no president or similar leader(s) elected 
by the legislature (Fish and Kroenig, 2009: 2). The UK’s Westminster system satisfies all 
of these criteria and is undoubtedly a parliamentary system of government. In fact, 
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parliamentary systems are the predominant form in the EU, numbering twenty-three out 
of the twenty-eight Member States. 
It is said that Westminster systems, as parliamentary systems of government, have a 
less strict separation of powers than do presidential systems. Certainly the latter have a 
more marked separation of powers with respect to the executive and legislature. In the 
United States, the presidential system par excellence, Congress is a more-or-less co-equal 
branch of the state. That is a far cry from legislatures under the Westminster system. 
Here the party with the most legislators in parliament typically goes on to form the 
government, with the latter viewed as answerable to the legislature. whereby its proposals 
are presented to legislators for scrutiny and amendment. At first glance, this formal 
arrangement might appear to allot significant influence to the legislature, but perhaps 
not. In the UK’s Westminster system, Parliament is inextricably linked to executive 
power, because a Parliamentary majority gives the government the power to enact its 
desired legislation, assuming it can persuade its backbenchers to support it issue by issue. 
Hence, the legislature formally passes new laws and, as a partly representative body, gives 
democratic legitimacy to them. It does not mean it has the power to match the executive. 
Even so, in the Westminster system as much as in the presidential system, a main 
constitutional function of the legislature holds constant: to redistribute power, and 
prevent its overconcentration in the executive. Thus, in the UK, Parliament forms a key 
part of the political system’s constitutional ‘checks and balances’. This aligns with another 
essential responsibility of the British Parliament, which is to scrutinise the detail of the 
proposed laws placed before it by the executive. Indeed, the UK Parliament’s 
responsibility to provide oversight of the executive is perhaps the property of greatest 
interest in this thesis. This oversight is provided by two chambers, each with a separate 
basis for the selection of its members, and with different functions and powers. It is this 
feature of the Westminster system that we now address. 
 
 
A bicameral legislature 
 
The UK Parliament is bicameral, meaning that it comprises two houses, the House of 
Commons, or lower house, and the House of Lords, which is the upper house. In 2016 
this parliament was one of seventy-eight legislatures worldwide that have or has more 
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than one chamber, around forty per cent of the total (IPU PARLINE Database: Structure 
of Parliaments, 2017). 
The political justification for second chambers has been described, following a 
metaphor adapted from biology, as “redundancy” (Patterson and Mughan, 1999). The 
idea is that, in the same way that animals can live with one eye, one kidney, or one lung, 
it is nevertheless better to have two, in case one malfunctions. When applied to 
legislatures, the implication is that under bicameralism each chamber may correct the 
mistakes and check the excesses of the other. In explaining this, Anthony King is most 
eloquent: 
 
In modern Britain…the existence of the House of Lords—or of some successor body to 
the House of Lords—is almost invariably made out on grounds of redundancy, of the 
desirability of having a chamber of second thoughts, a chamber able to act as a check on 
the excesses of the House of Commons, meaning, in practice, the excesses of the 
government of the day.  
 
There is another consideration, also from King, concerning “the desirability of having an 
august body…where issues of the day can be debated at a high level and relatively free of 
the party-political constraints that often inhibit members of the lower house” (2009: 
306). Observations of both the Commons and the Lords, along with a close reading of 
Hansard, as part of this present study, does indeed demonstrate the validity of this 
assertion.  However, conventional notions of the Lords give the impression of it being a 
forum that has little impact. What powers does the Lords actually possess? Certainly, it 
is far from being of equal power with the Commons (e.g., Wright, 2003). Nevertheless, 
it enjoys formal powers that are substantially greater than a great many other second 
chambers (Fish and Kroenig, 2009). It can block indefinitely the few bills that start in the 
Lords, as well as secondary legislation; and it can delay for around a year the majority of 
other bills, which start in the Commons. In its scrutiny of the Immigration Bill, would 
the Lords exploit these potential powers to compel the Government to offer concessions?  
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An integrated approach 
 
The theory of political motivation that I have outlined integrates political opportunity 
structures with an interpretive approach.  
The POS approach, when applied in this study,  has regard for four main dimensions 
of political life: (1) the formal institutional structures of government and Parliament; (2) 
the informal procedures and prevailing strategies of these institutions’ constituent actors, 
especially Parliamentarians and lobbyists; (3) political alliance structures, which includes 
political actors’ collaboration with influential allies as a means of resource mobilisation; 
and (4) the visibility, resonance and legitimacy of public political discourse. These 
dimensions tend to emphasise the constraints faced by political actors, which limit their 
agency. 
I have supplemented POS with an interpretive approach, one that can be seen as a 
selective version of that advocated by Bevir and Rhodes. Following fundamental 
interpretive principles, attention is directed to the meaning of political actors’ utterances 
and behaviour, via a consideration of their beliefs, preferences, values, interests and goals, 
as they are understood by the actors themselves – whilst, counter to the ideas of Bevir 
and Rhodes, leaving intact the familiar and useful concepts of the ‘institution’ and the 
‘Westminster model’. This approach emphasises the creative freedom of actors, and their 
capacity to make sense of their environment and thereafter act to serve whatever they 
perceive to be their interests and objectives.  
This integrated theoretical framework requires the application of certain research 
methods; and these are the subject of the next chapter.  
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5 Methodology 
 
 
The theoretical framework of the previous chapter provides clear guidelines about the 
kinds of question that ought to be asked in political science research. Why did a political 
actor, A, behave in that way? What were the constraining circumstances of their action? 
What is the power of Actor A? Why did A make that argument? Why was that argument 
successful in recruiting the support of Lobbyist B? Why, in the first place, did A recruit 
the assistance of B? And what explains B’s backstage relationship with Peer C?  And why 
did C co-operate backstage with Government minister D?” “Why did D make that 
concession?” “Why was that concession acceptable to E?” And so forth. These are the 
kinds of question to be answered in a POS-interpretive analysis. How can this be done? 
An initial step consists in analysis of the social context in which actors find 
themselves. This context has multiple ‘levels’. Causes may be located at any of these. At 
the most general level, such context invokes the broader national, European, and global 
situation. At a higher level of granularity, it refers, to take the example of an actor who is 
an MP, to their institutional environment – of Parliament, the MP’s party, their 
constituency, and so forth.  
In this analysis, I have zoomed in on one particular aspect of political actors’ 
institutional environment: Parliament. I analysed its institutional structure, and the 
various stages of the Immigration Bill’s passage through it. This provides necessary 
context for my analysis of all the Parliamentary debates on the Immigration Bill, in which 
the Government outlined and defended its policy against the scrutiny of the Official 
Opposition (the Labour Party), and was compelled to amend certain of its aspects.  
This was supplemented with documentary analysis, including ‘policy analysis’, in 
which I examined Government documents that described and justified the policies of the 
Immigration Bill.   
That might seem like enough to investigate. However, many of the kinds of question 
which I have sought to answer in this investigation could not be tackled with just those 
lines of enquiry. Principally, this is because the aim of such questions is explanation.  
In the social sciences, explanation is concerned not only with answering ‘who?’ and 
‘how?’, but also ‘why?’. Answering the ‘who?’ and ‘how?’ questions are often 
indispensable to answering ‘why?’ questions, but on their own admit of mainly 
descriptive answers. The ‘why?’ question, by contrast, looks immediately for explanation 
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in human motivation, including by reference to values, beliefs, preferences, interests, and 
goals. I am also interested in actors’ interpretations of their situations and those of others 
because they help us to understand why such actors behaved as they did.  
The best instrument for ascertaining these impetuses is the in-depth qualitative 
interview. Values, beliefs, preferences, and goals, which provide the basis for motivation, 
are typically complicated, nuanced, even contradictory, and require comparably deep and 
nuanced qualitative examination. Even power, which might seem to constitute one of the 
more ‘solid’ or ‘material’ features of human relations is substantially ideal, constructed 
mentally by the actors within a field. What I have aimed for in my fieldwork, following 
Bevir and Rhodes, may therefore be summarised as follows: subjective understandings of 
the ‘hows?’, and especially the ‘whys?’, of actors’ interpretation, role-playing, reasoning, 
and action. 
I learned during my fieldwork that the political analyst of Westminster would be wise 
to exercise caution in the interpretation of textbook and official writings on the formal 
procedures and constitutional functions of the Houses of Parliament, as well as the 
constitutionally-defined roles of its actors. The descriptions in such accounts are often 
unfaithful to the complexities and nuances of the political realities. They sometimes 
present idealised forms of what should transpire, rather than empirical descriptions of 
what, in fact, does. I therefore spent quite a lot of time learning about the rules and 
conventions that govern the behaviour of Parliamentary actors from Parliamentarians 
themselves, who must, as a matter of professional survival and success, operate effectively 
in that environment in their everyday lives. This invokes the second dimension of the 
POS part of my theoretical framework. 
 
In this research, I have therefore integrated four main lines of investigation:  
 
• documentary analysis, including policy analysis;  
• analysis of the formal institutional contexts of Parliament in which actors 
developed, defended, scrutinised, criticised, and amended the Immigration Bill 
(our first POS dimension);  
• the more informal rules and unwritten procedures that guide actors (our second 
POS dimension); 
• discursive analysis of actors’ public statements (the fourth aspect of my 
framework, also derives from the POS of Koopmans and Statham); and  
• qualitative in-depth interviews with key (often elite) actors (as a means of 
elucidating the first three and fifth interpretivist dimension of my framework). 
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In Chapter 12 of this thesis I provide a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
Parliament’s legislative impact upon the Immigration Bill. I follow the state-of-the-art 
method used in Russell (2010), Russell and Cowley (2016), Russell et al. (2016), Russell 
et al. (2017). Because that analysis is limited to that chapter, I outline the methodology 
there. 
In the rest of this chapter, I describe my research practices in some detail. This is 
because I tried to conduct my research with a high attention to detail, and have reason to 
believe that without this attention to detail, some of my participants would not have 
returned my initial letter requesting an interview
25
. Much of the more tedious detail is 
provided in the footnotes, to avoid wearying the reader. I therefore hope to provide to 
other researchers keen to recruit elite political participants, including MPs and Peers, 
some guidance on how to do so. 
 
 
Approaching the strange world of Westminster politics 
 
I have conducted my research as an outsider looking in upon a strange world. It is apt 
that the seat of British politics is known as the “Westminster village” (or “Westminster 
Bubble”). Like a village, its peculiar customs are liable to appear unusual, even baffling, 
to non-natives. 
When preparing for my fieldwork with Westminster’s resident MPs and Peers, I 
found the small but specialised literature on interviewing elites, including British 
politicians, to be particularly helpful in bridging the ‘cultural divide’. At a general level, 
as a researcher with some interview experience, though not of elites, I found the practical 
advice in these articles and books to be pitched at a level that allowed me to build upon 
my existing expertise in conducting research interviews. More specifically, advice on 
interviewing British political elites proved invaluable (Richards, 1996; Puwar, 1997). 
 
25
 Elites, and especially political elites, seem to have an eye for detail, especially written detail. 
This should not, perhaps, be surprising. A large part of the job of such elites consists in either 
comprehending written material, or writing. As such, if a researcher pays close attention to 
the presentation and drafting of a request for participation – that can be the difference between 
recruiting a valuable informant, or receiving a message of rejection. For this research, it would 
be the difference between research with a strong empirical base, and no research at all. This 
was confirmed to me by the remark of one participant, a Parliamentarian, who noted that they 
receive many requests on their time from students, and that they turn most of them down. 
An exception was made in my case because I was clearly a “serious” student. 
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*** 
 
I began my PhD on 1 October 2012. The bulk of my interviews were conducted from 
October 2014 to January 2015, at the beginning of the third year of my degree, which for 
some doctoral students is their final year. It may therefore be said that the interviews 
were carried out rather late in the research process. Most PhD students prefer to conduct 
their research at the beginning of their second, not third, year.  
I did not initially plan to conduct my fieldwork so late. Instead, it arose out of my 
desire to acquaint myself with the Parliamentary debates at all stages of the Bill, the last 
of which was in May 2014. Because these debates ran to over 1,500 pages of transcribed 
text, constituting over 800,000 words, all of which required careful analysis, it was not 
until August that I had finished my first reading of them. Yet conducting my interviews 
so late in the research process may actually have yielded some benefits – due to the 
interviewees’ elite status. As Richards noted in an influential article on interviewing 
elites: 
 
In the vast majority of cases, elite interviewing is probably most productive in the latter 
stages of your work. This is particularly important, as there is a tendency for elites not to 
‘suffer fools gladly’. Their time is often limited, and if you fail to have a very good 
command of your material, then this can have a wholly detrimental effect on the 
interview. (Richards, 1996: 201) 
 
But a researcher cannot put off fieldwork forever. The interviews must take place, and 
interviewing elites brings a unique set of challenges. These challenges have been argued 
to result from an inversion of the usual power dynamic of social science research 
interviews. In a typical interview, the interviewer will be of higher status or more powerful 
than the interviewee. Much has been written about how to deal with power inequalities 
in interviews, which may result, for example, from gender, race, and class differences 
between the researcher and participant. The aim of such guidance is usually to improve 
the interviewers’ sensibility to interviewees’ likely sensitivities. By contrast, in elite 
interviews, the interviewee looks not ‘down’ to the participant, but ‘up’ to the 
charismatic, the talented, the creative, the intelligent, the experienced, the wealthy, the 
powerful, the famous, the revered, the successful. Resulting from this power dynamic are 
a number of risks. 
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Chief among these is elites “seizing control” and dominating the interview (Delaney, 
2007: 215). Fortunately, this is not a problem I encountered. All participants were polite 
or friendly, and answered questions in a straightforward and direct way, even indicating 
clearly when they were not speaking frankly, due, for example, to party loyalties or 
particular Parliamentary codes and political conventions.  
Second, there is the risk of the interviewer being “seduced” by their subject (Delaney, 
2007: 217):  
 
There is something seductive about interviewing those with great wealth, power, and 
success. … You enter someone’s life for an hour or two, you may speak as ‘relative equals’ 
… and it is easy to come out of an interview thinking either ‘that was amazing to interview 
someone like that’ or ‘that could be me’ – both of which reflect the process of seduction. 
Elites tend to be very forceful and eloquent spokespeople and, therefore, it is very 
easy to be seduced and lose objectivity. I have watched inexperienced interviewers go 
through this process, returning starry eyed from an interview, identifying with, or 
defending, the elite person well beyond what would typically be seen after an interview. 
 
I experienced this myself during my fieldwork. I found that there was much about my 
interviewees that I admired and wished to learn from or emulate: their confidence, charm, 
sense of humour, charisma, eloquence, erudition, kindness, and generosity. I can 
remember leaving some interviews thinking: “What an impressive person,” “she’s very 
clever,” “he’s so eloquent”, “she was so nice, and generous with her time”, and “she’s so 
charming and charismatic”.  
 My only hope is that these feelings did not affect the accuracy of my notetaking, and 
had worn off sufficiently by the time I came to analyse (dispassionately) the data.   
Finally, if this were not already enough to dissuade a doctoral researcher from 
interviewing elites, according to one of the “pioneers” of elite interviewing methods 
(Harvey, 2010: 195), Lewis Dexter, the challenges of these interviews are such that junior 
researchers should perhaps avoid doing them altogether! This is because research 
students are too often “inexperienced” and “ill-prepared” and “needlessly take up the 
time of important persons” (Dexter, 1964: 557).  
Dexter may have a point. In my first interview, with Dr Julian Huppert, then Liberal 
Democrat MP for Cambridge, within five minutes it had become clear that my knowledge 
of British politics, the UK’s parliamentary system, and immigration law, was wholly 
inadequate. Huppert is the son of Cambridge academics, and studied there himself for 
eleven years, including for a PhD in biochemistry that he received in 2005 (Huppert, 
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2005). Since losing his Cambridge seat in the 2015 general election he has worked as a 
University Lecturer at his alma mater in the Department of Politics and International 
Studies. Further, he was described by two Parliamentary colleagues I interviewed as “very 
intelligent”. It may therefore be unsurprising that his knowledge about not only politics, 
but immigration policy – on which I am expected to be an expert – far exceeded my own. 
He spoke quickly, and on things about which I knew nothing. Fortunately, Huppert 
realised this and was both considerate and patient in ‘bringing me up to speed’. 
Nevertheless, the interview was a wake-up call. Many of my interviewees could be 
expected to be equally intelligent. Some had legal backgrounds (e.g., Baroness Hamwee), 
or are themselves top lawyers (e.g., Lord Pannick QC), or immigration law experts (e.g., 
Alison Harvey, Policy Director of the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association). I 
thereafter resolved to learn ‘inside out’ (in fact, by rote memorisation) the details of both 
the Immigration Bill, and other relevant law. Moreover, I realised I would need to add to 
my knowledge of the esoteric workings of the UK’s political system, beyond a ‘crash 
course’ provided to me by Huppert. That I had exposed to myself the limitations in my 
own knowledge so early, especially after putting off my fieldwork for so long, was in one 
sense fortunate. It strengthened my resolve to ensure that the typical student, viewed by 
Dexter as generally unsuitable for elite interviewing, and which I feared I had exemplified 
in that first interview, would not again be me. 
Of course, reading books about the peculiar risks inherent to interviewing elites is no 
substitute for actually interviewing them. But attempting to do so introduces a further 
set of more general challenges. These are the problems familiar to all social researchers 
conducting interviews, but which are often exacerbated in the case of elites.  
First, the investigator must interview the ‘right’ people. This is the sampling problem. 
Second, when the investigator knows whom to interview, he must actually interview 
them. This is the problem of access, which is worsened in the case of elite participants 
(Bygnes, 2008). Finally, even if one has secured an interview, the participant in question 
may be uncooperative, or worse, misleading in their answers. The problem here, suggests 
Berry (Berry, 2002: 679), is that where interviewers are being misled – whether or not 
that is the participant’s intention – how can the interviewer know about it? This final 
concern reflects the problem of data quality: ensuring that one’s interviews produce 
information that is both valid and relevant. Each of these challenges and my way of 
tackling them is dealt with in turn. 
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Sampling 
 
Earlier research has shown that that the population of key actors in the UK immigration 
policy-making process is relatively small (Statham and Geddes, 2006; Somerville and 
Goodman, 2010). Excluding the general public and the media, its central actors are 
thought to number the tens rather than hundreds. Further, the government authorities 
at the very centre of its development can be counted on just a few hands. It was therefore 
not necessary to draw from this small population a ‘representative sample’, as in large-n 
research. It was quite possible to approach for interview a good many of the field’s most 
important actors. However, I did wish to hear from actors occupying a range of different 
institutionalised roles in the field: from ministers, MPs, Peers, lobbying groups, and so 
forth. From this diverse sample, I hoped to attain a broader view of the immigration policy 
field, in which I could discern how the roles of actors affected their impact upon the 
Immigration Act.  
I designed the sample on the basis of two sets of sources: earlier research, which 
identified key immigration policy stakeholders (especially Statham and Geddes, 2006; and 
Somerville and Goodman, 2010), and Parliamentary debates. I thus approached the actors 
said to be endowed with the formal authority to make immigration policy, including 
ministers, in addition to those with the apparent power to influence it: MPs, Peers, and 
the interest groups said to be important in guiding these Parliamentarians’ scrutiny of 
government legislation. Additional interviews were added through the ‘snowball’ process, 
whereby existing interviewees suggested other persons whom they thought might be of 
interest. 
The roles of interviewees fell into the categories below. The full list of on-the-record
26
 
interviewees is provided in the Appendix. 
 
26
 I do not use the term “on the record” in the way typically used by journalists, by which 
information provided by an informant can be used freely and attributed by name to its source. 
Rather, as a researcher, I use the term “on the record” to refer to a much more rigorous level 
of confidentiality. Indeed, in journalism, this level of confidentiality goes by the designation 
“not for attribution”; and this is what I offered to all of my participants. Continued overleaf… 
Thus, for “on the record” accounts in my thesis, I am permitted to: identify the names of 
participants as persons I interviewed; make use of all the information they imparted to me 
(except where they said otherwise); and quote that information in a way that could not 
reasonably be expected to narrow down or identify its source. I am not, therefore, authorised 
to ascribe quoted material to named participants, unless I have been given permission by the 
interviewee concerned. However, where I use a quotation without asking for permission, I am 
allowed to identify the category of the individual who conveyed the information. For example: 
“an MP I interviewed said the story was ‘completely false’, a view corroborated by another of 
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my informants”; or “as a Peer imparted to me during an interview, ‘the minister might think 
that, but he couldn’t possibly comment’.”  
This level of confidentiality was described in the Informed Consent Form, which I gave 
to participants before asking them any questions. I invited them to read, fill out, and sign the 
form, before countersigning it myself. Unfortunately, however, on a few occasions the form 
was never handed over. This typically occurred where interviewees began immediately to 
engage me in conversation,  
The term “off the record” is used in different ways by authors. Strictly speaking, “off the 
record” means that a source’s information cannot be used in any way, for any purpose. It 
cannot be used even if unattributed, or even to inform one’s work. For my own part, I use “off 
the record” to mean that I can use the source’s information, but cannot attribute it. I can 
neither name the person or even the category of actor to which a respondent belongs. Hence 
once a conversation is designated as being “off the record”, then I am obliged to not reveal 
that this person has spoken with me. I spoke with two respondents in this way, and so their 
names are not included in my thesis. In addition to these two, I also spoke more informally 
with ten other individuals, and their names are also not included.  
These levels of confidentiality, as they apply throughout my research and in this thesis, 
are as follows. When “on the record”, I can identify the names of the participants that I 
interviewed; make use of all the information they imparted to me (except where they said 
otherwise); quote that information, but only in a way that would not narrow down or identify 
its source; and indicate the capacity in which the quoted speaker is acting (e.g., MP). However, 
I cannot ascribe quoted material to named participants, except where I have sought and been 
given permission to do so by the respondent. In relation to “off the record”, I can use the 
information, but I cannot quote, attribute, or mention it. 
With regard to quotation and attribution within this thesis, the following five points 
should be noted. First, where I enclose a participant statement in quotation marks, “as here”, 
and attribute that statement to a named individual, I do so after having sought specifically, 
and received, that person’s express permission. Second, where I enclose a participant 
statement in quotation marks, and do not attribute that statement to a named individual, but 
instead to a category of actor, such as an “MP”, or “Peer”, I have not sought additional 
permission beyond that granted by the participant’s signing of my Informed Consent Form. 
Third, all statements enclosed in quotation marks are based on notes, which I wrote down as 
people spoke. As such, all quotations should not be viewed as verbatim, but only close 
approximations. Fourth, I omit quotation marks where I made notes of what respondents said 
after the fact on the basis of personal recollection. Fifth and finally, unattributed statements 
of fact are often based on my field notes or other elements of my investigation. Where they 
are not, I try to make this clear. 
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1. ministers; 
2. civil servants; 
3. Members of Parliament (in both Government and Opposition, including 
backbenchers);  
4. members of the House of Lords (known as Peers); 
5. interest groups; 
6. immigration lawyers; and 
7. academics. 
 
 
Access 
 
With the sample drawn, a second set of problems emerges: gaining access to policy elites. 
A recurring theme in the literature on elites is that they are widely sought after and hence 
very busy, a view supported by the diaries showed to me by participants.  
An illustration of the barriers encountered by the researcher keen to interview MPs 
is provided in a scene from the four-part BBC documentary television series, Inside the 
Commons, some of which was filmed during my own research at the Houses of 
Parliament. In a telling clip (which looks like it has been edited), the Conservative MP for 
Wellingborough, Peter Bone, sits in his Parliamentary office with a young woman, 
presumably his assistant, as she asks him which demands upon his time he wishes to 
accept: 
 
Narrator  For loyal MPs, and rebels alike, the demands on their time are never-
ending. 
   
MP’s assistant  You’re invited to ‘What’s the Point of the Human Rights Act?’ with 
Diana Rose QC on the 28
th
 October. 
   
Peter Bone MP  No. 
   
MP’s assistant  Would you like to celebrate ‘Anglesey: The Premier County of 
Wales’? 
   
Peter Bone MP  No. 
   
MP’s assistant  The British Retail Consortium annual reception? 
   
Peter Bone MP   No. 
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MP’s assistant  Institute for Government? 
   
Peter Bone MP  No. 
   
MP’s assistant  Energy security? 
   
Peter Bone MP  No. 
   
MP’s assistant  And then we are... 
   
Peter Bone MP  Back to the start again! (To the camera 
operator/interviewer/similar): The first thing you have to learn 
when you become an MP: you come in here, and you arrive on the 
first day, and there’s a full pile (raises hand about two feet above the 
top of the table). Eighty per cent of it, you just say no. 
 
There are, however, a number of practical steps that the researcher can take to decrease 
the likelihood of non-response. First of all, with regard to political elites, it is important 
to avoid contacting them near to an election (Harvey, 2010: 198). A particularly good 
time to approach Parliamentarians is at the end of a Parliamentary recess, just before they 
are about to sit in Parliament.  
The question of whether or not to write a formal paper-based letter, as opposed to an 
email, is apparently important. When drafting my initial requests for interview, I sent off 
only letters, following the advice given to me in personal correspondence by Erica 
Consterdine, a researcher who has recently interviewed over fifty immigration 
stakeholders in the UK, including senior politicians and civil servants.  
The formal letter has the benefit of allowing the researcher to draw attention to 
institutional affiliation in a striking way. All my letters were headed clearly with the 
University of Cambridge logo, with underneath it the words, Department of Sociology
27
.  
Apart from an indication of their institutional affiliation, what else should a first 
letter of request contain? Several researchers suggest forms of flattery. In this regard, it 
is the advice of Richards and Delaney that I followed most closely. The ‘flattery’ they 
recommend is neither insincere nor excessive. It is a particular kind of flattery that simply 
 
27
 In this, I followed the advice of Aberbach and Rockman, who noted, in a highly-cited article 
on elite interviewing, that, “It helps to have the imprimatur of a major and respected research 
house” (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002: 673). 
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emphasises that the recipient’s “particular set of experiences and expertise are crucial to 
gaining a full understanding of the issue at hand” (Delaney, 2007: 212):  
I followed Delaney’s advice closely. Flattery tends to have negative connotations. It 
is often used to imply insincerity, especially to further one’s own interests. In this 
research, however, the first negative connotation, insincerity, did not apply. Nor should 
it. If one’s sample is well designed, the statement that the recipient’s participation is 
important to gaining a full understanding of the issue at hand will be true. I changed this 
particular line in my letter to correspond with my understanding of the centrality of the 
recipient actor in the field of immigration policy
28
.  
By trying to communicate to the recipient the significance of their participation to my 
research, and to do so with a firmer basis in fact than the use of flattery in its pejorative 
sense would entail, I hoped to convey recognition for what I expected would be, for many 
participants, unsung contributions to the Bill
29
, whilst avoiding a well-known pitfall of 
elite interviews: sycophancy, which can appear disingenuous, or manipulative, and is 
easily detected (see Richards, 1996: 201). Of course, the second negative connotation of 
flattery, that it is used to serve one’s own interests, could be said to apply here. The 
particular form of flattery I used would have made the letters I sent more pleasant to 
receive, which would likely aid in endearing me to the recipient, and improving 
participation rate.   
I initially sent out letters to fifty-four people asking for just a twenty-minute 
interview
30
. If respondents had not responded after a month, I wrote to them again after 
three weeks
31
, this time by email, in case this would yield an improved chance of response; 
 
28
 Thus, in my letter to Mark harper, I wrote that (with emphasis in original), “…being able 
to hear your insight on the development of the Act would really make my thesis.” By 
comparison, in my letter to Julian Huppert, I said: “Given your very extensive involvement in 
the debate on the Bill (in its passage through the Commons you made more than eighty 
interventions, behind only the Immigration and Shadow Immigration Ministers), I would be 
most interested to hear your perspective on the direction of the Act, and the general state of 
immigration politics in the UK today.” 
29
 Two interviewees, with experience as MPs, confirmed the importance of receiving credit for 
achievements in politics, whilst noting that many of a politician’s achievements will earn no 
credit, at least with the general public, because they took place backstage. 
30
 I asked for so little not wanting to put off informants, and keen to show that I valued their 
time. In fact, only two interviews were shorter than twenty minutes, and almost all were over 
forty minutes. I estimate the median interview length to be one hour. The longest interviews 
were over two hours. 
31
 For this advice I thank my friend, Liam Conlon. 
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one respondent expressed a preference to be written to electronically, and others 
confessed to having misplaced or lost letters. One participant responded, without 
additional prompt, fully eight weeks after receiving their follow-up letter! 
But how does one prepare for an interview with an elite, such as a charismatic 
politician? It is of course essential to have a thorough knowledge of the lives of all 
interviewees. In this regard, the advice of Richards, an experienced interviewer of UK 
politicians, was invaluable. He highlights “the obvious sources” of information on the 
social backgrounds and careers of Westminster elites: Who’s Who, The Whitehall 
Companion, The Times Guide to the House of Commons, and The Parliamentary 
Companion (Richards, 1996: 202). For this researcher, these sources were not as obvious 
as Richards suggested.  
For almost all of the interviewees, I produced an “interview guide”, which I emailed 
to participants in advance of meeting them. This was a word-processed document in .pdf 
format summarising the participants’ public work on the Immigration Bill, and listing the 
questions I would ask. So, for MPs, the majority of the interview guides’ content was 
given to summaries of their speeches in the House of Commons. The interview guide 
served a threefold purpose. First, it displayed courtesy to the interviewees, many of whom 
preferred to have sight, before the interview, of the questions that they would be asked
32
.  
The second purpose of the interview guide was to allow participants to prepare for 
the interview. Seeing the questions beforehand encourages and helps interviewees to give 
fuller, more considered, more accurate, and thereby more valuable answers. A common 
remark of participants was something to the effect of: “as soon as work begins on a new 
Bill, one forgets the last one!” Providing a summary of an individual’s work on the Bill 
thus helped the participant to ‘jog their memory’. 
Third, the interview guide provided me with an opportunity to develop further my 
credibility as a researcher in the eyes of interviewees. I took care to draft my initial letters 
and follow-up emails with care. I did that to demonstrate my seriousness and competence 
as a researcher. The interview guides allowed for a continuation of this ‘performance’. 
From the narrow perspective of my research, the purpose of these efforts was, first, to 
persuade recipients to speak to me, and second, to make them take their participation 
more seriously. The guides may have contributed to these aims. In email correspondence, 
 
32
 A number of participants requested the questions I would be asking in their initial replies 
to my letters. One participant asked to be given the questions at least a week in advance. 
Another respondent said I should feel free to send the questions, but that their receipt would 
not affect his answers! 
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a Peer I interviewed reported that a colleague was “very impressed by your preparation”, 
adding “Looks like your work rate and ethic are substantial!” 
All of these efforts to improve access to the key actors in the field could be said to 
have produced an interview participation rate of around forty-one per cent (based on the 
percentage of individuals initially approached through letters that were interviewed). Of 
the fifty-four individuals initially approached, I received positive responses from twenty-
six. Of these, I interviewed twenty-two on the record, and spoke with one off the record 
(see Footnote 26). 
With access to participants having been secured, the third set of problems arises. 
These are to do with having smooth and productive interviews that generate data that are 
of good quality: reliable, valid, original, insightful, and so forth. Concerns over data 
quality raise a number of practical questions. Should interviews be audio- or video-
recorded, or does that reduce participants’ frankness?  Should one ask relatively open 
questions, which allow interviewees greater freedom in their answers at a cost to response 
consistency and participant comparability; or relatively closed questions, which allow for 
higher response consistency and participant comparability at a cost to interviewees’ 
freedom to reply as they wish? Finally, how can we trust what political actors say? It is to 
these difficult questions that we now turn.  
 
 
Data quality 
 
The decision not to audio-record 
 
When planning my fieldwork, I agonised over whether or not to audio-record my 
interviews. The major benefit of using a sound recorder is that it enables a full verbatim 
record to be produced. By contrast, if one records interviews through handwritten note-
taking alone, data loss can be substantial. However, the potentially significant benefit of 
interviewing without a recorder is that interviewees may be more candid
33
. This may apply 
 
33
 One researcher, Les Back, has even suggested that the capacity to record voices accurately 
has meant that researchers have become “less observant and actually less involved in the social 
world.” (Baker and Edwards, 2012: 14) 
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with particular force to politicians; historically, recording devices are known to have 
caused much embarrassment to many.  
In the end, I adopted a cautious approach to participant confidentiality, deciding not 
to audio- or video-record the interviews. Instead, I asked permission to take notes; all 
interviewees said that would be fine. Nor would I attribute quotations to specified 
participants without their permission, which I would seek by email after the interview, 
giving the quotation I wanted to use, along with the context in which it appeared in my 
thesis. Many interviewees nevertheless insisted that they did not mind being quoted, or 
recorded. I took nobody up on the latter offer. In one case, an interviewee asked if his son 
could video record the interview, and I approved.  
Why did I decide not to audio- or video-record my interviews?  
First, as mentioned earlier, political actors have, in recent years, and especially since 
the rise of mobile devices and networked communication, become increasingly anxious 
about leaks and gaffes. The sources of this anxiety have been well explained in Political 
Scandal (Thompson, 2000). Against this backdrop, in the trade-off between a greater 
quantity of perfectly-accurate data (through the audio-recording and verbatim 
transcription of interviews), and the prospect of increased data validity (i.e., participant 
frankness), I opted for the latter. My preference was for interviewee candour, in the hope 
that this would bring me if not closer to the truth, then closer to the truth as participants 
saw it. Judging by the decidedly ‘colourful’ language used by one interviewee, the notion 
that the absence of a recording device makes certain interviewees more open seems 
plausible.  
Second, transcribing takes a lot of time. A common estimate is that one hour of 
speech takes six hours to transcribe. I decided to spend more time in data analysis than 
transcription. It also seems that note-taking yields a curious benefit: “Writing notes 
rapidly with occasional glances at the interviewee can also encourage more detailed 
responses” (Dexter, 2006, cited in Harvey, 2011: 438). Keen to eek whatever advantage I 
could from note-taking, whenever periods of silence arose, and I was keen for the 
participant to say more, I would begin writing, as a way of reducing the tension that arises 
in silence. In one interview, where the respondent took a little time to think before 
answering questions, taking a sip from a cup of tea provided by the participant served the 
same function.  
Overall, then, I decided that the benefits of being able to produce a verbatim 
transcript and all that this implies – zero data loss, and perfect or near-perfect accuracy – 
did not outweigh the cost of potentially losing fascinating information that would not 
have been imparted were the interviews recorded. I did, of course, ensure that, as soon as 
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interviews were over, I took additional notes as soon as possible, to reduce data loss that 
can lead to researcher bias (Beamer, 2002: 92).  
Turning now to the nature of the questions themselves, my interviews typically 
began, in line with guidance in the literature, with broader questions, before turning to 
more specific ones (see, for example, Beamer, 2002: 92). The first question often asked 
interviewees to explain their interest in immigration matters, or asked for biographical 
details not commonly available
34
. Later questions tended to be more open-ended, in line 
with the advice in the literature
35
. 
 
34
 Aberbach and Rockman advise, “Starting with innocuous questions about the person’s 
background”, to facilitate a relaxed conversation, “since people find talking about themselves 
about as fascinating as any subject they know” (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). 
35
 Berry has described open-ended questioning as a “high-wire act”; although it is potentially 
the most valuable mode of elite interviewing it is also the riskiest as interviewers must “know 
when to probe and how to formulate follow-up questions on the fly” (Berry, 2002: 679) – a 
task made all the more difficult when the interviewer is taking notes. In my research, I took 
the risk, and asked predominantly open-ended questions. This was especially the case early in 
the research process, to allow, as Berry explains, “the subjects to tell the interviewer what’s 
relevant and what’s important rather than being restricted by the researcher’s preconceived 
notions about what is important (Berry, 2002: 681). The advice resonates. In my first 
interview, with Julian Huppert MP, I quickly abandoned, in situ, the questions I had prepared, 
when it became clear that they were misguided. Huppert had taken the interview in a direction 
of much greater relevance to my research.  
Furthermore, more open questions have the additional benefit of allowing “respondents 
to organize their answers within their own frameworks”, increasing the validity of their 
responses (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002: 674). This openness was particularly well suited to 
the kind of exploratory, in-depth qualitative investigation I was conducting, though a 
corresponding cost (the research process is continually a fine balancing act) is that it makes 
coding and analysis much more difficult (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002: 674).  
A related pitfall is for investigators to slip into the jargon of their discipline. Instead, one 
must use the language of the participants. As Beamer has stressed, the researcher’s concepts 
should never be explained to respondents overtly; “a better strategy is to develop an 
instrument that poses questions that bring these underlying dimensions into relief” (Beamer, 
2002: 88). Of course, this has the potential to introduce another problem: the freedom for 
participants to be evasive, or steer the conversation in a direction that pleases them more than 
it does the researcher. This point highlights what Berry calls the, “paradox of elite 
interviewing”: that the valuable flexibility of open-ended questioning exacerbates the validity 
and reliability issues that are part and parcel of a more open, less structured approach (Berry, 
2002: 679). 
A third and significant benefit of asking clear, uncomplicated, and open questions, derives 
from the observation that elites prefer not to be ‘boxed in’ by closed questions. As 
Schoenberger argues:  
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Nevertheless, although interview questions were largely open-ended, allowing for 
long and wide-ranging answers of substantial sophistication and nuance, they were 
carefully chosen. In fact, I had a list of similar ‘core’ questions for each of the different 
categories of actor, though each individual interview was tailored to my needs
36
.  
 
 
Respondents are likely to feel less frustrated if they are able to explain exactly what they 
mean in their own terms rather than trying to fit themselves into the terms of reference 
proposed by the researcher (Schoenberger, 1991: 183, cited in Harvey: 2010: 202). 
 
36
 Some questions I asked of all or almost all participants. Others I put only to specific 
categories of actor, such as lobbyists, or MPs. Many questions were actor-specific. In what 
follows, I provide the questions asked of all or almost all interviewees, as well as those specific 
to certain categories of actor. These questions were often modified depending on the 
interviewee. 
 
Questions asked to all or almost all participants (not verbatim): 
 
1. When did you first learn that the Government was developing an Immigration Bill? 
2. What was your role in the Bill’s development? What influence did you have? 
3. What was your political strategy in the policy-making process? 
4. Who were the most important people in shaping the Bill? 
5. What were their motivations?  
 
Questions asked to non-Government Parliamentarians (not verbatim): 
 
1. How did you prepare your scrutiny of the Immigration Bill? 
2. Which external groups did you communicate with? 
3. What were these communications like (with respect to frequency, content, and aims)? 
4. Were you involved in any “behind-the-scenes” negotiations with the Government? 
What did these involve? 
5. (If they tabled amendments): What was the background to the amendments you 
tabled? How were they developed? What was their purpose? 
 
Questions asked to external actors, such as lobbyists (not verbatim): 
 
1. How did you prepare your scrutiny of the Immigration Bill? 
2. Which Parliamentarians did you communicate with? 
3. What were these communications like (with respect to frequency, content, and aims)? 
4. Were you involved in any “behind-the-scenes” negotiations with the Government? 
What did these involve? 
 
For each interviewee, there were also questions I wanted, and intended, to ask, but did not 
include in the Interview Guide. If an opportunity presented itself, or it otherwise seemed 
appropriate, I would ask such questions, often at the end of the interview. Finally, I would 
end interviews by asking if there were any further areas I did not mention which the 
interviewee would like to comment on. 
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Trusting what elites say 
 
The final problem is exemplified by the question: How can we trust what our interviewees 
tell us? Take politicians, for example. As a class, they are not known for their honesty or 
forthrightness. Moreover, politicians may be more intelligent, articulate, charismatic, and 
socially skilled than a great proportion of relatively inexperienced research students (the 
author included). It would therefore be unwise for such a researcher to imagine they could 
‘see through’ politicians, some of whom will even have received special media training to 
improve their interview technique, and enable them to skilfully evade questions (Harvey, 
2011: 438).  
As such, one could argue that it is doubtful that many social researchers, perhaps all 
but the most competent, can have much confidence in distilling the truth from what elite 
participants say.  
However, an attentive and critical interviewer asking simple and direct questions, 
such as “what motivated this policy?”, senses when they are being given a straight answer.  
Moreover, there are a few considerations that help the researcher to improve the 
accuracy of the picture they glean from political actors. The first is to realise that roles 
identify interests, and interviewees are likely to respond in ways that serve their interests. 
In Westminster politics, interests are structured principally by party affiliation. Following 
from this, it is in the interest of a member of the Government to present the Government 
in a favourable light. Similarly, it is in the interest of a Labour member to present the 
Government in a less-than-favourable light. And so on. But more strongly than this, the 
kinds of things that politicians are able to say of their party colleagues will be 
circumscribed by party allegiance. Loyalty is an important aspect of being professional in 
the political domain. Thus, members of the Government are proscribed from criticising 
Government policy in public. Ministers, for example, are bound in this way by the 
Ministerial Code. More generally, the kinds of things that politicians say of their party 
colleagues is also constrained, though typically more by convention and the dictates of 
loyalty, than by written guidelines as with ministers. Consider a comment from an 
informant whose opinion I invited on one of their colleagues. The participant praised the 
professionalism of their associate, before adding something like, “but then what do you 
expect me to say!” Civil servants may not be able to criticise the ministers that they serve, 
in the same way that members of the same party will be reticent to criticise their 
colleagues or the policies of their party. One effect of this is that remarks that would 
appear to go against an actors’ party line may thereby attain greater credibility or weight.  
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It is important also to hear from a wide variety of actors, from all parties, including 
backbench politicians, for whom there are generally weaker disincentives to stray from 
the party line (this being carefully borne in mind when assessing the frankness of any 
statement). Throughout the interview process, I continually checked the accounts of 
interviewees against one another, seeking corroboration for a number of key events, hence 
providing a view of the field from multiple perspectives.  
Third, it is important to check the House of Commons Register of Members’ 
Financial Interests (formerly the Register of Members’ Interests), to see if members’ 
views are likely to be influenced by outside interests.  
A realisation recurrent throughout my fieldwork was that the variable most 
important to determining the quality of data was, perhaps, the investigator himself, me. 
As such, I have found it fruitful to regard the primary research process as an experiential 
journey in which my knowledge and skills developed as I went on. My methods were 
under a continual process of adjustment, both in the short-term, say, over the course of 
an interview, but also over the whole research process, so that the comparatively more 
naïve researcher at the beginning of an interview, or at the commencement of fieldwork, 
had become, by their conclusion, a less naïve one. That is, I think, an instructive (and 
accurate) observation.   
In spite of this, there has been a need to guard against complacency and be wary of 
jumping to quick conclusions on the belief that, “I’ve heard this before”.  
But perhaps most important of all has been to avoid ‘easing up’ on my preparation. 
By resisting such inclinations, and trying to view each interview afresh, tailoring it 
according to knowledge gained earlier in the research process, I have hoped at least to 
maintain, if not to improve, data quality. 
 
 
The data 
 
This research used the following sources of data:  
 
• Twenty-two “on-the-record”, semi-structured, in-depth interviews recorded by 
handwritten notes only, with little verbatim transcription. All interviews were 
conducted face-to-face
37
. The list of these interviewees is given in the Appendix. 
 
37
 I wanted to conduct all interviews face-to-face. When asked (by telephone or email) if I 
would prefer to conduct a phone interview, I politely suggested that it, “would be no bother 
whatsoever” to see the informant at a time and place of their convenience, thereby indicating 
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The handwritten notes were organised, condensed, and typed up into a word-
processing document, which ran to around 14,000 words. The interviewees 
included Government ministers who defended the Immigration Bill in Parliament, 
Government and Opposition MPs, Government and Opposition Peers, 
immigration lawyers, lobbyists, and academics.  
• Nine interviews, conversations, or email communications “off the record” with 
actors under the following categories: MPs, Peers, civil servants, lobbyists, 
migration researchers, immigration lawyers.  
• A corpus of 341 newspaper articles, from 1 July 2012 to 1 July 2014, adding up to 
around 190,000 words. The articles were selected on the basis of a search of the 
LexisNexis archive of UK newspapers for articles containing as a “major mention” 
the word “immigration” or “migrant”, which includes “migration” and 
“immigrant”. By “major mention” is meant that the search terms are found in an 
article’s headline, lead paragraph, or index. The search was conducted for articles 
published between 1 July 2012 and 1 July 2014, and covered the following 
newspapers: The Daily Telegraph, The Sunday Telegraph, Daily Mail, Mail on 
Sunday, Daily Mirror, Sunday Mirror, London Evening Standard, The Guardian, 
The Observer, The Sun, The Times, The Sunday Times, Daily Express, and the 
Sunday Express. The search results provided the “most relevant” 1,000 articles. 
From these I selected the “most read”, which produced 341. The articles informed 
both a rough thematic analysis of immigration reportage, not intended as 
representative, as well as a more systematic basis for immigration-related news, 
events, and developments during the years studied. 
• All Parliamentary debates on the Immigration Bill, lasting 93 hours and three 
minutes, and totalling around 800,000 words transcribed in around 1,500 pages. 
 
my willingness to accommodate them – as well as conveying the importance of their 
participation to my research. Although I did not know it at the time, face-to-face interviews 
may yield more detailed responses than those conducted by telephone (Sturges and Hanrahan, 
2004). Other benefits were clearer. By visiting participants at their place of work (often in 
Westminster, the seat of the UK government, and especially Portcullis House, or the House 
of Lords), I was able to see participants’ offices, workstations, computer screens, email 
inboxes, and diaries, and was able to ask for any relevant primary documentation. By three 
interviewees, I was given box files full of documents. One particularly long and fruitful 
interview took place in the home of a participant, and, contrary to usual practice, led to the 
interview being recorded (with audio and video) not, as is more common, by the researcher, 
but by the interviewee! (whose son was amassing material to chronicle his father’s life, 
perhaps with a view to writing his biography).  
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I reviewed the entirety of the video and audio footage of the debates to correct 
errors in the official Hansard transcripts. 
• Parliamentary materials on the Immigration Bill, which are publicly available, 
with most accessible online, including: 
 Four “Consultation documents”, and the Government’s “results” or 
“responses” to the consultations.  
 Seven draft Immigration Bills 2013-14. 
 One Immigration Act 2014. 
 Three sets of Explanatory Notes for different versions of the Bill, and one 
set of Explanatory Notes for the Act (the Explanatory Notes for the Act 
runs to 62 pages). 
 The House of Commons Library research paper on the Bill (51 pages). 
 Six “Impact Assessments” for six separate provisions of the Immigration 
Bill. 
 Two Government Immigration Bill “Factsheets” (total: 7 pages) 
 Written Evidence for the House of Commons Public Bill Committee, 
comprising 65 submissions, adding up to around 250 pages, or 197,000 
words 
 “Notices of Amendments” documents. 
• An MP’s diary throughout the period they worked on the Immigration Bill. 
• A full box file of Lord Avebury’s documents on the Immigration Bill. 
• A full box file of a second Peer’s documents on the Immigration Bill. 
• A full box file of an MP’s documents on the Immigration Bill. 
 
 
Methodological limitations 
 
My research has a number of noteworthy, though I hope not fatal, limitations.  First of 
all, I failed to interview a number of the field’s most important actors. I failed, for 
example, to interview those actors revealed by participants to be the most important 
authorities: the Home Secretary, Theresa May, who did not reply to my letters, and the 
Immigration Ministers Mark Harper and James Brokenshire, from whom I received two 
polite letters of rejection. The 2015 General Election result, which resulted in the 
Conservatives winning 330 seats, four more than the 326 required for an absolute 
majority in the House of Commons, was problematic for my research, as some of those 
who declined to be interviewed perhaps did so on the basis of their appointment to 
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ministerial positions, a role with extra demands on time, and special rules and 
conventions militating against participation in research interviews. This was the case with 
Harper and Brokenshire, for example. These rules and conventions are formalised in the 
‘Ministerial Code’, which advises that requests for academic research interviews “should 
normally be declined” (Cabinet Office, 2010: 19). Some participants said that the 
Ministerial Code was the reason for being unable to provide an interview, or gave this 
reason as explanation for their ministerial colleagues’ inability to be interviewed38.  
 Second, in failing to interview the most important ministerial figures, my attempts 
to open up the ‘black box’ of immigration policy-making only went so far. In fact, I 
discovered that after opening up the black box of Westminster, there was inside a further 
black box within which the most decisive work and policy decisions take place, involving 
the Home Secretary, Immigration Minister, special advisors, civil servants, and other 
departmental ministers. It is within this black box – largely unreachable, even after-the-
fact, for researchers, that much of most important policy-making takes place. 
For this reason, third, my research gives almost no insight into the relations, and 
possible tensions, between ministers and their departments, including civil servants. I 
occasionally heard gossip about a minister having or not having the “respect” of his or 
her department, but little more. This is an important area for research, as a number of 
interviewees reported the importance of intra-departmental struggles between ministers 
and their departments, sometimes resulting from ministerial decisions motivated by 
short-term political reward, given that it is the civil servants who must deal with the 
practical implementation and impact of such decisions, for a long time after the minister 
has left. Recent immigration policy research also reveals the importance of inter-
departmental relations, which my own fieldwork did little to illuminate (especially 
Hampshire and Bale, 2014; Consterdine, 2015b).
 
38
 The part of the Ministerial Code recommending that ministers refuse interviews for the 
purposes of academic research reads: “Ministers are sometimes asked to give interviews to 
persons engaged in academic research or in market opinion surveys or questionnaires. 
Ministers should bear in mind the possibility that their views may be reported in a manner 
incompatible with their responsibilities and duties as members of the Government and such 
interviews should normally be declined.” (Cabinet Office, 2010: 19) 
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6 The UK’s post-war immigration law-making 
 
 
Before turning to the details of this case study investigation, it will be helpful to first take 
a step back and view the UK’s immigration law-making from a broader perspective. In 
this chapter, I therefore present an historical overview of the UK’s major immigration 
law-making after the Second World War until the present, the period that has attracted 
most interest from immigration policy researchers. In so doing, I aim to situate the 
provisions of the Immigration Bill 2013-14 within their appropriate historical and 
political context. My focus here is not on the development of political parties’ policy 
proposals (stances), which would require a more detailed history, but on the content of 
major enacted legislation, as either statutes, in the form of Acts of Parliament, or as 
secondary legislation, such as changes to the Immigration Rules (for fuller histories of 
UK immigration policy-making see Layton-Henry, 1981, 1984, 1992; Spencer, 1997; 
Winder, 2010).  
Moreover, because this study focuses upon a Bill whose principal aim was announced 
as the creation of “a really hostile environment for illegal immigrants”, special attention 
is given in this history to legislation that concerns illegal immigration, which first 
appeared in 1962. But what is illegal immigration law? Resolving this preliminary 
question is the first aim of this chapter. 
 
  
Illegal immigration law: towards a definition 
 
On what basis can one distinguish illegal immigration law from the whole body of 
immigration law, of which it is a subset? What are the characteristic features of such law, 
and what are its practical manifestations? 
 
 
Existing definitions 
 
The investigator determined to answer these questions may struggle to find their answers 
in the literature. Although there have been many definitions of immigration policy, 
incorporating references to stances and implementation as well as to law, most of these 
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are provided as working definitions and are relatively brief and general. As such, they do 
not differentiate between policy and law relating to immigration as a whole and that 
which applies specifically to illegal immigration. Neither is illegal immigration law 
distinguished from other subsets of immigration law (e.g., Freeman, 1992: 1145).    
Some definitions of immigration policy are more elaborate, with a number of authors 
providing a disaggregated definition of immigration policy. Here immigration policy is 
divided into different ‘dimensions’, most commonly between immigration control policy, 
and immigrant policy (Hammar, 1985: 7-10); as well as between labour, asylum, student, 
and family unification (e.g., Freeman, 1994; Freeman and Birrell, 2004; Somerville and 
Goodman, 2010; Milner and Tingley, 2011). However, very few of these authors identify 
illegal immigration as a distinctive domain of immigration law (Freeman, 1994; Freeman 
and Birrell, 2004).  
In addition, one can find several definitions of illegal immigration (for a history of 
the concept see: Düvell, 2006: 21-29). These sometimes invoke the related question of 
what is an ‘illegal’ immigrant, which in UK law has proved an elusive concept (Couper, 
1984). Furthermore, typologies of illegal immigration have been developed, with most of 
these set up around three criteria: legal and illegal entry; legal and illegal residence; and 
legal and illegal employment (Broeders and Engbersen, 2007: 1594).  
However – and this signals the main difficulty – there have been no attempts to 
integrate in a systematic way the two related concepts of immigration law and illegal 
immigration, to produce a definition of illegal immigration law that will enable its reliable 
and intuitive identification. Rather, authors have tended to provide a simple working 
definition of illegal immigration policy or law, implying that its purpose is to ‘regulate’, 
‘restrict’ or ‘combat’ illegal immigration.  
Against a backdrop of definitions inadequate to the task of focused analysis, there is 
just one within the specialist immigration policy-making literature that offers a more 
thoughtful account of illegal immigration law. It is Freeman who advances this definition, 
based on government responses to the “specific tasks and problems” posed by four 
categories of immigration, including illegal immigration (1994: 18). Where illegal 
immigration is concerned, these responses are of two kinds (1994: 22): 
 
(1) measures to prevent persons from entering the country without permission such as 
physical controls at frontiers and airports – what may be called external controls – and 
(2) the supervision of persons legally in the country to ensure that they leave when their 
visas expire and do not engage in illegal activities such as working without permits – what 
may be called internal controls. 
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Though well-suited to his research, Freeman’s definition is too broad for the purposes of 
this study. A majority of immigration control law could be said to encompass the first 
part of Freeman’s definition, ‘external controls’: “measures to prevent persons from 
entering the country without permission”. Yet, it seems more intuitive to describe such 
measures, which represent the foundation of any immigration regime, as having been 
designed to control immigration in general, rather than for the express purpose of 
preventing or regulating illegal immigration.  
This points to the challenge in developing an analytic definition of ‘illegal 
immigration law’. Other categories of immigration law, such as those relating to ‘asylum’ 
or ‘citizenship’, are specialised and narrowly defined sub-sets of ‘immigration law’. 
Asylum law, for example, is based on a long-established and solid foundation of 
jurisprudence, most notably the United Nations’ 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees. By contrast, nowhere does ‘illegal’ immigration seem to be so definitively 
conceptualised, and this is doubtless due to it being less a sub-set of the parent category 
‘immigration law’, than the other side of the very same coin. In other words, the great 
bulk of immigration law that is created to control lawful immigration – for example, the 
establishment of a system that requires those entering a country have a passport – 
simultaneously produces irregular immigrants (i.e., those who enter a country without a 
passport) and hence illegal immigration. This might help to explain why so little work 
appears to have been done to clarify ‘illegal immigration law’ as its own identifiable class, 
and hence why the term lacks clarity.  
The task ahead, therefore, is to develop a precise definition of illegal immigration law 
that will enable the analyst to differentiate it reliably from other specialised areas of law, 
but more importantly, from those laws that have no remit for illegal immigration.  In so 
doing, it should also establish the specific features of law that are designed for the control 
of illegal immigration. Ideally, such a definition will prove to be an effective instrument 
in dedicated future research, both operationally and analytically.  
  
 
Illegal immigration law: a definition 
 
My definition of illegal immigration law derives from the conventional understanding of 
what identifies an irregular immigrant. Immigrants can be classified as ‘irregular’ if they: 
enter a country without authorisation; violate the conditions of their stay by, for example, 
staying in a country for longer than the period permitted by their visa; or work full-time 
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whilst on a student visa that prohibits such work (Boswell, 2003: 134; LeMay, 2015, 3-
4). In the UK, persons who violate the terms of their conditions of stay are considered by 
the government to be irregular immigrants. Based, therefore, on our understanding of 
how immigrants are categorised as ‘irregular’, we can propose that ‘illegal immigration’ 
refers to the processes by which people become irregular immigrants.  
From this preliminary discussion, it seems reasonable to suggest that illegal 
immigration law will be drafted in order to control and respond to irregular immigration, 
this being the start point, and endpoint, of most existing definitions.  The key 
consideration here is that governments and the public tend to view illegal immigration as 
altogether undesirable. Hence, immigration law will aim, in principle, to ensure that: no 
persons residing in a country lack the state’s permission to be there, or are present in that 
country, having violated the conditions of their entry or stay (e.g., those conditions 
specified in a visa or comparable travel document).  
Defining immigration law with respect to this aim could be argued to be somewhat 
abstract, because most countries do not have zero illegal immigration as their goal. It is 
widely recognised that this would imply excessive or impracticable levels of enforcement 
(Djajić, 2001: 144). Indeed, some countries appear to desire some illegal immigration, 
even if they do not reveal that publicly. For example, France’s Minister of State for Social 
Affairs, Jean-Marie Jeanneney, stated in 1966 that, “Illegal immigration has its uses, for 
if we rigidly adhere to the regulations and international agreements we would perhaps be 
short of labour” (Hargreaves, 1995: 178-179, cited in Schain, 2008: 101). 
The overarching aim of illegal immigration law, introduced above served by two 
narrower objectives: prevention and reduction. Prevention itself has two distinct goals. 
The first is to keep unauthorised entry from happening in the first place. Legislative 
measures in service of this goal include fines for drivers of vehicles carrying stowaways, 
and making unauthorised entry a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment.  
The second preventative aim is to make sure that persons do not violate the 
conditions on which their entry, stay, visa, or citizenship status is granted. To this end, 
countries must ensure that those who are permitted to stay for only a limited time, leave 
before that period expires. It is said that ‘visa overstaying’ is the way that most people 
become irregular immigrants in the UK, although in some countries the pattern is 
reversed, such as in the US (LeMay, 2015: 4). Understandably, then, this is a major focus 
of immigration law, and has given rise to initiatives such as ‘visa bonds’, to be submitted 
before entry and collected on exit; and ‘reminder services’, which notify visitors by email 
or text when the expiration of their visa is imminent. 
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Additional measures aimed at preventing both illegal entry and an individual’s 
transition to irregular immigrant status, operate via specific deterrence. This is a term 
adopted from criminology and adapted for this study. It is used here to refer to law 
intended expressly to deter persons from entering or staying in the UK without state 
permission. Unlike laws that are intended to act as a general deterrent, illegal immigration 
laws designed to operate via specific deterrence are likely to be drawn up to tackle 
particular forms or causes of illegal immigration, or types of irregular immigrant
39
.  
The second aim of illegal immigration law is the reduction of the number of irregular 
immigrants that are already present in a country. Measures that serve this aim can also 
be classified into two kinds. The first is the regularisation of persons without immigration 
permission. This usually takes the form of amnesties, government initiatives by which 
large segments or all of a country’s undocumented immigrants can have their status 
regularised.  
The other reduction measure aims at securing the exit of irregular immigrants from 
a country, either voluntarily or via deportation. Like the measures aimed at prevention, 
those aimed at instigating the exit of irregular immigrants apply to two kinds of irregular 
immigrant: those who enter a country without authorisation and those who enter a 
country lawfully, but who violate the terms of their entry or stay by, for example, 
overstaying, irregular working, or obtaining their visa via deception. Such measures 
include the monitoring, identification and ultimately the removal of irregular immigrants. 
Further measures seek to constrain and complicate the everyday and working lives of 
irregular immigrants through policies of ‘exclusion’ (Broeders and Engbersen, 2007), 
restricting their access to accommodation or work by imposition of penalties against 
those found harbouring or employing irregular immigrants. All such measures are 
intended to compel irregular immigrants to leave of their own accord – in the case of 
employer sanctions, by cutting off irregular immigrants’ principal means of survival. At 
the same time, they will also overlap with the preventative aim, by acting as a disincentive 
to illegal overstaying and, in the case of measures to restrict illegal working, by removing 
the primary motivation for irregular immigration.  
Theresa May’s principal rationale for the Immigration Bill, to “create a really hostile 
environment for illegal immigrants”, is consistent with both the preventative and 
 
39
 In criminology, deterrence assumes two principal forms. General deterrence is aimed at 
reducing criminal activity by targeting the total population with the universal threat of 
punishment. Specific deterrence is targeted at a known individual or category of offender, to 
deter them from criminal activity. (McLaughlin and Muncie, 2001: 88) 
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reduction aims, as are most of the Bill’s measures, including the provisions to restrict 
irregular immigrants’ access to private rented accommodation and to bank accounts. Such 
laws can be seen to straddle both of these functions assigned to illegal immigration laws, 
and for this study’s analysis we can therefore define illegal immigration laws as those 
whose specific stated intention, or clearly inferable intention, or likely effect, is either:  
 
1 To prevent or deter unauthorised entry to the UK; or the violation of conditions 
of stay or entry, such as visa overstaying, unauthorised working, deceiving the 
authorities in the obtaining of a visa, or exploitation of immigration law to obtain 
an illegitimate immigration advantage; or 
2 To reduce the number of irregular immigrants in the UK, via regularisation, or 
the exit of irregular immigrants from the country, either voluntarily or by 
deportation.  
 
Note that this definition relies only in part upon policy-makers’ statements of justification 
for particular provisions. This is because policy-makers do not always provide such 
justifications or because their statements may be misleading. For these reasons, the 
definition allows for inferences to be made, based upon an informed judgement as to 
whether a provision is likely to have been introduced with the intention of controlling 
illegal immigration or could be thought likely to de facto serve that end. 
Our understanding of illegal immigration law is summarised in Figure 4, which 
structures the main mechanisms and measures under the twin main aims of prevention 
and reduction. It is important to point out, however, that whilst these legal devices and 
instruments are organised into separate boxes that may appear under different headings, 
they may also share a purpose, capable of delivering on both prevention and reduction. 
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Figure 4  A schematic of illegal immigration law with examples of its measures 
 
 
Now that I have clarified the concept of immigration law that underpins my analysis of 
UK immigration law-making in the post-war period, we may turn to the substance of the 
account, a modern history of immigration law-making in the United Kingdom. 
 
 
A post-war history of UK immigration law-making, 1945 to 2013 
 
I divide my historical account into four key periods. Each has special relevance for the 
history of British immigration law-making, and can be distinguished by a distinctive 
theme, or themes, which underlie its major legislative developments. These four periods 
are: post-war liberalisation, from 1945 to 1948; the advent of illegal immigration law-
making and the “bifurcated” approach (Somerville: 2007), from 1962 to 1976; the 
Conservative government’s restriction of asylum and illegal immigration, from 1979 to 
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1997; and the ‘Golden Age’ of illegal immigration law-making, under Labour, from 1997 
to 2007.  
The final period of this history ends in 2007, even though 2009 saw the enactment 
of a dedicated immigration statute. This is because the period from 1997 to 2007, 
comprising Labour’s first ten years of rule, saw the enactment of five dedicated 
immigration Acts of major legislative importance, each of which introduced an array of 
measures that transformed the country’s means for combating illegal immigration. This 
was the last of such legislation before the Immigration Act 2014, as the Borders, 
Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 contained no such provisions. A timeline depicting 
these four periods is provided by Figure 5. 
Over these five periods, we will see how successive UK governments have enacted 
legislation in five areas of immigration law, covering both immigration admission or 
control law; and immigrant integration law. These five areas are: labour, asylum, 
citizenship, race relations, and illegal immigration.  
 
 
 
Figure 5  The post-war history of UK immigration law-making: a timeline of key periods 
 
 
Post-war liberalisation, 1945–1948 
 
In the wake of the Second World War, the UK’s workforce lay decimated. A subsequent 
flu epidemic worsened the already considerable labour shortages. From the ruins of war, 
how was Great Britain to rebuild itself? The Ministry of Labour contributed a key part of 
the answer: mass immigration. Thus, in 1945, it created the European Voluntary Worker 
Scheme (EVWS), as a means of bolstering the UK’s diminished labour force. Described 
as the “first low-skill economic migration programme” (Somerville, 2007: 14), the EVWS 
sought European (rather than Commonwealth) workers, especially those in Europe’s 
liberated concentration and prison camps, or those who had been displaced by conflict, 
or wished to escape Europe’s devastated cities (see Kay and Miles, 1992). Consequently, 
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in the three years following the war, as many as 180,000 people moved to Britain from 
the Continent to take up employment (Kay and Miles, 1992: 162-164).  
The EVWS continued a pre-war trend of immigration policy through administration 
rather than legislation (Spencer, 1997: 8). That trend was broken, however, with the 
Polish Resettlement Act 1947, which offered citizenship to some 200,000 Polish troops 
who, having fought alongside the British against the Axis powers, found themselves at 
the end of the war on British soil. As a result of the 1947 Act, approximately 128,000 
people of Polish origin settled permanently in Britain (Zubrzycki, 1956). 
This liberal approach to immigration law-making reached its zenith for the entire 
post-war period with the British Nationality Act 1948. This statute represented the first 
– and last – major immigration Act of the twentieth century that was of decidedly liberal 
character. This was due mainly to its redefinition of British nationality via the 
establishment of two new categories of citizenship: Citizen of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies (CUKC), for people born or naturalised in the United Kingdom or one of its 
colonies; and Citizen of the Independent Commonwealth Countries (CICCs), known 
formerly as “British subject”, which included citizens of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
the Union of South Africa, Newfoundland, India, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, and 
Ceylon. Importantly, both these categories of citizen had a right to enter and reside in the 
United Kingdom. Thus, with the enactment of this single twenty-six-page statute, an 
estimated 600 million citizens of the British Empire were granted the right to settle in 
the UK. The Act formed the “legal foundation for the transformation of Britain into a 
multi-ethnic society” (Hansen, 1999: 68) and between 1948 and 1962 approximately half 
a million new Commonwealth (i.e., non-White) immigrants entered the United Kingdom. 
According to Hansen, the Act had little to do with immigration control per se, but rather 
the invigoration of an Empire in decline through affirmation of Britain’s place as head of 
the original members of the Commonwealth of Nations, also known as the Old 
Dominions: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland, and Ireland 
(Hansen, 1999).  
 Whatever the motives that lay behind government initiatives on immigration 
between 1945 and 1948, the overall effect was to liberalise entry to the United Kingdom. 
This, however, was to prove to be the last historical period to exhibit such an approach, 
as we shall now see. 
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The advent of illegal immigration law-making  
and the ‘bifurcated’ approach, 1962–1976 
 
With the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, all that changed. Reflecting a marked 
shift towards restriction, the Act was created to prevent any further non-White 
immigration to the UK (Dummett and Nicol, 1990; Layton-Henry, 1992). To that end, it 
made all CICCs, and CUKCs with passports issued outside the UK, subject to 
immigration and labour market controls. Only those with government-issued 
employment vouchers, of which there were few, were permitted to settle.  
 The 1962 Act also introduced, for the first time (Düvell, 2005: 26), controls with the 
explicit aim of reducing illegal immigration – the main focus of this history. Most notably, 
it created three new offences. These were: entering or remaining in the UK in 
contravention of immigration law; “knowingly harbouring” a person in contravention of 
immigration law; and altering immigration documents without legal authority. 
This about-face was subsequently strengthened by the Commonwealth Immigrants 
Act 1968. This Act was a direct response to the Asian crisis in East Africa. An 
‘Africanisation’ policy threatened the expulsion of 200,000 Indians from Kenya and the 
British government feared that those expelled would take up their legal rights to reside 
in the UK. To prevent that from happening, the 1968 Act restricted the right of entry and 
settlement, which hitherto had been enjoyed by all CUKCs, to only those CUKCs born in 
the UK, or who had one parent or grandparent born in the UK, or who had lived in the 
UK for five years or more. 
Hansen argues that this advent of restrictionism, evident in the 1962 and 1968 Acts, 
was a reflection of British nationalism taking precedence over the honouring of 
Commonwealth promises (1999). The capstone to this restrictionist bent was the 
Immigration Act 1971. In sixty-three pages, it consolidated almost all previous legislation, 
thereby constituting at that time the most comprehensive immigration statute in British 
history. It also contains the legal source of the authority for the UK state to control 
immigration: 
 
The power under this Act to give or refuse leave to enter the United Kingdom shall be 
exercised by immigration officers, and the power to give leave to remain in the United 
Kingdom, or to vary any leave under section 3(3)(a) (whether as regards duration or 
conditions), shall be exercised by the Secretary of State. 
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A major part of the Act was dedicated to a further tightening of access to citizenship. It 
created a new concept in nationality law, that of patriality or right of abode, by which 
CUKCs and other Commonwealth citizens had the right to remain in or enter the UK 
only if they, or their husband (if female), or their parents, or their grandparents, were 
born, adopted, naturalised, or registered in the United Kingdom, or had lived there for 
five years or more before 1 January 1973 (when the Act came into force). Non-patrials, 
by contrast, were subject to immigration control. The Act thus entrenched differences in 
citizenship rights on the basis of ancestral connection, and hence on race (Spencer, 1997: 
143).  
Importantly for the present study, the 1971 Act also contained two provisions that 
expressly targeted illegal immigration – just the second set of such provisions in UK 
history (the first set being those introduced by the 1962 Act). Each of the two provisions 
created a new criminal offence. The first was entering the UK without immigration 
permission, and was punishable by a maximum fine of £200, or with imprisonment of 
not more than six months, or both. The second criminal offence was assisting illegal entry 
or harbouring irregular entrants, and was punishable by a fine of not more than £400, or 
with imprisonment for not longer than six months, or both, though repeat offending 
could be punished by imprisonment of up to seven years. From this point, irregular 
immigration would be truly illegal immigration – a criminal offence, inviting sanctions 
under the UK’s penal code. 
It is due largely to the restrictionist character of the 1962, 1968, and 1971 Acts that 
the UK would come to be described by researchers as the Western world’s first “would-
be zero immigration country” (Layton-Henry, 1992). Yet, the United Kingdom can be 
said to have taken a bifurcated approach to immigration law-making, displaying a more 
liberal side, too. Most notably, on the same day that the majority of the 1971 Act came 
into force, 1 January 1973, the UK entered the European Single Market, thereby removing 
immigration controls to some 250 million nationals of the European Economic 
Community (EEC). Freedom of movement between member states was to be affirmed by 
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which established the European Union on 1 November 1993.  
This more liberal dimension of immigration law-making found further expression in 
a second legislative initiative, that of race relations. Three race relations statutes were 
enacted in this fifteen-year period, reflecting a commitment to improving the integration 
of the UK’s ethnic minorities through the reduction of unfair racial discrimination.  
  The Race Relations Act 1965 created two civil offences: discrimination in public 
places on the grounds of “colour, race, or ethnic or national origins”; and “incitement to 
racial hatred”. It also laid the statutory framework for the creation of the Race Relations 
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Board, and the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants, to oversee the 
implementation and enforcement of the Act. These bare-bones provisions were expanded 
by the Race Relations Act 1968, whose bill Enoch Powell excoriated in his infamous 
“Rivers of Blood” speech. This second race relations Act expanded and clarified the 
contexts to which its notion of unfair discrimination applied. These included public 
places; the provision of goods, facilities, and services; employment, including by trade 
unions and professional organisations; housing and business premises; and 
advertisements and notices. It also replaced the National Committee for Commonwealth 
Immigrants with a newly created Community Relations Commission, charged with 
promoting “harmonious community relations”.  
Yet it was the Race Relations Act 1976, the third of this period, that provided a truly 
comprehensive basis for the UK’s liberal approach to immigrant and ethnic minority 
integration. This statute, which incorporated the anti-discrimination legislation of the 
previous two race relations Acts, introduced a statutory duty for public bodies to promote 
race equality and to demonstrate that their procedures to prevent racial discrimination 
were effective. The 1976 Act also established the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), 
to replace both the Race Relations Board and Community Relations Commission, to 
review the legislation periodically, and ensure its rules were followed. The CRE was also 
endowed with the power to set guidelines for the government and issue legally-binding 
non-discrimination notices.  
It is in this period that the currently dominant “bifurcated” approach to immigration 
law was established and entrenched (Somerville, 2007: 18). The two branches diverge on 
a liberal-restrictive axis. The first branch entailed tight immigration restriction: the ‘zero 
immigration’ approach evinced by the ’62, ’68, and ’71 Acts. The second branch 
incorporated an emphasis on the effective integration of immigrants into British society: 
the ‘race relations’ approach.  
It might appear that such a divergence of approaches would be difficult to rationalise, 
in that liberalism and restrictionism can be construed as polar opposites. However, it was 
Labour MP Roy Hattersley who sought to reconcile them. In a speech to Parliament in 
1965, while a junior Home Office minister, he declared that, “Integration without control 
is impossible, but control without integration is indefensible”, giving rise to what has 
been called the “Hattersley equation” (Saggar, 1992: 90).  
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Restrictions on asylum and illegal immigration, 1979–1997 
 
This third period comprises eighteen years of unbroken Tory rule, composed of five 
successive governments, three of Margaret Thatcher followed by two of John Major. Over 
this time, legislation continued along much the same path: towards ever greater 
restriction. It did, however, initiate a change of focus, away from migration from the 
Caribbean and Commonwealth, especially South Asia, to that from: (1) Eastern Europe, 
following the break-up of the Soviet Union; (2) Africa, following conflicts in Somalia and 
elsewhere; and (3) the British colonies, especially Hong Kong. The underlying motivation 
for this change of focus was the rapid growth in refugee streams from these places, which 
made asylum the central preoccupation of legislation in this period, coupled with a 
perceived need to keep foreigners out. 
Yet at the start of this period, when the Thatcher administration assumed office, it 
was another issue that constituted the main focus of public attention, with anxieties 
stirred by a sensationalist tabloid press. This was the concern that marriage was being 
exploited for immigration advantage, a concern that persists to this day and is reflected 
in the Immigration Bill’s provisions on “sham marriages”. Thus, one of the central pillars 
of the Thatcher government’s first statute, the British Nationality Act 1981, prescribed 
that women married to British men could no longer acquire citizenship solely by virtue 
of that marriage.  
The 1981 Act also reformed British citizenship law in more substantial ways. This 
was the third time since the end of the war, and brought about a further tightening of the 
criteria for naturalisation. Restrictions were twofold. First, Citizenship of the United 
Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC) was split into three categories: British citizenship; British 
Dependent Territories citizenship (BDTC); and British Overseas citizenship. Only those 
belonging to the first category, British citizens, would be granted the right of abode. 
Second, the Act modified the application of jus soli in the acquisition of British 
nationality, such that being born in the UK no longer entitled a person to British 
citizenship; one must also have had at least one parent who is either a British citizen, or 
had enjoyed permanent residence. 
Shortly thereafter, in February 1983, the Government introduced via a change to 
secondary legislation what became known as the “primary purpose rule”. This provision 
sought to make it more difficult to gain an immigration advantage through marriage, by 
stipulating that a person seeking admission to the UK, or an extension of their stay, for 
the purposes of marriage to a person settled in the UK, must have their application 
refused unless they can demonstrate that it is not the primary purpose of the marriage to 
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obtain admission to the UK. The rule was contentious and viewed by judges as “unfair”, 
not least because of its requirement that couples prove a negative (Justice, 1993: 8). 
Although this rule was not technically a test of the genuineness of a marriage, but of the 
main reason for it, it nevertheless came to be viewed as providing a clear indication of 
policy-makers’ concern over ‘marriages of convenience’. 
Then came the first Act in British history whose main purpose was stated as the 
prevention of illegal immigration: the Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1987. This 
created a new civil offence: of vehicles, ships, or aircraft bringing passengers to the UK 
without the required entry documents. The fine was set at £1000 per inadmissible 
passenger. This is an example of what Zolberg has called “remote control” immigration 
measures, which refers to controls that operate beyond the borders of the destination 
country (2000, 2003; see also: Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001: 13-15; 2002).  
There were two further Acts of importance in this period, both under the premiership 
of John Major: the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, and the Asylum and 
Immigration Act 1996. The first of these was introduced in response to a sharp rise in the 
number of people seeking asylum in the UK, from 3,998 in 1988 to 44,840 in 1991 (Home 
Office, 1997). Its purpose was, in the words of Home Secretary Kenneth Baker, “the rapid 
rejection of a large number of unfounded claims” (Hansard, 2 July 1991, col 167). While 
the Act affirmed the primacy of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, thus 
acknowledging a liberal standpoint, it simultaneously provided for a trio of less-than-
liberal measures: the fingerprinting of asylum applicants, to prevent multiple 
applications; the subjection of asylum seekers to inferior housing provision; and the 
creation of a streamlined appeal procedure enabling the quick rejection of claims certified 
as being “without foundation”.   
In the two years following the 1993 Act, asylum applications continued to rise, and 
on 20 November 1995, the Home Secretary, Michael Howard, described to the House of 
Commons the scale of the problem (Hansard, 20 November, col 335): 
 
…only 4 per cent of applicants are initially granted asylum, and only 4 per cent of appeals 
against refusal are allowed by the independent adjudicators. Seventy per cent of claims 
are made, not on arrival in this country, as one would expect of any genuine refugee, but 
after gaining entry on another basis, and often only when leave is about to expire or 
removal about to take place.  
The Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 initially helped us to bring down 
decision times dramatically, from eighteen months to four for a new claim. But the 
relentless rise in claims has outstripped the improvements in our ability to process them. 
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By claiming asylum, those who have no basis to remain here can not only substantially 
prolong their stay, but gain access to benefit and housing at public expense. The 
population of asylum applicants has now reached 75,000. The annual cost in benefit alone 
is more than £200 million. 
 
The Government’s response was the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996. Its major 
provisions included: an extension of the ‘fast track’ appeals process so that all asylum 
applicants could potentially be caught by it; the substantial restriction of housing and 
benefits support to asylum seekers; and the certification of asylum claims as being 
without foundation if they related to countries designated as providing “in general no 
serious risk of persecution”. These countries initially included Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ghana, 
India, Pakistan, Poland, and Romania.  
The 1996 Act also contained two provisions related to the control of illegal 
immigration. The first was the creation of a new criminal offence of assisting, for gain, 
the entry of a person known or suspected of being an asylum seeker, or assisting people 
seeking to obtain leave by deception. This offence was liable to a maximum fine of £5,000. 
The second provision made employing those without permission to live and work in the 
UK a criminal offence, again with a maximum penalty of £5,000.  
It is perhaps no coincidence that in the 1996 Act we find measures to combat illegal 
immigration alongside those imposing restrictions on asylum seekers. At the time, as 
suggested by the words of Michael Howard, there was much public, political and media 
discourse expressing concerns that the UK’s asylum system was being exploited by 
‘illegal’ or ‘bogus’ asylum applicants, those seeking asylum in the UK on the basis of a 
patently false claim.  
We see here the conflation of the terms ‘asylum seeker’ and ‘illegal immigrant’, even 
though the former is not illegal.  Any person arriving in the UK may engage their legal 
right under the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees to apply for 
asylum. Moreover, the correct descriptor for such a person is ‘asylum seeker’ or ‘asylum 
applicant’; and they have the right to stay in the UK while awaiting a decision on their 
application.  Added to this, the term ‘asylum seeker’ is also confused with ‘refugee’. This 
too is factually incorrect and so misleading. A refugee has by definition had their claim 
for asylum accepted, either by Home Office officials or an immigration judge.  
For the present study, it follows that one should not classify provisions to facilitate 
the swift rejection of asylum applications as illegal immigration law. First, it is the legal 
right of any person to submit such an application within the UK, a country that is party 
to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Second, there are no legal penalties for having submitted 
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a claim later found to be unsuccessful or fraudulent. This is because such applications as 
are determined to have been ‘bogus’ may only be so determined after their consideration 
by a Home Office immigration official or judge. 
This third period of immigration legislation can be recognised for its fresh measures 
to reduce illegal immigration and restrict asylum. Yet, in most other respects it can be 
seen to be a period of relative continuity. The ‘bifurcated’ legal model of liberal race 
relations and restrictive control, excepting EEA free movement agreements, remained 
intact. How then, would illegal immigration law-making and illegal immigration law 
under Labour compare? 
 
 
The ‘Golden Age’ of illegal immigration law-making, 1997–2007 
 
The Labour Party’s thirteen-year rule across four governments, three under Tony Blair 
ministries and one under Gordon Brown, was witness to the most active period of 
immigration law-making in the history of the United Kingdom. It has been described as 
“nothing short of hyperactive”, with ten Acts passed on immigration and asylum, the 
publication of “countless” policy documents, and the establishment of the Migration 
Advisory Committee and the (defunct) UK Border Agency (Consterdine and Hampshire, 
2014: 277-278). Yet, as for the preceding Conservative ministries, this period also 
displayed ambivalence: a restrictive approach to asylum, alongside a liberal approach to 
economic migration, termed “managed migration”.  
It was also the time during which legislation exhibited its strongest focus on the 
regulation of illegal immigration, with this the predominant theme in several Acts of this 
period. Surprisingly, illegal immigration provisions receive just a single cursory mention 
in the histories of this period (Consterdine and Hampshire, 2014; Consterdine, 2015a: 
1441). But, make no mistake, this was indeed the ‘Golden Age’ of illegal immigration 
law-making.  
Somerville characterises the first Labour ministry, from 1997 to 2001 when Jack 
Straw was Home Secretary, as comprising two distinct ‘phases’ (2007: 20). The first phase 
saw immediate changes in response to core supporters (Hussain, 2001: 209-16). The 
“primary purpose rule” was abolished; and the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated the 
rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights, into UK law. This phase 
was marked by a more liberal approach to immigration. 
By contrast, the second phase saw steps taken to tighten the asylum system and clear 
asylum backlogs. Here the New Labour Government produced the Immigration and 
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Asylum Act 1999, regarded as “probably the greatest tightening of controls since 1905” 
(Cohen, 2002: 143-4. This makes reference to the Aliens Act 1905, which is widely viewed 
as marking the end of the UK’s ‘open door’ immigration policy40 (Cohen, 2002: 143-4).  
In addition to restricting welfare benefits for asylum seekers and appeals against 
immigration decisions, the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 contained four major 
initiatives for the regulation of illegal immigration, viewed by commentators to be in 
response to a report by French police that as many as 20,000 thousand asylum seekers 
would arrive in Britain that year by lorry (Webster, 1999).  
First, the Act contained provisions for a new power to impose a civil penalty on 
persons responsible for the transport of clandestine entrants to the UK. This replaced and 
strengthened the similar power introduced by the Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Act 
1987, with the fine now set at £2000. Second, the Act increased the number of airline 
liaison officers based overseas, to curb the number of immigrants travelling to the UK 
without proper documents. Third, the Act contained further provisions on what in the 
2014 Act are termed “sham marriages”. It empowered registrars to request the name, age, 
marital status and nationality of couples, and to refuse to give authority to the marriage 
if they considered it “suspicious”. At the same time, it introduced a duty on registrars to 
report marriages they suspected to have been arranged to evade immigration controls. 
Fourth, the Act substantially extended the powers of immigration officers to arrest, 
search, and take fingerprints, without the presence of police officers.  
One can state categorically that no statute prior to the Immigration and Asylum Act 
1999 had contained such focused attention on the prevention of illegal immigration. 
Historically, therefore, it may be viewed as the pivot upon which the UK swung into the 
age of illegal immigration law-making. 
Historically, therefore, it may be viewed as the pivot upon which the UK swung into 
the age of illegal immigration law-making. In spite of this, however, greater scholarly 
attention has been paid to a synchronous development of immigration policy-making, 
 
40
 The metaphor of the ‘open door’ paints a vivid and in some senses insightful picture of 
immigration control, but it is not appropriate here. A door is always part of some larger entity, 
which it provides entrance to. In this metaphor, it is clear what entity the door is a part of and 
where it leads: ‘Residence Britain’. But doors can also be shut, to keep people out. They are a 
mechanism by which people can enter, or be denied entry, to a place. However, before the 
1905 Act, there was no such mechanism. There was no immigration system, no immigration 
officers, no ports of entry, no bureaucracy, and no established body of immigration law. 
Passports did not even include photographs of the holder, which were introduced in 1914. In 
short, before 1905 there was no door. It was the 1905 Act that created one. 
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focusing on Labour’s newly devised “managed migration”. This was viewed as a liberal 
approach to economic immigration, with an emphasis upon the role of the UK in a 
globalised economy (Consterdine and Hampshire, 2014; Consterdine, 2015a). It was also 
considered to be “pro-active, rather than reactive” (Somerville, 2007: 22; emphasis in 
original) and so was clearly distinct from the reactive and restrictive characteristics typical 
of illegal immigration law-making. Between 2001 and 2007, there were four major Acts 
that included several important clauses to combat illegal immigration. This theme has 
been somewhat neglected, overshadowed by the interest shown in Labour’s migration 
management. To explore those provisions on illegal immigration more fully, each of these 
Acts is dealt with in turn. 
 
 
The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 
 
Amidst concerns about the loyalty to the UK of the country’s immigrant and ethnic 
minority groups, especially the loyalty of its Muslims following 9/11, the 2002 Act 
instituted the ‘Life in the United Kingdom’ test for everyone seeking naturalisation or 
permanent residence. This was accompanied by a language requirement for applicants, 
who would have to demonstrate sufficient proficiency in English, Welsh or Scottish 
Gaelic. Those applicants who were successful would then participate in new citizenship 
ceremonies. Here they were required to take an oath of allegiance to the Queen, or a non-
religious “affirmation” of allegiance, and to then read aloud a citizenship pledge:  
 
I will give my loyalty to the United Kingdom and respect its rights and freedoms. I will 
uphold its democratic values. I will observe its laws faithfully and fulfil my duties and 
obligations as a British citizen. 
 
In addition to further restricting the appeals system, and providing a statutory basis for a 
new kind of accommodation centre to house asylum seekers and their dependants, the 
Act contained four major provisions aimed at dealing with irregular immigration and 
immigrants. It was again prompted by public and political concern that the government 
was not doing enough to either prevent clandestine entry, or deport clandestine entrants. 
Such views were spurred by alarmist media coverage of stowaways in trucks, as was 
highlighted by the discovery, in June 2000, of fifty-eight dead Chinese immigrants, who 
had suffocated on their journey (BBC News, 2000).  
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Taking each of these major provisions in turn, first the Act gave additional powers to 
facilitate the removal of irregular immigrants: for detainee custody officers to enter 
private premises to search persons being detained; for children born in the UK to parents 
who entered the country unlawfully to be removed; and for the removal of those who 
attempted to obtain permission to stay by using deception. Second, the Act introduced a 
scheme to require physical data, such as iris or facial images, to accompany immigration 
applications. Third, it created three new criminal offences: assisting unlawful 
immigration; trafficking people into, out of, or within the UK for the purposes of 
prostitution; and failure to comply with a notice requesting information due to a suspicion 
of immigration offending. Fourth, the 2002 Act expanded the powers of police and 
immigration officers, enabling them to enter business premises to search for and arrest 
immigration offenders, and to seize and inspect personal records following the arrest of 
an immigration offender on those premises. Illegal immigration was now the principal 
theme in Labour’s immigration law-making. But would the subsequent Acts from Labour 
governments continue in the same manner? 
 
 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 
 
Yes. In addition to further limiting appeals and benefits for asylum seekers, and 
introducing regulations on immigration advisers, it introduced six provisions to bring 
illegal immigration further under government control.  
The first provision created a new criminal offence of arriving in the UK without a 
valid travel document without a reasonable excuse for not having one. Purposely 
discarding or destroying travel documents were specified as invalid excuses. The second 
provision broadened the criminal offence of trafficking in the 2002 Act, extending it to 
the trafficking of persons for the purposes of exploitation of a non-sexual nature. Third, 
prefiguring similar provisions in the 2013-14 Bill, the 2004 Act endowed immigration 
officers with powers of arrest, entry, search, and the taking of fingerprints. The fourth 
provision, again reflecting concern with issues that are manifest in the Immigration Bill, 
targeted “sham marriages”, by requiring parties to a marriage involving a non-EEA 
national to give written notice of their marriage and receive its approval from the Secretary 
of State. The fifth initiative was intended to prevent the absconding of persons subject to 
immigration control, especially asylum seekers, via electronic monitoring, including 
tagging and tracking, and the application of voice recognition in immigrant identification. 
Finally, a sixth provision empowered the Immigration Services Commissioner to enter 
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premises where he suspects there is material likely to be of substantial value to an 
investigation of a criminal immigration offence.  
Taken together, these six provisions equated to a concerted and conspicuous attempt 
to crack down on irregular immigrants and immigration. Never had a piece of immigration 
legislation displayed such an extensive preoccupation with resolving this vexing problem. 
 
 
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 
  
The third Act of this second phase in Labour rule continued the now long-standing and 
cross-party tradition of tightening the asylum system and limiting rights of appeal against 
immigration decisions. The 2006 Act granted the Secretary of State the power to deprive 
individuals of British citizenship – a power to be later extended in the 2013-14 Bill – if 
the Home Secretary deemed it “conducive to the public good” and the individual would 
not be rendered stateless as a result. This legislation also continued the more recent trend 
– introduced in 1962, solidified in the 1971 Act, and then deepened by Labour – of 
legislating to reduce illegal immigration. A major impetus seems to have been the death 
of twenty Chinese cockle-pickers, whose dead bodies were discovered on the shores of 
Morecambe Bay in February 2004. This may be seen to have renewed and intensified 
alarm over ‘illegal workers’, especially in the tabloid press, which suggested the 
government had no control over the issue.  
It is against this backcloth that the 2006 Act devoted significant space to measures 
aimed at ameliorating illegal migrant working. Two dovetailing provisions are especially 
noteworthy, which continued a third trend: of creating new civil and criminal offences 
relating to immigration. The first provision created a new criminal offence of knowingly 
employing an adult who does not have permission to be in the UK, or does not have 
permission to work, due to their immigrant status, such as being a student, which forbids 
full-time work. Violation of this law could be punishable by up to two years in prison and 
an unlimited fine. This was buttressed by a new civil penalty scheme, the second 
provision, which that introduced on-the-spot fines for employers of persons without 
immigration permission. These fines were severe: up to £2,000 per irregular immigrant 
worker.  
These restrictions on work were supplemented with two further initiatives, aimed at 
preventing the flow of irregular immigrants into the country. The first concerned the 
surveillance and investigation of suspected irregular immigrants, empowering 
immigration officers to verify and confiscate passengers’ identity documents and require 
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the holders of such documents to provide biometric information. The second related 
provision granted a power to the Secretary of State to require or enable an immigration 
officer to obtain advance information on passengers, freight, or crew of any ship or aircraft 
leaving or arriving at the UK. 
 
 
UK Borders Act 2007 
 
The fourth and final Act in this period of illegal immigration law-making again 
concentrated upon the ‘threat’ posed by irregular immigrants, with a focus, following the 
7/7 attacks in London, upon security. It granted immigration officers with police-like 
powers of detention, entry, search, and seizure. It introduced the power to impose 
compulsory biometric identity documents for non-EEA immigrants, and granted the 
Home Secretary wide-ranging powers to retain and share biometric information. It also 
created a new regime to prevent visa overstaying by immigrants granted time-limited 
permission to reside in the UK, via regular reporting to the UK Border Agency and the 
submission of an immigrant’s proof of residence at a specific address. 
In the same year, the points-based immigration system was introduced through 
secondary legislation. This was a five-tier system setting out criteria for migrants’ entry 
to the UK, which replaced all previous work permits and entry schemes. It gave highest 
priority to highly skilled immigrants; and lower priority to unskilled workers, students, 
and temporary workers.  
 
*** 
 
A trio of further Acts with relevance to immigration were passed in the final three years 
of Labour rule. Only one was a dedicated immigration statute, the Borders, Citizenship 
and Immigration Act 2009. Although an extensive piece of legislation, bringing further 
restrictions to appeals and ever greater powers to immigration officers – it contained no 
provisions related to illegal immigration, and so falls outside our fourth period of law-
making. A second statute, the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, contained (in 
spite of its title) just one noteworthy provision related to immigration, and twenty-one 
related to the criminal justice system. The last statute of these three years, before the 
formation of the Coalition Government, was the Equality Act 2010. This consolidated the 
array of primary and secondary legislation that formed the basis of UK anti-discrimination 
law, including discrimination against foreigners, its otherwise only connection to 
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immigration. Thereafter, it would not be until 2013 that a British government would 
announce the development of another immigration statute. 
 
 
Continuity and change 
 
Considered as a whole, the UK’s immigration law-making in the post-war era may be said 
to have transformed the country’s dealings with migrants. More than this, it has brought 
profound change to every major facet of British life. Yet the law-making over these seven 
decades was not conceived as a whole, still less a coherent one. It unfurled piecemeal, in 
an ad-hoc fashion, through no fewer than twenty-one major Parliamentary Acts. As such, 
we are presented with an intricate history that resists easy thematisation. Certainly, one 
finds no unilinear progression, no single trend to unite the development of immigration 
law throughout this period. Nor do we find a multi-linear progression, comprising 
separate lines of asynchronous development, with each type of immigration law moving 
towards some identifiable telos. Rather, we find a process that is both multifaceted and 
multidirectional, comprising several, often interrelated, elements, each travelling a 
variable and sometimes ambivalent course. To adapt a phrase from one researcher, it is 
very much a case of “one step forward, two steps back” (Consterdine, 2013), to which 
one is tempted to add: then three steps left, and four steps right!  
Yet, in spite of this complexity, the development of immigration law is, of course, far 
from random. The challenge though is to identify the patterns that exist amidst the 
apparent chaos, requiring the investigator to deploy some analytic tools.  The first is to 
apply a disaggregated conception of immigration law. In the prior analysis this enabled 
the author to chart developments spanning five legislative domains: labour, citizenship, 
asylum, race relations and, the focus of this study, illegal immigration. The second is to 
utilise the liberal/restrictive binary, according to which the bent of a legal provision may 
be described, and law-makers’ ‘direction of travel’ discerned. This is necessary to be able 
to make use of our third set of analytic tools, which are indispensable to the historian: 
continuity and change. Deploying these three conceptual instruments, we may draw the 
following portrait of the key patterns of the UK’s immigration law-making for the whole 
of the post-war period.  
From 1945 to 1948, British immigration law-making reflected a general trend 
towards liberalism, with its borders opened to people from Poland and from the colonies. 
However, 1962 signalled the end of this general liberalisation, with an Act that not only 
introduced illegal immigration law to the statute book, but also introduced labour market 
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controls and more restrictive routes to citizenship, thereby marking the beginning of 
restrictive trends in the enactment of law in those two areas, trends which have persisted 
to this day without deviation.  
The proclivity towards the restriction of labour migration did not last quite so long. 
That ended forty-nine years after 1962 with the initiation of ‘managed migration’ under 
Labour, a policy ended abruptly by the Coalition on its election to government in 2010.  
Another theme can be identified from 1965 with the introduction of the race relations 
agenda, which created an entirely new area of law-making relating to the harmonious 
incorporation of immigrants into the societal mainstream. It is here that we can also 
detect the beginnings of the bifurcated approach to immigration law-making, where the 
emphasis on restrictive control in the domains of labour, asylum and citizenship is 
accompanied by the liberalist character of race relations law.  
These patterns of continuity and change are depicted in Figure 6. From this, we can 
see that the UK’s immigration law-making in this period may admit of broad 
characterisation after all. From 1962 to 2013, legislative developments in fact conform to 
a single trend, that of restrictionism. To this general rule, there are just two exceptions, 
both simple: law-making on race relations, which has always been liberal; and ‘managed 
migration’ under Labour, from 2001 to 2010. 
 
 
 
Figure 6  Patterns of continuity and change in the UK’s immigration law-making,  
1945–2013  
Citizenship
Labour
Commonwealth Immigrants Act
Illegal
First Race Relations Act
Race Relations
EVWS
Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act
Asylum
"Managed Migration" Coalition
Immigration Bill 2013-14
1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Trend of immigration law-making
Restrictive Liberal No significant change
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*** 
 
In this history of the UK’s major post-war immigration law-making, our focus has been 
on immigration Acts, the primary form of law and source of the foundation and structure 
of the UK’s immigration regime. However, for each of these pieces of legislation to have 
become immigration Acts, they must have successfully traversed an elaborate multi-stage 
Parliamentary process. Therefore, before we turn our attention to the next major piece of 
immigration legislation in Britain’s history, the Immigration Bill 2013-14, which was 
introduced to Parliament after a four-year hiatus in the development of immigration 
statute, we must first examine, stage-by-stage, the UK’s Parliamentary process. That is 
the subject of our next chapter. 
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7 The legislative process 
 
 
Before turning to the details of the Immigration Bill’s passage through Parliament, let 
us first consider briefly the general framework under which all executive-initiated bills 
are developed and enacted. This includes a pre-legislative and post-legislative or 
Parliamentary process, the latter proceeding through several stages, each with its own 
institutional design and function. These stages give structure to the remainder of the 
thesis, which is ordered chronologically (for a more detailed account of the UK 
legislative process see Zander, 2004). 
 
 
The decision to legislate 
 
First of all, what is a bill? There are two kinds: public bills, which are proposed laws 
that apply to the general population of one or more countries of the UK and if enacted 
become public law – the ‘law of the land’ throughout their jurisdiction; and private 
bills, which are proposals for laws that apply to (1) individuals (known as private or 
personal Acts), such as those which have historically granted British nationality to 
foreigners; and (2) organisations, such as local authorities (known as local acts). 
Today, almost all bills are public bills, and these too divide into two types: 
government bills, of which the Immigration Bill is an example, and private members’ 
bills. Government bills are authored and introduced to Parliament by the executive, 
whilst private members’ bills are authored and introduced by MPs, and Peers who are 
not government ministers; that is, are from government-supporting parties 
(backbenchers), opposition parties (frontbenchers or backbenchers), or are 
independents or Crossbenchers (non-party political Peers).   
Both kinds of public bill constitute draft proposals for new laws, or changes to 
existing laws, presented for scrutiny, discussion, and amendment in the Houses of 
Parliament. In the UK’s parliamentary system, all proposed legislation must receive 
the approval of both Houses of Parliament to become law.  
Some bills are published in full draft form before introduction to Parliament, so 
that they may undergo a process known as ‘pre-legislative scrutiny’ in which they are 
considered by a Parliamentary committee or committees. These committees may 
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invite, receive and consider evidence and will make recommendations to the executive 
branch of government based on this evidence as well as the content of the legislation.  
Because consultation involves the executive and not Parliament, this pre-
legislative phase need not concern us here – although I can confirm on the basis of a 
detailed analysis of the Bill’s consultation phase that there is no evidence to suggest 
it changed the Government’s proposals. 
 
 
The Parliamentary process  
 
In the UK, a bill’s passage through the legislature proceeds in stages. Typically, there 
are at least eleven stages, each with its own institutional design, (more informal) 
conventions, and function. A bill can start in either the House of Commons or the 
House of Lords, depending upon its subject. Bills that concern taxation or public 
expenditure, for example, originate in the Commons, whereas bills relating to the 
judicial system tend to begin their passage in the Lords. However, all bills must be 
approved in the same form by both Houses of Parliament, the Immigration Bill being 
no exception. In fact, in all other major respects, the Immigration Bill’s Parliamentary 
passage was unexceptional. It passed through all stages, which functioned as 
expected. A brief description of each Parliamentary stage follows, given in the order 
in which the Immigration Bill passed through them.   
 
 
The House of Commons 
 
(1) First Reading 
The first Parliamentary stage of a public bill is its First Reading. This takes place 
in the Commons Chamber, also known as the Floor of the House, which is the 
main debating room of the House of Commons, as distinct from smaller 
committee rooms. Here, the short title of a bill is read aloud, which is followed by 
an order for the bill to be printed. This first stage is a formality and takes place 
without discussion or a vote. Shortly thereafter, the bill is published in full as a 
House of Commons paper, which is freely accessible online. 
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(2) Second Reading 
This stage provides an opportunity for MPs to debate the general principles and 
policies of a bill. It begins with the minister of the department with overall 
responsibility for the bill – here, Theresa May of the Home Office – describing and 
justifying its legislative proposals.  
After the minister has finished, the spokesperson of the Official Opposition –  
for the Immigration Bill, Labour’s Shadow Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper – 
responds with their own views on the Bill. A basic rule that applies in both Houses 
is that only one person is permitted to hold the floor at any one time. However, 
MPs may briefly interject to request that the person currently speaking ‘give way’ 
and relinquish the floor to allow the interjector to make a brief intervention, such 
as a query or statement. However, it is the prerogative of the Member holding the 
floor to decide whether or not to give way.  
The debate then continues. Any MP is permitted to attend and speak. These 
debates usually take all day, in practice around six hours. At the end of the debate, 
MPs vote on whether the bill before them should proceed to the Committee stage. 
If votes are not unanimously in favour of a bill, then we have what is known as a 
‘division’, which represents a clear and direct challenge to the principle of a bill. 
If more votes are registered in opposition to the bill’s passage, its life ends. It is 
highly unusual for bills to not be approved by the Commons at Second Reading; 
a defeat here usually signifies a major loss for the Government. The last time a 
bill was rejected by the House of Commons at this stage was in 1986 under 
Margaret Thatcher.  
 
(3) Public Bill Committee  
The adversarial, turn-taking character of the Second Reading stage is retained for 
Committee, in which non-Government Members conduct detailed line-by-line 
examination of a bill’s clauses. At Committee, the Government is able to receive 
written and oral evidence from experts and interest groups beyond Parliament. 
The Committee considers each clause of the bill, and proposes changes to it, 
known as ‘amendments’. Proposals to amend the bill are selected for debate by 
the Chairman of the Committee. The person who proposed the amendment will 
then explain why it is required, after which the Government’s spokesperson, 
usually a departmental minister, will respond to Opposition criticism. In the light 
of the minister’s response, the Member proposing the amendment may choose to 
withdraw it, if they are satisfied with the Government’s response, or put it to a 
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vote.  If an amendment is pushed to a vote, and the Committee’s members vote 
by a majority in support of the amendment, then the bill is changed according to 
the amendment.  
The passage of public bills is strictly timetabled, and as such there is limited 
time to discuss them at Committee. This means the Committee’s Chair must be 
selective in deciding which issues will be discussed. Membership on Public Bill 
Committees is also limited, usually to between sixteen and twenty-five MPs.  
The Committee stage will often comprise multiple sessions or ‘sittings’, of 
about two hours each. The Immigration Bill had eleven sittings, taking place over 
a three-week period (from 29 October to 19 November 2013). At the final sitting 
of the Committee, there is no deciding vote, with a bill proceeding automatically 
to the next Parliamentary stage.  
 
(4) Report 
This stage provides an opportunity for any MP, and not just a select group as in 
the Public Bill Committee, to debate further amendments to a bill. Unlike the 
Committee, the House need not consider every clause of the bill, but only those 
on which amendments have been proposed or ‘tabled’. For lengthy and 
complicated bills such as the Immigration Bill, debates may be spread over several 
days, if time permits. As in Committee, there is no vote on whether the whole bill 
should proceed to the next stage, which it does by default.  
 
(5) Third Reading 
This fifth stage in a bill’s development is the final opportunity for MPs to debate 
the final text of the bill, as amended in earlier Commons stages. As for Report, 
any MP may participate. Debate is usually short, however, and no amendments 
can be made. At the end of the debate, the House votes on whether to approve the 
bill. If more votes are received in support of it, the legislation proceeds to the 
House of Lords, where it is subjected to a further five stages of scrutiny. It is 
possible for the Lords to reject the bill, though the Commons may force it through 
without the approval of the upper House in the following session of Parliament. 
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The House of Lords 
 
(6) First Reading 
Once a bill arrives in the House of Lords from the Commons, it receives its First 
Reading. This is the same as the First Reading stage in the lower House, a 
formality taking place without debate, with one exception: it is not the bill’s short 
title that is read aloud, but its long title, which provides additional indication of 
the bill’s content. Once a bill has received this formal introduction, it is published, 
both in print and online in digital format. 
 
(7) Second Reading 
Like its Commons namesake, Second Reading in the Lords provides the first 
opportunity for members to debate the main principles and purpose of a bill. 
Before this Second Reading debate takes place, Peers who would like to make an 
intervention add their name to a list, the ‘speakers list’. At the conclusion to this 
stage, the House votes on whether the bill placed before it should be progressed 
to the next stage, Lords Committee.  
 
(8) Committee 
As in the Commons, the Lords Committee stage involves line-by-line scrutiny of 
all aspects of a bill. Unlike in the Commons, where Committees typically comprise 
no more than twenty-five MPs, any member of the House of Lords may take part 
in the debate and table amendments.  
There are further differences between the Houses. In the Lords, unlike in the 
Commons, the Government cannot restrict the subjects to be discussed and there 
is no time limit on discussions. At this stage, every clause of the bill has to be 
agreed to, and all suggested changes be considered. At the end of Lords 
Committee, which can last more than a week, the legislation progresses 
automatically to the next stage. 
 
(9) Report 
The Report stage in the Lords provides an opportunity for the detailed 
examination of a bill to continue, and is the final point in the Lords at which a bill 
can be amended. There is no final vote, and a bill proceeds automatically to the 
next, and perhaps final, Lords stage. 
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(10) Third Reading 
Third Reading in the Lords provides Peers with the opportunity to “tidy up” a bill, 
as Lords often describe it, to ensure that the law enacted is practical, effective, and 
“without loopholes”. Unlike at Third Reading in the Commons, amendments can 
be made, though they are usually moved by the Government as a means of making 
good on any promises it made at earlier stages.    
 
(11+) Consideration of amendments and Ping Pong 
In this final set of stages in the life of a bill, the legislation is returned to the House 
where it started, for the consideration of any amendments made by the other 
House. For the Immigration Bill, this meant it was returned to the Commons, 
whose MPs may make further changes if desired. If they do make any changes, the 
legislation must then be returned to the Lords, who must either agree or disagree 
with MPs’ amendments, or make alternative proposals. If the Lords disagrees with 
any Commons amendments, or makes alternative proposals, then the bill is sent 
back to the Commons, who may do likewise. In this way, a bill may go back and 
forth in quick succession between each House, reminiscent of a ball in a game of 
table tennis, hence the name, until both Houses reach agreement on its exact 
wording.  
 
*** 
 
Once a bill has passed through all the preceding stages, it goes on to receive Royal 
Assent, the method by which the UK’s constitutional monarch formally approves the 
version of the legislation agreed upon by the legislature, thus converting it into an Act 
of Parliament, and hence law. The legislative process described in this chapter is 
summarised by Figure 7. 
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Figure 7  The multi-stage Parliamentary process of a government-drafted Act
[1] First Reading
Publication and formal introduction of
the bill to the Commons; no debate
[2] Second Reading
Debate on general principles of the bill
[3] Public Bill Committee
Detailed examination of the bill by
selected MPs; chance to amend bill
[4] Report
Opportunity for the whole Commons
to debate and amend the bill
House of Commons
[5] Third Reading
Last opportunity for Commons debate;
no amendments; bill voted on
House of Lords
[6] First Reading
Formal introduction of the bill to the
House of Lords; no debate
[7] Second Reading
Debate on general principles of the bill
[8] Committee
Detailed examination of the bill; open
to any peer; chance to amend bill
[9] Report
A further opportunity for the Lords to
debate and amend the bill
[10] Third Reading
For refining the bill and removing
loopholes
[11] Ping Pong
The House of Commons considers any
Lords amendments to the bill
[12] Ping Pong
 The House of Lords considers any
Commons amendments to the bill
[13] Royal Assent
The Monarch agrees to make the bill
into an Act of Parliament; a formality
The passage of a government
bill starting in the House of
Commons
if amended if not amended
if not amended
if amendedif not amended
if amended
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In the remaining chapters of this thesis, I analyse the role of Parliament in the shaping 
of the Immigration Bill. I present a detailed, mostly chronological narrative of the UK 
legislature’s scrutiny of the Immigration Bill, examine Parliament’s institutional 
structure and political dynamics, and try to explain why it had the influence it did, if, 
indeed, it had any.  
 
 
Introducing the Bill to Parliament 
 
Around six months after its first public announcement in the House of Commons, the 
first version of the Immigration Bill was published, by the Home Office, on 10 October 
2013. In revealing the Coalition’s policy, Theresa May, repeating remarks that she 
made in May 2012
41
, described the main purpose of the Bill in the following way: 
 
to create a really hostile environment for illegal immigrants. (Travis, 2013b)  
 
Explaining the Bill’s focus on “illegal immigrants”, May stated: 
 
Most people will say it can’t be fair for people who have no right to be here in the UK 
to continue to exist as everybody else does with bank accounts, with driving licences, 
and with access to rented accommodation. We are going to be changing that because 
we don’t think that is fair. (Travis, 2013b) 
 
When introduced to the House of Commons, the Bill was supplemented by fifty-four 
pages of “Explanatory Notes”, which outlined its provisions in more accessible 
language; and a four-page “Immigration Bill Factsheet”, which provided the following 
overview of the prospective legislation (Home Office, 2013b: 1-2):  
 
 
41
 In an interview with the Telegraph newspaper, Theresa May said, “The aim is to create 
here in Britain a really hostile environment for illegal migration.” (Kirkup and Winnett, 
2012) 
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As things stand, it is too easy for people to live and work in the UK illegally and take 
advantage of our public services. The appeals system is like a never-ending game of 
snakes and ladders, with almost 70,000 appeals heard every year. The winners are 
foreign criminals and immigration lawyers – while the losers are the victims of these 
crimes and the public. It is too difficult to get rid of people with no right to be here. 
 
This is not fair to the British public and it is not fair to legitimate migrants who want 
to come and contribute to our society and economy. 
 
What we are going to do: 
 
• Reform the removals and appeals system, making it easier and 
quicker to remove those with no right to be here; 
• End the abuse of Article 8 – the right to respect for private and 
family life; 
• Prevent illegal immigrants accessing and abusing public services or 
the labour market. 
 
How we are going to do it: 
 
The Bill will make it: 
 
(i) easier to identify illegal immigrants by extending: 
 
• powers to collect and check fingerprints; 
• powers to search for passports; 
• powers to implement embarkation controls; 
• powers to examine the status and credibility of migrants seeking to marry 
or enter into civil partnership. 
 
(ii) easier to remove and deport illegal immigrants by: 
 
• cutting the number of decisions that can be appealed from 17 to 4 – 
preserving appeals for those asserting fundamental rights; 
• extending the number of non-suspensive appeals. Where there is no risk 
of serious irreversible harm, we should deport foreign criminals first and 
hear their appeal later; 
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• ensuring the courts have regard to Parliament’s view of what the public 
interest requires when considering Article 8 of the European Court of 
Human Rights in immigration cases; 
• restricting the ability of immigration detainees to apply repeatedly for bail 
if they have previously been refused it. 
 
(iii) more difficult for illegal immigrants to live in the UK by: 
 
• requiring private landlords to check the immigration status of their 
tenants, to prevent those with no right to live in the UK from accessing 
private rented housing; 
• making it easier for the Home Office to recover unpaid civil penalties; 
• prohibiting banks from opening current accounts for migrants identified 
as being in the UK unlawfully, by requiring banks to check against a 
database of known immigration offenders before opening accounts; 
• introducing new powers to check driving licence applicants’ immigration 
status before issuing a licence and revoking licences where immigrants 
are found to have overstayed in the UK. 
 
Which of the Coalition parties were responsible for these proposals? Four measures 
appear to have been present in the Liberal Democrats’ 2010 election manifesto: exit 
checks, the extension of immigration officers’ powers, the deportation of foreign 
criminals, and a crackdown on irregular migrant working
42
. By contrast, none of the 
Conservatives’ 2010 election manifesto pledges appear to have resurfaced in the Bill43. 
 
42
 The Liberal Democrats’ 2010 election manifesto promised to: (1) “Immediately 
reintroduce exit checks at all ports and airports”; (2) “Secure Britain’s borders by giving a 
National Border Force police powers”; (3) “enforce any immigration system through 
rigorous checks on businesses and a crackdown on rogue employers who profit from illegal 
labour”; and (4) “Prioritise deportation efforts on criminals”. (Liberal Democrats, 2010: 
75-77) 
43
 Under a system intended to “attract the brightest and best to our country”, the 
Conservatives presented as their main goal in their 2010 election manifesto the reduction 
of “net migration back to the levels of the 1990s – tens of thousands a year, not hundreds 
of thousands”43. To help achieve this goal, the Conservatives promised the introduction 
of the following three measures: “(1) setting an annual limit on the number of non-EU 
economic migrants admitted into the UK to live and work; (2) limiting access only to those 
who will bring the most value to the British economy; and (3) applying transitional 
controls as a matter of course in the future for all new EU Member States” (Conservative 
Party: 21). The remainder of the Conservatives’ most substantial specific policies 
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On the basis of this ‘process-tracing’ of policies, from election commitments to draft 
legislation, one could reasonably infer that the Liberal Democrats had exerted a strong 
impact upon the Bill’s content. To be sure, Lib Dem negotiators had successfully 
removed from the Bill a plan for immigration checks in schools.  
Yet this process tracing gives a misleading impression. The Liberal Democrats’ 
more progressive policies on asylum were not in the Bill and appear to have been 
dropped entirely
44
 (except for their goal to end the detention of children for 
immigration purposes). In addition, much of the rest of the Bill they “detested”, 
according to one interviewee (others gave a consonant impression of strong 
disapproval), and their Coalition negotiators even disliked the four (more illiberal) of 
their election proposals that did appear to have made it into the Bill. In fact, revealed 
interviewees, in Coalition negotiations on immigration policy, the Conservatives were 
uncompromising; immigration was on their list of “non-negotiables”. And given that 
popular opinion was on the side of the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats decided 
to devote their bargaining energies to policies that, unlike immigration, they had 
prioritised.    
Over roughly the next six months, the Government’s principal aim would be to 
ensure the Bill’s “smooth passage” through Parliament, as one interviewee described 
it. By this is meant that the Immigration Bill would in around six months become the 
Immigration Act, having been amended by non-Government Parliamentarians as little 
as possible. To achieve this, the legislation would have to pass through at least eight 
substantive Parliamentary stages, some of which would entail line-by-line scrutiny 
and discussion of the executive’s legislative proposals in the debating chambers of the 
Houses of Parliament. At some stages, Parliamentarians would have the opportunity 
to table amendments to the Bill, and compel their respective House to vote on them. 
Any amendment that received majority support would be incorporated into the Bill. 
 
concerned students, and were three: These policies were three: “(1) insist foreign students 
at new or unregistered institutions pay a bond in order to study in this country, to be 
repaid after the student has left the country at the end of their studies; (2) ensure foreign 
students can prove that they have the financial means to support themselves in the UK; 
and (3) require that students must usually leave the country and reapply if they want to 
switch to another course or apply for a work permit” (Conservative Party: 21). 
44
 These included, according to the Liberal Democrats’ 2010 election manifesto: (1) Taking 
responsibility for asylum away from the Home Office and giving it to a wholly independent 
agency; (2) pushing for a co-ordinated EU-wide asylum system; and (3) allowing asylum 
seekers to work. saving taxpayers’ money and allowing them the dignity of earning their 
living instead of having to depend on handouts (Liberal Democrats, 2010: 76-77). 
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Our first Parliamentary stage, Commons Second Reading, allows for debates, but 
not the tabling of amendments and hence no modification to the Bill – although if the 
Bill does not receive more votes in its favour than against it, it will be thrown out and 
not proceed to the next stage. Given that governments typically enjoy a majority in 
the Commons, such an outcome is rare. Yet even if that were not to transpire, the 
events and discussions of this stage – and related behind-the-scenes activities –  
remain worthy of review, both to set the scene for what follows, but also because 
arguments raised at Second Reading would later prove to be influential in guiding 
scrutiny in later Parliamentary stages. 
 
 
Backstage 
 
After the Immigration Bill’s publication on 10 October, MPs of the Official 
Opposition, as part of their Parliamentary role to scrutinise the Government’s 
proposed legislation, worked to make sense of the Bill’s 113 pages. The definition of 
a Parliamentarian’s ‘role’ has no single formal source, but is guided by Parliamentary 
procedure and constitutional conventions, which form a part of the UK’s uncodified 
constitution, comprising customs, legal precedent, and a variety of statutes and legal 
instruments (described in Erskine May’s Parliamentary Practice; May, 1997). The 
Parliamentarian’s responsibilities hence derive from elements straddling the first two 
dimensions of my POS framework, formal and legal institutions, as well as more 
informal procedures.  
With the Second Reading debate scheduled for 22 October, just six Parliamentary 
sitting days after the Bill’s introduction to the Commons, time was of the essence.  
However, the MPs did not work alone. They were aided in their scrutiny by 
external groups (i.e., those outside Parliament), operating largely beyond public view. 
Four stand out: the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (ILPA), Liberty, 
Justice, and the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI)
45
. These 
 
45
 ILPA is a professional association of over 1,000 members, mainly barristers, solicitors, 
and advocates, practising immigration law. Its aim is to improve immigration advice, 
representation, and most importantly, law, with this last aim served by campaigns and 
political lobbying. The second pressure group, Liberty, is one of the UK’s leading advocacy 
groups, and campaigns to protect civil liberties and promote human rights. The third 
group, Justice, is an all-party membership organisation – primarily of the legal profession 
– that works to promote law reform and human rights. The fourth external organisation 
was the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI), an independent national 
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relationships, between lobbyists and Parliamentarians is long-standing, and has for 
decades formed the core of the political alliance structures from which effective 
Parliamentary scrutiny of legislation derives. 
What motivates external groups to lobby? It depends on the group. Typically, the 
group in question will have an interest in doing so. In the case of Liberty, for example, 
its raison d’être is the promotion of civil liberties. Usually, Liberty will become active 
in the field should any legislation appear to expand state power and impinge on 
personal freedoms.  
There are further considerations. Consistent with what POS’s undergirding 
theory of collective action suggests, the incentive to lobby may be strengthened or 
weakened by the perceived likelihood of success: the greater the perceived chance of 
success, the stronger the incentive. This perception is determined by such factors as 
the politicisation of the issue, or, as predicted by Koopmans and Statham (2000: 34), 
the presence of splits within the Government.  
To continue with our example of Liberty, they do not always intervene in 
immigration law-making. But given the well-known divide between the Coalition 
parties, its members believed that on this occasion their efforts could bear fruit.  
Lobbying groups do not work in isolation outside Parliament. From a 
mobilisation of social organisational resources, especially the exploitation of their 
networks of contacts, they co-ordinate and pool their criticism, sharing data, ideas, 
and arguments – intellectual resources in the terms of my POS approach. Much of the 
lobbying of the Immigration Bill was co-ordinated by Alison Harvey, the Legal 
Director of ILPA, whom I interviewed for this research.  
ILPA is an important actor in the field. It has substantial intellectual resources, 
accrued over its thirty-year history. And it also has some political capital. It is well-
regarded by Parliamentarians, enjoying a hard-earned reputation as a credible voice in 
immigration policy analysis. Partly, this is due to the group’s long-time presence in 
the field. Since its creation in 1984, ILPA has been involved in the development of 
every piece of major immigration legislation (Brazier et al., 2009: 96). As Brazier et 
al. note, when the Government publishes a new immigration bill, it is usually ILPA 
that first works out what its provisions mean (Brazier et al., 2009: 96).  
This is no understatement. All the Parliamentarians I interviewed reported either 
being advised personally by ILPA or consulting the organisation’s published materials. 
 
charity that provides legal assistance to immigrants, and campaigns for a human rights 
approach to the formulation of immigration law. 
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One interviewee revealed being “utterly reliant” on the group. This, I learned, meant 
essentially being utterly reliant upon the advice of a single person: Alison Harvey.  
It is Harvey that authors almost all of ILPA’s briefing material for 
Parliamentarians. Whatever influence and reputation ILPA publicly enjoys is thereby 
generated in no small part by her. When considered alongside her role as a coordinator 
of external lobbying groups, with whom she liaises and whose scrutiny she informs, 
Harvey emerges as an actor of some significance.  
Interviewees’ shared the opinion that Harvey’s policy scrutiny is distinguished by 
its legal acuity. Yet more than this, it is the volume of Harvey’s policy critique that 
stands out. For the Immigration Bill, she produced comprehensive briefings at every 
stage of the legislative process, which included detailed amendments, many of which 
were then moved by Parliamentarians without modification. In total, ILPA published 
over one thousand pages of briefings for Parliamentarians (admittedly, containing 
some repetition) over a period of about six months. More impressive – if not 
astonishing – is that Harvey was virtually the sole author of it all. Less surprising is 
her explanation for such productivity: working long hours and having a strong grasp 
of the material. Indeed, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Harvey is something 
of a workaholic, an immigration law obsessive. “Indefatigable”, as one Peer I 
interviewed said. 
Yet despite Harvey’s expertise, there were places where even she struggled to 
make sense of the Bill’s many and complicated clauses. But despite such difficulties, 
the lobbyist, like the Parliamentarian, must make sense of the legislation before them. 
After all, Harvey would soon need to begin emailing Parliamentarians and lobbying 
groups, to assist them in their scrutiny.  
At this stage, the main source of such assistance is a Second Reading ‘briefing’ 
document, which describes and critiques the principles and provisions of a Bill. This 
support is supplemented by emails, phone calls, and meetings, as required. ILPA’s 
briefing was fourteen pages, Liberty’s forty-six, Justice’s thirteen, and the JCWI’s nine. 
As for the other lobbyists I spoke with, Harvey targeted the Opposition frontbench, 
although some backbenchers were also contacted. Harvey estimates that her network, 
the majority of which were contacted, includes around 150 Peers, over 150 MPs, and 
two dozen or more lobbying groups – a substantial reservoir of social organisational 
resources accumulated over many years.  
Working collaboratively, the lobbying groups can harmonise their Bill criticism, 
enhancing its strength. Liberty’s briefing document, developed in this way, was 
authored by Rachel Robinson and Isabella Sankey, both non-practising barristers, 
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Robinson with a background in immigration and asylum law, Sankey with specialisms 
in human rights, extradition, and surveillance. Like ILPA, Liberty has extensive 
reserves of intellectual resources, but also moral resources and political capital, 
deriving from a long and distinguished history of policy analysis and political 
intervention (their members can be seen in television and newspapers interviews, and 
occasionally author opinion pieces of their own). This heritage, allied to their focus 
on certain principles – liberty, equality, human rights, and the rule of law – endows 
their briefings with persuasive, ethically-informed arguments. Their discourse has, in 
the terms of POS, visibility, resonance, and legitimacy. The same applies to Justice.  
But regardless of the expertise of these groups, and the quality of their arguments, 
their members nevertheless suggested that their battle was always going to be an 
uphill one. “There is little political appetite on the part of the two main parties to 
adopt a liberal position on immigration – such as that of the Liberal Democrats”, said 
one. “Immigration is one of the hardest areas to get people on board for”, said another.  
Indeed, the lobbyists I spoke to were virtually unanimous in the view that during 
backstage negotiations with the Government, it soon became clear that the first draft 
of the Bill represented not a policy blueprint presented, in a spirit of co-operation, for 
amendment commensurate to the merit of outside views. Rather, it was an entrenched 
position, something to be defended. The problem, reported interviewees, was one of 
well-reasoned policy losing out to power politics. “The government are bombastic on 
immigration”, said one, “and largely unwilling to be swayed by argument”. “Any 
changes to the Bill”, said another, “would have to be fought for on the Floor of the 
House.”  
This much was clear from the drafting process of the Bill, conducted with less 
consultation than usual, said interviewees, such that when the Bill was at Commons 
Second Reading, most NGOs (ILPA excepted) were not ready to brief MPs. 
Thus, as the slight political opportunity to influence executive law-makers during 
the Bill’s drafting ended (known as the pre-legislative phase), another set of 
opportunities opened: those related to the Bill’s passage through Parliament.  
The process of legislative scrutiny is one of the most challenging and 
underappreciated aspects of Parliamentarians’ work. The conscientious analysis 
required to effectively scrutinise bills seems a world away from the world of stump 
speeches and prime-time media appearances. Yet it is as important a part of a 
politician’s remit as the work they do before attentive audiences. 
At this point, with the guidance of these external groups, MPs must compose 
their Second Reading speeches, which forms the central plank of their initial scrutiny. 
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Some MPs have dedicated policy teams, the research of which may be particularly 
fruitful to generating convincing policy critique. Others even employ speechwriters 
for the task. These constitute a particularly important part of Opposition MPs’ alliance 
structure. However, someone like Jeremy Corbyn, then an unassuming backbencher, 
whom I interviewed, cannot afford a policy team, and must make do with the 
assistance of two constituency caseworkers. In addition, such a person must write 
their own speeches.  
 
 
Frontstage 
 
In the House of Commons, the responsibility for defending the Immigration Bill fell 
predominantly to the Immigration Minister, Conservative MP Mark Harper, although, 
per convention, the Home Secretary, Theresa May, introduced the Immigration Bill at 
Second Reading. At Commons Committee, Harper received assistance from the 
Liberal Democrat MP Norman Baker, then the Home Office Minister of State for 
Crime Prevention
46
.  
For the Official Opposition (here the Labour party), a great deal of the public 
scrutiny and criticism of a bill is undertaken, similarly, by one or two individuals in 
the respective Houses. For our case study, in the House of Commons this fell initially, 
again in accordance with Parliamentary convention, to the Shadow Home Secretary, 
then Yvette Cooper, with the Shadow Immigration Minister, Labour MP for Delyn 
David Hanson, taking on that role at Committee. In the Lords, the majority of the 
Labour Party’s Parliamentary scrutiny was shouldered by two people who shared the 
workload roughly equally: Lord Rosser (Richard Rosser), then Shadow Spokesperson, 
and Baroness Smith (Angela Smith), then Opposition Deputy Chief Whip.   
 
 
 
46
 Baker was one of two people interviewed for this research who acted as the 
Government’s minister for the Bill. I spoke to him on the day he resigned from his post, 
when he said that support for “rational evidence-based policy” was in short supply at the 
Home Office, and likened his experience under May to “walking through mud” (Watt, 
2014b). 
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Parliament’s uneven playing field 
 
In Parliamentary debates, the playing field is not level. Effective scrutiny of legislation 
is limited by two resources: human (especially intellectual) resources, and time. The 
distribution of these is decidedly uneven.  
In designing and promoting policies, ministers draw upon the considerable 
apparatus of Government: its extensive human and intellectual resources of its civil 
servants, the policy-makers, researchers, and lawyers of its various departments. 
Ministers also benefit from the assistance of ‘special advisors’ or “SPAD”s as they are 
known colloquially. These are typically paid by governments and are styled as 
‘temporary civil servants’, their principal role being to assist and advise ministers.  
A minister’s brief is typically prepared by between six and eight civil servants 
(eight in the case of the Bill), two of whom are usually government lawyers, and three 
of whom may commonly be seen sitting at the bench beside the minister – to give any 
assistance should the need arise. 
In contrast, although Parliamentarians of the Official Opposition enjoy the 
assistance of secretaries, they usually have just one or two additional research staff, 
and must often carry out much of their scrutiny without formally-institutionalised 
expert help.  
Opposition Parliamentarians do, however, have important ‘informal’ allies to help 
level the field. These are the aforementioned expert external actors working at 
lobbying groups such as ILPA or Liberty. In the struggle over immigration law, this 
relationship is of considerable importance, and one to which we will frequently return. 
With regard to the second limit upon effective Parliamentary scrutiny, time, it is 
worth bearing in mind that the Government developed the Immigration Bill over a 
long period, of at least a year. This provides the opportunity for policy rationales to 
mature, such that by the time a bill is before Parliament the government’s arguments 
may have reached a level of clarity or sophistication as to seem virtually unassailable. 
These arguments may, in addition, have the benefit of being highly visible, being well-
known to the public via speeches, television interviews, and newspaper articles. That 
certainly helps with their resonance; indeed, that is virtually assured, along with 
legitimacy, in a country whose population is as anti-immigration as Britain’s.  
With regard to the Immigration Bill, although Opposition Parliamentarians’ 
arguments would often seem initially so powerful as to invoke the familiar sense of 
“ah-ha!”, ministers were seldom phased by such submissions. Most commonly, and 
this is especially true for Mark Harper, they provided eloquent and reasonable 
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responses. They had, one surmises, heard that argument before, backstage. And 
indeed, it is customary for challengers to inform the Government of the questions 
they will ask during Parliamentary debate.  
In fact, for the Immigration Bill, the Government exploited its power over the 
legislative timetable so well that Justice, in their Second Reading briefing, were 
compelled to observe that (Patrick, 2013: 3): 
 
…even the most expert organisations and individuals have struggled to provide 
detailed briefing within this timescale.  
 
For the Immigration Bill, the Government’s principal Spokesperson was the Home 
Secretary, Theresa May. The Bill, interviewees suggested, was predominantly May’s 
brainchild. Intellectually and rhetorically formidable, and with the respect of her 
colleagues, May’s serious, no-nonsense demeanour can be intimidating, inviting 
comparisons with Margaret Thatcher, the so-called “Iron Lady”. It is this impression 
which one interviewee, himself a strong personality, presumably intended to convey 
in his description of May as “both the snake and the mongoose” – a reputation which 
appears to have been substantially dented in the light of May’s failed attempt via a 
snap June 2017 election to increase her Parliamentary majority. 
Recall that at Second Reading the Government’s aim is clear: to describe, 
promote, and defend the underlying principles and main policies of the bill they are 
presenting to Parliament. At 12.43pm, May introduced her Bill to the House of 
Commons by first listing the Government’s immigration successes. The Government 
had (Hansard, 22 October, col 156):  
 
…introduced a limit on economic migration from outside the EU, cut out abuse of 
student visas and reformed family visas. As a result, net migration is down by a third.  
 
May’s next and fourth sentence would be interrupted by Labour MP Simon Danczuk, 
an intervention that May accepted with an exasperated chuckle (“Well, if the hon. 
Gentleman really wants to intervene.”). “The Home Secretary says that net migration 
is down by a third”, said Danczuk. “The reality is that it has fallen by only a quarter” 
(Hansard, 22 October 2013, col 156). The first salvo in what came to be termed by 
one Parliamentarian the “war of statistics” – a struggle over the rational high ground 
– had been fired. 
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May’s initial response to Danczuk invoked Labour’s opening of the UK to eight 
central and eastern European countries in 2004: “It is a bit cheeky for a Labour 
Member to stand up and complain about the figures for falling migration.” (Hansard, 
22 October 2013, col 156) 
Labour MP Simon Hughes intervened quickly on May’s riposte. His argument was 
related to the democratic properties of the Bill’s development:  
 
…there was no draft Bill, no Green Paper and no White Paper; there was consultation 
on only part of the Bill, and there are sensitive areas that need to be looked at across 
the board, including in connection with the legal aid changes. Why do we have to deal 
so quickly with such sensitive and difficult issues? (Hansard, 22 October 2013, col 
156) 
 
May replied: “I can assure him that there have already been a considerable number of 
discussions on the elements that have gone into the Bill” (Hansard, 22 October 2013, 
col 157). 
For other Commons critics, the very existence of the Immigration Bill reflected a 
regrettable Home Office tendency to deal with problems by legislating rather than 
better management. David Heath, the Liberal Democrat MP for Somerton and Frome, 
enquired of May (Hansard, 22 October 2013, col 159): “Can she convince me that the 
Bill is not another example of the Home Office reaching for the statute book, rather 
than dealing with the management of the immigration service properly…?”. 
Ignoring the remark, the Home Secretary resolved to make some progress, though 
occasionally ‘giving way’ throughout. As a strategy of Parliamentary debate, giving 
way is not without its merits. Apart from making a minister look gracious, it impedes 
progress, allowing a minister to spend more time dealing with the often simpler and 
better-rehearsed provisions at the front end of the legislation, whilst limiting the 
opportunity to provide at the end of the debate the off-the-cuff responses that are 
necessitated by Parliamentarians’ impromptu queries. Sometimes, as we shall at the 
Commons Report stage, business that a government would rather not deal with is 
strategically scheduled for later in a debate, leaving it vulnerable to a filibuster, 
thereby preventing its scrutiny.  
Second Reading would come to be dominated by two of the Bill’s measures: the 
reduction of appeal rights, and the landlord immigration checks. After May took her 
seat, the former proposal was criticised by the Opposition Spokesperson, the Shadow 
Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper (Hansard, 22 October 2013, col 176):  
The Commons: Second Reading 
 
167 
 
…it appears that the Government want to abolish appeals for whole categories of 
immigration cases because they cannot cope with the fact that they get so many 
decisions wrong in the first place. There are genuine and serious concerns about that 
approach because it turned out that the Government got it wrong in 50 per cent of 
entry clearance cases that went to appeal.  
 
*** 
 
It is important at Second Reading to know whether the Official Opposition will 
oppose the Government’s legislation. Without Labour’s support, there would be a 
much stronger change that the Bill would be thrown out. With it, that would be 
inconceivable. Hence, Labour’s strategy would have major consequences for the 
structure of political opportunities in the rest of the legislative process.   
Yvette Cooper would answer that question later in the debate. In the meantime, 
she probed how the Government’s landlord provisions might work in practice:  
 
The measures on landlords take up 16 clauses—a quarter of the Bill. This, it appears, 
is the Government’s flagship policy on tackling illegal immigration. The only trouble 
is that we have no idea how it is supposed to work. There are more than 400 European 
identity documents, and the Government have not explained whether private 
landlords are supposed to know which one is which. (Hansard, 22 October 2013, col 
172) 
 
The Liberal Democrat MP, Sarah Teather, questioned the degree to which the Bill was 
made “in good faith”, as interviewees were fond of saying, that is, made not for the 
rational furtherance of considered immigration goals, but in the service of power and 
political advantage. Teather said she was (Hansard, 22 October 2013, col 185): 
 
…weary of a politics that creates and defines enemies in order to demonstrate 
potency…to see politics do that at the expense of those who have the least power to 
change their own futures. All three Front Benches, I am afraid, are at it, including my 
own, scrabbling over the mantle of toughness, chasing opinion polls and, in some 
cases, wilfully whipping up fear and loathing in the process.  
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Teather also added a now-familiar criticism: that the detail of the Bill seemed to have 
been negotiated “by an exceptionally tight group of people within the Government, 
and very little time is being afforded to this House to consider it” (Hansard, 22 
October 2013, col 186), a view supported, or conceded, by almost all of my 
informants. So hurried was the timetable, said Teather, that external organisations 
were constantly playing catch-up as the Bill “raced” through Parliament.  
Nor did the Bill’s content escape Teather’s ire. She described the landlord checks 
as the “most absurd” of all the Bill’s provisions. Especially interesting was her view 
that few clauses of the Bill were policy-directed, instead being “mostly about politics, 
political gain, and what works with voters.” As such, she invited MPs “to join me in 
the No Lobby, rather than just adding to the impression that we are all happy for a 
Bill as ill thought through as this to pass on to the statute book” (Hansard, 22 October 
2013, col 186-188). Such an invitation represents collective action at a nascent stage. 
A great deal of such action begins with the attempted resource mobilisation of a single 
individual, which is what (according to POS) requests such as Teather’s reflects.   
But perhaps most exasperating for Teather was the party politics of the affair, 
with so little opposition to the Bill, and few MPs willing to mount an organised 
rebellion. This speaks to our second dimension of political opportunity structures. 
With Labour MPs directed by their parties to adopt strategies in support of the Bill 
(following the direction of the party whips, whose well-defined function within 
parliamentary systems invokes the first, but also partly the third, of our POS 
dimensions), Teather could expect few allies. 
Fiona Mactaggart was one exception. As one of the few MPs that made 
considerable efforts to oppose the Bill by vote, she sustained the theme of a Home 
Office doggedly pursuing its own agenda whilst disregarding the views of 
stakeholders. Turning to the landlord checks, Mactaggart, deploying an argument 
from authority – a popular tactic among Parliamentary debaters, perhaps due to the 
greater legitimacy carried by such views – noted that “the Residential Landlords 
Association – not noted for its lobbying of Parliament – has written to say that it is 
‘seriously concerned that the proposal depends on untrained landlords doing the work 
of UK Border Agency staff without support and with the threat of penalties if they get 
it wrong.’” Finally, she observed that a health insurance system for immigrants was a 
“more popular response in the Home Office consultation than the proposed levy, yet 
the Home Office has rejected that idea”, adding that the reductions in appeal rights, 
“were not prefigured in the consultation”, thereby revealing the “arrogance” of the 
Home Office (Hansard, 22 October 2013, col 190).  
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Bill sentiment was not, of course, all negative. In fact, it received universal 
Conservative support. The Tory MP for Henley, John Howell, used evidence gathered 
by the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford to argue in support of the 
landlord provisions. “If we want to look for new migrants and potentially illegal 
immigrants,” he said, “we need to look at the private rented sector” (Hansard, 22 
October 2013, col 191). This reflects the strategy of Parliamentarians to debate in 
ways that draw upon appropriate evidence – as a means, in public political debates, of 
enhancing arguments’ legitimacy.  
A second major rhetorical tactic is a focus upon the principles of democracy. This 
approach, which gains from democracy’s symbolic currency and emotional resonance, 
may be seen in the Second Reading speech made by Nicholas Soames, the 
Conservative MP for Mid Sussex, and grandson of Winston Churchill. Soames 
bolstered his position by appealing to the legitimacy inherent in wide public support 
(Hansard, 22 October 2013, col 196): “According to a recent opinion poll, two thirds 
of the public want to see drastic action to reduce immigration and three quarters of 
the population want to see it reduced”. 
So, would the official Opposition vote against the Immigration Bill at Second 
Reading? With the debate at its halfway point, and Cooper still to provide an answer, 
Stewart Jackson, Conservative MP for Peterborough, offered his perspective (Hansard, 
22 October 2013, col 199):  
 
If they [the Labour Party] really believe that this is a bad Bill, why will they not vote 
against it tonight? They will not do so because they know that that would be 
unpopular with voters.  
 
The criticism is forceful. It alleges that Labour prioritises political expediency at the 
expense of policy principle. At Second Reading, Labour offered no response to 
Jackson’s allegation. My interviewees – even Labour affiliates – explained why: he was 
right. The Labour Party had been instructed by its leadership not to formally oppose 
the Bill (by voting against it). To do so, they believed, would prove too electorally 
costly.    
Notably, Jackson denied that the same incentive, electoral advantage, motivated 
his own party (Hansard, 22 October 2013, col 204): “This Government have taken the 
right decision, not particularly because they want to be electorally popular but because 
they have listened to people.” This argument, in invoking an MP’s responsibility to 
represent their constituents, makes a powerful claim to legitimacy. It is not easily 
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refutable. Following majority opinion is largely indistinguishable from acting in ways 
that are electorally popular but not motivated by populism. Multiple opinion polls do 
indeed suggest that more stringent immigration measures would command the 
support of a majority of the voting public (e.g., Duffy and Frere-Smith, 2014; Ford 
and Lymperopoulou, 2017). 
Pete Wishart was unimpressed. “I wish I could say it is a pleasure to follow the 
hon. Member for Peterborough”, he said. “But I cannot.” Wishart continued 
(Hansard, 22 October 2013, col 204):  
 
The Government’s stated aim with this Bill is to make the UK a more ‘hostile 
environment’ for illegal immigrants. I give the Minister 10 out of 10 and say to him, 
‘Well done and pat yourself on the back,’ because the Government have most certainly 
achieved that with this Bill. They have just made the UK an even more intolerant place 
for the rest of us to live in.  
 
Speaking to Schain’s thesis about the impact of right-wing political parties on 
immigration debate and policy (e.g., Schain, 2002, 2006; see also Bale, 2014), Wishart 
observed (Hansard, 22 October 2013, col 205): 
 
We now live in UKIP UK. The party does not have one member in this House, but it 
is pulling all the Conservative party’s strings and dominating political debate. 
Everything is predicated on UKIP and Nigel Farage.  
… 
We do not want to take part in the appalling race to the bottom that the 
Conservatives are engaged in with UKIP—a race to the bottom that they can never 
win. They will never out-UKIP UKIP. It is the master of right-wing gimmickry.  If the 
Conservatives enter a race with UKIP, they will only get beaten.  
 
Interesting also was Wishart’s interpretation of Labour’s position, which corroborated 
that of Stewart Jackson (Hansard, 22 October 2013, col 205-206):  
 
They do not like aspects of it [the Immigration Bill], but they are compromised. … 
They are aware that immigration is a hot issue in seats that they have to win, so they 
are having to be very careful about what they say.  
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This invokes Jeanette Money’s thesis (1997, 1999): that immigration is placed on the 
national agenda by politicians if the issue can swing enough marginal constituencies 
to win their party a general election, where a marginal constituency in this context is 
one in which a candidate’s success is dependent upon their stance on immigration, 
specifically, their advocating restrictive policies, in accordance with the anti-
immigration sentiment of constituents.  
In his concluding remarks, Wishart captured well the unease of the 
Conservatives’ coalition partners, noting that he could imagine the Liberals “sitting 
there thinking, ‘Uh-oh! This is not a liberal bill.” In fact, continued Wishart (Hansard, 
22 October 2013, col 206), “It is one of the most illiberal Bills that we have seen from 
this Government. It will be an absolute disgrace if even one Liberal goes through the 
Aye Lobby tonight. When I sat on the Opposition Benches with them, I heard them 
rant against new Labour immigration bills. This bill is ten times worse than anything 
New Labour concocted!”  
When it came to the vote, only two Liberal Democrats followed Wishart into the 
No lobby – out of a possible fifty-seven. 
 
*** 
 
The Bill’s Second Reading was brought to its close with a lengthy and detailed 
discussion from the Shadow Immigration Minister, Labour MP for Delyn in Wales, 
David Hanson. Now was the time for the Opposition to reveal its stance on the 
Government’s immigration proposals. Labour agreed with the principles of the Bill, 
said Hanson, but had questions regarding how its provisions would work in practice. 
Nevertheless, he stated unequivocally that the “Opposition will give the Bill a Second 
Reading today, but we will table amendments in Committee to deal with its 
inequities” (Hansard, 22 October 2013, col 254). 
It was then time, at 6.50pm, for the Government, via its Immigration Minister, 
Mark Harper, to respond to the issues raised during the entirety of the Bill’s near-six-
hour Second Reading debate. Harper began with a qualification. There would be no 
chance to discuss the issues raised thus far at Second Reading in the seven minutes 
that remained. However, he promised, the issues would be dealt with in detail at 
Committee. There was therefore little further to add except a final, ringing 
endorsement of the Bill (Hansard, 22 October 2013, col 257):  
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The Bill continues our reforms of the immigration system, and it will ensure that the 
public’s expectations of a fair system are delivered. I commend the Bill to the House.  
 
At 6.59pm, the House voted. The result was overwhelmingly in favour of the Bill: 303 
Ayes to 18 Noes. Among the Noes were Respect leader George Galloway, the SNP’s 
Pete Wishart, and seven Labour Members, representing a minor rebellion. Equally 
small was the rebellion within the governing parties: John Leech and Sarah Teather 
were the only members of the Liberal Democrats who exited through the No Lobby. 
No Conservative did. The only UK parties opposing the Bill officially were the Greens 
and UKIP, with the sole Green MP, Caroline Lucas, voting against the Bill. Even 
UKIP’s leader Nigel Farage, not himself an MP, would later aver that the Bill “would 
lead to a society where scrutiny in daily life would threaten individual freedoms and 
liberties” (Harris, 2013). 
The Bill’s Second Reading reveals an important institutional constraint that 
impedes the effective scrutiny that is essential to legislation’s amendment by 
Parliament: limited time. This is with respect to both the period allocated for 
deliberations, which was too short to allow the Government to respond fully to MPs’ 
criticisms; and also with respect to the time available to develop a thorough 
understanding of the Bill before its Second Reading.  
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9 Commons Committee: an impotent 
institution? 
 
 
The next Parliamentary stage was the House of Commons Public Bill Committee. Bill 
Committees are said to have played a fundamental role in the detailed consideration 
of the vast majority of legislation since 1907 (Walkland, 1979: 258, cited in 
Thompson, 2015b: 1), and typically comprise over 300 hours of public discussion in 
a Parliamentary session (Thompson, 2015b: 1). 
Of all the UK’s Parliamentary stages, the Public Bill Committee would appear – 
at least to the naïve observer – to be among the most consequential for a government’s 
draft legislation. It is here that, in principle, bills can be modified for the first time by 
non-government MPs. As in Second Reading, they can also be thrown out altogether.  
Research on this apparently most critical of Parliamentary stages is scarce 
(Thompson, 2013a: 460). In one of the few contemporary studies of Public Bill 
Committees, which were known before 2007 as Standing Committees, Thompson 
observes that a recent literature review on the policy impact of the British Parliament 
revealed that many authors seemed to treat the UK “as if it lacked legislative 
committees altogether” (Russell and Benton, 2009: 8, cited in Thompson, 2013a: 
460). “Until very recently”, adds Thompson (2015b: 2), citing a work by Levy (2010), 
as well her own research (Thompson, 2013a, 2014), “the only comprehensive 
examination of bill committee work and performance was over forty years old” 
(namely, Griffith, 1974). It may therefore be said that the meagre amount of research 
on Bill Committees seems strikingly disproportionate to their potential legislative 
importance. 
But although detailed analyses may be hard to come by, the basic facts on the 
institutional structure of the Commons Committee stage are more easily found. Most 
depictions of the UK Parliament describe Committees as consisting of usually 
between sixteen and twenty-five Members of Parliament (e.g., Norton, 2013: 86; 
Rogers and Walters, 2006: 112, both cited in Thompson, 2015b: 1-2), who reflect the 
party composition of the House, and conduct detailed “line by line” scrutiny of bills 
(Norton, 2013: 926, cited in Thompson, 2015b: 2). Moreover, Public Bill Committees 
have a long tradition of inviting outside parties to submit written evidence, to be 
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considered by their Members when scrutinising bills. Such evidence may come from 
private citizens, lobbying groups, and other interested organisations. These written 
submissions are published on the UK Parliament’s website alongside the official 
report of Committee proceedings. The content and impact of written evidence as it 
pertains to the Immigration Bill is analysed later in this chapter. 
From November 2006 (Thompson, 2014: 1-2), before their ‘rebranding’ and 
redesign the following year, Public Bill Committees have also received the 
presentation of oral evidence from ministers and external experts, in something akin 
to the traditional Select Committee format (Thompson, 2015b: 2). In theory, the 
receipt of written and oral evidence improves scrutiny by increasing the policy 
knowledge of MPs and bringing greater legitimacy to the process through the 
participation of persons representing a wide range of civil society interests. As 
Thompson has observed, “little assistance” is generally provided to MPs serving on 
Bill Committees other than through their own (two or three) research assistants. As 
such, they “rely on material provided by outside groups or the House of Commons 
Library” (Thompson, 2014: 390). Therefore, the potential for expert oral evidence to 
assist the scrutiny of Committee Members, and hence bring effective legislative 
change, may be substantial. 
In the light of these few basic facts, Public Bill Committees appear to be a model 
democratic institution: a forum for rational critique in which a government’s 
prospective legislation is scrutinised with evident transparency in public (and with 
video and transcripts provided online), by a gathering of dedicated MPs, who bring to 
bear a wide range of relevant experience and expertise in their line-by-line scrutiny. 
Prima facie, one duty of these MPs is to represent their electors’ interests, bringing to 
light pertinent constituent cases. Additionally, any Member of a Committee may 
participate directly in the changing of policy by tabling amendments: proposed 
deletions, modifications, or additions to a bill that can, if the MP chooses, be pressed 
to a vote. If a majority of the Committee votes in support of an amendment, it then 
becomes part of the bill under discussion, ostensibly bringing real and meaningful 
change to prospective legislation.  
Notably, the selection of outside experts to provide their evidence is decided by 
the Government after consultation with the Opposition. In theory, this should lead to 
a fairer balance of testimony than if the selections were made by the Government 
alone. Even so, the Government takes the lead in deciding whom to invite, and also 
has the final say over the appointments.  
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Thus, at first glance, the overall picture of the Public Bill Committee may be said 
to accord well with democratic ideals. However, on closer inspection this neat and 
rosy picture becomes more complicated – and more negative.  
None of my interviewees described the Bill Committee as an effective check on 
executive decision-making. Indeed, quite the opposite. As Thompson notes (2015b: 
10):   
 
Contemporary literature and comment on bill committees by journalists and 
parliamentarians implies that they are powerless and ineffective bodies, staffed by 
unwilling generalists who would, it seems, prefer to be writing their Christmas 
cards…, reading newspapers…and even playing Sudoku…than engaging in the 
detailed scrutiny of legislation. 
 
Moreover, as Thompson records (2015b: 7), in recent years Bill Committees have been 
described as a “sham” (Abbott, 2011), and as being of largely “ritualistic” significance 
(D’Arcy, 2013). From this contrasting viewpoint, Public Bill Committees are less a 
transparent domain of informed deliberation and accountability – hence a paragon of 
democracy and serious check on executive power – than one of indolence, ignorance, 
irresponsibility, and ultimately, irrelevance. Such a highly critical account finds a 
degree of corroboration in the academic literature, especially on the central question 
of the ability of Public Bill Committees to limit executive strength by correcting the 
excesses of government legislation. In this regard, in one notable analysis of 
Parliament by Crick, Bill Committees are presented as having “little real chance of 
influencing legislation” (Crick, 1970: 8, cited in Thompson, 2015b: 7).  
Is Crick’s view correct? Answering this question is the principal objective of this 
chapter. We begin through a consideration of the fourth dimension of our POS 
framework: public political discourse.   
 
 
The Commons Immigration Bill Committee: the debates 
 
The Immigration Bill Committee sat eleven times for a total of twenty-two hours and 
twenty-three minutes. The Committee comprised twenty-five members: two chairs, 
two clerks, and twenty-one MPs (who I refer to as Members). Of the MPs, two were 
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Government ministers, the Immigration Minister Mark Harper, and the Liberal 
Democrat Minister for Crime Prevention, Norman Baker.  
The party breakdown of the twenty-one MPs is as follows: Conservatives: ten; 
Labour or Lab/Co-op: eight; Liberal Democrats: two; Democratic Unionist Party: one. 
Seldom did all members of the Committee attend each session. In the first sitting, 
four were absent.  
The first three sittings of the committee were dedicated to hearing oral evidence 
from seventeen external actors, most representing special interest groups. In the 
fourth sitting, the committee heard evidence from the Home Office, provided by 
Harper. Evidence sessions are strictly timetabled by the Programming Sub-committee, 
a timetable which must be agreed upon by all Committee Members. It is important to 
note that expert witnesses were not told beforehand what questions they would be 
asked. This contrasts with the other debates in Parliament, where Parliamentarians 
often informed the Government what questions they would ask, in a spirit of co-
operation, and to allow the Government to better answer their queries. 
In this qualitative analysis of the Committee stage, I shall focus especially on the 
arguments presented by expert witnesses, as these represent some of the strongest 
and best-informed arguments in all of the Parliamentary debates on the Bill. 
 
 
Sittings 1-4: the expert oral evidence 
 
On 29 October 2013, the Committee heard evidence from six witnesses: four medical 
professionals and two members of MigrationWatch UK. The first medical 
professionals to give evidence, at 9.03am, were Professor J. Meirion Thomas, a Senior 
Surgeon and Professor of Surgical Oncology at The Royal Marsden, a specialist cancer 
treatment hospital; and Jacqueline Bishop, from the Brighton and Sussex University 
Hospitals Trust and Co-Chair of the Overseas Visitors Advisory Group of the NHS, a 
body that advises the NHS and government on recouping medical costs from foreign 
users of the NHS.  
Thomas became a public figure – and one of some notoriety within the health 
sector – for authoring four articles on health tourism in the Spectator from February 
to August 2013.  A person obviously dedicated to the NHS, Thomas was shocked to 
learn of the scale of its abuse by so-called “health tourists”: a problem on which he 
had conducted years of personal research, including speaking with immigration 
officials and colleagues.  His first article, “The next NHS scandal: We heal the world 
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– and you pay for it”, highlighted the loopholes by which non-British individuals could 
access costly NHS care to which they were not entitled, and crucially, for which they 
did not pay.   
Labour MP Helen Jones began the questioning, trying to elicit facts about “health 
tourism”, the Government’s main reason for the immigration health charge (Hansard, 
29 October 2013, col 8):  
 
What evidence can you provide us about the numbers of people who come here 
deliberately to use the National Health Service as opposed to those who come here 
and find themselves ill, but who have not made proper provision?  
 
“We have no idea how many such people there are”, said Thomas, adding that a recent 
report conducted by Creative Research in 2013, which suggested that the cost of 
visitor and migrant use of the NHS was £2bn, “does not take us anywhere near the 
total amount”, because the report did not include in its sample “problem hospitals” 
targeted specifically by health tourists (Hansard, 29 October 2013, col 8). 
Harper asked if the witnesses supported the Bill’s proposal to amend the 
“ordinary residence test” so that a person will receive NHS care free only if they are a 
permanent resident of the United Kingdom. “The definition of OR has been the 
biggest loophole of all,” said Thomas, “so yes is the answer.” Bishop concurred 
(Hansard, 29 October 2013, col 11).  
At 9.45am, Thomas and Bishop were replaced by three new witnesses: Professor 
Vivienne Nathanson (interviewed for this research), director of professional activities 
at the British Medical Association, the largest trade union and professional body for 
doctors and medical students in the UK, with over 170,000 members; Clare Gerada, 
chairman of the Royal College of GPs; and Terence Stephenson, chairman of the 
Academy of Royal Colleges. Helen Jones again began the questioning, asking whether 
the new residence criterion to grant free NHS treatment would help “identify people 
who should not be accessing the NHS for free”. The difficulty, said Nathanson, was 
whether eligible individuals would be able to prove their permanent residence 
(Hansard, 29 October 2013, col 17).  
When asked whether the proposed health charge would deter health tourists, 
Professor Stephenson replied: “A flat levy is clearly a nonsense; £200 would not pay 
diddly-squat for one consultation; a single inhaler for asthma costs £55 without you 
even seeing a doctor to examine you and make the diagnosis.” Gerada agreed, adding 
that a levy “opens the floodgates for anybody who wants to come and have free health 
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care, because you are saying that if you pay £200 or £250, you can get what you like” 
(Hansard, 29 October 2013, col 20). The implication of these criticisms was clear: this 
part of the Bill would have to be deleted. 
Next to give evidence were two members of MigrationWatch UK: the group’s 
Chairman, Sir Andrew Green, and Matthew Pollard, its Director. MigrationWatch is 
a prominent player in the field and makes frequent public interventions: in 
newspapers, on the television, and through a steady flow of content onto its website, 
which includes research reports. Interviewees also suggested that Green has the ear 
of senior figures in the Conservative Party, including David Cameron. So 
MigrationWatch’s presence at the evidence sessions – a presence which both conveys 
and confers authority in the field – was perhaps telling. 
The Shadow Immigration Minister, David Hanson, asked the first question, which 
aimed to glean the magnitude of the central problem that the Bill was said to tackle: 
illegal immigration. “I am grateful for your written evidence, which I looked at this 
morning”, said Hanson. “You indicate in it that you estimate that the number of illegal 
immigrants…is 1 million now. Can you give the Committee the basis on which you 
have made that estimate?”  
The basis, said Green, were the two major attempts at an estimate: a study in 
2005, which made a “central estimate of 430,000”, and a 2009 report by the London 
School of Economics on behalf of the Mayor of London, which made a “central 
estimate of 618,000”. Green added that after considering some other data and making 
some “adjustments”, “we then came to the figure of 1.1 million”, which, while based 
on a “lot of intelligent guesswork”, was nevertheless a “cautious estimate” (Hansard, 
29 October 2013, col 34). When asked whether the Bill would help reduce the 
number, Green suggested that the Bill was addressing the issue in the only way 
possible: “to try to make it more difficult for people to stay in the UK illegally” 
(Hansard, 29 October 2013, col 35). Yet with regard to health tourism, Green said 
that he did not think the Bill “is going to do very much that is helpful” (Hansard, 29 
October 2013, col 37).  
 
*** 
 
At the second of eleven sittings of the Immigration Bill Committee, which took place 
later that day, the Committee received evidence from seven witnesses representing 
landlords, lettings agents, the homeless, universities, and immigration lawyers. The 
committee heard first from three witnesses with a special interest in the landlord 
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immigration checks: Carolyn Uphill, Chairman of the National Landlords Association; 
Richard Jones, Policy Director of the Residential Landlords Association (interviewed 
for this research); and Caroline Kenny, from the UK Association of Letting Agents 
(UKALA).  
Hanson asked the first question, noting that the witnesses’ written submissions 
gave him “the impression that you object to the clauses in the Bill in principle”. Uphill, 
representing landlords, agreed, highlighting the “administrative burden on landlords 
who are not experts in immigration” and the “periodic checks” that landlords would 
be expected to carry out to ensure the tenant still has immigration permission. To 
which Jones, representing landlords, added: “we think that the Bill and its provisions 
are not workable and will not be effective in achieving the objectives set out.” Kenny, 
representing letting agents, was less critical, saying that UKALA had “generally 
welcomed the Bill”, though it shared the concerns over the proposed requirement for 
landlords to check tenants’ migration status periodically (Hansard, 29 October 2013, 
col 43-44).  
When the witnesses were asked about the potential negative consequences of the 
provisions for “indigenous individuals”, Kenny noted “major concern” over the 
“impact on ethnic minorities, irrespective of their immigration status”, while Uphill 
explained that while landlords’ properties are empty, “they are running up overheads, 
so the landlord is going to be tempted to take the easiest option.” For Jones, there 
was a more general problem: “Having to produce original paperwork and copy and 
retain it will inevitably impact on British citizens as well” (Hansard, 29 October 2013, 
col 46-47). Worse, the UK’s 600,000 private landlords would be “bewildered by the 
complexity” of the bureaucracy that implementation of this provision would require, 
given that there were at that time, said Jones, 444 European Economic Area 
documents that prove immigration status (Hansard, 29 October 2013, col 49). 
On the telephone service that the Home Office planned to provide to landlords to 
provide them instruction on whether or not to let to a particular tenant, Uphill 
expressed concern that the pledged 48-hour turnaround time would be too long. “In 
many, many cases”, said Uphill, “the property will be gone by then” (Hansard, 29 
October 2013, col 49).   
But Uphill had a greater worry: that the proposal would feed the “rogue operator 
sector”: “if you make it less attractive and more of a risk for a landlord to take on 
someone who has only a temporary right to stay in the country, those people will be 
forced into using that underclass of operators” (Hansard, 29 October 2013, col 50). 
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After thanking these witnesses for their wisdom and experience, the Chair took 
evidence at 2.58pm from Katharine Sacks-Jones (whom I interviewed), the Head of 
Policy and Campaigns at Crisis, a national UK charity for single homeless people. 
Crisis’s concern, said Sacks-Jones, was that the Bill would make it more difficult for 
homeless people to access private accommodation, including people “who are either 
British citizens or who have a right to reside here, but who might struggle to have the 
necessary documents to prove that.” Although the Bill contained exemptions from the 
landlord checks for social housing, hostels, mobile homes, student halls of residence, 
and properties with long leases, Sacks-Jones noted, “not all accommodation used to 
house homeless people will be exempt” (Hansard, 29 October 2013, col 60). But when 
asked by Hanson whether Crisis would prefer to see the landlord provisions deleted 
from the Bill, Sacks was cautious. She said that Crisis had “concerns overall around 
the Bill”, but affirmed that, “there are steps that can be taken and amendments 
brought” that would improve its provisions (Hansard, 29 October 2013, col 61). Many 
lobbying groups prefer such an approach. Be too critical, said one lobbyist interviewed, 
and the Government “digs its heels in”. Be more positive, and they are more likely to 
make concessions.  
Next up, at 3.18pm, were two witnesses from Universities UK, an advocacy 
organisation for universities in the United Kingdom with 133 individual members, 
each an executive head (vice-chancellor/principal) of a UK university. The university 
lobby, interviewees related, is particularly powerful, both within and beyond 
Parliament, with special power in the Lords where its members are often chancellors 
or vice-chancellors of UK universities. The Committee heard evidence from the Chair 
of Universities UK, Colin Riordan, and the group’s Policy Adviser, Jo Attwooll.  
Their main concern was the deterrent effect of the Bill upon students and staff, 
especially of the landlord checks and health charge. The landlord checks, said Riordan, 
would “create a whole set of problems that we feel are unnecessary and will seriously 
disadvantage us”. The potential negative effect of the “moderate” health charge was 
not considered great of itself, but was worried to contribute to a “cumulative impact” 
of disincentives for international students when added to the tightening of the 
immigration system in 2010 (Hansard, 29 October 2013, col 71). Jo Attwooll 
supported this idea with reference to a survey by i-graduate, which showed that 
between 2008 and 2009, “the perception of the UK as a very attractive destination for 
international students went down by, I think, eight percentage points” – while 
Canada’s rose by fifteen per cent.  
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At 3.46pm, the Committee welcomed the barrister Adrian Berry, chair of the 
Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association. Berry is described by The Legal 500 
United Kingdom, a guide on UK law firms and practitioners, as “the best of any 
barrister at EU and nationality law” (Garden Court Chambers, 2015). The strategy of 
ILPA differs from that of other lobbying groups. It is forceful and plain in its criticism 
and evidences no attempt to conciliate the Government by a gentle tone or by 
balancing criticism with praise. Its Second Reading briefing on the Bill was entirely 
negative in its critique. Because ILPA’s evidence is especially well-informed, it is 
worth considering Berry’s oral evidence in some detail. 
Berry began by providing an assessment of the current standard of decision 
making in the Home Office for immigration applications – which the Bill sought to 
limit appeals against. The Bill’s reduction of appeal rights concerned “managed 
migration routes”, said Berry, “which are the people who come in for work, for study 
and for family reunion purposes.” Decision making in this area, said Berry, “is 
extremely poor, as the appeals impact assessment notes”: “Some fifty per cent of 
managed migration appeals are allowed on points of administrative law, and do not 
engage human rights or the refugee convention”. The result of a lack of a judicial 
remedy against bad decision-making would be that applicants would “either try for a 
very expensive, privately funded judicial review”, said Berry, “or they will not bother 
coming to the UK” (Hansard, 29 October 2013, col 74).  
Original decision making could be improved, suggested Berry, not through 
legislation, but by better administration: investing more resources in training as well 
as a “broader approach to acceptable evidence, with less rigidity and more flexibility”. 
“Ultimately”, Berry said, “there is no substitute for the judge on your shoulder” – the 
decision-maker’s appreciation that wrong decisions are subject to a judicial remedy. 
“We have already trailed administrative review with the points-based system before,” 
said Berry, “and it is no substitute for the rule of law, where you have independent 
judicial scrutiny of executive action” (Hansard, 29 October 2013, col 75). 
In his response, Harper noted that for overseas immigration applications, which 
use the system of administrative review, the Bill’s proposed replacement for domestic 
appeals, twenty-one per cent of initial decisions are overturned after administrative 
review. “Why would we not be able to implement that sort of system here?” The 
exchange continued (Hansard, 29 October 2013, col 75): 
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Berry   …If twenty-one per cent of decisions are overturned through 
administrative review, but fifty per cent of economic managed 
migration appeals are allowed, you can see the difference that 
independent and impartial judicial scrutiny makes. 
 
Harper  …If we look at the … response to the removal of the family visit visa, 
which was effective from 25 June, in the first three months, we have 
seen only three judicial reviews from people for whom we refused a 
family visit visa. Does that not suggest that the processes we have put 
in place for administrative review are successful and will not force 
people to follow the expensive judicial review avenues that you 
suggested? 
 
No, said Berry. The low incidence of judicial review resulted from cuts to legal aid. 
“As you will be aware,” Berry continued (Hansard, 29 October 2013, col 76): 
 
…judicial review is a procedural remedy, which looks at the way in which a decision 
is taken and not at the substantive outcome. The difference with an appeal on facts 
and law is that one is able to adduce evidence that allows the decision to be 
substantively overturned, rather than be a running commentary on the way in which 
the decision is taken.  
 
Berry’s point is an important one. Judicial review aims at reducing governments’ past 
abuses of power by improving decision making processes. It is not concerned with 
providing substantive remedies, such as granting entrance to the UK or leave to 
remain.  
In his final remarks, when asked whether appeal rights should be reduced at all, 
Berry said that they should not. He noted that illegal migrants could still appeal on 
human rights grounds, but that “the ordinary Joes, who play by the rules and seek 
leave to enter or remain” would have their rights to appeal against wrong decisions 
taken away. “I fail to see how that deals with the problem of illegal entrants or 
overstayers”, said Berry, adding: “You have hit the wrong target, frankly” (Hansard, 
29 October 2013, col 82). With that, the second evidence session of the Commons 
Committee drew to a close.  
 
*** 
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The Committee sat to hear expert evidence for a third time on Thursday 31 October, 
at 11.30am. It heard oral evidence from three witnesses: Angela Patrick, Director of 
Human Rights Policy at Justice, a lobbying group that campaigns for human rights; 
Rachel Robinson (whom I interviewed), Policy Officer at Liberty; and Saira Grant 
(pronounced Sarah), Legal and Policy Director at the Joint Council for the Welfare of 
Immigrants, an independent national charity that provides legal assistance to 
immigrants, and campaigns for a human-rights-based approach to the formulation of 
immigration law. 
Patrick opened the discussion, expressing concern about “a number of areas”, 
especially on the Bill’s provision concerning the interpretation of Article 8. “We do 
not think that Parliament needs to do what it is proposing to do, and we think that 
the courts consider many of the factors that are included in clause 14 already” 
(Hansard, 31 October 2013, col 87). Robinson was stronger in her criticism, saying 
that it amounted to the imposition of a “judicial straitjacket” (Hansard, 31 October 
2013, col 102). 
On residential tenancies, Robinson noted that the Bill would bring immigration 
control “into our communities”, with private citizens doing the job of immigration 
officials, producing the potential for discrimination where they think tenants are less 
likely to be British. “We should not underestimate the kind of tensions that would 
create in our communities”, said Robinson (Hansard, 31 October 2013, col 97). 
The last expert witness to give evidence was Saira Grant from the JCWI. Hanson 
addressed his first question to the ‘deport first, appeal later’ provision, which would 
prescribe that migrants appealing deportation decisions could do so only from abroad 
after being deported for having received in the UK a prison sentence of 12 months or 
more. “Not allowing people the chance to have their appeal heard here”, said Grant, 
“goes against fundamental principles of the rule of law in this country” (Hansard, 31 
October 2013, col 103).  
Could Grant make any suggestions that might assist the Committee in tabling 
amendments to improve the fairness of the landlord provisions, asked Hanson. “I 
struggle to provide you with what you want because I so fundamentally oppose what 
is being attempted in this area,” replied Grant. “With both the landlord and NHS 
provisions, the Government are not achieving what they seek to achieve or what they 
have stated that they want to achieve.” By way of explanation, Grant stated that the 
NHS provisions would have “no bearing” upon those unlawfully accessing NHS 
services, but would effectively mean that long-term migrants would pay twice for their 
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NHS care, once through their taxes and national insurance, and a second time through 
the immigration health charge. Moreover, said Grant, the levy would stand to earn the 
Government £200 million a year, just “0.18 per cent” of the NHS’s “£109 billion a 
year” budget (Hansard, 31 October 2013, col 104). 
 
*** 
 
In the Committee’s fourth sitting, later that day, the Immigration Minister Mark 
Harper gave evidence, and responded to questions about the Bill. Most queries were 
put by the Shadow Immigration Minister, David Hanson. Hanson has a gentle and 
easy manner, and began by reassuring Harper that he would “not engage in political 
debate” (Hansard, 31 October 2013, col 111), but ask questions that would aid Labour 
in tabling amendments. In developing his scrutiny, Hanson was briefed not only by 
Labour advisors but also the aforementioned external groups. Importantly, Hanson 
informed Harper beforehand of what questions he would ask.  
On reducing appeal rights, Harper assured the Committee that UK Visas and 
Administration was, “putting great effort into improving the quality of original 
decision making” – given that over fifty per cent of appeals are upheld. “It is worth 
putting the numbers in context”, added Harper, noting that only thirteen per cent of 
managed migration applications were not granted, and of these, not all those with a 
right of appeal chose to use it (Hansard, 31 October 2013, col 111-112). The fifty per 
cent figure is a share of the less than thirteen per cent of all applications that were 
refused, meaning that less than 6.5 per cent of all decisions could be said to have been 
demonstrably wrong. 
On the landlord provisions, Hanson asked whether the Government would “pilot” 
the scheme before full implementation. Harper promised that there would be a 
“phased roll-out”. “Can you explain what the difference is between a pilot and a roll-
out”, asked Labour MP John Robertson. “With the phased roll-out”, said Harper, “we 
are making it clear that we want to proceed…it is sensible to roll it out first in one or 
more parts of the United Kingdom. We can then learn from that experience. Some 
practical implementation issues might arise, but we can then deal with those before 
we roll the policy out across the rest of the country” (Hansard, 31 October 2013, col 
116). 
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The written evidence 
 
In addition to the taking of oral evidence, the Committee also took written evidence 
as a means of enhancing its Members’ scrutiny. As noted by Thompson (2014: 387), 
the introduction of extensive evidence taking powers was intended to “hone [the] 
scrutinising edge” of Bill Committees (Modernisation Select Committee, 2006). The 
receipt of written evidence is important because it provides a further opportunity for 
interest groups and private citizens to communicate with Parliamentarians and 
government in Committee.  
The Government invited the submission of written evidence to be considered in 
Committee via a webpage on the UK Parliament website, created 23 October 2013, 
after the Immigration Bill’s Second Reading. The invitation read as follows: 
 
Do you have relevant expertise and experience or a special interest in 
the Government’s Immigration Bill? 
 
If so, you can submit your views in writing to the House of Commons Public Bill 
Committee which is going to consider the Bill.  
… 
The written evidence will be circulated to all Committee Members to inform their 
consideration of the Bill. 
 
All submissions were circulated to all of the Committee’s Members to inform their 
consideration of the Bill. The evidence does not reflect all outside opinion considered 
by Parliament. It does not include opinion on the deprivation of citizenship clause 
added at Commons Report, for example. Nor does it include briefings submitted by 
lobbying groups to Parliamentarians. But it does provide a good sample of external 
opinion. 
Sixty-five items of written evidence were submitted for the Committee’s 
consideration. However, thirty of these appear to have been received after the final 
sitting. Of the thirty-five items of written evidence submitted in time to be considered 
by the Committee, most came from external interest groups. Five were from 
individual private citizens.  
I analysed the content of these thirty-five pieces of written evidence. I coded every 
comment regarding the Bill’s provisions into one of three categories, depending on 
whether they indicated support, opposition, or other, which included neutral 
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comments and comments that contained both support and opposition. I then 
calculated for each article a ‘balance of criticism’ score, where 1 indicates that all 
comments were negative (i.e., criticised or indicated opposition to the Bill or its 
aspects); and 0 indicates that all comments were positive. A score of 0.5 indicates 
equal numbers of comments that praised and criticised the Bill or its aspects.  
Only one submission was solely positive in its critical content, that of 
MigrationWatch UK.  
Three submissions provided no critical comment (i.e., positive or negative 
evaluations) on the Bill’s content. One of these was from the Residential Landlords 
Association and sought to correct an error of fact in the oral evidence of its Chairman, 
Richard Jones. The second was a statement signed by thirty-three London doctors 
which questioned remarks made by expert witness Professor J. Meirion Thomas, who 
had suggested that health tourism was so common that doctors at the Guy’s and St 
Thomas’ hospital had a special label, the “Lagos shuttle”, because so many women 
from Lagos had arrived heavily pregnant in the UK to give birth under NHS care. 
Finally, the written submission of Universities UK provided information relevant to 
consideration of the Bill’s landlord and health charge provisions as they related to 
students. It provided data on UK student accommodation, the average comparative 
cost of study abroad for international students, and UK student visa requirements 
compared with those of competitors – but no critical comment.   
Two submissions contained a mixture of positive and negative critical comment. 
The first, from Shout Out UK – an independent news network and course provider 
that aims to get young people more active in politics – provided five comments 
indicating approval, and one negative comment, giving a balance of criticism score of 
0.17. The second submission providing a mixed critique was from TUI UK & Ireland, 
a leisure travel group. Whilst providing wholly negative comment on the Bill’s 
proposal to introduce embarkation checks, they indicated at the start of their 
submission support for “the vast majority of the proposals outlined and believe they 
will assist the UK Border Force to control immigration more effectively and improve 
removal processes”.    
Two submissions, from Crisis and the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, I 
excluded from the analysis because they did not fit my framework. Their critical 
comment was so nuanced, with negative evaluations prefaced by positive ones, that I 
felt I would be doing them a disservice to fit them into my analytical scheme. 
 The remaining twenty-seven submissions of written evidence were wholly 
negative in their criticism. 
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Notably, Bail for Immigration Detainees provided four amendments in their 
written submission. This evidence provided four written amendments for MPs: 
Amendments 39, 18, 32 and 33, the first two of which were tabled in Committee 
Meeting 6, with the latter two tabled in the Committee’s fifth and sixth sittings. 
Moreover, two submissions from ILPA provided amendments and questions for MPs 
to put to the Immigration Minister.  
Finally, how many of these written submissions appear to have been drawn upon 
or referenced in the Committee debates (other than when their authors gave oral 
evidence)? Just twelve. 
 
 
Sittings 5-11 
 
In the remaining seven sittings of the House of Commons Public Bill Committee, all 
major provisions of the Bill were discussed, sometimes in fine detail that focused upon 
the meaning of single words. To give our analysis greater focus, we will not here 
recount the arguments which were presented for and against each of the Bill’s main 
provisions. Many of these have already been presented. Instead, we will focus upon 
the Committee’s apparent capacity to change the proposals of the executive.  
To the naïve investigator, the final seven sittings of the Committee present two 
major puzzles. The first arises from the contrast they provide with the previous four 
expert evidence sessions. In those, the majority of the Bill’s major clauses were 
criticised from most actors, often in strong terms. Yet in the final seven sittings, minor 
amendments were debated as if no serious criticisms had previously been registered.  
Tellingly, not one of the forty-five amendments tabled by non-executive 
Parliamentarians and which were discussed and moved
47
 – many of which were 
 
47
 Sometimes the Opposition did not propose an addition to the Bill, nor a minor deletion 
of a part of it – these modifications being known as “amendments” – but proposed instead 
that an entire clause or Schedule of the Bill be removed. In the Parliamentary convention, 
such a proposal is labelled “opposition to the Question that the clause or Schedule stand 
part of the bill”. For simplicity, I treat such proposals as “amendments” even though that 
is not the conventional term. Consequently, in instances where deletions of entire clauses 
or Schedules are proposed by the Opposition, because there is technically no amendment, 
there is no amendment to “withdraw”. By convention, if the proponent of a deletion of a 
clause or Schedule is satisfied with the Government’s oral response to their proposal, they 
will abandon the proposal and the relevant clause or Schedule will be “ordered to stand 
part of the Bill” (i.e., will remain as part of the Bill). In this analysis, I treat the lack of a 
willingness to put such a proposal to Committee vote as a withdrawal. This is reasonable 
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drafted by Alison Harvey at ILPA, and other external lobbying groups such as Bail for 
Immigration Detainees – was passed. This is less remarkable when one considers the 
striking fact that only four non-Government amendments, or ten per cent, were 
actually put to a vote. The remaining forty-one were withdrawn, sometimes without 
any debate at all. What explains this second puzzle: the seemingly bizarre behaviour 
of MPs tabling amendments, then withdrawing them, apparently of their own volition, 
as if they had no intention to change the Bill in the first place? (The outcome of 
amendments is summarised by Table F.) 
 
 
 
as its effect is identical to the formal withdrawal of an amendment, and will allow my 
statistical analysis to provide a fuller and more accurate picture of the character of 
Opposition action. 
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Table F  Commons Committee amendment outcomes, by sponsor  
     
Sitting 
No. of non-Gov. 
amendments
1
 
2 
Outcome of non-Gov. 
amendments 
No. of Gov. 
amendments 
Outcome of Gov. 
amendments 
     
     
     
5 8 8 withdrawn 0 - 
     
6 8 7 withdrawn,  
1 rejected on vote: 
Ayes 6, Noes 9 
9 9 accepted without 
vote 
     
7 2 1 withdrawn,  
1 rejected on vote: 
Ayes 8, Noes 12 
0 - 
     
8 10 10 withdrawn 3 3 accepted without 
vote 
     
9 8 8 withdrawn 38 (35 [amendments 
61-95] + 3 others) 
38 accepted without 
vote 
     
10 3 1 withdrawn;  
2 rejected on vote: 
Ayes 8, Noes 9; Ayes 
7, Noes 10 
4  
 
4 accepted without 
vote 
 
     
11 6 6 withdrawn 0 - 
     
TOTAL 45 41 withdrawn; 
4 rejected after vote 
54 54 agreed to 
     
     
1 
Amendments included are those discussed or moved. Tabled amendments not discussed or moved are not 
included. 
2
 Included as non-Government amendments are amendments tabled by MPs of the ruling parties if such MPs 
are not members of the Government, i.e., are not the prime minister, ministers (i.e., cabinet ministers), or 
junior ministers. The count includes not only amendments that are moved but those which are discussed but 
not formally moved (following Thompson, 2014, 2015).  
     
 
 
The answer to these puzzles is that the Immigration Bill’s Committee stage, like all 
Public Bill Committees, was “a bit of a charade”, to use the words of one interviewee. 
The main reason for this is simple institutional design – reinforcing the importance 
of the two dimensions of my POS approach derived from neo-institutionalism. The 
Committee of Selection, which nominates Members to serve on the Committee, must 
“have regard…to the composition of the House”. This apparently modest and 
somewhat obscure instruction, is in fact profound in its consequences for the 
legislative influence of the Committee. It means that the composition of Commons 
Committees, with respect to the party affiliations of its Members, should be roughly 
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proportional to that found in the House of Commons. In practice, this directive is 
adhered to closely, as is made clear by Figure 8, which shows the proportion of MPs 
of each party in both the House of Commons and the Immigration Bill Committee. 
 
 
 
Figure 8  The number of MPs in the Immigration Bill Committee and in the House 
of Commons, as of 19 November 2013: a pie chart comparison 
  
 
The important logical consequence of this is that in Public Bill Committees, as in 
debates of the whole House, such as at Second Reading, there is always a Government 
majority. This derives from the design of the Westminster system, where the ruling 
party or parties usually have an absolute majority in Parliament. Without this 
majority, passing legislation would be that much more difficult, as their business 
would be under constant threat of being amended or thrown out by an opposing 
majority vote. Thus, as long as MPs of the ruling party or parties remain united in 
Committee, they can outvote the Opposition on any amendment put to a vote.  
For the Immigration Bill Committee, the Coalition stayed united, successfully 
voting against all non-Government amendments – as governments almost always do 
in Public Bill Committees. Indeed, in her sample of 139 Bill Committees in which 
were tabled 17,123 non-government amendments, Thompson showed that just 
eighty-eight were successful: a small fraction of 0.5 per cent (2015b: 8). Moreover, 
sixty-four of these (seventy-three per cent) entailed only minor changes to the 
wording of a bill (see Thompson, 2013: 468). One interviewee spoke to this pattern 
plainly: “the Opposition cannot win in Committee.” 
10
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This raises the question of how parties maintain discipline. Because even with a 
majority at Committee, the Government can lose on an amendment vote if its 
members do not vote unanimously. Yet members of the Coalition tended to vote as 
one. Why? Interviewees suggested the strength of Commons whips is partly 
responsible, allied to a particular attitude among MPs: that showing loyalty to their 
party and its leadership, through support of their policies, brings professional 
benefits, such as advancement within their party. Rebellion entails the inverse cost: 
barriers to intra-party career progression.  
This is reflected in the number of non-Government amendments tabled by 
Conservative Party Members. Reinforcing the view that the role of ruling-party MPs 
is to provide loyal support for, rather than serious scrutiny of, bills, only eleven out of 
all 109 amendments tabled at Committee were from Coalition MPs seeking to change 
the Bill. Ten of these were from Liberal Democrat Julian Huppert. The only 
amendment tabled by a Conservative was from Nigel Mills, which sought to extend 
the movement restrictions on Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants.  
Consequently, it is rare for amendments contrary to a government’s wishes to be 
successful. Even if they are put to a vote, the ‘tyranny of the government majority’, to 
modify a phrase made famous by Tocqueville, prevents them from being accepted. 
Loyal MPs will defend their party’s legislation regardless of the merit of opposing 
arguments. As such, barring any unexpected rebellions, amendments pushed to a vote 
can almost always be expected to be “negatived on division” (rejected by vote). Such 
was the case with the Immigration Bill in the Commons. 
It is therefore a simple fact of institutional design – that the Commons Public Bill 
Committee must reflect the strength of the parties in Parliament – allied to the 
incentive structure that operates within parties, which explains why at the 
Immigration Bill’s Committee amendments of the Government, totalling fifty-four 
and mostly of a minor and technical nature, were all agreed to without opposition 
(being not even put to a vote), while non-Government amendments were seldom put 
to a vote at all, and were all rejected when they were. Requesting a vote on 
amendments that oppose the executive’s proposals is widely, and reasonably, 
considered to be a waste of time.  
Apart from professional self-interest, there is another reason for Members’ 
unwillingness to push amendments to division: they may favour a less adversarial, 
more co-operative approach to scrutiny, in the belief that this is more likely to 
encourage a minister to move on an issue before the Report stage (Thompson, 2013: 
475). It is plausible that the increased popularity of this method has contributed to 
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the decrease in the mean number of amendments pushed to division in Bill 
Committees over recent years: from 9.6 per bill in the period from 1967 to 1971, to 
7.3 from 2000 to 2010 (Griffith, 1974: 260-266; Thompson, 2013: 476). Note that the 
number of amendment divisions in the Committee for the Immigration Bill was 
remarkably lower than the average for the first decade of the millennium – a result, 
suggested interviewees, of the knowledge that the Government would not move on 
the issue.  
We can now answer concisely the first and second puzzles identified at the start 
of this section. The Bill Committee is not, like Second Reading, a place for broad 
arguments of principle or strongly-worded criticism. That is not the way to win the 
sympathy of ministers. It is not the way to win concessions. Nor is testing the opinion 
of the Committee amendments near-certain to be rejected, given that the Government 
outnumbers the Opposition, and tend to be averse to all amendments that seek to 
change its legislation. 
An additional aspect of this disparity in power is evidenced by the Committee’s 
sixth sitting. Here, Harper tabled nine amendments to expand the Government’s 
powers within clause 12 of the Bill, such that the Government would be able to deport 
not only “foreign criminals” appealing to stay in the UK on human rights grounds (as 
was currently proposed by the Bill), but also others whose deportation is deemed by 
the Home Secretary to be “conducive to the public good”. Harper downplayed the 
significance of these amendments, describing the power as entailing only a “slightly 
broader judgement” than that already present in the Bill (Hansard, 5 November 2013, 
col 205). In response, Hanson, while noting that, “the Opposition do not oppose 
clause 12 and will not divide the Committee on it” (an apparent indulgence of the 
committee “charade”; doing so would be pointless), resolved to “test the Minister 
slightly more on his amendments” (Hansard, 5 November 2013, col 207). His 
justification was telling: Harper had tabled these amendments “very late in the day.” 
“He knows”, Hanson continued, “that the Bill has not had pre-legislative scrutiny and 
that it effectively received an unopposed Second Reading…yet he is tabling major 
amendments that change quite significantly the nature of the provisions in clause 12” 
(Hansard, 5 November 2013, col 207). The tabling of amendments at this stage, which 
the Government is entirely within its power to do, makes their adequate scrutiny 
difficult if not impossible.  
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The Commons Committee: an initiator of change? 
 
By thus far focusing upon the direct legislative impact of non-Government 
Parliamentarians, via the success of their amendments, we have made, in the view of 
Thompson, an error of imagination. She argues that to discern the true function and 
impact of the Public Bill Committee, we must depart from a focus upon the stage’s 
“formal outputs”, namely, the acceptance of non-Government amendments, by vote 
or otherwise, and instead pay more attention to the Committee’s influence upon the 
“remainder of the legislative process”. Thompson has two types of influence in mind 
(2015b: 8). The first is where the Government, in response to arguments made at 
Committee, makes changes to the regulations or guidance accompanying a bill. For 
Thompson, although such changes do not change the text of the bill itself, they can 
nevertheless “be crucial for the implementation of a policy” (2015b: 8). The second 
way in which non-executive activity at Committee can change bills is if the 
Government tables amendments at Committee or Report in response to issues raised 
by Opposition and backbench MPs during the Committee stage.  
An analysis sensitive to these indirect forms of influence suggests that the Bill’s 
Commons Committee did indeed produce some significant ‘knock-on’ effects. These 
are analysed in Chapter 12, which shows that eight out of the ten main changes 
brought to the Bill during its passage through Parliament, and which resulted from 
Parliamentary pressure rather than at the sole initiative of the executive, resumed 
critical debates raised at Commons Committee.  
 
 
Commons Committee: a ‘runny’ institution? 
 
In this chapter, I subjected the House of Commons Committee stage to a qualitative 
analysis. I presented a number of manifest puzzles in Bill Committee practice, noting 
that its institutional design ensures that the Official Opposition “cannot win”. This 
explains the polarisation in amendment outcomes: why all non-Government 
amendments failed, and all Government amendments succeeded.  
The central fact says a lot: the Immigration Bill left the committee modified only 
by the Government that introduced it. This in spite of the expert witnesses criticising 
it in strong terms. However, in broadening our view beyond the “formal indicators” 
of Committee impact, beyond the acceptance by vote of non-Government and 
backbench amendments, we can appreciate the true political meaning of the 
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Committee stage. Its impacts were evidenced at later Parliamentary stages, including 
in the Lords.  
The resulting picture is of a Parliamentary stage whose apparently numerous and 
meaningful democratic features – the possibility for extensive participation from 
external actors, the receipt of expert oral and written evidence to provide to MPs the 
information required for effective scrutiny, extensive line-by-line deliberation of the 
Bill, allowing for Government accountability in a substantially transparent process – 
yield limited legislative impact.  
If the effectiveness of a Bill Committee is determined principally by its ‘viscosity’, 
a political science buzzword meaning the capacity for a political institution to check 
the power of another, which here translates as the ability of the legislative in the form 
of the Parliamentary Committee to constrain the Government in its passage of 
legislation, then this stage may be characterised as in general offering little resistance. 
It is a ‘runny’ institution, no serious check on executive power.  
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10 Commons Report 
 
 
In the weeks preceding the next Parliamentary stage in the House of Commons, 
Report, newspapers revealed the stirrings of a Conservative backbench rebellion to 
extend controls on Romanian and Bulgarian migration due to expire on 1 January 
2014. The rebellion was led by Conservative backbencher Nigel Mills. On 19 
November, the Daily Mail reported that backbench support was “coalescing” around 
Mills’s plan, with “dozens” of Tory MPs likely to back the measure, thereby, in the 
words of the Mail, putting “huge pressure on the Prime Minister to defy the European 
Union over its cherished free movement rules.” (Doyle, 2013). By 4 December, Mills 
had tabled an amendment with the support of sixty-two MPs to extend restrictions 
on Romanian and Bulgarian migrants until 31 December 2018. The MPs comprised 
mainly backbench Conservatives from the right of the party, including those without 
a reputation for being “serial rebels” (Ross, 2013b). 
The campaign won ministerial support. Kris Hopkins, the housing and local 
government minister, was reported to say that it was MPs’ “democratic right” to 
demand the Government defy the EU, before adding that he did not disagree with the 
MPs’ position (Ross, 2013b). The support of Hopkins was significant. Ministers have 
more political heft than backbenchers by virtue of their office. Their ministerial status 
is also thought both partly to reflect, but also to require, stronger party loyalty than 
the average backbencher. Indeed, any ministers or ministerial aides voting for a rebel 
amendment would be expected, revealed The Sunday Telegraph, to resign (Ross, 
2013b). In response, the Conservative leadership sent out the whips. Soon after, a 
number of Conservative MPs reported being given strong instruction not to back 
Mills’s rebel amendment to the Immigration Bill.  
Were Government attempts to conciliate the rebels only a failsafe? On 5 
December, Commons Leader Andrew Lansley revealed that the Immigration Bill's 
Report stage – during which Mills’s amendment would be debated – would take place 
in 2014, after the transitional controls that Mills sought to extend had expired. 
Responding to Tory MP Mark Reckless’s demand to know why the Bill’s Report stage 
had been “delayed”, Lansley responded saying the Bill was not being delayed, but that 
there was simply “a lot of legislation before the House” (Little, 2013b). 
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Mills described the delay as a “terrible pity”, with Tory MP Philip Hollobone 
invoking democratic norms in his condemnation of the timetabling: “We have been 
denied a vote expressing views of our constituents” (Ashton, 2013). 
However, contrary to those pronouncements, it seems that the delay of the debate 
until the new year was intended to serve a largely symbolic function. It would have 
made little practical difference because the measure could not have become law until 
the Immigration Bill had received Royal Assent, probably in May 2014, long after the 
expiration of the labour market controls on Romanian and Bulgarian migrants. 
Symbolically, though, delaying the Commons Report debate until 2014 would render 
opposition to the expiration of controls, after the fact, moot. Recording a vote against 
their expiration before the fact seems more politically meaningful, even if it would be 
no more consequential in legislative terms. 
Nevertheless, support for the amendment grew to include John Whittingdale, the 
chairman of the Commons Culture, Media, and Sport Committee; Bernard Jenkin, the 
chairman of the Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs 
Committee; and former Tory ministers Bill Wiggin, James Duddridge, and Sir Gerald 
Howarth.  
In late January, a week before the Commons Report stage was scheduled to take 
place, Mills reiterated his intention to pursue his amendment, though in modified 
form. It would no longer seek to extend but reintroduce the controls that expired 
earlier that month.  
On 23 January, The Guardian reported that the Government had dispatched John 
Hayes, its “ambassador to the Tory right”, to try and reach agreement with Mills and 
other rebels (Watt, 2014a). It confirmed suspicions that the Bill had indeed been, 
“held up after Sir George Young, the chief whip, told No 10 that it cannot proceed 
until agreement is reached with Mills”. But after meeting with Hayes, Mills said he 
remained unimpressed, even with the announcement, offered as a concession before 
Christmas, to prevent EU migrants from claiming benefits until they had been in the 
UK for three months.  
Meanwhile, support for a second amendment, unrelated to Mills’s, had been 
gathering pace. The brainchild of former solicitor and Conservative MP Dominic Raab, 
the amendment, which had accrued the support of 105 MPs, forty-two more than 
Mills’s amendment, sought to prevent foreign nationals who had been sentenced in 
the UK to a year or more in prison from appealing deportation on the basis of Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to a family life; see Footnote 
19). Under Raab’s amendment, the Home Secretary, rather than judges, would decide 
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whether offenders’ family links were strong enough to allow them to avoid 
deportation. 
 
*** 
 
At the Commons Report stage, on 30 January 2014, the Bill returned to the floor of 
the House with fully fifty Government amendments. While most of these, were, as 
Theresa May said, mostly of a minor and technical nature, they also included what 
would become by far the most controversial provision of the whole Bill: New Clause 
18, which would grant the Home Secretary the power to deprive a naturalised British 
person of their citizenship if that person had conducted themselves in a manner 
“seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom” even if it would 
render the person stateless as a result.  
In presenting the new clause to Parliament, May noted that depriving a person of 
their citizenship, “is one of the most serious sanctions a state can take against a person 
and it is therefore not an issue that I take lightly”. She stated that the new clause was 
a “consequence of a specific case” (Hansard, 30 January 2014, col 1040). That case 
was of Hilal Al-Jedda. 
Al-Jedda was an Iraqi national who moved to the UK in 1992 with his wife and 
claimed asylum. In 2000, he and his wife were granted British citizenship, 
immediately losing their Iraqi nationality under Iraqi law. In 2004, Al-Jedda was 
detained by British armed forces in Iraq, because of suspected involvement in 
terrorism. In December 2007, the Labour Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, made an 
order depriving him of his citizenship on the ground that it would be conducive to the 
public good. However, such an order could not then be made if the Home Secretary 
was satisfied that it would render the person subject to it stateless. In the case of Al-
Jedda, however, that seemed to be exactly what happened. 
Al-Jedda challenged the order depriving him of his British nationality before the 
Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) on the grounds that the order had 
made him stateless and was therefore void. SIAC rejected Al-Jedda’s challenge, but 
was directed to rehear the issue by a higher court: the Court of Appeal. SIAC came to 
the same conclusion. However, the Court of Appeal rejected it as erroneous in law 
(Equal Rights Trust, 2013). The Secretary of State, then Theresa May, challenged the 
Court of Appeal’s decision before the highest UK court, the Supreme Court, which 
heard the appeal on 27 June 2013. The Supreme Court dismissed May’s appeal on 9 
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October 2013. In so doing, it restored to Al-Jedda his British citizenship because its 
deprivation had rendered him stateless, and was therefore unlawful. 
The last-minute tabling of this critical new clause, just one day before Report, 
attracted condemnation from across the House. Conservative MP Peter Bone asked 
May if she thought it “unfortunate” that such amendments were not included in the 
original Bill, “rather than tabling them on Report and not giving us enough time to 
debate them?” Shadow Immigration Minister David Hanson was more scathing. He 
asked why, given the seriousness and complexity of the issue, May had “tabled the 
new clause twenty-four hours before Report without consulting any outside bodies?” 
The situation, said Hanson, was such that the Opposition had had to table ‘manuscript 
amendments’ to deal with the serious concerns the new clause raised. This has 
significant consequences for Commons scrutiny. Manuscript amendments are tabled 
on the day of the debate itself, without prior notice. As such, they do not appear on 
the day’s business papers and are rarely selected for debate – a significant blow to the 
informed deliberation required for Parliament to provide an effective check on the 
executive. 
It is to that problem which Hanson spoke when he observed that (Hansard, 30 
January 2014, col 1056): 
  
A range of outside groups would like to examine the consequences of the proposed 
legislation, yet today the House of Commons is expected to approve it. The 
Opposition want to reserve judgment on some of the details that have been 
mentioned. We want to look at the measures, take advanced legal advice and consult 
outside bodies, which the Government should be doing, so we can consider the 
implications.  
 
More specifically, Hanson noted that the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association 
had sent a brief at 4am that day. “That was the first opportunity it had to put down 
its views on this matter,” said Hanson (by which he meant that it was the first 
opportunity that Alison Harvey had had), adding that ILPA noted that they did not 
have enough time to address the “complex questions” raised by the provision 
(Hansard, 30 January 2014, col 1056). 
Jeremy Corbyn highlighted that this was no special case, but was “indicative of 
the whole approach to the Bill”, adding that, “it has not been adequately debated 
anywhere”, and that, “Most of it will be not be debated today and it will pass through 
this House unexamined” (Hansard, 30 January 2014, col 1056). 
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Interviewees were sure that the late introduction of the new power was no 
coincidence, but part of a political strategy to prevent its effective scrutiny, given that 
it would likely be particularly contentious. The result of this tactic would be to grant 
the Bill smoother passage and enhance its robustness to amendment.  
But others suggested that the late introduction of the clause also served a second 
purpose: filibustering. What did the Government intend to filibuster? Strangely 
enough, the backbench amendment from within its own party, that of Nigel Mills. 
This is the point to which Pete Wishart alluded when he stated that May had “brought 
forward the measure to prevent proceedings on what Conservative Members want to 
discuss and vote on.” To this, Wishart added remarks echoed (in broad outline) by a 
number of interviewees: 
 
[T]his is all about seeing who can be toughest on immigration. I have to say to the 
Home Secretary, “You’re not gonnae win that one – forget about it. You cannot out-
UKIP UKIP. They are the masters of nasty, pernicious populism, and you’ll never beat 
them. (Hansard, 30 January 2014, col 1079) 
 
Although allowed within the rules, filibustering is understandably recognised to entail 
a perversion of deliberative ideals and an undermining of the legislature’s power. It is 
possible only because of limits on time. Commons Report on the Bill was allotted just 
four and a half hours. Yet, taking a number of interventions whilst explaining the 
Government’s amendments in detail, May had managed to take up roughly one third 
of that time. Would there be space to hear Mills’s amendment?  
Before Mills was the amendment tabled by Dominic Raab. Then Liberal Democrat 
Sarah Teather spoke to ten of her amendments, as well as to Yvette Cooper’s 
Amendment 1, which sought to delete from the bill the entire provision to limit appeal 
rights. As time ran short, Labour MP John McDonnell expressed his annoyance at the 
subversion of the debate: 
 
Mr Deputy Speaker, you have rightly asked us to curtail our speeches and I shall try 
to complete mine in four minutes, but I am seething with anger. The Bill affects many 
of my constituents, and this is the only time for backbench MPs to introduce or speak 
to amendments on Report. I am being denied that opportunity because most of my 
amendments will not be reached today. (Hansard, 30 January 2014, col 1096) 
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Such was the case for Conservative MP Nigel Mills. His amendment, which had 
excited so much chatter, debate, and controversy, whilst revealing a split in the 
Conservative party over both immigration, and its EU membership, was never heard. 
Time had run out. 
When it came for the House to vote, the Government’s new power to render 
citizens stateless was approved overwhelmingly: 297 Ayes to 34 Noes. 
Dominic Raab’s New Clause 15 was rejected, receiving 97 votes for it, and 241 
votes against.  
When Yvette Cooper’s Amendment 1 was put to a vote, an amendment which 
sought to remove altogether the Bill’s clause limiting appeal rights, the support was 
impressive. It received 210 Ayes. But again, a victory was recorded for the 
Government: it also attracted 301 Noes. 
 
*** 
 
The Bill’s Third Reading stage, which does not allow for the tabling of amendments, 
lasted just twenty-one minutes. Much of that time was given to a stout defence by 
May of the Bill’s underlying principles and provisions. In a response that, as ever, 
relied heavily upon democratic norms, especially on the importance of debate, Shadow 
Immigration Minister, Yvette Cooper, said: 
 
Even though Parliament has had hardly any business…there has been no debate 
today. On the proposals of Tory backenchers on Bulgaria and Romania, there has been 
no debate today. … A series of amendments has been tabled by Members from all 
parts of the House, but none of them has been debated today. 
What have we had instead? The Home Secretary pulled out of her hat, at the last 
minute, a new power on citizenship, with no consultation and no scrutiny, in a 
desperate attempt to distract her own party… (Hansard, 30 January 2014, col 1126) 
 
The Bill was voted overwhelmingly to progress to the Lords: 295 Ayes to 16 Noes. It 
therefore left the Commons without amendment by non-executive MPs. 
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11 The House of Lords 
 
 
How can it be that in the UK’s bicameral legislature it is the unelected chamber, 
pejoratively labelled the “House of Cronies” (Sampson, 2005), that safeguards more 
effectively than its fully-elected complement the rights of some of society’s least 
privileged people, such as asylum seekers and immigrants? This might be thought 
especially perplexing, given that its average member is a sixty-nine-year-old, highly 
privileged white man appointed for life by the government of the day
48
.  
In this chapter, I endeavour to show that when examining the House of Lords in 
its scrutiny and amendment of the Immigration Bill, and hence, in its constitutionally-
defined role as a check against executive power, and especially the restrictionist bent 
of that branch of the government, this is, against expectation, what one finds. The 
question of why one finds this has long fascinated political analysts. It is a difficult 
question requiring a multifaceted answer, which proceeds in this study by means of a 
comparative analysis of the two Houses of Parliament.  
 
*** 
 
It must first of all be said that as political institutions, the British Houses of 
Parliament are much more alike than dissimilar. They both have debating chambers, 
in which, on one side, the government of the day describes and defends its prospective 
legislation. Also, the Opposition benches stand in parallel across from those of the 
government, in parallel, from which Opposition members make speeches, putting 
questions to the Government regarding its policies, or debating the issues of the day. 
Further, each is a domain of power and argument, in which actors are locked in a 
struggle of wits, eloquence, and rationality. Each provides an opportunity for general 
discussion of the underlying principles of bills, as well as line-by-line scrutiny. Each 
allows for the tabling of amendments. Each allows for sessions in which any member 
 
48
 On 13 February 2014, there were 780 Peers in the House of Lords, comprising 667 Life 
Peers, eighty-eight Hereditary Peers, and twenty-five Bishops, none of which were elected 
by the public, unlike Members of Parliament in the House of Commons (UK Parliament, 
2014a). Life Peers are appointed by the Queen on the advice of the Prime Minister to serve 
for their life. Hereditary Peers, by contrast, inherit their membership. 
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of that House can participate. Each allows for relatively free debate in which only one 
member, who stands while the rest sit, may speak at any one time. Both Houses may 
decide questions by vote, in which MPs or Peers walk into one of two lobbies, thereby 
indicating their support or opposition. Both Houses conduct most of their business 
in public, before television cameras and microphones, and all debates are transcribed 
in records, known as Hansard, which are readily accessible online. Finally, both 
Houses have a number of stages through which a bill must progress to become law. 
   
 
A new Minister of State for Immigration and Security 
 
The Immigration Bill left the House of Commons on 30 January 2014, arriving in the 
House of Lords for its Second Reading debate ten days later, on 10 February. Two 
days earlier, our Immigration Minister, Mark Harper, resigned from his post after 
discovering that the Colombian woman he had paid to clean his flat for the past six 
years was an irregular immigrant. Harper had conducted only one full check on her 
background in 2007 when he began employing her, at which time the woman had 
apparently presented a Home Office letter confirming she had indefinite leave to 
remain. However, on requesting the Home Office double-check the cleaner’s status, 
Harper learned that his cleaner was in the country unlawfully. The irony was not lost 
on the press. The Times, for example, reported that Harper appeared to have “fallen 
victim to exactly the obligations that he is seeking to impose” (Grimston and 
Summers, 2014). 
 Harper was replaced later that day by James Brokenshire, Conservative MP for 
Old Bexley and Sidcup, and formerly a junior minister: the Under Secretary of State 
for Crime and Security. A lawyer by training, in his first speech as the new Minister 
of State for Immigration and Security, Brokenshire said: 
 
For too long, the benefits of immigration went to employers who wanted an easy 
supply of cheap labour, or to the wealthy metropolitan elite who wanted cheap 
tradesmen and services – but not to the ordinary, hard-working people of this country. 
(Warrell and Rigby, 2014) 
 
Given the circumstances of his predecessor’s resignation, Brokenshire’s remarks 
understandably created a stir.  
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The Commons and the Lords: a comparison 
 
In this section, I sketch a comparison of the Commons and the Lords with respect to 
their institutional design and political culture (the first two dimensions of my POS 
framework). If I speak as if the findings of this case study reflect more enduring 
patterns of conduct between the Houses, it is because such a view was supported by 
my research, most especially by my interviewees. 
At the time of this study, the average age of a member of the House of Lords, or 
‘Peer’, was sixty-nine (UK Parliament, 2014b), twenty years older than the average 
MP (UK Parliament, 2014c), roughly thirty years older than the average citizen (Office 
for National Statistics, 2014: 11), and around thirty years older than the average 
migrant worker (Rienzo, 2016: 3). The membership was seventy-five per cent men 
and twenty-five per cent women (UK Parliament, 2014b), a smaller disparity than in 
the Commons, where women constituted twenty-two per cent of the total (UK 
Parliament, 2014c), but still far from the gender distribution in the UK-born and 
foreign-born populations, which is for both close to equal. Although Parliament has 
no official statistics on the ethnicity of its Peers, unofficial reports estimate that in 
2016 just fifty-one out of the House’s 800 Peers were ethnic minorities: 6.4 per cent 
(Audickas, 2016: 7).  
From this picture of a Lords so profoundly unrepresentative of both the general 
and immigrant populations – with respect to such basic characteristics as age, gender, 
and ethnicity – it is perhaps little wonder that commentators have held low 
expectations of its ability to represent effectively the interests of those it should serve 
(for example, Cowan, 2016). How could such a pale, male, aged elite possibly be 
expected to understand and defend the interests of people whose life experiences are 
so different from their own?   
The answer is to be found in seven features of the Lords, which distinguish it 
from the Commons. 
 
 
No Government majority 
 
The first difference, and it is an important one, is that unlike in the Commons, in the 
Lords the Government does not have an overall majority. Partly, this is because the 
Peers are not elected like MPs, but appointed by the Prime Minister of the day, 
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sometimes on the recommendation of the House of Lords Appointments 
Commission. Formally, however, all Peers are created by the Sovereign. Unlike in the 
Commons, a majority is not thought essential for a government to conduct its 
business. After all, the Lords can only delay a bill. It cannot throw them out. If a bill 
receives non-Government amendment in the Lords, it must return to the Commons 
for approval. And in the Commons, the Government has a majority.   
 
 
Crossbenchers 
 
A second difference, and which is partly constitutive of the first, is that unlike in the 
Commons, the Lords contains a large number of crossbenchers. At the time of this 
research, there were 180 crossbenchers in the House of Lords, constituting twenty-
three per cent of all Peers. Crossbenchers are independent Peers without formal 
alignment to any political party. As such, they do not report to whips. This fact of 
composition has an important impact upon the chances of non-Government 
amendments, and means, as one Peer imparted to me, that the strategy of opposition 
Peers in the Lords differs from that adopted by opposition MPs in the Commons.  
Most notably, it is a strategy directed to the crossbenches. If a Peer can convince 
the Official Opposition to get behind their proposal, whilst also convincing enough 
crossbench Peers to vote for her amendment, she can, so the rule of thumb goes, 
defeat the Government on a division. A comparison of the composition of the 
Commons and Lords by party at the time at which amendments to the Immigration 
Bill could be received is given in Figure 9 below. 
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Figure 9  Composition of the House of Commons and the House of Lords 
 
 
My interviewee’s point is based on the assumptions, born from long experience, that, 
in general, non-crossbench Peers vote in accordance with the position of their party, 
whilst crossbenchers, beholden to no party, are more independent, more receptive to 
“force of argument”, as one interviewee put it, and whose positions, therefore, are 
determined more by rational considerations and the desire to make responsible, rather 
than simply expedient, political choices. The presence of independent crossbenchers 
brings the context of political persuasion in the Lords far closer than is possible in the 
Commons to Habermas’s deliberative ideal. The idea that arguments should be judged 
solely on the basis of their rational strength is impossible in a House where so few of 
its members are free of powerful party influence. Such a substantial complement of 
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crossbench Peers thus provides an effective counter to the domination of rational and 
responsible decision-making by the exigencies of party politics, manifest in the 
disciplinary function of the whip, and the pressure to ‘toe the party line’. 
 
 
Greater independence of party-affiliated Peers 
 
The third difference between the Houses is a more general form of the second: 
typically, putting aside the greater independence of crossbench Peers, party-affiliated 
Peers are more independent than their Commons counterparts, MPs. The main 
explanation for this is well known. For those Peers with a party affiliation, who are by 
virtue of that affiliation incentivised to follow the party leadership, their careers are 
typically behind them. They have already ‘made it’. They are in little need of social or 
political advancement. For such Peers, the professional incentives to toe their party’s 
line are considerably weaker than those for MPs. So, too, are the disincentives of 
rebellion: the reprimands of whips, stalled party advancement, and hence continued 
life on the backbenches with no promise of professional development. As one Peer 
told me, “my whip cannot hold anything over me, unlike my colleagues in the 
Commons.” As such, the asymmetries of power in Parliamentarian-whip relationships 
are substantially smaller in the Lords than in the Commons. In the elected House, 
party sanctions loom large. As one Parliamentarian I interviewed lamented, there has 
long been manifest in the House of Commons a dearth of even minimally independent 
MPs.  
The claim that Peers are more independent, more likely to vote by conscience 
than my party diktat, was thought by interviewees to be reflected by Peers’ greater 
frequency of rebellion. However, this general perception is hard to validate 
statistically. This is because the action of whips is not publicised, so it is difficult to 
know in any particular instance whether a party-affiliated Peer has defied their whip, 
which should be the proper definition of rebellion. In statistical counts, such as those 
conducted by TheyWorkForYou.com, a vote is typically held to be rebellious if it is in 
opposition to the majority vote of a Peer’s colleagues. The problem with such a count 
is that it will also include ‘free votes’, also known as ‘unwhipped votes’, where 
members are not pressured to vote a certain way by their party leaders, traditionally 
because the issue is viewed as a matter of personal conscience.  
Nevertheless, the voice of the Lords as a whole may be considered to be more 
‘counter-Government’ than that of the Commons, reflecting not only the greater 
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independence of party-affiliated Peers, but also the large number of crossbenchers. 
While the House of Commons defeated the Coalition just six times, the House of 
Lords inflicted ninety-nine defeats.  
There is a kind of economics that underpins the rebellion of party-affiliated Peers. 
Its currency may be given our label “political capital”, a term with widespread usage, 
including by politicians themselves. Interviewees revealed that if a Parliamentarian 
rebels infrequently, then each rebellion carries more weight. Conversely, an act of 
rebellion by a Parliamentarian known to rebel frequently reduces the significance of 
that rebellion. The Peer that rebels often, even for sound reasons, risks being labelled 
a “troublemaker”, as one Peer interviewed described it. The actions of a troublemaker 
carry less weight than the actions of the ‘loyal Peer’, who on the rare occasion of 
rebelling is perceived to do so because of the weight of her conscience. When such a 
Peer rebels, the perception among their colleagues is that the rebellion reflects the 
sincere belief that, “Something must be really wrong with the legislation”. The Peer 
that rebels infrequently, even when they might wish to have rebelled more frequently, 
‘saves up’ their political capital, endowing future rebellions with greater political 
force. There is thus an inversely proportional relation between a Parliamentarian’s 
frequency of rebellion and each rebellion’s impact. As for material objects, such as 
precious metals, the rarer the rebellion (vis-à-vis its commissioning actor), the greater 
its political worth. Following this logic, it becomes important for each party-affiliated 
Peer or MP to choose their rebellions wisely. As one Peer said to me: “political capital 
must be well spent.”  
It is nevertheless important to realise that though Peers may be more independent 
than MPs, they are still whipped, and apparently rebel infrequently. They are also 
reluctant, said an interviewee, to stand their ground against the Commons. They value 
the legitimacy that being elected confers to its MPs. 
 
 
More deliberation 
 
In our analysis of the Commons, we saw that its debates were subject to strict 
timetabling. There was also evidence, beyond the consensus view of the MPs I spoke 
to, of the Bill’s journey being sped up: there were on a Tuesday and Thursday 
concurrent sittings of the Committee, producing, with regard to deliberation, a doubly 
negative impact. First, it increases the material to be scrutinised on those days, whilst, 
second, reducing the time for MPs to prepare their scrutiny of it. Consequently, only 
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a fraction of MPs’ tabled amendments was actually discussed. This was a point 
bemoaned (I do not think that is too strong a word) by one interviewee, who noted 
with others the unusual pace at which the Bill was rushed through its Commons 
stages. In the Lords, by contrast, there are no time limits at Committee or Report. In 
the Parliamentary debates on the Immigration Bill, it showed: in the Commons, the 
Bill was discussed publicly for over thirty hours; in the Lords, the Bill was discussed 
for almost twice that time: fifty-six hours and fifty-nine minutes. Such tight 
constraints on Commons debate at Committee and Report are obviously in strong 
opposition to the democratic tenet that deliberation be free.  
One is reminded of Socrates’s trial defence against the dual charge of corrupting 
Athenian youth and impiety against the Pantheon of the city-state, for failing to 
believe in Gods, and allegedly creating his own. Socrates begins his defence by asking 
that the jury judge him by the truth of his statements, but concedes towards its close 
(Plato, 2003: 62):  
 
I am convinced that I never wrong anyone intentionally, but I cannot convince you of 
this, because we have had so little time for discussion.  
 
As for Socrates in ancient Athens, so for MPs in contemporary Britain: political debate 
suffers under constraints on time. 
 
 
More participation 
 
Relatedly – and again, resulting solely from institutional design – the Lords allows for 
wider participation in deliberation. In the Commons, there was only a single stage 
propitious to serious Bill scrutiny: Committee. And at Committee, twenty out of the 
twenty-one Committee Members participated. Table G summarises the activity of the 
Committee’s Members, where an ‘intervention’ is an oral statement by an MP. 
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Table G  MPs’ activity at Commons Public Bill Committee 
 
Committee Member (party) 
Number of 
interventions 
% of all 
interventions 
Number of 
amendments moved 
    
    
Bain, William (Lab) 24 3 0 
Baker, Norman (Minister for Crime 
Prevention, LD) 
83 
11 
0 
Dowd, Jim (Lab)   8 1 0 
Doyle-Price, Jackie (Con)   3 0 0 
Hanson, David (Shadow Immigration 
Minister, Lab)   
170 
22 
25 
Harper, Mark (Immigration Minister, 
Con) 
156 
20 
52 
Hillier, Meg (Lab/Co-op) 93 12 5 
Huppert, Julian (LD)   41 5 10 
Jones, Helen (Lab)   65 8 27 
Kirby, Simon (Con) 4  1 0 
McFadden, Pat (Lab)   25 3 0 
Mills, Nigel (Con)   7 1 1 
Milton, Anne (Con)  7 1 0 
Opperman, Guy (Con)   24 3 0 
Paisley, Ian (DUP)   0 0 0 
Patel, Priti Con)   9 1 0 
Robertson, John (Lab)  16 2 1 
Smith, Henry (Con)   20 3 0 
Soames, Nicholas (Con)   3 0 (0.4) 0 
Syms, Robert (Con)   4 1 0 
Wilson, Phil (Lab) 14 2 22 
    
TOTAL 776 
 
100 109 
 
(Note: amendments do 
not sum to 109 as some 
amendments are tabled 
by multiple MPs) 
    
 
 
The data reveal participation that is highly skewed, in that discussion was dominated 
by just six Members. A total of 608 interventions, or seventy-eight per cent of all 
interventions, came from these six Members, who comprised just twenty-nine per 
cent of the Committee. The prominence of three of these is to be expected: the two 
Government ministers, Mark Harper and Norman Baker, and the Shadow Immigration 
Minister, David Hanson. Only three other MPs made a substantial number of 
contributions: Meg Hillier, Julian Huppert, and Helen Jones, respectively. Their efforts 
contrast sharply with nine of the Members, or forty-three per cent of the Committee. 
When scrutinising the substance of their interventions, these nine may be said to have 
contributed virtually nothing of value.  
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Notably, the ten Conservative MPs, who comprised just under half of all the 
Committee’s Members (forty-eight per cent), remained largely silent, contributing a 
total of just eighty-one interventions, (equating to ten per cent of all interventions). 
This lack of scrutiny from the majority ruling party lends credence to the views of the 
MPs quoted earlier: that at Committee, party loyalty trumps proper legislative 
scrutiny. Also revealing is that just seven Committee Members participated in the 
earlier Second Reading debate, thus reinforcing Griffith’s point about Members’ lack 
of interest (Griffith, 1974: 53). 
In the Lords, by contrast, this most critical stage, Committee, was, per 
convention, extended to the ‘floor of the whole House’. Any Peer may participate. 
Sixty-five did. Moreover, there is greater scope for serious scrutiny of a bill in the 
Lords because the subsequent Report stage retains much of the character of Lords 
Committee: it is open to the whole House, with no time limits, allowing for the 
continuation of detailed bill scrutiny. In the Lords, both the Committee and Report 
stages are, in the words of one Parliamentarian interviewed, “where the action is”. 
Thus, a better indicator of Peer participation in the serious scrutiny of the 
Immigration Bill is the total number of unique Peers that participated in both Lords 
Committee and Report, which was eighty-eight, who collectively contributed 732 
interventions. This means that the number of participants in the key Lords stages was 
more than fourfold that in the Commons.   
In addition to there being limited participation at Commons Committee, at 
Commons Report the debate is subject to strict time limits: for the Immigration Bill, 
just four-and-a-half hours. As such, at Commons Report, the serious discussion and 
amendment of legislation is vulnerable to obstruction. For the Immigration Bill, the 
debate was subverted by a filibuster. Most amendments tabled could not be discussed, 
or voted on.  
 
 
More non-executive amendments discussed 
 
The sixth difference stems from the features of institutional design highlighted by 
points four and five: the lack of time restrictions, and the provision of an additional 
forum, Lords Report, for Peers to continue their detailed policy scrutiny. Because 
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more Peers participate
49
, in debates less constrained by tight and stringent limits on 
time over more stages whose conditions are favourable to serious deliberative 
scrutiny, more non-Government amendments can be discussed.  
Non-Government amendments are especially important to the Parliamentary 
process because they are the medium through which executive policies can be 
challenged, and changed. In the Commons, none were successful, whilst all 
Government amendments were accepted. As Figure 10 shows, in the Lords as in the 
Commons, there is substantial polarisation in the success of amendments, depending 
on whether or not they are tabled by the Government. In the Lords, too, it is rare for 
non-Government amendments to be successful, while the opposite is true of 
Government ones. The Immigration Bill was no exception. In the Commons, 
Government amendments had a formal success rate of one hundred per cent: all of 
the Government’s 106 amendments were accepted. Non-Government amendments, 
by contrast, had a formal success rate of zero per cent. Not one of the 128 non-
Government amendments tabled in the Commons was accepted. The picture in the 
Lords is broadly comparable. All thirty-three Government amendments were 
accepted. And just two of the 225 non-Government amendments tabled were 
accepted: 0.89 per cent.   
 
 
49
 Free participation at Lords Committee does not necessarily mean that more 
amendments will be tabled. Also, in the Commons, non-membership of the Committee is 
not a barrier to the tabling of amendments. A committee Member may speak to an 
amendment tabled by a non-Committee Member. But, in practice, this seldom happens. 
And it is more difficult for an MP to discuss an amendment which is not ‘theirs’ and about 
which they may feel less enthusiastic than the person tabling it. 
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Figure 10  Outcome of tabled amendments to the Immigration Bill  
in both Houses of Parliament 
 
 
However, as for Commons Committee, a sole focus on formal success misses subtler 
aspects of the process. Here, it overlooks an important procedural difference between 
the Houses: the capacity for non-Government amendments to be discussed.  
Non-Government or backbench amendments tabled by MPs for Commons 
Committee and Report are subject to a ‘filtering process’, or what may be labelled 
more critically a process of ‘attrition’, by which only a fraction end up being discussed 
by Committee Members. As one interviewee put it, most Commons amendments 
“never see the light of day”. In this research, just forty-seven Commons amendments, 
out of the 128 that were tabled, were actually discussed: thirty-seven per cent. In the 
House of Commons, this filtering process has four stages, with each of these four 
stages presenting potential barriers to amendments being discussed – with significant 
consequences for Parliamentary scrutiny
50
. Figure 11 shows the filtering to which 
 
50
 The stages are as follows. First of all, an amendment, if it is to be discussed in either 
House, must be tabled. Tabling is the act of formally submitting an amendment to 
Parliament, which must be in hard copy and delivered by hand or by post to the House 
Clerks, or the Public Bill Office, of the Parliamentarian’s respective House. For the 
Immigration Bill, 128 Commons amendments were submitted in this way. 
However, for a tabled amendment to be discussed and hence voted on, it must, second, 
be selected. According to the published guidelines for MPs on tabling amendments, 
selection is “wholly at the discretion of the Chair”. To oil the procedure, MPs are 
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non-Government Commons amendments to the Immigration Bill were subject. The 
shaded portion highlights the key figure: the number of amendments discussed, just 
forty-seven out of the 128 tabled, or around thirty-seven per cent. Note that the size 
of the ‘filter’s’ parts are impressionistic, not accurate reflections of amendment 
numbers by area. 
 
 
 
instructed that the selection “should not be questioned in debate.” The guidance provides 
some of the reasons for amendments not being selected, such as because they: 
 
• were not tabled within the deadline 
• do not make sense as currently drafted, or would ‘wreck’ all or part of the bill 
• have been tabled to the wrong part of the bill, or are very vague 
• are outside the ‘scope’ of the bill, or of the clause or schedule they are seeking to 
amend 
• would involve expenditure not authorised by a money resolution. 
 
For the Immigration Bill, 111 Commons amendments were selected. This stage is seldom 
highly attritional. 
Yet even if an amendment is selected in the Commons, it may not be called. This is 
the third stage. An amendment may not be called because its content has already been 
covered by an earlier discussion, but more common is that a Commons amendment is not 
called due to a lack of democracy’s central underlying resources: time. It is at this stage 
that most Commons amendments were filtered out, thereby preventing their discussion, 
and by extension, their being voted on. For the Immigration Bill, forty-nine amendments 
were called, a loss of sixty-two, almost half of all amendments. This represents, so far, a 
cumulative attrition rate of sixty-two per cent. 
The fourth stage that a non-Government Commons amendment must clear in order 
to be discussed or put to a vote is that it must be formally moved. Only after passing these 
four attritional stages – after having been tabled, selected, called and moved – can it then 
be discussed and put to a vote. 
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Figure 11  Filtering of non-Government Commons amendments  
(shaded section highlights number of amendments discussed) 
 
 
The House of Lords is different in two key ways. First, there is no filtering of 
amendments via a process of selection; and second, there is no substantial filtering 
due to amendments not being called. Indeed, in our case study, only twenty-one non-
Government Lords amendments were filtered out by not being called. But this was 
not for reasons of time, as in the Commons. Instead, it was because their subjects had 
already been discussed. For these two reasons: almost all amendments tabled in the 
Lords were discussed: 204 out of 225, or ninety-one per cent. (For the sake of 
completeness, it should be noted that the Lords differs from the Commons in a third 
way, in that, by convention, in the Lords, amendments may be discussed without 
having been formally moved, whereas in the Commons, all amendments discussed 
were typically moved formally beforehand.) Figure 12 shows the filtering of the non-
Government amendments to the Immigration Bill in the House of Lords. 
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Figure 12  Filtering of non-Government Lords amendments  
(shaded section highlights number of amendments discussed) 
 
 
In comparing the fates of the non-Government amendments tabled in each House, the 
difference in the number of such amendments that were discussed is considerable. 
This is shown in Figure 13. The consequences of these differing levels of amendment 
attrition may be comparably substantial. For the Immigration Bill, the logic of 
amendment attrition in the Commons limits participation at Report to those MPs 
fortunate enough to have their amendments called. But because at Commons Report 
non-Government amendments must be heard after the Government’s own 
amendments, in a debate allotted a limited amount of time (4.5 hours in our case 
study), this meant that only those non-Government amendments affecting earlier 
parts of the Bill were heard. That the fate of so many non-Government amendments 
is subject to these constraining and somewhat arbitrary conditions, which exclude the 
majority of them from the debate, thereby leaving substantial portions of the Bill 
undiscussed, while granting the Government further control over deliberation in the 
Commons, has the effect of reducing the accountability of Government to the 
democratically-elected chamber.  
 
THE LEGISLATURE IN IMMIGRATION POLICY-MAKING 
216 
 
Figure 13  Outcome of non-executive amendments to the Immigration Bill 
 
 
More expert scrutiny 
 
The House of Lords was not only able to discuss more amendments to the 
Immigration Bill, covering the full range of its provisions. Its discussion was also 
notably more expert. This is the seventh way in which the Houses differ with respect 
to their capacity to check the will of the executive. On this factor, the difference 
between MPs and Peers is remarkable, in two respects. First, the Peers that scrutinised 
the Bill had greater collective breadth of specialisation than their Commons 
counterparts. Second, they had greater individual levels of specialisation than MPs.  
But what is specialisation in this context, and how can it be measured? 
 
  
Evaluating Parliamentarians’ specialisation51 
 
If legislative proposals are to be scrutinised effectively in a legislature, the legislators 
scrutinising it must possess expertise on its content. Only then can deliberations be 
 
51
 The word specialisation has been used in research that analyses the expertise of the 
members of Public Bill Committees to determine whether they are fit to scrutinise 
legislation effectively. It is an apt term because it captures the possibility that a member’s 
experience and apparent specialist knowledge does not necessarily correspond with – and 
therefore does not presume – competence. Other terms, such as capability, skills, and 
proficiency, do not speak so clearly to this possibility. 
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adequately informed and governments held sufficiently to account. This statement 
enjoys a virtually axiomatic status among Parliamentarians, political commentators, 
and academic analysts alike. Being so widely taken for granted, however, it often 
escapes explicit acknowledgement. Nevertheless, it is an assumption that undergirds 
much critical commentary of Parliament, especially that concerning the efficacy of the 
main Commons stage of legislative influence, the Public Bill Committee.  
For example, in his 1979 analysis of the function and impact of “Committees in 
the British House of Commons”, Walkland observed that the MPs appointed typically 
had little interest or knowledge in the subject under discussion (Walkland, 1979: 
254). Previously, Griffith’s study of the ten-year period before 1974 established that 
MPs assigned to a Standing Committee may not have bothered to even participate in 
the preceding Second Reading debate for the bill they had been tasked to scrutinise 
(Griffith, 1974: 53, cited in Thompson, 2014: 390), with predictably lamentable 
consequences for their understanding of its content at Committee (Thompson, 2014, 
2015a, 2015b). 
A lack of interest and expertise on the part of Parliamentarians would, in 2013-
14, have been especially injurious to the effective scrutiny of bills, given that they 
exhibit a now long-observed tendency towards ever-greater length, breadth, and 
complexity (Korris, 2011: 565). Yet, bills have always been drafted in this way and 
most MPs have not – and do not – usually come from a background in law. In 2010, 
eighty-six out of all 650 MPs, just over one in eight, had worked as either a barrister 
or solicitor [McGuinness, 2010: 5]). Thus, as long as a large part of Members’ political 
lives continues to be spent in the intellectually demanding and time-intensive scrutiny 
of lawyers’ argot, including the ‘small print’, legalese is perhaps more an ‘enduring 
root cause’ of inadequate scrutiny than simply a ‘compounding factor’. 
More recent criticisms of the Committee Stage by MPs have, in line with earlier 
scholarship, focused on deficiencies of Members’ interest and expertise. For example, 
Diane Abbott MP recently suggested that the specialist knowledge of Members was 
not taken into account for their appointment to Committees, with government whips 
ensuring that “anyone who knows or cares about the legislation does not get on the 
committee in the first place” (Abbott, 2011, cited in Thompson, 2015b: 4, emphasis 
mine). Abbott’s view is shared with MPs ‘across the political divide’. The 
Conservative, Peter Luff, for example, observed that, in general, Committee Members 
“are not experts” (Hunting Bill Committee, 25 February 2003, col 1116, cited in 
Thompson, 2015b: 4).  
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The more recent academic literature tells a similar tale. In an analysis of how best 
to reform Commons legislation committees, Russell, Morris and Larkin lend credence 
to the view of Abbott by revealing that, “Committee memberships are manipulated ... 
to block Members who might prove awkward ... even including ‘expert’ Members” 
(Russell, Morris and Larkin, 2013: 43, cited in Thompson, 2015b: 4). The notorious 
‘Sarah Wollaston incident’ would appear to reflect this problem. In the 2010-12 
session of Parliament, Wollaston, a Conservative MP and former GP, felt particularly 
qualified to serve on the Public Committee for the Health and Social Welfare Bill, and 
submitted a request to do so. However, this was rejected by her Government-party 
whips, an outcome Wollaston attributed to her unwillingness to guarantee 
unquestioning support for the Bill, given her first-hand expertise on its subject.  
To what extent did the Members appointed to the Commons Committee on the 
Immigration Bill possess sufficient interest and expertise to provide effective scrutiny 
of the draft legislation’s provisions? Were they selected with regard to their ability, 
or, as is suggested by the Wollaston case, were they selected due to their lack of ability 
to deliver concerned and informed criticism, thereby granting the Bill a smoother 
passage through Parliament, and a greater chance of its being passed into law with 
minimal opposition amendment? Also, how does the extent of MPs’ expertise at 
Commons Committee compare with that of Peers at the Lords Committee and Report 
stages?  
 
 
Making sense of specialisation 
 
To be able to answer these questions properly, we will first need some workable 
concepts to help us make sense of the utility of Parliamentarians’ diverse forms of 
Bill-relevant specialisation.   
Two properties of specialisation are of particular importance to bill scrutiny. The 
first is what we may call its mode of acquisition, specifically, whether it was acquired 
first-hand or second-hand. The second property is what I have termed its subject-
focus, namely, whether the specialisation was focused principally upon immigration 
– what I call dedicated specialisation – or upon some other area, such as housing or 
healthcare, which is nevertheless relevant to the content of the Immigration Bill. This 
second form of subject-focus I call associated specialisation. Each of these types of 
specialisation is elaborated on in turn. 
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The terms first-hand specialisation and second-hand specialisation were first used 
in 1968 in a study by Kimber and Richardson, which examined whether Members of 
British Parliamentary Committees possessed specialisation adequate for their task of 
scrutinising the prospective legislation of the executive (Kimber and Richardson, 
1968). The distinction was then deployed in the most comprehensive recent analysis 
of the expertise of Public Bill Committees, by Thompson (2013, 2015). I make use of 
the same distinction here. 
Specialisation that is acquired first-hand is knowledge or experience acquired 
either by formal tuition, such as that for degrees, apprenticeships, and professional 
qualifications; or actual personal involvement in the areas that are the subject of the 
legislation. Due to the high workload of the contemporary MP, which typically 
prevents them from the pursuit of dedicated study and from having a parallel non-
Parliamentary career, first-hand specialisation refers typically to expertise that has 
been acquired prior to a Member’s election to Parliament. This does not apply to 
Peers, who have not typically had careers as politicians and have often been appointed 
to their seats on the basis of leadership in a specialised area. 
By contrast, specialisation that is acquired second-hand is usually acquired during 
a Parliamentarian’s time in their respective House, typically through ministerial 
portfolios and membership of Select Committees, Public Bill Committees, and All-
Party-Parliamentary Groups. Such specialisation is deemed to be ‘second-hand’ 
because the Member has no direct personal involvement with its subject matter, 
having acquired relevant knowledge through their Parliamentary activities. 
First-hand specialisation, having been acquired through direct personal 
experience with the policy subject at issue, is likely to be seen as more authoritative 
and useful than specialisation acquired through an MP’s or Peer’s Parliamentary 
career. Thus, if a Parliamentarian is tasked to scrutinise a healthcare bill, for instance, 
a pre-Parliamentary career as a physician would be considered more useful than 
having served on a Parliamentary health committee, during which a variety of other 
political matters are likely to have vied for the Member’s attention. In general, with 
all other things being equal, this argument seems plausible. 
Whilst the mode of acquisition of a Parliamentarian’s specialisation, whether 
first-hand or second-hand, is certainly important to an assessment of its value to bill 
scrutiny, subject-focus is arguably a still stronger indicator of its worth in legislative 
scrutiny. Yet, this particular dimension has not hitherto been identified, at least 
explicitly, in the scholarly literature. My research intends to correct this shortcoming.  
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For an Immigration Bill, therefore, dedicated specialisation would be 
immigration-centric and concerned specifically and expressly with immigration and 
its associated processes, issues, policies, laws, and so forth. Associated specialisation 
on the other hand would be acquired not through engagement with the bill’s main 
subject of immigration, but by contact with a different area (health, for instance) that 
nevertheless has some immigration-related component. By way of example, an MP 
who has worked as a hospital administrator may possess some Bill-relevant 
knowledge because of their responsibility to ensure that immigrant patients are 
charged for their treatment. 
The distinction between dedicated and associated specialisation would be most 
applicable where a bill is wide-ranging and affects areas beyond the main subject 
indicated by its title. As such, this distinction has particular relevance for the 
Immigration Bill, which contained clauses directed towards a number of areas beyond 
those thought to be within the usual purview of immigration legislation. Thus, as well 
as provisions targeted at the ‘immigration system’ – border control, visa rules, and 
naturalisation paths, for instance – the Bill also incorporated proposals that would 
affect the private rental sector, healthcare, higher education, driving licensure, 
banking, and so forth. For this reason, even if Parliamentarians do not possess any 
specialist knowledge of immigration and its laws in and of themselves, those with 
expertise in housing, healthcare, education, and so on, may be said to possess 
specialisation relevant to the Bill’s discussion and scrutiny. In addition, even if such 
associated specialisation may be acquired second-hand, as long as it could be thought 
to enhance scrutiny of any of the Bill’s clauses, it counts here as specialisation.  
The fruitfulness of considering this additional property of specialisation, subject-
focus, may be revealed by pointing out that there are sources of bill-relevant expertise 
that would be classed as first-hand – the ‘superior’ class of specialisation according to 
the one-dimensional first-hand/second-hand framework – which nevertheless offer 
relatively little in terms of effective scrutiny. For example, when applying the first-
hand/second-hand scheme, a Parliamentarian’s pre-Parliamentary career in 
immigration law would count the same as having worked as a solicitor specialising in 
motoring offences. Even though the former source of specialisation would obviously 
be of greater value to scrutinising the overall Bill, because both are forms of relevant 
first-hand expertise, they would, in the simpler scheme, be afforded an equal 
weighting. Thus, the utility of the one-dimensional first-hand/second hand 
framework is considerably enhanced by the addition of the subject-focus dimension. 
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In relation to this second dimension, dedicated specialisation can reasonably be 
expected, in general, and with all other things being equal, to be more useful than its 
counterpart associated specialisation. To illustrate, a person whose knowledge of the 
immigration system was acquired through experience as an immigration lawyer is 
likely to be a more authoritative critic of immigration law than someone whose 
expertise was acquired in the course of a more general legal practice in, say, human 
rights. However, as with first-hand and second-hand specialisation, the applicability 
of this rule is not universal. Any individual case will rest on the precise nature of 
Parliamentarians’ dedicated and associated specialisations, relative to the issue under 
discussion. On some topics, the person with associated expertise may well be more 
authoritative than the dedicated immigration specialist. For example, on the Bill’s 
clause concerning the interpretation of Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, the human rights barrister may possess more useful expertise than 
the immigration solicitor. 
One final note: with respect to any particular source of specialisation, the 
categories first-hand/second-hand and dedicated/associated are treated as if mutually 
exclusive: specialisation is either first-hand or second-hand; dedicated or associated. 
However, with regard to the individual, any Parliamentarian may be said to possess 
both first-hand and second-hand, as well as dedicated and associated specialisation if 
their (multiple) sources of specialisation support such an assessment. Thus, armed 
with these two properties of specialisation – its mode of acquisition and subject-focus 
– we can now classify any source of Members’ specialisation according to four discrete 
categories: first-hand dedicated; second-hand dedicated; first-hand associated; and 
second-hand associated. 
  
 
The four types of specialisation: what counts? 
 
First-hand specialisation that is dedicated could include, for example, a 
Parliamentarian having worked as an immigration lawyer, an immigration officer at a 
port of entry, or a civil servant responsible for processing immigration applications. 
Respondents would also be said to have first-hand dedicated specialisation if, for 
example, they had studied for a degree on immigration, or had conducted research or 
published on the subject. 
First-hand specialisation that is associated could include, among other things, a 
Parliamentarian having worked as a human rights lawyer, but with no first-hand 
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experience of human rights law as it pertains to immigration. The rationale is that 
such expertise can be reasonably expected to aid a Member’s scrutiny of the 
Immigration Bill’s provisions on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The same would apply to work in healthcare, given the Bill’s proposed health 
charge. Similarly, those with extensive property interests would be considered as 
possessing first-hand associated specialisation because their experience could be 
useful in scrutinising the Bill’s landlord provisions.  
Second-hand specialisation that is dedicated could include membership of various 
committees, notably: the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Migration; Select 
Committees on immigration; and Public Bill Committees with substantial 
immigration-related content. Since 2000 there have been seven of the latter – and 
there is readily accessible data on membership.  
Second-hand specialisation that is associated could include any expertise in a non-
immigration area that was subject to provisions within the Immigration Bill, such as 
housing, health, and education. Therefore, of relevance would be membership of any 
relevant All-Party Parliamentary Group, Select Committee, or Public Bill Committee, 
where topics such as housing, health, and education were covered. Additionally, I also 
included MPs representing higher-immigration constituencies, that is, those with 
populations of at least ten per cent who are foreign-born (i.e., not born in England, 
Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, according to the UK’s 2011 census). The 
rationale for this, which was implicit in the Bill’s Parliamentary debates and in some 
of my interviews with Parliamentarians, is that MPs hold regular surgeries in their 
constituencies. Local people can book an appointment to discuss personally with their 
MP any matters that concern them. In this way, such MPs are more likely to have to 
deal with immigration-related cases, such as those with visa problems. In this, I 
applied the logic of Kimber and Richardson in their classic study of MPs’ specialisation 
in Parliamentary Standing Committees, which has since been used by Thompson in 
her analyses of the specialisation of MPs in Public Bill Committees (2015a, 2015b). 
For their analysis, in the case of MPs scrutinising, say, agricultural bills, they counted 
as specialisation “that possessed by those members who represented rural 
constituencies” (1968: 98). 
Whilst the choice of ten per cent appears to be somewhat arbitrary, the 2011 
census revealed that 11.5 per cent of the UK’s total population was foreign-born, 
though this conceals great variation in constituents’ migrant populations as a 
proportion of residents, as suggested by Figure 14. The percentages of resident 
populations classed as foreign-born in 2011 range from 0.8 per cent in Na h-Eileanan 
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an Iar, the most north-westerly constituency in Scotland, to fifty-nine per cent in the 
constituency of Brent North in Greater London. From Figure 14 we can also determine 
that around sixty-four per cent of constituencies have populations where fewer than 
ten per cent were born outside the UK. Thus, based upon a ten per cent threshold, a 
“high-immigration constituency” in this analysis is identified as one that sits in the 
top third of those with the most foreign-born constituents. 
 
 
 
Figure 14  Number of constituencies by percentage of foreign-born residents 
(Source: 2011 Census UK)  
 
 
One could have chosen a higher threshold, such as twenty per cent or thirty per cent, 
but respondent MPs who spoke of having a “high immigration caseload” resided in 
constituencies that typically had at least fifteen per cent born abroad. Given that in 
2011 the mean for constituencies of those born abroad was 11.6 per cent (a statistic 
deceptively close to the 11.5 per cent for the overall average) with a modal proportion 
around four per cent and a median around 7.5 per cent, the ten per cent threshold 
does not seem unreasonable. It is not so low as to make the label “high-immigration 
constituency” a misnomer. Neither is it too high to exclude constituencies with high 
immigration populations in absolute terms (in fact, the mean number of foreign-born 
residents across all constituencies is 12,258). In short, the ten per cent threshold is 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
c
o
n
st
it
u
e
n
c
ie
s
Percentage of constituency residents born outside the UK
THE LEGISLATURE IN IMMIGRATION POLICY-MAKING 
224 
appropriate in identifying those MPs with a high enough immigration caseload, and 
to qualify them as having associated specialisation.   
In this analysis of Parliamentarians’ specialisation, I therefore considered eight 
distinct sources of specialisation. These are configured and summarised in Table H, 
as follows: 
 
 
Table H  Public Bill Committee: sources of MPs’ specialisation 
   
  
mode of acquisition 
  first-hand second-hand 
    
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
-
f
o
c
u
s
 
dedicated 1. Formal tuition on immigration, e.g., 
a degree in migration studies 
 
2. Personal experience, involvement, 
or interest in immigration, e.g., 
employment as immigration lawyer, 
immigration official, immigration 
enforcement officer, civil servant in 
UK Border Agency/UK Visas and 
Administration; authored book on 
migration; lectured on migration 
4. Membership of the All-Party 
Parliamentary Group on Migration 
  
5. Membership of previous 
immigration-centric Public Bill 
Committees:  
a. Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Bill 2001 
b. Asylum and Immigration 
(Treatment of Claimants, etc.) 
Bill 2003 
c. Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Bill 2005 
d. UK Borders Bill 2006 
e. Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Bill 2007 
f. Borders, Citizenship and 
Immigration Bill 2009 
g. Equality Bill 2009 
 
6. Membership of Select Committees 
on immigration 
   
   
associated 3. Personal experience, involvement, 
or interest in an area not directly 
concerned with immigration per se, 
but which is nevertheless related to 
the content of the Immigration Bill, 
e.g., experience as a landlord, or 
employer; employment as a medical 
professional, university 
administrator, employer, banker, 
registrar, Driver and Vehicle 
Licensing Agency employee, etc.  
7. Membership of All-Party 
Parliamentary Groups, Select 
Committees, and Public Bill 
Committees, the principal subjects 
of which are not immigration but 
which are nevertheless relevant to 
the content of the Immigration Bill; 
e.g., health, housing, education, 
banking, etc. 
 
8. Representing constituencies with 
high levels of immigration (whose 
populations are at least 10 per cent 
foreign-born) 
    
 
 
Before examining the findings, a potential weakness of the analysis should be borne 
in mind. The proxies used to identify Committee Members’ levels of specialisation 
could, in some instances, prove misleading. The criterion of the ‘high immigration 
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constituency’ may be especially prone to misrepresentation of this kind. It is by no 
means certain that all MPs representing such a constituency will possess specialist 
immigration knowledge.  
Second, the analysis is limited by the sources of data. To determine whether 
Parliamentarians possessed specialisation relevant to the Immigration Bill, and based 
on the framework depicted in Table H, I conducted biographical analysis, with a 
particular focus on Members’ education, work experience, and Parliamentary career. 
My principal sources were Who’s Who and Debrett’s, each reputable reference works 
on influential figures in British public life. This information was supplemented with 
data compiled from media and internet research, especially from the UK Parliament’s 
website, which contains details on MPs’ Parliamentary activity.  
However, truly comprehensive material about MPs’ and Peers’ backgrounds is 
difficult to obtain. For example, information on the degree subjects of some Members 
could not be found. Moreover, it is possible that some Parliamentarians may have 
acquired knowledge of immigration and its laws without formal indication. 
Unfortunately, such knowledge would be missed by this analysis. 
In general, however, this study’s determination of Parliamentarians’ respective 
levels of specialisation remains robust, I think, in its systematic and cautious approach 
to measurement. 
 
 
Specialisation: the Commons vs. the Lords 
 
For the Commons Public Bill Committee, the overall picture regarding MPs’ 
specialisation is mixed. Only three Members appeared to have no relevant 
specialisation: Nigel Mills and Priti Patel, (both Conservative) and Ian Paisley of the 
DUP. In the case of Patel, this was perhaps to be expected; she had been a Member of 
Parliament since only 2010. By contrast, eighteen Committee Members had some 
form of Bill-relevant specialisation, either first- or second-hand, dedicated or 
associated. At the same time, there was a notable lack of both first-hand and dedicated 
specialisation, respectively – the two forms considered most important to effective Bill 
scrutiny. 
With regard to first-hand specialisation, not one Committee Member had relevant 
dedicated specialisation. None had studied for any specialist immigration degree or 
other qualification. Neither had any worked in an immigration-focused profession. 
This was probably because such a profession is rarer than others. Take the medical 
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profession, for instance. In 2013, the NHS employed over one million employees, 
whereas the UK Border Agency employed only 22,000 personnel in 2011 (National 
Audit Office, 2012). In addition, no Member appeared to have had an interest in 
immigration prior to being elected to Parliament, in the sense of having a substantial 
stake or personal involvement in immigration. Unsurprisingly, though, many 
Members professed to be interested in immigration in that they were intellectually 
curious about it.  
Four Members could be said to have had some form of first-hand associated 
specialisation, which should have equipped them to more effectively scrutinise the 
Bill. William Bain had an earlier career as a university lecturer in Public Law, which 
would certainly relate to the public law principles embodied in immigration law. Meg 
Hillier worked for three years as a journalist for Housing Today, which had relevance 
for the Bill’s landlord provisions. Before her Parliamentary career, Anne Milton 
worked as a nurse for eight years and as a medical advisor for twenty years – 
experience that doubtless would have informed her consideration of the proposal to 
introduce an immigration health charge. Lastly, Guy Opperman worked as a barrister 
for twenty-one years, including on over three hundred criminal cases (according to 
his CV on the website of his barristers’ chambers: 3PB Barristers, 2016), before 
becoming MP for Hexham in 2010. Like Bain, his specialism was public law, but with 
no evidence of practice in immigration law. Nevertheless, Opperman’s expert legal 
knowledge, including the area of human rights, equipped him with a specialisation 
which, although not dedicated, would have been advantageous to scrutiny of the 
Immigration Bill. 
With respect to second-hand specialisation, the picture is more positive. Of the 
Committee’s twenty-one Members, sixteen appeared to have had some second-hand 
specialisation relevant to the Immigration Bill. However, of these, just four Members 
may be said to have had dedicated immigration expertise. Julian Huppert was a 
member of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Migration. David Hanson and Phil 
Wilson both sat on the Public Bill Committee for the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Bill 2007; with Wilson also sitting on the one for the Citizenship and 
Immigration Bill 2008.  
In all, sixteen Members possessed associated second-hand specialisation. Of 
these, eleven represented ‘high-immigration’ constituencies (with at least ten per cent 
foreign-born). Notably, seven out of these eleven would not have been classed as 
having second-hand associated specialisation without this status, six of whom would 
have had no relevant expertise had this criterion not been included.  
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However, closer examination reveals that much of this specialisation was not 
applied to effective Bill scrutiny, with Conservative members making few meaningful 
interventions and debate dominated by a handful of non-Government MPs, as shown 
in Table G. This lack of scrutiny from the majority ruling party lends credence to the 
views of MPs interviewed: that at Committee, party loyalty trumps proper legislative 
scrutiny. With relevant specialisation seemingly ‘going to waste’, meaningful and 
effective scrutiny of the Bill is surely dealt a substantial blow. 
This may be explained in large part by the process by which MPs are selected to 
serve on a Public Bill Committee. The MPs that will serve on a Public Bill Committee 
are nominated by the Committee of Selection. This consists of nine MPs elected by 
the House of Commons at the beginning of each Parliamentary session. In making its 
formal nominations, the Committee of Selection’s brief is simple. They must, by 
virtue of Standing Order 86, “have regard to the qualifications of those Members 
nominated and to the composition of the House” (House of Commons, 2011: 79).  
Taking into consideration the “qualifications” of Members is obviously critical to 
appointing MPs suitable to the task of scrutinising legislation that is often highly 
technical and complex. Yet in her research on the operation of the Committee of 
Selection from 2000-2010, Thompson highlighted its less democratic aspects. Most 
notably, she described the process by which MPs are appointed to work on Public Bill 
Committees as “opaque” (2013b: 3). Indeed, the Committee of Selection’s approach 
to appointments was so obscure, that Thompson, on the basis of her interviews with 
twenty-one MPs, revealed that it was “a source of uncertainty” for both frontbench 
and backbench MPs alike. (2013b: 3). This is a revealing point. As MP Graham Allen 
has observed, if the process by which Members are appointed to Public Bill 
Committees is unclear even to Members within the House of Commons, “it must be 
completely mystifying to those outside it.” (Allen, 2013: 6) 
This applied to the Immigration Bill’s Committee. A little light can be shed on 
the process by first of all examining who actually sits on the Committee of Selection. 
More precisely, who made the important decisions that determined the membership 
of the Committee for the Immigration Bill? On 11 September 2013, one month prior 
to the Immigration Bill’s introduction to Parliament, this Committee was made up of 
the following MPs: Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Chair, Con), David Evennett (Con), Anne 
Milton (Con), John Randall (Con), Heidi Alexander (Lab), Tom Blenkinsop (Lab), 
Alan Campbell (Lab), Mark Tami (Lab), and Mark Hunter (LD). Of these, with the 
exception of the chair, who was appointed by the Government, all were whips from 
the main parties, including both Coalition parties.  
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It is worth reminding oneself of the principal responsibilities of whips. As my 
interviewees explained – some of whom had previously acted as whips, or, as in the 
case of Earl Attlee, were whips at the time of being interviewed – the role of the whip 
is a multifaceted one. Yet, the principal responsibility for all whips, whether 
Government or Opposition, is to enforce party discipline, making sure that MPs vote 
according to the party line. Additionally, Government whips will endeavour to ensure 
their Government’s business is changed as little as possible by non-Government 
Parliamentarians. Here then, from the perspective of democratic theory, lies a 
potential danger. As whips are chosen by their respective party leaders, the latter can 
effectively decide – through the agency of loyal whips on the Committee of Selection 
– which of their MPs are selected to scrutinise legislation. Unsurprisingly, there is a 
general impression that party loyalty – toeing the party line regardless of an MP’s 
personal views – is valued more highly than the ability to carry out fair-minded and 
critically rigorous legislative scrutiny (Thompson, 2013a, 2015b). That is supported 
by the findings of this thesis.  
 
*** 
 
The situation in the Lords is more positive. As Figure 15 overleaf shows, when 
compared with the figure for the Commons, slightly higher proportions of Peers 
possessed relevant specialisation at the two Lords stages favourable to serious 
legislative scrutiny: Committee and Report. Specifically, ninety-five per cent of Peers 
who participated in these stages possessed some form of Bill-relevant specialisation, 
compared with eighty-six per cent for MPs at Commons Committee. 
However, this overall figure misses the substantial differences between MPs and 
Peers in the types of specialisation possessed. Particularly notable is the large 
difference in the possession of first-hand specialisation, which results from the large 
difference in associated first-hand specialisation, with ninety-four per cent of Peers 
possessing this specialisation, compared with just nineteen per cent of MPs at 
Commons Committee. A second notable difference is in the number of 
Parliamentarians possessing dedicated specialisation, which results mainly from the 
difference in second-hand dedicated specialisation, with fifty-two per cent of Peers 
possessing this specialisation against just nineteen per cent in the Commons. In fact, 
on no form of specialisation did MPs, collectively, possess more than Peers.
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Figure 15  A comparison of MPs’ and Peers’ specialisation 
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However, whilst it is helpful to compare the percentages of Parliamentarians with Bill-
relevant specialisation in each House, this does not show what is perhaps of greater 
significance: the numbers of those possessing specialisation. Figure 16 overleaf shows 
the numbers of MPs and Peers with specialisation who scrutinised the Bill in the 
stages propitious to that task in each House: the Committee stage in the Commons, 
and the Committee and Report stages in the Lords. It shows that, due to the Bill being 
debated in the Lords on the floor of the whole house, in which any Peer could 
participate, many more than the Commons’ twenty-one MPs scrutinised the Bill in a 
detailed way: eighty-eight, more than four times the Commons figure.
The House of Lords 
 
 
231 
 
 
Figure 16  The number of MPs and Peers with specialisation 
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But again, even this statistical analysis of specialisation misses something important. 
Measuring as it does only whether a Parliamentarian possesses at least one source of 
each of the four kinds of specialisation, it misses the extent of each Parliamentarians’ 
experience and expertise. The difference between the Houses on this measure is 
particularly striking.  
Whilst the average MP possessed around two separate sources of specialisation 
(1.86) – say, working on a bill, and having had some associated first-hand work 
experience – the average Peer possessed around eight (7.6) separate sources of 
relevant specialisation. The MP with the most sources of specialisation at Commons 
Committee was Anne Milton with five. In the House of Lords Bill debates, the Peer 
with the most sources of specialisation was Lord Avebury, who had participated in 
over three dozen immigration debates, including extensive scrutiny of five earlier 
immigration bills. He was joined by fully fifteen other Peers who had worked to 
scrutinise, often extensively, between two and five earlier immigration bills.  
Apart from greater experience and expertise, there are other reasons that Lords 
scrutiny was (and is) more expert. First, they had more time to prepare it. The 
Commons Second Reading debate took place just twelve days after the Bill was made 
public, with Committee, the most important Commons stage for detailed scrutiny, 
commencing nineteen days after the Bill’s publication. By contrast, the Lords Second 
Reading debate took place on 10 February 2014: 123 days after the Bill was introduced 
to Parliament (over seventeen weeks) – substantial extra time for Peers and external 
actors to refine their critique of the Bill. This means that members of the House of 
Lords had more than ten times longer to prepare their scrutiny than MPs in the House 
of Commons.  
Second, because Peers’ scrutiny takes place after that of MPs, they benefit from 
the Commons debates, including the Government’s responses to queries seeking 
clarification.  
The difference in specialisation has appreciable consequences. Take Second 
Reading, for example. Both Commons and Lords debates contributed roughly 60,000 
words at this stage. However, the nature of the speeches reveals clear differences in 
practice and approach. In the Commons, fifty-two MPs contributed orally, with there 
being a total of 234 interventions, a mean of 4.5 interventions per MP. In the Lords, 
forty-three Peers contributed, but in stark contrast with the Commons, the total 
number of interventions was just fifty-seven. The average Peer made just over one 
statement (1.3). That is, most made just one long speech, of mean length 1,053 words. 
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By contrast, the average Commons intervention was roughly a quarter of that, just 
252 words.  
Because making a good oral submission takes time not only to write, but also to 
deliver, this statistic provides a quantitative indication of what is qualitatively readily 
apparent: the quality of debate is higher in the Lords. Speeches are more 
comprehensive, more accurate, more detailed, more rational, admittedly less pithy, 
but also less influenced by party-political point-scoring. This should come as little 
surprise. Peers represent some of the most successful professionals in the country. 
And it shows in their scrutiny. This is further enhanced because Peers tend to prepare 
written speeches, and read them aloud, while in the Commons, most MPs do not read 
from a prepared address.  
Table I provides a summary of the differences between the Houses.
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Table I  Eleven dimensions of comparison: case study findings on the nature of the two Houses 
    
   House of Commons  House of Lords 
GENERAL     
1  Legitimacy  Greater than in the Lords because MPs are elected by constituents.  Less than in the Commons because Peers inherit or are appointed to their Peerages.  
2  Time constraints  Debates are subject to strict timetabling, even by the government, such as in 
‘allocation of time’ (‘guillotine’) motions. 
 In principle, none. The House sets its own timetable, and the government cannot 
impose any time limits on debates. 
3  Strength of whips  Strong; their potential to hinder MPs’ party advancement is a powerful incentive 
for MPs to toe the party line. 
 Influential, though notably weaker than in the Commons; their potential to hinder 
Peers’ party advancement is of little concern to Peers.  
4  Independence of 
Parliamentarians 
 Low; personal conscience constrained by (1) a strong incentive to toe the party 
line; and (2) a weak incentive to represent views of constituents. 
 Higher than in the Commons; personal conscience constrained only by a 
comparatively weak (or no) incentive to toe the party line. 
5  Government 
majority? 
 House: Yes. Committee: Yes; the proportion of committee members from each 
party mirrors each party’s share of MPs in the Commons. 
 House: No. Committee: No; any Peer may participate, so the government will not 
necessarily have a majority. 
6  Relative power of 
House 
 Stronger: the Commons can ‘force through’ prospective legislation to become 
law after it has been delayed in two Parliamentary sessions by the Lords. 
However, the power of the Lords to delay policy for up to a year often compels 
government concessions. 
 Weaker: the Lords can delay policy for a maximum of two Parliamentary sessions 
before the Commons can ‘force through’ prospective legislation to become law. 
However, the power of the Lords to delay policy for up to a year enables them to put 
pressure on the government to make concessions. 
7  Oppositional 
dynamic 
 More adversarial; divided along party lines.  More collaborative. 
      
BILL-SPECIFIC 
8  Amendments  Few were discussed; the majority were filtered out – by not being selected or 
called. 
 Almost all were discussed, except where their content had already been covered.  
9  Specialisation  Moderate. At the Immigration Bill’s Committee: 18 out of 21 MPs had 
specialisation; the ‘average MP’ had around two sources of specialisation; a lack 
of first-hand and dedicated specialisation; and effective application of expertise 
was limited by time constraints. 
 High At the Immigration Bill’s Committee and Report: 84 out of the 88 participating 
Peers had specialisation; the ‘average Peer’ had around eight sources of specialisation; 
more first-hand and dedicated specialisation than the Commons; the application of 
expertise was unhindered by time constraints.  
10  Non-Government 
legislative impact 
 Directly, none. There may have been more indirect impact (see Chapter 12).  Directly, very little (two amendments). Indirectly, there was more impact than in the 
Commons (see Chapter 12). 
11  Quality of debate  Lower; debate quality was diminished by (1) party-political point scoring; (2) 
strong incentive to toe the party line; (3) lack of applied specialisation; (4) MPs 
elected by popular vote, not personal achievement.  
 Higher; debate quality was enhanced by (1) less party-political point-scoring; (2) 
greater Peer independence; (3) expertise of members; (4) greater participation at 
Committee; (5) Peers appointed on personal achievement.  
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Backstage politics 
 
The role of a Peer is partly that of an advocate. Although no Peer I spoke to used that 
term, it captures well their role as they described it to me. On this view, a Peer 
represents certain external interests, of landlords, students, and so forth. The same is 
true, in principle, of MPs, who must add their constituents to the list of those on 
whose behalf they advocate. But the institutional framework of the Lords, with its 
non-time-restricted debates, and near-zero amendment attrition, is more favourable 
to effective advocacy.  
Throughout the scrutiny of the Bill, the Government was perpetually in a mode 
of ‘threat assessment’, by which it evaluated the risk posed to the provisions of its Bill 
by the positions, arguments, or amendments, of opposing Peers. In interviews, it was 
revealed that it is embarrassing for the Government to be defeated in a vote on an 
amendment. The purpose of the ‘threat assessment’ mode is to prevent such 
embarrassment. 
By contrast, Peers opposing the Bill revealed being constantly on the lookout for 
the support of colleagues, or in the terms of POS, the cultivation of alliance structure. 
This orientation may be called a mode of ‘opportunity assessment’, by which opposing 
Peers remain alert to signals that colleagues will be sympathetic to their cause and 
support it at division. Peers attach great significance to collegiate support of their 
amendments.  
This support has three modes of expression, suggested Parliamentarians 
interviewed, each of which conveys a different level of support. A Peer can indicate 
their support for an amendment by voting for it at division. A Peer may express 
stronger support by indicating their support of an amendment, including their 
intention to vote for it, in an oral intervention. In the hierarchy of amendment 
support, this is understandably more highly valued than a vote. Many more Peers vote 
than give speeches. Yet a Peer can indicate still stronger support for an amendment 
by adding their name to it. For a Peer trying to gather support for an amendment to a 
bill, this is comparatively difficult to achieve and hence relatively rare. For these 
reasons, the more Peers that add their name to an amendment, the greater the 
amendment’s political weight, or put differently, its embodiment of moral resources.  
Similarly, there is a hierarchy of value not only in how colleagues support a Peer’s 
amendment, but who is supporting it – those actors which constitute their alliance 
structure. Most valued of all is the support of the leadership of the Official Opposition 
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– here, the Labour party. For the support of the Labour leadership usually entails the 
support of a much larger number of Labour Peers, compelled to follow their leaders 
through the activity of whips. The support of the Official Opposition is the sine qua 
non for amendment success. It is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition. Absent 
this support, there is “no prospect”, said one interviewee, of defeating the 
Government. For this reason, in interviews Peers spoke of “victories” and “coups” on 
winning the support – often not announced publicly but pledged privately backstage 
(and confirmable by voting data) – of the Labour Party. 
Second most valuable is the support of crossbench Peers. The arguments, 
amendments, and actions of these Peers are generally viewed as resulting less from 
the demands of party politics and the instruction of whips than from reasoned policy 
critique, which is thought to be comparatively more objective, even-handed, and 
uncorrupted by ideology and partisanship. The crossbenchers are the next target 
because energy invested in convincing the crossbench is thought to be justified by 
their perceived independence, and hence openness and receptivity to argument. For 
the Immigration Bill, some Peers even met weekly with crossbench Peers to brief them 
on the development of their amendments. 
Third most valuable is the support of backbench rebels: members of the 
Government parties – here the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats – who can be 
persuaded to depart from the party line. As one Peer interviewed suggested, in 
drafting an amendment, it is important to find a form of words acceptable to both the 
Labour Opposition and backbench rebels. 
The lobbying of Peers may not, therefore, be said to be the preserve of external 
groups. Peers are also lobbied by other Peers (and more so than MPs are lobbied by 
their colleagues in the Commons).  
As in the Commons, lobbying groups play an important backstage role. In the 
Lords, this role is even greater than in the Commons. There are more amendments to 
draft, and more Peers to brief. One lobbyist revealed the strategic importance of 
“touching base” with the Convenor of the Crossbench Peers, an individual elected by 
crossbenchers who is responsible for updating them on the business of the House. 
This office was occupied by Lord Laming at the time of this research, a social worker. 
In speaking with him, lobbyists were able to gauge the sentiment of crossbenchers, 
who, as we have said, are critical to amendment success in the Lords.   
 
*** 
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In this case study, on the frontstage, as in the Commons, the Lords Opposition sat 
across from the Government, and advanced critical arguments of its policies. Strong 
criticisms also came from the crossbenches, giving the impression of a Government 
under siege from all angles. This setup reflects the institutional design of Parliament; 
it has been built to be adversarial.  
But that is not the whole picture. It belies the ways in which the Lords is more 
collaborative than the Commons. To see this, we must venture backstage. Here, Peers 
typically allow Government ministers prior sight of their queries, and it is widely held 
that defeating the Government by vote is not the preferred course. Partly, this is 
because any amendments to a bill must receive final approval in the Commons, where 
the Government has a majority, making non-executive amendment success unlikely. 
The resulting preference of Peers to “move by agreement”, in the words of one 
interviewee, that is, to encourage concessions through negotiation and compromise, 
gives the Lords a collegial character that is absent in the Commons. We will see this 
in the desire for non-Government Peers to bring amendment to the most controversial 
of the executive’s proposals: to endow the Home Secretary with the power to make a 
naturalised British citizen stateless. 
 
 
The statelessness clause: frontstage and backstage 
 
To bring the importance of Parliamentarians’ backstage negotiations into sharp relief, 
and especially the importance of the combination of this action with forceful 
frontstage advocacy, it will be helpful to focus our attention on the fate of one Bill 
clause in particular: the provision to enable the Home Secretary to deprive a 
naturalised British citizen of their citizenship, even if that person would be made 
stateless as a result.  
Recall that this clause derived from the case of Hilal Al-Jedda, an Iraqi national 
suspected of involvement in terrorism, whose deprivation of citizenship by the Home 
Secretary had been ruled unlawful by the highest UK court because it rendered him 
stateless as a result. Theresa May wished to change the law to make such a deprivation 
lawful. This was by far the most contentious of all the Bill’s clauses, not least because, 
in the words of Labour Spokesperson Baroness Smith:  
 
This clause was tabled just twenty-four hours before Report stage in the other place, 
with no prior consultation, let alone explanations or agreement, and a very truncated 
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debate. Parliament has had little opportunity to scrutinise this measure, which has 
massive consequences and implications both for the individual and for the state, and 
for other countries. (Hansard, 17 March 2014, col 41) 
 
This clause was subject to the most impassioned and condemnatory of all arguments 
heard in the Lords. Baroness Kennedy of the Shaws (Lab), a barrister, described it as 
“disgraceful”, adding that she felt, “ashamed that we have sunk to this” (Hansard, 10 
February 2014, col 485). But criticism was not confined to the Opposition. The 
Conservative Peer Lord Bourne criticised the clause on both principled and practical 
grounds, arguing that, “It seems neither fair nor effective. If they are in this country, 
there is nowhere we can legally deport them to if they are stateless” (Hansard, 10 
February 2014, col 490). 
Lord Bourne’s pragmatic argument referenced arguably one of the most important 
figures in the debate – an individual who was not even present. This was Guy 
Goodwin-Gill, a barrister, and Professor of International Refugee Law at the 
University of Oxford. Described by Peers as “an expert on this area” (Baroness Smith), 
and “eminent international lawyer” (Baroness Kennedy), he was referenced by name 
thirty times, mostly in speeches critical of the statelessness clause. Persistent was 
Goodwin-Gill’s argument that, under international law, the UK has no right to require 
any other state to accept those it has rendered stateless. Such countries would be 
entitled to return such individuals to the UK. And the UK would have to accept them 
(Goodwin-Gill, 2014). 
Liberal Democrat Peer Lord Roberts of Llandudno reminded the House of the 
“judgment of Chief Justice Warren ruling in the United States Supreme Court case of 
Trop v Dulles in 1958”, who said that, 
 
“use of denationalization as a punishment”, 
 
means, 
 
“the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It is a form of 
punishment more primitive than torture”. 
 
But by far the most persistent and persuasive of Lords critics was crossbench Peer 
Lord Pannick QC, a judge and leading barrister, whom I interviewed for this research. 
Possessive of superlative powers of argument, Pannick is held in high esteem by 
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Parliamentary colleagues. If Pannick is critical of a provision, said his colleagues, Peers 
listen. More than any other actor, he was responsible for bringing, admittedly in his 
words, a “very substantial concession” on this most contentious of provisions. How 
did he achieve that?  
He began with a strong public statement in the House of Lords chamber 
(Hansard, 17 March 2014, col 48): 
 
My current view is that Clause 60 is so fundamentally flawed, so in breach of 
international law and so damaging in its practical consequences for the security of 
this country that it should be removed from the Bill. I am happy – and I am sure that 
noble Lords who have spoken and will speak in this debate are too – to meet the 
Minister in the short period of time before we return to this subject, as inevitably we 
will on Report this month, to see whether there is a possibility of making real progress 
on this very troubling matter.  
 
Pannick was true to his word. He began his backstage activity by first getting a ‘feel’ 
for his fellow Lords’ positions on the issue. He spoke with a wide range of Peers: the 
Labour spokespeople, the crossbench, and potential rebels. He listened. Pannick then 
had a series of meetings with Lord Taylor, and a meeting in which were present both 
Taylor and the new Immigration Minister, James Brokenshire. Pannick also met the 
Bill team a handful of times, comprising five highly experienced civil servants, and 
discussed matters with Parliamentary draftsmen. On the basis of these backstage 
discussions, Pannick tabled Amendment 56, at the third (and final) sitting of the 
Lords Report stage, when opposition to the statelessness clause had reached its peak. 
It was tabled in the names of three additional Peers representing each of the three 
main parties: Baroness Smith of Basildon (Labour), Lord Macdonald of River Glaven 
(Liberal Democrats), and Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood (Conservatives). 
That the amendment displayed cross-party and crossbench (because of Pannick) 
support was important: it enhanced its political weight. It was a modest amendment: 
to establish a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament to consider all aspects of 
the Government’s proposal including its likely effects and report back – before the 
clause became law. 
Pannick pushed his amendment to a vote. It was accepted by a substantial 
majority: 242 Contents to 180 Not Contents, on the back of, “considerable support 
from the crossbenches and a very substantial Liberal Democrat rebellion”, in the 
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words of one Peer. But any Lords amendments accepted would still need to be agreed 
to by the Commons, at a stage known as Ping Pong.  
The amended Bill was ‘bounced’ to the Commons and debated there just eighteen 
hours after it received its Third Reading in the Lords. The Government disagreed with 
the amendment, with Brokenshire providing two arguments. The first was that such 
a committee, “would not have access to the appropriate closed material to make 
further assessments beyond what has already been discussed in the House.” The 
second was that the committee would, “cause unnecessary delay, leaving a loophole 
to be exploited and creating a barrier to effective action for a considerable number of 
months, if not years.” (Hansard, 7 May 2014, col 198) 
The Government proposed two alternative amendments in its place. Amendment 
(a) limited the application of the deprivation power such that the Home Secretary 
could use it only if she had “reasonable grounds to believe that, under the laws of a 
country or territory, an individual is able to become a national of that country or 
territory”. Amendment (b) would implement an independent review mechanism of 
the clause, after its implementation, which would report to Parliament on the clause’s 
impact after one year and then on a triennial basis. This latter amendment, Pete 
Wishart likened, with characteristic humour, to “closing the stable door after the 
horse has left, without its passport, having been deprived of its citizenship. It is too 
late to do anything then.” (Hansard, 7 May 2014, col 207) 
Labour presented some resistance to the Government, appealing to the 
democratic weight inherent in such strong Lords support for Pannick’s Amendment 
56. They argued that the proposals:  
 
do not have the support and confidence of both Houses. The removal of citizenship is 
such a challenging and extreme measure to take that it must have the confidence of 
both Houses of Parliament. (Hansard, 7 May 2014, col 204) 
 
John McDonnell’s criticism was also of the procedural kind, and entailed an appeal to 
democratic norms, noting that the Government’s amendments had been debated in 
the Commons for just ninety minutes, while observing that in his seventeen years’ 
experience as an MP, “the worst civil liberties violations have occurred when the 
House has been bounced into urgent decisions. That is what is happening today and 
I resent that.” (Hansard, 7 May 2014, col 211)   
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The Commons voted against Pannick’s amendment. It received 239 votes of 
support and 305 votes opposing it. In doing so, the Commons was taken to approve 
of the Government’s Amendments (a) and (b) proposed to replace it. 
Pannick had anticipated the defeat. The Government majority in the Commons 
made (and makes) victory there unlikely. In addition, success was made more 
improbable by a lack of Labour support. For that reason, even before the Commons 
vote had been cast, Pannick had continued his backstage negotiations with the 
Government, to find a form of words acceptable to both sides.  
Thus, Government Amendments (a) and (b) were in fact drafted with Pannick’s 
input. Apart from the likely defeat in the Commons, Pannick had also predicted 
subsequent defeat when the Bill was ‘bounced’ back to the Lords. He was unconvinced 
that an amendment vote could be won again, partly because Peers are reluctant to 
stand their ground against the elected house – they generally respect the legitimacy 
conferred to MPs by being elected to their Parliamentary position.  
On being ‘bounced’ back to the Lords for their Ping Pong stage, Government 
Amendments (a) and (b) were relabelled as Amendments 18A and 18B, and 
incorporated into a single Government ‘motion’, “Motion B”: that (1) the Lords do 
not insist on Pannick’s amendment for a committee of both Houses to consider the 
ramifications of the policy before it becomes law, and (2) the Lords agree with the 
Commons amendments (on reasonableness and post-facto reviews).  
Pannick announced to his colleagues in the House of Lords that he considered the 
concession of Amendment 18A “very substantial” because it “very substantially 
reduces the risk of leaving an individual stateless” (Hansard, 12 May 2014, col 1673). 
An Opposition motion, Motion B1, was tabled by Labour Spokesperson Baroness 
Smith. It sought to reject the Government’s Motion B, and reinstate Pannick’s original 
amendment to create a committee of both Houses to consider the proposals in detail 
before they became law. Motion B1 had some support. Most notably, Lord Macdonald 
averred that (Hansard, 12 May 2014, col 1677): 
 
The history of this matter is that it appears to have been conjured up to serve an 
entirely party-political purpose in the midst of a debate in the other place. It is 
illiberal, it is an affront to civilised international relations, it will not improve our 
security and, in all likelihood, it threatens a legal and diplomatic quagmire, to no 
useful purpose and to the detriment of the reputation of the United Kingdom.  
 
THE LEGISLATURE IN IMMIGRATION POLICY-MAKING 
242 
Yet Motion B was rejected by the Lords by 286 votes to 193. In doing so, the House 
was taken to indicate agreement to the Government’s Motion B, which rejected 
Pannick’s original Amendment 56 and introduced Government Amendment 18A 
[formerly Amendment (a)], to ensure that the Secretary of State must have 
“reasonable grounds” for believing that the individual to be deprived of citizenship “is 
able to acquire another citizenship”; and Government Amendment 18B [formerly 
Amendment (b)], which responded, said Taylor, “to the request made by a number of 
noble Lords that there should be an independent review of the operation of the 
power”, and which provided “for a review after the first 12 months following 
commencement and triennial reviews thereafter” (Hansard, 12 May 2014, col 1667). 
A review of the voting data reveals that Pannick abstained. Given the merits of 
Opposition Motion B1 (which was, as Amendment 56, let us recall, an amendment 
that Pannick drafted), he did not want to vote against it. But nor could he vote for it 
in light of the Government’s compromise. 
 
 
Parliament as liberalist constraint 
 
There were three other particularly notable non-Government successes, each 
constituting evidence for the liberal influence of the Lords. Lord Hannay and the 
education lobby were successful in their efforts to remove students from the landlord 
provisions. Government Amendment 29, added at Lords Report, sought to exempt 
students from the checks if they have been “nominated” by an educational institution. 
In commending the amendment to the House, Lord Taylor said (Hansard, 10 March 
2014, col 1652): 
 
We have listened carefully to the views expressed by Universities UK, the Russell 
Group and Universities Scotland that we have not got this exemption quite right, that 
it does not go far enough in covering the different circumstances in which higher 
education institutions arrange accommodation for their students. After careful further 
reflection, we have concluded that a broader exemption would be appropriate, to 
cover all accommodation that is owned, managed or arranged directly by higher 
education institutions.  
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Lord Avebury also succeeded in correcting an historical injustice in nationality law. In 
a telling remark at the sixth sitting of the Lords Committee, Avebury said (Hansard, 
19 March 2014, col 182): 
 
I never expect an amendment that I have drafted to be accepted on the spot by the 
Minister – that does not happen in real life – but the answer he has given [to go away 
and formulate an amendment for the Lords Report stage] is extremely satisfactory.  
 
At Lords Third Reading, Avebury returned with two amendments, developed in 
collaboration with the Government. To honour Avebury’s advocacy, the Government 
had agreed to allow him to formally table the amendments, which would then be 
accepted by the Government. Representing the only change to the Bill that was 
brought by non-Government amendments, it is worth examining in more detail. 
In this study, the success of Lord Avebury’s amendments constituted the only 
alteration to the Bill brought by non-Government amendment. This episode provides 
a fine illustration of the legislative importance of the Parliamentarian-lobbyist 
alliance, and its mechanism of action. It will therefore be appropriate to take a short 
detour and examine more closely the history of this clause, which began with Alison 
Harvey of ILPA.  
Harvey has a ‘wish list’ of measures she would like to become law. As usual, 
whenever an immigration bill is in Parliament, Harvey presents to MPs and peers 
some of these measures, in the form of amendments, gauging their enthusiasm to 
argue for them in their respective House. For the Immigration Bill, Harvey and ILPA 
wished to modify a minor immigration law, which, due to the idiosyncrasies of its 
development, led to a legal anomaly and unfair discrimination. According to this law, 
a person born abroad to a British father not married to their mother was entitled to 
register as a British citizen – unless they were born before 1 July 2006. This legal quirk 
arose because, in 2006, amendments to the 1981 Immigration Act enabled so-called 
‘illegitimate children’ to inherit nationality from a British father in the same way as a 
‘legitimate’ child. However, those amendments were not made retrospective, 
excluding from a route to citizenship ‘illegitimate’ individuals born before 2006.  
Thus, ever since this law was passed on 1 July 2006, Harvey had wished to amend 
it via a simple provision. Harvey persuaded Julian Huppert in the Commons and Lord 
Avebury in the Lords to try to pass her ‘illegitimacy amendment’ onto the statute 
book. Thus, at the fifth sitting of the Commons Committee, Julian Huppert sought 
via his Amendment 34 to correct the “discrimination” inherent in the application of 
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the 2006 law (Hansard, 5 November 2013, col 176). Huppert’s impassioned and 
forceful arguments were resumed by Avebury in the Lords. In backstage collaboration 
with the Government, Lord Avebury tabled at Lords Report Amendments 3 and 5, “to 
provide for registration as a British citizen for persons born before 1 July 2006 to a 
British father, where their parents were unmarried at the time of their birth.” They 
were successful. In a rare act – and partly, it seems, to credit Avebury’s advocacy – the 
Government, rather than tabling its own amendments, helped Avebury formulate his, 
such that they could accept them without vote. This exemplar of legislative influence 
illustrates, first, that it is consistent and co-ordinated pressure, across both Houses, 
that is key to securing Government concessions; and second, the legislative 
importance of the Parliamentarian-lobbyist alliance, and its main mechanism of 
influence.  
 
 
The Lords: chamber of responsibility? 
 
What is it that brings Government concessions in the Lords? Interviewees suggested 
some combination of the following interrelated elements: 
 
(1) A strong case for modification of the prospective legislation. 
(2) The full backing of the Official Opposition. 
(3) Substantial crossbench support. 
(4) A minister who listens. 
(5) External groups that bring effective pressure. 
(6) Timing. A government might have a deadline by which they want to pass a 
policy, such as an election, and hence may prefer concession to delay. 
 
In this chapter, we have seen how the House of Lords, the unelected upper chamber 
of the UK Parliament, is able to bring more change to Government policy than the 
House of Commons, the fully-elected lower chamber. We have also seen the ways in 
which the Houses of Parliament differ, on eleven dimensions, with the Lords 
providing a firmer check than the Commons on the will of the executive via a liberal 
influence of its legislative proposals. From one perspective, this might seem a 
counterintuitive finding, given that the Lords is not elected by the public, and not 
directly accountable to them. Yet, from another perspective, the Lords, being 
unelected, is better insulated from public restrictionism. In this sense, it functions 
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more like a national judiciary, exercising its functions with higher regard for 
responsible decision-making above responding to populist pressures. 
Moreover, free of the strict time constraints present in the Commons, Lords 
debate entailed greater Parliamentary participation, in stages more favourable to 
effective deliberation. This debates also seemed better informed, comprising longer, 
more intellectually rigorous, and evidence-based speeches from Peers possessing 
much higher levels of specialisation than their Commons counterparts, and who, in 
their voting behaviour, appeared to vote less by party diktat than from personal 
conscience.  
On the question of Parliamentarians’ specialisation, we saw that the stage in the 
Commons most propitious to effective Bill scrutiny and change, the Committee, 
comprised Members whose specialisation tended to be second-hand and not based on 
a dedicated engagement with immigration. Furthermore, a minority of MPs actually 
took advantage of their specialisation by applying it to effective scrutiny of the Bill. A 
substantial majority of interventions and amendments came from a small number of 
MPs, with only a single MP from the ruling parties, Julian Huppert, offering comments 
of real critical value. As one interviewee noted, Commons MPs are “completely 
whipped”. This seems less evidenced by the Lords. 
Of additional significance is the number of amendments discussed in each House. 
In the Lords, more than four times as many amendments were discussed than in the 
Commons. For these reasons, the Lords could hold the Government to better account 
than the Commons, and, supported by the important work of expert external actors, 
was consequently, for all of these reasons, more effective in constraining the 
executive’s manifest restrictionism.  
 Does this then mean that the House of Lords, as a political institution, displays 
higher ‘viscosity’ than the Commons, constituting a stronger check on executive 
power? On the basis of this research, the answer is yes, though not, it would seem, 
by much – if we are to consider direct indicators. After all, just a single change to the 
Bill was brought by non-Government amendment, that is, by Parliamentarians who 
are not the prime minister, cabinet ministers, and junior ministers. One might 
therefore suggest that although we have focused in this chapter upon the differences 
between the Houses, it is important not to lose sight of the core of the picture: a 
continued general resilience of the Government’s proposals to Parliamentary 
challenge. With that said, in our next and final empirical chapter, we will follow the 
advice of Thompson and broaden our analysis, to consider whether the influence of 
the Houses of Parliament may be seen in indirect changes to the Bill: those which 
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whilst brought formally through Government amendment, were offered as 
concessions in response to the pressure of non-executive Parliamentarians.
 247 
  
12 The legislative impact of Parliament 
 
 
The preceding empirical chapters have shown that the direct impact of Parliament was 
limited to a single change, brought in the House of Lords at its Third Reading stage 
by two amendments moved by the Liberal Democrat Peer Lord Avebury. In this 
chapter, I endeavour to demonstrate that a more detailed quantitative and qualitative 
analysis of each change reveals the indirect impact of Parliament. 
I begin by providing an initial, quantitative indication of the extent to which the 
Immigration Bill was changed during its passage through Parliament. This is achieved 
by comparing the enacted legislation, the Immigration Act that received Royal Assent 
on 14 May 2014 after its consideration by Parliament, with the proposed legislation 
of the executive, the Immigration Bill that was introduced to Parliament on 22 
October 2013. Note here that it is preferable to speak of changes, alterations, or 
modifications to the Bill rather than amendments, even though the latter is more 
common in the literature. This is because a clearly identifiable change to the Bill, such 
as the introduction of a new provision, could comprise multiple amendments, some 
of which may have been introduced by necessity to provide for consistency across the 
legislation.  
Further questions will need to be asked. Was the Bill modified during its passage 
through Parliament, and if so, by whom?  Was it the legislature or the executive? 
What was the direction and importance of these changes? Were they liberal or 
restrictive, major or minor?  
Our case study legislation, the Immigration Bill 2013-14, is well suited to our 
investigation. This is because its first version, published 10 October 2013, was 
revealed by interviewees to have been almost entirely executive-authored. This meant 
that before the multi-stage Parliamentary process, there was minimal input from non-
Government Parliamentarians. Initiated, envisioned, and drafted by the Coalition, 
specifically the Conservative part, the Bill can be expected to be a fair embodiment of 
that Government’s vision for the country’s immigration regime. We are therefore 
justified in limiting our analysis to the actions of Parliamentarians and their allies 
during the Bill’s journey through the legislature, having eliminated the possibility of 
their behind-the-scenes impact before the Bill was published.   
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The Bill, even in its first version, was an extensive piece of legislation, running to 
113 pages and totalling 40,000 words. It was also complex, being organised into seven 
“parts”, seventeen ‘sub-parts’ (my own label), and sixty-six “clauses”. These made up 
the first forty-nine pages of the Bill document. The remaining sixty-three pages 
detailed eight “schedules”, which described the provisions of the legislation in greater 
detail, and clarified how they were to work in practice. The Act itself was even longer, 
at 137 pages and 50,000 words. This was because its seven parts now contained 
twenty sub-parts and seventy-seven clauses, all capped off by nine schedules.        
 
 
Method 
 
For this analysis of Parliament’s legislative impact, I have adopted the core of the 
method employed by researchers at the Constitution Unit of University College 
London in their rigorous research of the legislative influence of the UK Parliament 
(Russell, 2010; Russell and Cowley, 2016; Russell et al., 2016; Russell et al., 2017). 
The Constitution Unit’s research was based upon a six-step process, the particular 
strengths of which are twofold. First, it deals with the full duration of the 
Westminster Parliamentary process. Second, it considers whether successful 
amendments brought by the government were nevertheless offered as concessions in 
response to Parliamentary pressure. As such, Russell and her colleagues have brought 
welcome improvement to studies that have measured legislative influence solely on 
the basis of policy outcomes and known party positions (e.g., Martin and Vanberg, 
2005).  
The analysis for this study applied the six-step process, as follows. The first step 
was simply to list each of the Immigration Bill’s main provisions. This included 
virtually all of the Bill’s clauses, yielding fifty-seven provisions.  
The second step entailed placing each of these fifty-seven provisions into one of 
three categories: liberal, restrictive, or neutral. Each category was defined precisely. A 
liberal provision if passed into law would expand the freedom and individual rights of 
persons affected by it, with a particular focus on those most directly subject to 
immigration control: non-UK nationals and in some cases their family members
52
. So, 
 
52
 In classifying each provision as either liberal or restrictive, one may ask: with respect to 
whom? Immigration laws affect a wide range of individuals, not just immigrants or would-
be immigrants. Sometimes, all of the people in a country, whether they are permanent 
residents, tourists, UK citizens, or non-UK citizens, will be affected. The analytic problem 
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for example, a provision that would abolish embarkation checks when people leave 
the country would be a liberal provision, as would creating new routes to citizenship, 
or introducing checks upon the power of immigration enforcement agencies. By 
contrast, provisions classed as restrictive in this analysis would, when passed into law, 
produce the obverse: a reduction in the freedom and individual rights of immigrants, 
that is, those attempting to stay in or enter the UK, or acquire British citizenship. 
Finally, a provision was deemed to be neutral if it could be expected to bring about 
neither an extension nor reduction in immigrants’ rights. For example, the Bill’s final 
provisions, which set out the commencement dates of its proposed measures and the 
countries of the UK to which they would apply, fall into this category.   
It should perhaps go without saying that in labelling a provision “liberal” or 
“restrictive” my aims are analytical not normative. Hence, the placement of a 
provision in one or the other of these categories says nothing about that provision’s 
fairness, reasonableness, evidence base, practicality, or merit; but rather only the 
direction of its proposed change to immigration law vis-à-vis its planned or likely 
effect upon the rights of immigrants, would-be immigrants, and their family members. 
In fact, deciding whether a provision was liberal, restrictive or neutral was 
straightforward. Not one provision was ambiguous or ambivalent. 
The purpose of step three was to see whether the Bill was changed during its 
passage through Parliament. Thus the content of the Immigration Bill as introduced 
to Parliament on 22 October 2013 was compared with the content of the Immigration 
Act 2014 (c. 22) that received Royal Assent on 14 May 2014. In principle, all changes 
to the Bill can be classed as additions or deletions of text, or some combination of the 
 
here is that a provision could be restrictive for some classes of individual, but liberal for 
others. For example, a provision that I class as restrictive – say, the reduction in rights of 
appeal against immigration decisions – whilst restrictive from the perspective of 
immigrant appellants could, from another perspective, be characterised as liberal. For 
example, from the perspective of native citizens, such a development could be argued to 
save much time, effort, and hence (taxpayers’) money that would otherwise have been 
spent examining appeals in the courts. My perspective is that of immigrants, that is, non-
British citizens, because these tend to be the explicit target of such reforms and are more 
actively and directly affected by immigration regimes. Defining restrictiveness and 
liberality in this way is the default approach in the literature and uncontentious (e.g., 
Timmer and Williamson, 1998). Nevertheless, although my aim has been to use the labels 
‘liberal’ and ‘restrictive’ in an analytical, not normative, way, when using terms that carry 
as much political baggage as does ‘liberal’, conducting research that is to some degree 
normatively-laden may be an inescapable outcome.  
 
 
THE LEGISLATURE IN IMMIGRATION POLICY-MAKING 
250 
 
two. In all, there were fifteen ways in which the text of the Act was different to that 
of the Bill, comprising thirteen additions, one deletion, and one that included a 
deletion and an addition.  
The fourth step was to categorise each of these fifteen changes as liberal, 
restrictive, or neutral, following the same method as in step two, though with one 
modification. In that earlier step, when classifying the Bill’s provisions, the frame of 
reference was existing immigration law. The question therefore asked was: would the 
provision in the Bill make immigration law more liberal or more restrictive than it 
was at that time, that is, when the Bill was published? In this fourth step, when 
categorising provisions in the Act that were not present in the Bill, I asked, in addition 
to that question: would this provision in the Act have made a proposed provision of 
the Bill more liberal or more restrictive? This modification in approach is necessary, 
because there may be cases where non-Government Parliamentarians liberalise a 
restrictive provision in the Bill, yet that provision is still restrictive relative to existing 
immigration law. Such restrictive provisions that have been ‘liberalised’ ought to be 
classed as liberal, which this alteration in method makes possible. 
Of course, it is the nature of legislative provisions that they are not only binary in 
character, either liberal or restrictive. Rather, they are liberal or restrictive to different 
degrees and in different ways. This therefore brings us to our fifth step: the 
classification of amendments by substantiveness. As Russell et al. note (2016: 293), 
the classification of amendments by their substantiveness has been widely adopted in 
academic studies (the authors cite, for example, Kreppel, 1999; Tsebelis and 
Kalandrakis, 1999). This derives from the recognition that not all amendments are of 
equal significance. Some propose or make minor technical changes, while others entail 
substantive changes, of greater or lesser significance. For example, some restrictive 
changes, like the introduction of a power to enable the Home Secretary to render a 
person stateless, is by its very nature considerably more ‘restrictive’ than, say, 
allowing the Government to consider a slightly broader range of factors in setting fees 
for immigration services. 
Russell et al. relate that differences in the substantiveness of bill changes “are 
explicitly recognised in the government’s own internal classification of amendments” 
(2016: 293). This internal scheme has not been made public, but interviewees 
confirmed that it is used behind-the-scenes in Whitehall to determine which 
amendments require policy clearance from party leaders, a point corroborated by 
Russell et al., (2016: 293).  
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In classifying the substantiveness of the Bill’s changes, a four-point scale for 
coding amendments was deployed, building on a similar three-point scale of Shephard 
and Cairney (2005), and the Constitution Unit (e.g., 2016: 293-294), but adding a 
fourth category, scope-changing (Kreppel, 2002: 794). Both scales assess the 
legislative impact of each change by evaluating it according to increasing levels of 
substantiveness. These begin with typographical or consequential amendments that 
make only “cosmetic or lexical changes (e.g. renumbering, or correcting drafting 
errors) or provided consistency following other, more substantive amendments (e.g. 
adding references throughout the bill to a new clause or definition)” (Russell et al., 
2016: 293-294). The next category, clarificatory, comprises changes that seek to 
remove undesired vagueness or ambiguities in the text of a bill. These might seem as 
unimportant as the typographical or consequential category, but can be of some 
import given that much can rest on the interpretation of vague or loose legislation. 
Borrowing from Kreppel (2002: 794), the next most substantive category, scope-
changing, refers to alterations that extend or limit the scope of an existing provision, 
such as adding additional exemptions. Finally, as with the three-point scale, the most 
significant kind of change includes alterations that would alter the effect of the 
legislation in a way that is substantial, such as adding a new provision (Kreppel, 2002: 
794). Hence, the scale utilised for this study progresses in the following sequence: 
typographical or consequential; clarificatory; scope-changing; and finally substantial. 
This brings us to the sixth and final step, which seeks to determine whether a 
change to the Bill represented a response to Parliamentary pressure, rather than being 
at the sole behest of the Coalition. Such changes are well known to researchers (e.g., 
Griffith, 1974) and Parliamentarians. A typical scenario is for a non-executive 
Parliamentarian to propose a change that the Government agrees should be 
incorporated into their legislation, but via the Government’s own amendments tabled 
at a later stage. Such non-Government amendments would then be withdrawn 
following ministerial promises to table amendments to similar effect later in the 
Parliamentary process. Russell et al. (2016: 296-297) state that there are three main 
reasons for this phenomenon. The first is political: to avoid being seen to concede to 
the opposition. The other reasons are procedural. First, ministers require clearance, 
including from other departments, before accepting legislative changes; and second, 
they need to ensure that legislative drafting is technically correct.    
The determination of whether a legislative change resulted from the influence of 
non-Government Parliamentarians required what Russell et al. call the analysis of 
legislative strands (2017: 7). This requires the granular triangulated analysis of three 
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elements: the content of changes to the Bill, to determine whether similar changes 
were proposed at an earlier stage; Parliamentary discourse, to see whether a minister 
suggested that Government changes were made as concessions to non-Government 
Parliamentarians; and the ‘insider’ accounts of relevant actors, typically provided 
through interviews, to confirm or refute the inferences made on the basis of analysing 
the prior two elements. All three of the above elements were utilised in analysing the 
legislative strands of the Bill. 
In addition, all changes to the Bill were coded with respect to two further 
variables: the Parliamentary stage in which the change was formally brought via 
amendment(s); and the formal source or ‘sponsor’ of the successful amendment(s), 
either the Government or non-executive Parliamentarians.  
It was on the basis of this six-step analysis that the author was able to discern the 
liberalising or restrictionist impact of Parliament. Where a change satisfies both the 
conditions of being (1) liberal and (2) traceable to the pressure of Parliament rather 
than Government, we have evidence of the legislature as liberalist constraint. 
 
 
Findings 
 
The results of the first two steps in the analysis – listing each of the original Bill’s 
main provisions, then coding them as liberal, restrictive, or neutral – demonstrate 
unambiguously that the Immigration Bill reflected a decidedly pro-restriction 
Government. When introduced to Parliament, it had fifty-seven main provisions, fifty-
four of which were restrictive. The remaining three were neutral. Thus, we may 
calculate an overall restrictiveness rating of the Bill by dividing its number of 
restrictive provisions by the total of its provisions, excluding neutral provisions, and 
multiplying by one hundred. This gives a score of 100 per cent. The Immigration Bill, 
as introduced to Parliament by the executive, was entirely restrictive.  
Turning to the findings of the third and fourth steps, compared with the Bill the 
Immigration Act contained fifteen significant changes, bringing its number of major 
provisions to seventy-two. Fifty-six of these provisions were restrictive, twelve liberal, 
and four neutral. This gives a substantially lower restrictiveness rating of 82.4 per 
cent. This is best explained by reference to the fifteen changes. Twelve were liberal, 
just two were restrictive, and one was neutral. This comparison of provisions between 
Act and Bill is summarised in Table J. 
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These results may seem persuasive as to the liberalising differences between Bill and 
Act, but one should not place too much stock in these figures, which capture only the 
number of provisions changed by Parliament, and their direction. Despite these 
reservations, the restrictiveness rating can be said to function as a reasonably useful 
and convenient indicator of immigration legislation’s restrictiveness. In future 
research, it may enable quick and fruitful comparisons. However, this and the other 
figures say nothing about the more textured nature of the legislation. Some changes 
are of far greater moment than others. Some may restrict or liberalise the Bill to a far 
greater extent than do others. These aspects are considered in the more detailed 
analysis that follows.  
First, let us first turn to the results of the fifth step in our method, which reveal 
the substantiveness of each of the fifteen changes made to the Bill during its 
Parliamentary passage. This reveals that eleven out of the fifteen changes were 
substantial; and that nine of these eleven were liberal. But how many substantial 
liberal changes resulted from Parliamentary pressure? This is, of course, the key 
question.  
The final, most critical sixth step is an analysis of legislative strands, which will 
uncover how many Government changes responded to pressure from non-executive 
Parliamentarians rather than being at the Government’s own behest. The findings 
suggest that of the fifteen changes brought to the Bill during its Parliamentary 
passage, ten of these changes could be traced to some form of Parliamentary pressure, 
and all ten of these changes were liberalising. This is in spite of the Government being 
Table J  The Immigration Bill and the Immigration Act: a comparison of provisions  
    
Provision category  Immigration Bill (10.10.13) Immigration Act 2014 
    
  Count Share Count Share 
Liberal  0 0% 12 16.7% 
Restrictive  54 94.7% 56 77.8% 
Neutral  3 5.3% 4 5.56% 
‘Restrictiveness rating’  100% 82.4% 
TOTAL  57 100% 72 100% 
Note: the share is given as a percentage of all of the legislation’s provisions, 57 for the Bill, 72 for 
the Act. These may not add to 100% due to rounding. 
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the sponsor of fourteen of these fifteen changes.  Moreover, both of the two restrictive 
changes appear to have been solely Government initiatives.  
We therefore have persuasive evidence of Parliament as liberalist constraint. 
Furthermore, of the ten changes that evidence the UK legislature as liberalist 
constraint, seven were substantial in their effect; two were scope-changing, both 
narrowing the scope of restrictive provisions; and one was clarificatory. These findings 
are shown in Table K, with the changes to the Bill listed in the order in which they 
appear in the Immigration Act.  
These findings invite two caveats. First, we cannot say that the changes traceable 
to Parliament resulted solely from its pressure, as “it often provides the forum to 
negotiate changes that have been called for by others” (Russell et al., 2016: 297; my 
emphasis), such as the media and interest groups. Second, and more importantly, 
perhaps, although the painstaking amendment analysis developed at the Constitution 
Unit sheds valuable light on Parliament’s impact upon legislation, its creators caution 
that it may still fail to illuminate much of that influence, due to what has been called 
the “rule of anticipated reactions” (Russell et al., 2016: 289-290). As Russell et al. 
remark (2016: 289), “Legislative studies scholars have long emphasised that the 
‘reactive’ influence of parliaments can be less important than their ‘preventive’ 
influence”, as executive decision-makers anticipate the legislature’s likely reaction to 
proposals, and adjust them accordingly in advance of submitting them to the 
legislature. Studies of the European Parliament have confirmed the presence of this 
dynamic (e.g., Häge and Kaeding, 2007). Regrettably, this was not a subject of 
discussion with the few members of the executive interviewed for this study. 
However, it is fair to observe that, as Russell et al. suggest, any such research will be 
likely to underestimate Parliament’s influence (2016: 290, my emphasis).  
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Table K  The fifteen changes to the Immigration Bill: results of the six-step analysis  
      
 
 
Details of the change 
with comments Direction Substantiveness 
Traceable to 
Parliamentary 
pressure? 
      
1  Deleted provision via Government amendment(s) at Lords Third Reading, though first raised by non-Government 
Parliamentarians at Commons Committee:  
 
To provide a power for the Secretary of State to make regulations regarding the removal of family members 
(subject to the negative resolution procedure).  
 
Before its deletion, this provision granted the Government, specifically the Home Secretary, the power to produce 
secondary legislation specifying four procedural details related to the deportation of immigrants: who is a family 
member of an immigrant to be deported; the period within which such a family member may be deported; whether 
the family member is to be given notice of their deportation; and how (e.g., by letter). The deletion removed the 
delegation of the power to define a family member for the purpose of deportation and also limited the power to 
make regulations about the removal of family members to the period within which a family member may be 
deported, and whether the family member is to be given notice of their deportation. 
Liberal Substantial 
 
✓ 
      
2  Addition via Government amendment(s) at Lords Committee, though first raised by non-Government 
Parliamentarians at Commons Committee: 
 
Limits the detention of an unaccompanied child in a short-term holding facility to a maximum period of 24 
hours, either where directions are in force requiring the child’s removal from the UK, or a decision on 
whether to give directions is considered likely to result in such directions. 
Liberal Substantial ✓ 
      
3  Addition via Government amendment(s) at Lords Committee, though first raised by non-Government 
Parliamentarians at Commons Committee: 
 
Provides a separate legal basis for “pre-departure accommodation” as a place used solely for the detention 
of children and their families for a period of not more than 72 hours, or not more than seven days in cases 
Liberal Substantial ✓ 
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Table K  The fifteen changes to the Immigration Bill: results of the six-step analysis  
      
 
 
Details of the change 
with comments Direction Substantiveness 
Traceable to 
Parliamentary 
pressure? 
      
where the longer period is authorised personally by a Minister of the Crown. The Act makes clear that a 
short-term holding facility is not pre-departure accommodation. 
      
4  Addition via Government amendment(s) at Lords Committee, though first raised by non-Government 
Parliamentarians at Commons Committee: 
 
Prevents a child and their parent or carer living with them from being removed from, or required to leave, 
the UK for a period of 28 days after the family has exhausted any right of appeal. 
Liberal Substantial ✓ 
      
5  Addition via Government amendment(s) at Lords Committee; appears to be the Government’s sole initiative: 
 
Establishes the Independent Family Returns Panel as a statutory body (it had previously existed as a non-
statutory body), and places a requirement on the Secretary of State to consult the Panel in each family 
returns case on how best to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the family. 
Liberal Substantial  
      
6  Addition via Government amendment(s): at Lords Report, though first raised by non-Government 
Parliamentarians at Commons Committee 
 
Requires the Secretary of State to commission a report from the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and 
Immigration on administrative review within a period of 12 months from when section 15 of the Act comes 
into force. This is to address in particular the effectiveness of administrative review in identifying and 
correcting case working errors and the independence of persons conducting the administrative review. The 
Chief Inspector must send the report to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State must lay a copy 
before Parliament. 
Liberal Substantial ✓ 
      
7  Addition via Government amendment(s) at Commons Committee; appears to be the Government’s sole initiative 
(highlighted in boldface): 
Restrictive Substantial  
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Table K  The fifteen changes to the Immigration Bill: results of the six-step analysis  
      
 
 
Details of the change 
with comments Direction Substantiveness 
Traceable to 
Parliamentary 
pressure? 
      
 
Enables the Home Office to deport foreign criminals and those whose presence in the UK is non-conducive 
to the public good, who are appealing to stay in the UK on human rights grounds, before the appeal has 
been determined, unless they face a “real risk of serious irreversible harm” if deported. 
 
This change expanded the Government’s powers such that the Government would be able to deport not only 
“foreign criminals” appealing to stay in the UK on human rights grounds (as was initially proposed by the Bill), 
but also others whose deportation is deemed by the Home Secretary to be “conducive to the public good”. This 
change therefore broadened the class of persons subject to the ‘deport first, appeal later’ power under the Act. 
For that reason, this change could be viewed as scope-changing, but because it could substantially broaden the 
scope of the power, it has been classified it as being substantial. 
      
8  Addition via Government amendment(s) at Commons Report Committee, though first raised by non-Government 
Parliamentarians at Commons Committee: 
 
Added refuges to the list of property categories that would be exempt from the landlord immigration checks. 
Liberal Scope-changing ✓ 
      
9  Addition via Government amendment(s) at Lords Report, though raised by non-Government Parliamentarians at 
Commons Second Reading and Committee: 
 
Added a further exemption to the landlord immigration checks: residential tenancy agreements where a 
student has been nominated to occupy it by an educational institution. 
Liberal Scope-changing ✓ 
      
10  Addition via Government amendment(s) at Commons Committee; appears to be the Government’s sole initiative: 
 
Liberal Substantial  
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Table K  The fifteen changes to the Immigration Bill: results of the six-step analysis  
      
 
 
Details of the change 
with comments Direction Substantiveness 
Traceable to 
Parliamentary 
pressure? 
      
Enables the remit of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland to be expanded to provide for the oversight 
of certain persons exercising specified enforcement functions in relation to immigration, asylum and 
customs matters in the Home Office. 
      
11  Addition via non-Government amendment(s) at Lords Third Reading, and first raised by non-Government 
Parliamentarians at Commons Committee: 
 
Enables certain adults, notably those who were born abroad before 1 July 2006 to a British father who was 
not married to their mother at the time of their birth, to register as British citizens. Such persons include 
those who would have become British automatically had their parents been married at the time of their 
birth and those who would currently have an entitlement to registration but for the fact that their parents 
were not married at the time of their birth. 
Liberal Substantial ✓ 
      
12  Addition via Government amendment(s) at Commons Report; appears to be the Government’s sole initiative: 
 
Enables the Secretary of State to deprive a person of their British citizenship status – regardless of whether 
or not it will render them stateless – if all of the following apply: (1) the person has acquired citizenship as 
a result of naturalisation; (2) the person has conducted themselves in a manner seriously prejudicial to the 
vital interests of the United Kingdom. 
Restrictive Substantial  
      
13  Addition via Government amendment(s) at Lords Ping Pong, though first raised by non-Government 
Parliamentarians at Lords Second Reading: 
 
The Secretary of State can deprive a person of their citizenship under provision 12, above, only if the 
following condition is satisfied: the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is 
able, under the law of a country or territory outside the UK, to become a national of such a country or 
territory if their citizenship is so deprived. 
Liberal Substantial ✓ 
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Table K  The fifteen changes to the Immigration Bill: results of the six-step analysis  
      
 
 
Details of the change 
with comments Direction Substantiveness 
Traceable to 
Parliamentary 
pressure? 
      
      
14  Addition via Government amendment(s) at Lords Report, though first raised by non-Government 
Parliamentarians at Lords Second Reading: 
 
Duty regarding the welfare of children: For the avoidance of doubt, this Act does not limit any duty imposed 
on the Secretary of State or any other person by section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 
2009 (duty regarding the welfare of children). 
Liberal Clarificatory ✓ 
      
15  Addition and deletion via Government amendment(s) in the post-legislative pre-Royal Assent phase: 
 
Provides that the Act applies to England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, apart from Section 59 
and Schedule 6, which apply to England and Wales only.  
 
The words in boldface reflect a technical change to the Immigration Bill. In the first version of the Bill (published 
10 October 2013) they read “Section 53 and Schedule 5”. These designations were updated for the Immigration 
Act 2014 to reflect the new places of that section and schedule in the legislation. 
Neutral Typographical or 
consequential  
      
Summary 
 Changes via Government amendment(s): 14, of which 10 are traceable to non-Government Parliamentary 
pressure 
 
Changes via non-Government amendment(s): 1 
 
 
Liberal: 12 
Restrictive: 2  
Neutral: 1 
Substantial: 11  
Scope-changing: 2 
Clarificatory: 1 
Typographical or 
consequential: 1 
 
Traceable to 
non-Gov. 
Parliamentary 
pressure: 10 
(10 liberal, of 
which 7 
substantial, 2 
scope-
changing, 1 
clarificatory) 
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Sole Gov. 
initiative: 5 
(2 liberal, 3 
restrictive, of 
which 4 
substantial, 1 
typographical 
or 
consequential) 
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13 The legislature: the other liberalist constraint  
 
 
With this enquiry, I have sought to contribute to an understanding of the role of the 
national legislature in shaping the immigration law of liberal democratic states. My case 
has been the United Kingdom, with a focus upon a single set of proposals for reform: 
those of the Immigration Bill 2013-14, which culminated in the Immigration Act 2014. I 
framed this investigation in relation to the central preoccupation of researchers of 
immigration politics, namely the striking and near-universal ‘gap’ within Western nations 
between mass immigration and popular calls for immigration restriction.  
Responses to this vexing puzzle fall broadly into three camps. The first assumes that 
governments seek to reflect popular preferences for immigration restriction, but that they 
fail in their efforts, due to one or the other of the following reasons, or some combination 
of the two: first, there is a problem with the implementation of their measures to control 
immigration; and second, migration pressures are simply too great and liable to 
overwhelm even perfectly-implemented immigration laws. By contrast, the second 
approach posits that governments have in fact cultivated – not always openly – an 
expansionary approach to immigration. Any gap between public opinion and immigration 
patterns is thus not the result of states having ‘lost control’, as the first kind of argument 
posits, but is entirely consistent with their liberal objectives (Freeman, 1995a). The third 
approach is like the first in that it also assumes that governments are not ignoring their 
citizens, and generally try to honour the popular bent towards restrictionism. However, 
policy-makers are frustrated in their efforts by institutions and norms characteristic of 
liberal democracies: national judiciaries, international human rights norms, state 
bureaucracies, global capitalism, and supranational institutions. My approach fits into 
this third camp due to its consideration of whether that other core feature of the liberal 
state, the national legislature, might also constitute a source to liberalise immigration 
law, thereby contributing to the existence or widening of the ‘gap’.  
My principal objective has therefore been to uncover the precise nature of 
Parliament’s influence upon the proposals of the executive – the Coalition – and hence 
determine the importance of Parliament, as an institution, in British immigration law-
making. That objective revolved around a linchpin question of whether the UK legislature 
delimited the scope of the Coalition Government’s conspicuous restrictionism, thereby 
acting as a liberalist constraint. If we accept the United Kingdom as a ‘most-likely’ case 
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for having a pusillanimous and restrictionist legislature, and the evidence were to 
demonstrate that its Parliament did indeed act as an important liberalist constraint in the 
legislative development of the Bill, then we are able to draw inferences about the 
importance and bent of other national legislatures in immigration law-making. Put 
simply, if the UK has a legislature that acts as a liberalist constraint upon a restrictionist 
executive, then it is more likely that other national legislatures, which are argued to be 
more powerful and liberal than the British Parliament, will also act in this way. 
The findings that respond directly to these issues will be presented and explained 
presently. This conclusion begins, however, by describing the initial drafting process of 
the Bill. This speaks to a number of central debates in the literature, and also reveals a 
notable lack of Parliamentary impact in this pre-legislative phase. After this, we will turn 
to a detailed explanatory account of the Bill’s passage through both Houses of Parliament.  
   
 
The initial drafting of the Bill 
 
The Immigration Bill was shaped predominantly from within the Home Office, the 
ministerial department of the British government responsible for law and order, security, 
and immigration. There, the Bill was made by an institutional-political elite mostly 
comprising Government ministers, senior civil servants, and special advisors. These 
actors were largely insulated from the outside influence of other actors, including non-
executive Parliamentarians, although interviewees suggested that the Government 
(specifically, the Conservative part of the Coalition) was influenced by its leaders’ 
perceptions of voter opinion and of national newspapers. The latter were seen as being 
instrumental in swaying voters’ attitudes towards immigration and hence electoral 
behaviour.  
The impact of the populist press is thought to apply especially to actors within the 
Home Office because it is the dominant domestic affairs department, responsible for the 
control of activities considered socially harmful, including terrorism and crime 
(Consterdine, 2015b: 133). Such issues strike ‘closer to home’, both in the more literal 
geographic sense and because they are more emotionally resonant (as the POS framework 
of Koopmans and Statham would predict). For this reason, the Home Office attracts far 
more public interest than other departments, and hence, far more attention in the 
populist press.  
Interviewees, from both within and outside Government, were almost unanimous in 
their view that Theresa May, in her role as Home Secretary, was the main driver of the 
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Bill. However, the policy was also a multi-departmental project, with input from those 
departments with a particular interest in immigration law, notably: the Departmental of 
Health; the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills; and to a lesser extent Her 
Majesty’s Treasury, and the Ministry of Justice. I have not been able to explore in any 
depth this multi-departmental aspect of policy development, but I have seen enough to 
suggest that it is worthy of the greater attention that researchers have argued it deserves 
(Hampshire and Bale, 2014; Consterdine, 2015b). 
The bulk of the Bill was drafted backstage and so out of public view. Although I was 
not party to the activities behind the scenes, where the Bill’s provisions were 
brainstormed and designed, and in which they received their precise formulation, those 
who met with the Government at that time, as well as other interviewees, provided an 
outline of the process. They revealed that only a handful of individuals was involved, and 
that the Liberal Democrats had negotiated, as the Coalition’s “junior partner”, from a 
position of relative weakness in a policy area designated by the Conservatives as so 
important as to be ‘non-negotiable’. Here was a “red line” policy, revealed several 
interviewees, from across the political divide, on which they would not budge as part of 
a deal.   
From my investigation, I learned that the authorities most responsible for the nature 
of the Bill – Home Office ministers – were both reactive and creative with regard to policy. 
They were reactive in being sensitive to public attitudes and newspaper reportage on 
immigration. They were creative in the sense that they were the principals who 
formulated the legislation. They were not, as some scholars have suggested (Freeman, 
1995a, 1995b), essentially passive actors pushed about by external forces such as lobbying 
groups. Rather, Home Office ministers actively generated and championed certain issues 
and policy proposals. Moreover, this was not an atypical policy in this regard. Interviewees 
spoke in a way that revealed that they took for granted this exercise of power by 
government ministers.  
After initiating and designing the proposals that would later become the laws of the 
Immigration Act, these ministers – with the superior human resources possessed by the 
executive arm of government – then defended their proposals in Parliament. They did so 
with notable success, their original proposals being subject to moderate change by the 
Parliamentary process. In this particular case, this was in no small part due to the decision 
by the leadership of the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats not to oppose the Bill and 
its measures in Parliament. For Labour, said interviewees, this appears not to have been 
because they thought the Bill was good policy. Rather, it was because they believed that 
opposing it would be too unpopular with voters. As for the Liberal Democrats, in private 
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they opposed the Bill strongly, and backstage were effective in removing some of its more 
illiberal aspects, such as immigration checks within schools. However, their ability to 
oppose the Bill publicly and in Parliament was limited by their position as a minority 
Coalition partner and their prioritisation of other issues. As one interviewee said, their 
“hands were tied”: as Coalition partner, they occupied a position of relative weakness; 
had expended what political capital they had to ‘soften’ or remove some of the Bill’s 
‘toughest’ components; and were “wary of being seen to throw stones”. 
 
 
Enter Parliament: describing its legislative impact 
 
Yet the Bill was changed by the UK’s legislature, and in ways that were far more 
substantial than an engagement with the research literature would lead us to expect. This 
is because to ascertain the true nature of Parliament’s legislative influence requires that 
the analyst deploy a far more granular analysis than is implied by a focus upon what we 
may term direct legislative impact – an analytic tendency of earlier research (e.g., Martin 
and Vanberg, 2005). An analysis that examines only this form of influence would be based 
on formal amendment data, as is found in Hansard, the official record of Parliamentary 
proceedings. These data have three aspects relevant to the determination of direct impact: 
(1) the sponsor of each amendment, that is, whether the Parliamentarian or 
Parliamentarians that moved it are members of the Government or not; (2) the outcome 
of each amendment, that is, its success or failure, which refers to whether or not it was 
incorporated into the Bill; and (3) the House in which successful amendments were 
brought, whether the Commons or the Lords.  
In the case of the Immigration Bill, a survey of just these amendment data provides a 
clear but ultimately misleading impression of Parliament’s influence, critically 
underestimating it. It would reveal that across both Houses just two non-Government 
amendments were successful, with these brought in the Lords – thereby implying zero 
legislative influence for the Commons, and very limited impact for the Lords. However, a 
comparison of the provisions contained within the Immigration Bill and Act reveals a very 
different picture: that fifteen changes were brought to the Bill during its Parliamentary 
passage. The analysis of direct legislative influence would attribute all but one of these 
changes to the executive (those resulting from the amendments tabled by the non-
Government Parliamentarian, Lord Avebury). But that would be in error, as a more 
granular analysis of legislative strands shows, producing evidence to suggest that nine 
further changes, which resulted from Government-sponsored amendments, were offered 
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as Government concessions, in response to Parliamentary pressure. This means that in 
total, ten changes to the Bill may be traced, at least in part, to Parliamentary pressure, 
rather than being solely at the initiative of the Government – affecting around fourteen 
per cent of the legislation as a share of its clauses.  
This is no trivial proportion. Moreover, each of these ten changes was liberal in 
orientation, either softening the Bill’s solely restrictive provisions or introducing fresh 
measures to safeguard or extend immigrants’ rights. Even from this rough and 
impressionistic indicator, we are justified in concluding that the UK legislature 
constituted a liberalist constraint upon executive restrictionism.  
But how strong a constraint? Our metric says nothing about the more complex, 
nuanced qualitative nature of those eleven liberal changes.  In the main, these cannot be 
described as being of major or critical import, as these terms are intuitively understood. 
In fact, in the terms of my framework, most were substantial in their content – seven in 
total – while two were scope-changing, broadening the reach of liberal exemptions to 
restrictive provisions. This evidences Parliamentary impact far in excess of what one 
would expect from a legislature described as “a legislature on its knees” (Huhne, 2009; 
cited in Russell et al., 2016: 286), and “an elaborate rubber stamp” (Macdonald, 2009; 
cited in Russell et al., 2016: 286). 
In any case, even those changes which liberalised existing Bill provisions in less 
important, scope-changing ways may be substantial in their social impact, in that they 
apply to a nation of sixty-five million residents. That would appear to apply to both of the 
Bill’s non-Government liberal changes that alter the scope of provisions. Secondly, beyond 
their social implications, these impacts also have a broader political significance. They 
suggest that the power of the UK’s executive, which has argued to have increased 
markedly over the past twenty years, especially under the premiership of Tony Blair 
(Casey, 2009), appears to be far from total. 
These changes were brought about in substantial part by the most important (non-
Government) actor in immigration law-making, adjudged by legislative impact in this 
study: non-Government Parliamentarians in the House of Lords. Thus, this group of 
actors, non-Government Peers, were the principal agent of change for this particular Bill. 
The findings of this study revealed that the legislative influence of Peers derived primarily 
from their collaboration with expert external actors, who were almost all representatives 
of lobbying groups. Exchanges were conducted mostly via email, and over the course of 
the Bill’s development these could range from dozens to hundreds between individuals. 
Less quantifiable, but just as important, were Peers’ telephone conversations and face-to-
face meetings with outside experts and lobbyists.  
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Lobbying organisations were of two kinds: interest groups, such as the Residential 
Landlords Association (RLA), and promotional groups, such as Liberty. Interest groups 
are defined by their ability, or claim, to represent the interests of a particular category of 
person, such as landlords in the case of the RLA. By contrast, promotional groups 
endeavour to promote a particular cause, such as civil liberties and in the case of Liberty. 
However, not all lobbying groups fit neatly into one or the other of these categories. Most 
notably, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (ILPA) combines features of 
both, representing the interests of its members, mostly immigration lawyers, whilst also 
defending migrant welfare.  
These external actors provided Peers with expert guidance in the scrutiny of the Bill, 
and assisted them in drafting amendments or drafted them in their entirety. ILPA was a 
particularly important external actor in this regard. Alison Harvey, its Policy Director, co-
ordinated the scrutiny of lobbying groups, and provided the Bill’s critics, both inside and 
outside Parliament, with her expert legal evaluation of the Government’s proposals. In so 
doing, she helped to level a field that was markedly uneven in the distribution of human, 
and especially intellectual, resources between the Government and Opposition 
‘challengers’.  
I therefore accredit lobbyists with a less consequential role in immigration law-
making than does Freeman, who has argued that they are the principal force in shaping 
immigration policy- and law-making in liberal democratic states (1995a, 1995b 2006b). 
In observing that external actors influence policy primarily through their relationship 
with Parliamentarians, notably Peers, this study assigns lobbyists a dual role that has not 
been recognised in other studies, which have tended to consider only lobbyists’ direct 
impact upon Government actors (e.g., Hampshire and Bale, 2014). By contrast, this study 
assigns far greater importance to lobbyists’ indirect influence throughout the 
Parliamentary process via their symbiotic relationship with Parliamentarians and 
especially Peers. Lobbyists rely upon MPs and Peers for public advocacy: to argue and 
struggle on their behalf in the legislature in furtherance of these lobbyists’ interest. At 
the same time, Parliamentarians rely upon lobbyists to assist them in their legislative 
scrutiny, much of which requires highly specialist expertise.  
This speaks to arguments that locate the liberalist constraint in civil society groups 
and their struggles for rights. The persuasiveness of such arguments depends, observes 
Boswell (2007: 80-81), upon their adequate explanation of not only the mobilisation of 
societal groups, which is commonly accounted for by a struggle for justice and rights 
extension in contexts of social upheaval (Tilly, 1975; Giddens, 1985; Mann, 1995; cited 
in Boswell, 2007: 81); but also the more difficult question of what motivates governments 
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to respond to such mobilisation. Why should they heed the efforts of these ‘challengers’, 
which would appear to have no formal power over government elites?  
Historically, states have periodically extended rights to marginalised groups “in order 
to shore up legitimacy” (Boswell, 2007: 81). To this second question, the present enquiry 
points to another reason, which is that civil society groups operate through the 
legislature, via Parliamentarians sympathetic to their cause, who, in championing that 
cause in Parliament, compel governments to make concessions, for the same basic reason 
that any British government makes legislative concessions in Parliament: to prevent the 
Lords obstructing the Parliamentary passage of their legislative proposals and delaying, 
by up to two years, their enactment. 
 
 
Explaining Parliament’s impact 
 
In the House of Commons, the Government may be seen to have displayed a conspicuous 
lack of receptiveness to the criticisms of MPs and those of expert witnesses at the Public 
Bill Committee. This apparent obstinacy was facilitated by three institutional factors, 
which combined to ensure that the Government’s proposed legislation left the House of 
Commons without a single non-Government amendment:  
 
(1) The majoritarian ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system 
This meant that the ruling parties of the Coalition government had a majority in 
Parliament 
(2) The institutional design of Parliament  
Since the Government’s proposed legislation could be amended only by majority 
vote, this Government was able to outvote non-Government amendments.  
(3) Party discipline 
This was enforced by strong party whips, compelling most MPs to toe the party 
line.  
 
In this case study, the Government’s ability to enact a Bill that was substantially similar 
to its initiating legislation was eased considerably by the Labour Party’s refusal to vote 
against it. Added to this, there was little appetite for rebellion amongst Government 
backbench MPs. This meant that the Coalition’s majority in the Commons translated 
consistently into majority votes. The same conditions may be seen to apply in the 
subsequent Public Bill Committee, where there was always a Government majority 
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because the number of Members from each party reflects their proportions in the 
Commons. 
  In the House of Lords the situation proved to be quite different. Peers were more 
independent, more expert, and conducted a more robust scrutiny than did their Commons 
counterparts. Also significant was the presence in the upper chamber of a substantial 
complement of crossbench Peers, who do not have a formal party affiliation. In the words 
of one of the Peers interviewed, this meant that, “argument had an effect” to a 
considerably greater extent than was seen in the “other place”.  
Subject to no substantial limits on time, unlike those in the Commons, deliberations 
in the Lords were more extensive. Peers discussed over four times as many amendments 
as did MPs, being generally able to give each amendment its due attention. This 
contrasted with the high levels of amendment attrition exhibited by the lower House, 
which proved notably detrimental to the scrutiny carried out by its 
Members.  Furthermore, the Government was held more firmly to account at each of the 
Bill’s stages, from Second Reading through to Ping Pong. This was possible because the 
Government did not then – and does not now – enjoy a majority in the Lords. Additionally, 
it faced a substantial complement of more independent crossbench Peers, who profess no 
party affiliation. Consequently, its proposals were subjected to greater pressure, which 
ultimately compelled it to give ground and, through concessions, to liberalise its largely 
illiberal Bill. 
All but one of the ten liberal changes traceable to Parliamentary advocacy was brought 
formally in the Lords, but we would be wrong to conclude that MPs had no hand in them. 
In fact, nine were first raised as issues in Commons debates; and Peers revealed that this 
initial scrutiny proved to be a useful foundation for their own. From this, following 
Thompson (2015b), we ought not to presume that the role of MPs, especially Members 
of the Commons Committee, would be of very much less significance than that of Peers, 
despite first appearances.  
It was clear from this study that Parliamentarians, mostly Peers, working 
collaboratively with external actors, actively championed and generated new immigration 
law. In this sense, to describe legislators as merely a constraint would fail to capture the 
full extent of their activity and influence with respect to the Immigration Bill.  The British 
legislature did not act only as a check upon executive restrictionism, as implied by the 
term ‘constraint’. It did not function solely as a bulwark against immigration restriction. 
Rather, it constituted a wellspring of new legislative proposals to protect or enhance 
immigrants’ rights.  
The legislature: the other liberalist constraint  
 
 
269 
Ultimately, then, the UK Parliament did not serve as a neutral arena for the activities 
of political parties, MPs, or Peers. It is not a mere debating space. Nor does it function 
passively. But that is mainly due to the nature of the upper house. “The House of 
Commons is still more of an arena than a transformative legislature”, as King puts it 
(2009: 348).  
However, as is well known, the House of Commons ‘dominates’ the House of Lords. 
The latter can delay legislation through its continual amendment or its outright rejection, 
though for a maximum of only two Parliamentary sessions (i.e., about two years). 
Thereafter, the Commons can ‘force through’ prospective legislation for it to become law. 
In the case of the Immigration Bill, the Government was keen for it to be enacted in time 
for the elections to the European Parliament in May 2014. It was this time frame that saw 
the Government makes concessions in response to the Lords’ proposed amendments to 
the Bill. However, in this study, Peers then explained the reluctance of the Lords to vote 
for further amendments to the Bill at Lords Ping Pong or to reject the Bill outright. This, 
they said, reflected a long-standing and fundamental respect for the democratic legitimacy 
inherent to the fully-elected lower chamber. There is no formal rule forbidding Peer 
intransigence, so this general unwillingness to remain defiant against the executive is 
better understood as a Parliamentary convention. In relation to our POS explanatory 
framework, therefore, this would equate to the more informal dimension. 
In this study, the extent of Parliament’s legislative impact – and its principal source, 
Peers rather than MPs – was not regarded as unusual by interviewees. On the contrary, 
they suggested it was fairly typical. It would indeed be interesting in future research to 
ask how accurate is their judgement, and hence whether we are justified in using 
Parliament’s impact upon the Immigration Bill as a valid indicator of the UK legislature’s 
general capacity to influence legislation.   
 
 
The Lords: a quasi-judicial institution? 
 
To be able to justify this characterisation of the House of Lords, we will first need to 
consider the two central competing principles that guide political decision-making in 
liberal democracies and will inform our discussion. These principles derive from the long-
standing distinction in the analysis of British politics between representative and 
responsible government. It was Birch’s early contribution, Representative and 
Responsible Government (1964), that set the stage for an abundance of critical writings 
from the eighties onwards on the failure of the British political system to provide either 
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representative or responsible government (Gamble, 1990: 416). In these and later 
discussions, government decisions were viewed as broadly ‘representative’ when they 
reflected the interest and opinions of the public. Today, the word responsive is often used 
in place of ‘representative’, which has a variety of meanings in political analysis and is not 
in need of any more. This is why the more contemporary usage is adopted here.   
The term ‘responsible’ has been subject to many detailed and overlapping 
formulations, but in essence this adjective applies to when political decision-makers do 
not react only to immediate pressures, but pursue longer-term national interests, or what 
is considered morally right, even where a majority of the voting public would prefer 
otherwise. This kind of responsibility has elsewhere been termed “prudence” (Dunn, 
1991).  
“Almost everyone”, says Birch, “would agree that policy makers have a duty to take 
account of enlightened opinions and long-term interests as well as to respond to the 
immediate demands that are put to them” (1971: 112). The difficulty facing politicians 
is, of course, in knowing where to opt for one over the other. When ought they to 
disregard the demands of their constituency or the citizenry in favour of what is deemed 
to be the more responsible course? Sometimes, political leaders must take decisions that 
are unpopular. 
Thus, for the politician, the principles of responsiveness and responsibility are often 
in conflict. Perhaps the classic illustration of this was the abolition in the UK of the death 
penalty. That was a Parliamentary decision that did not have public support, and were 
there to be a vote today, polls suggest that the electorate would probably choose to 
reinstate capital punishment (Knowles, 2015: 5-6). Yet abolition was achieved in 1965, 
due to the acceptance by a majority of MPs “that the state just ought not to be in the 
business of taking human life” (Knowles, 2015: 5).  
The conflict between these opposing principles of political decision-making are 
doubtless exacerbated by there being multiple sources to which a policy-maker may 
respond, such that views of constituents might be at odds with the interests and 
preferences of the national electorate. Similarly, there are multiple criteria and competing 
standards for determining which courses of action are more or less responsible, such as 
an interpretation of the immediate public interest; longer-term national goals; procedural 
principles of ministerial office; party political considerations; or personal conscience.  
In truth, this is an age-old problem. It is captured in Dahl’s distinction between 
populist and Madisonian democracy (Dahl, 1956), as well as in the contemporary 
distinction between democratic and efficient government (e.g., Scharpf, 1999). Lord 
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Hailsham spoke plainly to this issue in a defence of his party’s particularly severe budget 
of 1962 (cited in Birch, 1971: 116): 
 
When a government has to choose between a run on the pound and its own popularity, 
it has only one choice it can make. It makes it unwillingly. It must face unpopularity, loss 
of by-elections and even, if need be, defeat at a later general election. This is the price of 
responsible government. 
 
A heavy price, one might think. Yet Lord Hailsham is not alone in prioritising 
responsibility above the avoidance of predictable political ruin. In contemporary political 
science, too, theorists have argued for the critical importance of an approach to 
democratic politics that avoids an overemphasis of responsiveness at the expense of a 
neglect of responsibility. On this point, a particularly effective polemic has been provided 
by Juan J. Linz with Thomas Jeffrey Miley (2012), in which the authors lament the 
tendency within democratic political theory to give far too much attention to 
responsiveness, and far too little to responsibility, an error, says Linz, with “grave 
consequences”. Particularly dangerous, says Linz, is the assumption (present throughout 
this thesis) that political elites ought to “mirror” public opinion, thereby entailing an 
abrogation of policy-makers’ responsibility, which, argues Linz, citing the US Secretary of 
Defense during the Vietnam War, Robert McNamara, led to the needless extension of 
conflict.   
In a similar vein, Gabriel Almond and Walter Lippmann famously argued that policy-
makers defy public opinion. On their account, which has been termed the ‘Almond-
Lippman consensus’, it was necessary for leaders to ignore public opinion because it is 
volatile, incoherent, and susceptible to manipulation (Lippmann, 1955; cited in Holsti, 
1992). Their last point might be thought to aptly describe the British public’s attitudes 
towards immigration, and it is one to which we shall soon return. 
Before turning our attention to the unique character and function of the House of 
Lords, which is the only unelected upper chamber in Europe, it will be helpful to examine 
first the way in which MPs in the present study negotiated these guiding principles? In 
justifying their preferences and decisions, these actors were quick to invoke their duty to 
respond to the demands of their constituents. They did, after all, elect them to their 
Parliamentary seats. In their interviews and in Parliamentary debates MPs explained their 
support of the Immigration Bill by reference to the concerns in their constituencies as 
well as broader national issues. This dual rationale was also evident in the executive-
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drafted supplementary materials to the Bill, both its Factsheet and Explanatory Notes 
(2013b).  
Peers, on the other hand, being unelected and beholden to no constituency, had a 
different appreciation of their political obligations. Formally insulated from populist 
pressures – they cannot be removed from office at the next (or any) general election – 
they were more likely to invoke the idiom of ‘responsibility’ in their opposition to the 
Bill. This understanding of the role of the House of Lords, as the chamber of responsibility 
rather than responsiveness, was made clearly by Baroness Lister, Professor of Social Policy 
at Loughborough University, when she stated at Lords Second Reading (Hansard, 10 
February 2014, col 492):  
 
The more unpopular the group, the greater the responsibility on your Lordships’ House 
to look dispassionately yet sympathetically at their needs and their rights. Many outside 
organisations which campaign tirelessly on behalf of migrants, refugees and asylum 
seekers are now looking to us to speak up on their behalf and to amend the more 
damaging provisions in this Bill. I hope that we will not let them down.  
 
The Lords are, moreover, sensitive to the Almond-Lippman consensus regarding the 
dangers of responsiveness, given that public opinion is so easily manipulated. This was 
implied by several Peers, and exemplified by Lord Dholakia, who argued in a speech to 
the Lords that (Hansard, 10 February 2014, col 436):   
 
The dangers of skewed public debate in the past few months are obvious. It has been 
characterised by hysteria and hyperbole, which makes rational discussion extremely 
difficult.  
 
Lord Paddick, a Liberal Democrat politician and formerly the Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service before his retirement in 2007, concurred 
with Lord Dholakia and drew attention to the “skewed public debate”, whilst adding 
(Hansard, 10 February 2014, col 511): 
 
There is no hope of considering this Bill objectively…if it is done against the distorted 
backdrop painted by UKIP, the Daily Mail and their sympathisers.  
 
We can now better appreciate why Peers, self-assured in the knowledge that they are 
appointed to their positions for life, doggedly and roundly opposed the Immigration Bill, 
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even though this might have been seen as running counter to popular opinion. It is 
perhaps for these reasons that the House of Lords appears to fulfil a unique constitutional 
role, acting not like the typical legislative body in conforming to popular opinion (Joppke, 
1998a), but more like a national judiciary, such as the Supreme Court of the United 
States. Of course, that is not to say that Peers have no regard for popular opinion. As we 
saw, their members appeared ultimately to respect the democratic legitimacy inherent in 
the elected House by choosing not to reject the Bill at Lords Ping Pong Furthermore, the 
same could be said for the judiciary, which is mindful of the rights of the citizenry, even 
when that means finding against the government.   
We are now able to address the matter reflected rhetorically by the title of this 
section, concerning the role of the Lords as a ‘quasi-judicial’ chamber that grants 
precedence to responsibility before responsiveness to public opinion. Given that the 
judiciary has been widely characterised as not representing a liberalist constraint on the 
restrictionism of the British executive (Joppke), could it be that the Lords acts in at least 
partial fulfilment of the judicial function? More specifically, to the extent that the Lords 
may be viewed as compensatory in its liberalist influence, might it make up for a relative 
lack of judicial power in the UK, thereby acting as a counterweight to rebalance the UK’s 
already executive-oriented distribution of constitutional power? These questions could 
well form the basis for fruitful future research. 
 
 
The role of the legislature in shaping immigration law:  
the broader significance of this study 
 
As we have noted, existing research has suggested that the national legislature has played 
a distinctly unimportant role in influencing Western democracies’ legislative efforts to 
restrict immigration in line with public preferences. Given that the UK’s legislature is 
typically understood to be only a marginal actor in immigration law-making, and in 
general one of the weakest of all legislatures, the findings of this thesis imply that the 
general view, as well as that relating to the UK, may have to be revised.  
National legislatures can reasonably be expected to constitute an important 
determinant of immigration law. More specifically, they may not necessarily represent the 
anti-immigration opinion of their constituents. As such, the possibility of their being a 
significant liberal influence should no longer be rejected a priori. Rather, researchers must 
remain open to the possibility of legislatures acting as a liberalist constraint upon the 
restrictionist bent of the executive, functioning neither passively nor as neutral arenas for 
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the activities of political parties and legislators, but as generative institutions of new 
immigration law. 
These are general conclusions of which researchers ought to remain cognisant in 
analyses of immigration law-making, in view of the evident liberalist influence of the UK 
Parliament, especially through the work of its upper chamber. On the basis of the United 
Kingdom being a ‘most-likely’ case for possessing a marginal and restrictionist legislature, 
this research provides empirically-grounded evidence that could be interpreted as either 
invalidating this view, or lending support for the contention that the legislatures of other 
nations may be both more influential, and more liberally-oriented in immigration law-
making than is presently understood.  
At the same time, we cannot presume that the legislature of any specific liberal 
democracy will exhibit such characteristics. These will need to be considered on a case-
by-case basis. That much is clear from this study’s comparison of each House of the 
bicameral UK Parliament.  
Thus, first, MPs who make up the House of Commons do appear, as elected 
representatives, to reflect the will of the citizenry for immigration restrictionism. Yet, we 
must also remember that most of the changes to the Immigration Bill were initiated by 
MPs, even though they were brought in the House of Lords.   
Second, few national legislatures will approximate the constitution of the House of 
Lords, which is the only upper chamber in the European Union, out of a maximum of 
twelve that are bicameral, which comprises unelected peers who are better insulated from 
popular pressures than their elected counterparts. Its reduced responsiveness to popular 
restrictionism allows it to exercise increased independence and responsibility relative to 
the Commons. In the absence of strong courts, Peers, especially crossbenchers, can be 
seen to assume a role to safeguard immigrants’ fundamental rights, as well as those of a 
more general constitutional and procedural nature.  
Finally, then, we cannot assume that the legislatures of Western Europe will exhibit 
the liberalist bent seen in the UK Parliament, which originated mainly from the House of 
Lords, rare in being a fully-appointed chamber. Much may depend, therefore, on the 
institutional design of these other legislatures and upon legislators’ understanding of 
their role. In future research, investigators would be well advised to include in their 
analyses a consideration of these potentially most pertinent of phenomena to an 
understanding of immigration politics. 
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14 Afterword: Parliament and Brexit 
 
 
Looking back from 2017, the reforms of the Immigration Act, then considered radical, 
now seem almost small beer. This is not the result of perceptual illusion. Today, the UK 
travels a road that is expected to end in the greatest tightening of its immigration regime 
since 1905, when the country first established a bureaucratised system of border controls. 
It certainly signals the greatest transformation in immigration regulation since the UK 
joined the European Economic Community in 1973 and opened its borders to some 250 
million European nationals. These anticipated reforms are, of course, those that will be 
influenced by the terms of the Brexit settlement. 
As things stand, the UK finds itself at a crossroads. To the left, access to the European 
Single Market entails the continued free movement of people between member states. To 
the right, a restrictive immigration policy – a principal reason many Britons voted Leave 
in the first place (Ashcroft, 2016) – would mean the UK’s withdrawal from the Single 
Market. Alternatively, there remains scope for a third way: an approach to immigration 
lying somewhere between these opposing paths of the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ versions of Brexit.  
Amidst this uncertainty, more than one year after the referendum, two things seem 
sure. First, whatever the terms of the settlement, its reverberations are likely to be long 
felt. Second, there is no turning back. 
 Or is there? Might the executive renege on its promise to honour the 51.9 per cent 
majority that voted to leave the EU? And what of the legislature? Might the UK 
Parliament continue to act as a liberalist constraint by obstructing the executive’s avowed 
intention to implement this most restrictionist of reforms? More specifically, might any 
such liberalist constraint emanate principally from the House of Lords, guided by its 
Peers’ understanding of their duty to prioritise responsibility above responsiveness? Nor, 
perhaps, should we neglect that third branch of government, our judiciary, as the legal 
case of Gina Miller would seem aptly to demonstrate.  
The ‘Miller case’ concerned the question of whether the British executive could 
trigger without the approval of Parliament ‘Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union’, 
thereby initiating the legal process of withdrawal. On 24 January 2017, the Supreme Court 
ruled in Miller’s favour. Reflecting a broader pattern of consternation among Brexit 
supporters, the Daily Mail responded with the following front-page headline, beneath 
photographs of three of the Supreme Court’s twelve judges: 
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ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE 
Fury over ‘out of touch’ judges who defied the 17.4m  
Brexit voters and could trigger constitutional crisis 
 
Nor did the British legislature escape the ire of the Daily Mail, concerned at the possibility 
of its scuppering the executive’s efforts to leave the EU: 
 
MPs last night tore into an unelected panel of ‘out of touch’ judges for ruling that 
embittered Remain supporters in Parliament should be allowed to frustrate the 
overwhelming verdict of the British public. 
 
What, then, might our study of the Immigration Bill tell us about Parliament’s role in the 
triggering of Article 50, this initial step on the two-year journey towards Brexit? Although 
set two years before the political earthquake of the Brexit vote, this research provides us 
with a helpful lens through which these struggles over Britain’s departure may be brought 
into sharper focus.  
On 26 January 2017, with the executive compelled by the judiciary to seek permission 
from the legislature to trigger Article 50, the Government introduced to Parliament 
the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill 2017. The Bill’s long title was:  
 
A BILL TO Confer power on the Prime Minister to notify, under Article 50(2) of the 
Treaty on European Union, the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the EU. 
 
At just 137 words, the Bill’s passage through Parliament was much faster than that of the 
Immigration Bill. After its First Reading on 26 January 2017, it received Royal Assent on 
16 March 2017, just thirty-nine days later. 
 Like the Immigration Bill, the legislation received the support of the Labour 
leadership. Jeremy Corbyn, a backbencher when interviewed for this research, but now 
leader of the Labour Party, stated: “I am asking all our MPs not to block Article 50 and 
make sure it goes through next week.” Just ten Labour MPs, out of a total of 230, voted 
Leave in the referendum (BBC News, 2016); and to ensure compliance, the party 
introduced a three-line whip, the strictest instruction to attend and vote in support of the 
Bill. Defiance could be expected to invite serious reprimand – even though just ten Labour 
MPs, out of a total of 230, voted Leave in the referendum.  
THE LEGISLATURE IN IMMIGRATION POLICY-MAKING 
 
277 
At the Bill’s Second Reading, which took place on 31 January and 1 February, the 
House of Commons voted by a substantial majority in support of the legislation, by 498 
to 114. Even though 346 MPs had voted Remain, a majority of these decided to support 
the Bill because, as many explained, they were democrats. They assigned supremacy to 
the democratic principle, to reflect the preferences of the national public and constituents, 
over and above their personal views.  
Reflecting the importance of the legislation, the next stage was a ‘Committee of the 
whole House’53. The programme was swift. The Commons Committee was scheduled to 
take place on 6, 7, and 8 February, with the Report and Third Reading stages also taking 
place on 8 February. Across all these debates, eighteen amendments in total were pushed 
to a vote. All were rejected – and by large margins. On 8 February, the Commons voted 
by 494 votes to 122 to progress the Bill, unchanged. 
However, on 1 March, at Lords Committee, the Government suffered its first defeat. 
The Lords voted to approve an amendment, by 358 to 256, which added to the Bill a 
requirement that the Government introduce proposals, within three months of the 
withdrawal notification, to ensure that the near-three million EU and EEA citizens legally 
resident in the UK would have the same residence rights after Brexit as before. A second 
successful amendment followed, one of pivotal significance from the perspective of 
constitutional politics. It granted Parliament a veto over the outcome of the Brexit 
negotiations.  
The Commons voted to overturn the Lords amendment guaranteeing the rights of EU 
nationals, by 335 to 287, a majority of 48. The second Lords amendment, to give 
Parliament a vote on the Brexit settlement, was also rejected by MPs, by 331 to 286, a 
majority of 45.  
The Bill was returned promptly to the upper chamber, its 137 words unchanged. Here 
was the crucial moment – for the Bill, for the commencement of Article 50, and for Brexit. 
Would the House of Lords assert itself against the Commons and insist on its 
amendments? Or would it back down, as it did for the Immigration Bill, and out of respect 
for the legitimacy of the elected house?  
Consonant with the findings of this enquiry, the Lords bowed to the democratic 
supremacy of the elected lower chamber. By substantial majorities, they accepted the 
Commons’ decision to remove the first amendment, by 274 votes to 135, and the second 
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amendment, by 274 to 118. This resulted mainly from the mass abstention of Labour and 
Crossbench Peers. Out of 202 Labour Peers, just twenty-one voted on whether the first 
amendment should be reinstated, nineteen of these against the wishes of the Commons. 
The second amendment division attracted the votes of twenty-six Labour Peers, twenty-
five of whom voted against the Commons. Of the 177 Lords Crossbenchers, 125 abstained 
from the first division, and 119 from the second.  
However, it was not solely out of respect for the greater legitimacy of the lower house 
that these Peers refused en masse to obstruct the legislation. As in the Bill’s passage 
through Parliament, Labour Peers had received instruction from whips. The Labour leader 
in the Lords, Baroness Smith of Basildon, explained the rationale for the party’s decision: 
continuing to oppose the Government would be playing politics because MPs would not 
be persuaded to change their minds. “If I thought there was a foot in the door or a glimmer 
of hope that we could change this bill”, said Smith, “I would fight it tooth and nail. But 
it doesn’t seem to be the case” (Mason et al., 2017).  
Even so, at the final Lords division – the last opportunity for the House to take a stand 
against the Commons – fully 669 Peers, out of a total of 804, decided not to obstruct the 
Bill, with 274 voting, in effect, to enact it without amendment, and with 395 choosing to 
abstain. Just 135 Peers, less than a quarter of those present, actively opposed the 
legislation, by insisting on the reintroduction of their amendment.  
That hardly speaks to the assertive upper chamber that has been documented in the 
present study. The question, of course, is why. What explains the Lords’ conspicuous 
failure to constitute a liberalist constraint at this crucial stage in the Brexit process? 
Especially vexing is the voting behaviour of the Crossbenchers. Why would these 
supposedly more independent Peers, bound neither by three-line whips nor party 
sanctions, remain quiet in the face of a bill to which many had displayed impassioned 
opposition? That is the foremost question.  
It is a question that only further empirical research could truly answer. By way of 
conjecture, however, could it be that in addition to a respect for the primacy of the House 
of Commons, a great many of these 669 Peers resisted their inclination to oppose the 
Government out of a sense of duty to the principle of responsibility. In so doing, they 
would be honouring a still higher principle, supreme in the hierarchy of the forms of 
democratic legitimacy, and hence superordinate to that represented by the elected lower 
house. Quite simply, as was argued by numerous Peers, irrespective of affiliation, in 
debates on the Article 50 bill, primacy would be given to respecting that which is 
immanent in the referendum result, namely – the will of the people. 
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Appendix: On-the-record interviewees 
 
 
Interviewee Affiliation (or position) Notes Interview date 
     
PEERS    
  
   
 Lord Best (Richard Best) Crossbench Appointed to a Peerage on the basis of his advocacy of social 
housing. 
23 Oct 2014 
  
   
 Lord Avebury (Eric Lubbock) Liberal Democrats Former Liberal Democrat MP for Orpington.  12 Nov 2014 
  
   
 Lord Judd (Frank Judd) Labour Party Former Labour Party MP and government minister. 24 Nov 2014 
  
   
 Lord Ramsbotham GCB, CBE 
(David Ramsbotham) 
Crossbench Former General of the British Army, and formerly Her Majesty’s 
Chief Inspector of Prisons (1995–2001). 
2 Dec 2014 
  
   
 Lord Hannay of Chiswick 
GCMG, CH (David Hannay) 
Crossbench Former British Ambassador to the UN. 3 Dec 2014 
  
   
 3
rd
 Earl Attlee (John Attlee) Conservative Party Lord-in-Waiting (Government whip in the House of Lords, with 
the same constitutional status as a departmental minister).  
3 Dec 2014 
  
   
 Baroness Lister of Burtersett 
CBE, FAcSS (Ruth Lister) 
Labour Party Professor of Social Policy, Loughborough University. 15 Dec 2014 
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 Baroness Barker (Liz Barker) Liberal Democrats Charity worker, Age Concern (1983–2007). 15 Dec 2014 
  
   
 Lord Pannick QC (David 
Pannick) 
Crossbench Barrister and Deputy High Court Judge. 6 Jan 2015 
  
   
 Baroness Hamwee (Sally 
Hamwee) 
Liberal Democrats Lead Home Affairs Spokesman for the Liberal Democrats in the 
House of Lords. Former chair of the London Assembly, and 
formerly a solicitor. 
26 Jan 2015 
  
   
MPS    
  
   
 Dr Julian Huppert Liberal Democrats The Liberal Democrats’ Spokesman in the House of Commons. 
MP for Cambridge. 
17 Oct 2014 
  
   
 Norman Baker Liberal Democrats Minister of State for Crime Prevention, with responsibility for 
defending the Immigration Bill at Commons Committee. MP for 
Lewes. 
3 Nov 2014 
  
   
 Jeremy Corbyn Labour Party Backbencher. MP for Islington North. 3 Nov 2014 
  
   
 Sarah Teather  Liberal Democrats Backbencher. MP for Brent Central. 11 Nov 2014 
  
   
 Meg Hillier Labour Co-operative Backbencher. MP for Hackney South and Shoreditch. 27 Nov 2014 
  
   
CIVIL SERVANTS    
  
   
 Liz Edmunds Former Immigration Service 
Administrator  
In this role, Edmunds interviewed immigration applicants at the 
UK border, including asylum seekers. 
6 Dec 2014 
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LOBBYISTS    
  
   
 Rachel Robinson Policy Officer, Liberty Non-practising barrister, background in immigration and asylum 
law. 
31 Oct 2014 
  
   
 Prof Vivienne Nathanson Director of Professional Activities, 
British Medical Association 
Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians; published author in the 
field of medical ethics. 
4 Nov 2014 
  
   
 Alp Mehmet Vice-chair, MigrationWatch UK Former British Ambassador to Iceland. 4 Dec 2014 
  
   
 Katharine Sacks-Jones Head of Policy and Campaigns, 
Crisis 
Former Parliamentary caseworker. 10 Dec 2014 
  
   
 Richard Price Board Director, National Landlords 
Association 
Negotiated with the Government to improve the landlord 
provisions of the Bill. 
12 Dec 2014 
  
   
 Alison Harvey Policy Director, Immigration Law 
Practitioners’ Association 
Non-practising barrister. Co-ordinated external groups’ Bill 
scrutiny. 
8 Jan 2015 
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